



The French Army crossing the Rhine in 1688. J. Parrocel

Army of the Rhine

The War of the Grand Alliance in Germany 1688-1697

Commentary

*M'sieu d'Turenne a dit aux Poitevins
Qui ont grand soif et lui demandent à boire
M'sieu d'Turenne a dit aux Poitevins
Aux champs d'Alsace il pousse aussi du vin
Et ce vin là pétille mieux
S'il est versé par madame la gloire
Et ce vin là pétille mieux
Lorsqu'il s'y mêle un flot de sang joyeux*

*M'sieu d'Turenne a dit aux Provençaux
Très désireux d'entendre les cigales
M'sieu d'Turenne a dit aux Provençaux
La poudre chante à l'heure des assauts
Dans l'air en feu vous entendrez
Autour de vous la musique des balles
Dans l'air en feu vous entendrez
Des cigalons de soleil enivrés*

*M'sieu d'Turenne a dit aux gars bretons
A qui les cloches donnent du courage
M'sieu d'Turenne a dit aux gars bretons
Morbleu ! Courez m'prendre ces canons !
Avec leur bronze l'on fera
De quoi sonner par-dessus vos villages
Avec leur bronze l'on fera
De quoi sonner lorsqu'on vous mariera*

*M'sieu d'Turenne a dit aux gens du roi
Qui marchent fiers sous les drapeaux de France
M'sieu d'Turenne a dit aux gens du roi
Levez la tête et tenez le corps droit
Aux jolis yeux sachez soldats
Mousquet au poing, faire la révérence
Aux jolis yeux sachez soldats
Quant aux boulets ne les saluez pas*

Chant de Monsieur Turenne

[The march, 'Monsieur de Turenne' is attributed to Louis XIV's court composer, Jean-baptiste Lully. The original score is probably much older. Bizet incorporated the melody into the drama, l'Arlésienne, but likely used a Provençal version which served as a traditional processional march in Christmas pageants. The words of the 'Turenne' version above were added by the Breton poet, Léon Durocher (1862-1918). They are not the only set of lyrics.]

Sources

Of all the theatres of this war, the Rhine has received the shortest shrift. As far as the old historians go, it's boring. So the new historians have nothing to sink their teeth into if they want to challenge the opinions of their forebears. In addition, since Germany was not a unified state at the time, there was no unified contemporary recounting of the historical details. Some states (read Bavaria) were too sloppy to even keep records. Fortunately, some memoirs survive.

Of these, the multivolume *Histoire Militaire du Règne de Louis Le Grand, Roy de France*, by the Marquis de Quincy, a brigadier in the French Army of Louis XV, is

very useful. His works cover the entire reign of the Sun King, so only volumes 2 and 3 are relevant. His perspective is naturally a French one. For the Germans there are the campaign biographies of Charles V of Lorraine, who led the war effort in 1689, and of Louis of Baden, also known as Türkenlouis, who commanded on the Upper Rhine from 1693-1697. The latter is quite detailed and serves as a good check on Quincy's work. In this text it is referred to as the B.H.K.

A recommended summary of events for the whole war is John A. Lynn's *The Wars of Louis XIV, 1667-1714*. It puts the war in context, and discusses each theatre of each war year by year. For background on the French Army, there is Lynn's *Giant of the Grand Siècle*. For the Germans, Peter Wilson's *German Armies: War and German Politics 1648-1806*, is somewhat technical but provides an understanding of how the Empire functioned militarily.

Mention must also be made of the maps reproduced on several of the pages herein. Most of the maps and diagrams were drawn by the author from original sources, but several pages depict the cartography of the Chevalier de Bourain. They are segments of a series of plates, the *Carte Topographique Du Cours Rhin Depuis Basle Justqua Mayence*, published in 1782 to accompany a book by the *comte* de Grimoard describing the campaigns of Turenne. The maps themselves date to 1675. Readers will understand why they were included here in their original form when they see them, but bear in mind the army positions which appear on the sheets have nothing to do with the Nine Years' War.

Dates

As always when writing about this time period, there is the danger of confusing Old Style (Julian calendar) and New Style (Gregorian calendar) dates. Hopefully, this author has managed to pick the right numerals — even some of his sources made clerical errors. OS dates were 10 days behind NS dates during the 1690s. New Year's Day was (in England at least) March 21, but nearly all historians use January 1.

The War of the League of Augsburg

“The possession of the Pfalz had long been the principal object of Louis’s ambition. The Pfalzgraf, Charles Louis, [had] been deprived of his inheritance by French intrigue... The capricious conduct of [Charles Louis’ consort], Charlotte of Hesse-Cassel, provoked a divorce, and he married Mademoiselle Louise von Degenfeld, by whom he had thirteen children, who, on account of the inequality of their mother’s birth, were excluded from the succession. Of his two children by his former wife, the prince died early, and his daughter, Elisabeth Charlotte, he was, in 1671, persuaded by Louis XIV to bestow upon Philip of Orleans, as security against all further attacks on the part of France. Louis’s insolence was, however, thereby increased, and, under pretext of Charles Louis’s having aided in again depriving him of Philippsburg, he demanded one hundred and fifty thousand florins by way of reparation and sent troops to Neustadt in order to enforce payment. Germersheim was declared dependent upon France, and the unfortunate elector, unsupported by the empire, died of chagrin, a.d. 1685.

Louis instantly claimed the inheritance for Philip, Charlotte’s husband, without regard to the right of the house of Wittelsbach. The German princes, who had unscrupulously deserted the imperial free towns and the nobility of the empire in Alsace, and the Dutch republic were, at length, roused by this insolent attack on their hereditary rights, and, entering into a close confederacy, formed, a.d. 1686, the great alliance of Augsburg against France. Even Maximilian of Bavaria, who, under the guidance of Marshal Villars and of his mistresses, imitated all the vices of the French court, saw his family interests endangered by the destruction of the Pfalz, ranged himself on the emperor’s side, and dismissed Villars, who, on quitting him, loaded him with abuse. The pope also, terrified at the audacity of the French monarch, once more pronounced in favor of Germany. Each side vied with the other in diplomatic wiles and intrigue. On the demise of Maximilian Henry of Cologne, William von Furstenberg, who had, by Louis’s influence, been presented with a cardinal’s hat, had been elected archbishop of Cologne by the bribed chapter and resided at Bonn under the protection of French troops. The citizens of Cologne, however, closed the gates against him and were aided by Brandenburg troops from Cleves and by the Bavarians. The election was abrogated by the emperor, the empire, and the pope, by whom Prince Joseph Clement of Bavaria was installed as archbishop of Cologne instead of the cardinal. The great league was, a.d. 1688, considerably strengthened by the accession of William of Orange to the throne of England in the place of his Catholic father-in-law, James II, who took refuge in France.

Louis XIV, foreseeing the commencement of a fresh and great struggle, hastened to anticipate the league, and, in the autumn of 1688, sent fifty thousand men, under General Montclas, into the Pfalz, which was left totally unprotected by the empire. The cities were easily taken; Treves, Spires, Worms, Offenburg, Mayence, and the fortress of Philippsburg, which offered but a short resistance, also fell. The electorates of Treves and Mayence were overrun and plundered. Coblenz and the castle of Heidelberg alone with stood the siege. Louis, meanwhile, unsatisfied with occupying and plundering these countries, followed the advice of his minister, Louvois, and, as far as was in his power, laid waste the Pfalz and the rest of the Rhenish and Swabian frontier provinces, partly to avenge his non-acquisition of these fertile territories, partly with a view of

hindering their occupation by a German army. Montclas and Melac, the latter of whom boasted that he would fight for his king against all the powers of heaven and of hell, zealously executed their master’s commands...”

Menzel, Wolfgang. Germany From the Earliest Period, Vol. III. Translated from the 4th Ed. Colliers, New York, 1849, pp. 1190-1192.

Thus wrote the great 19th Century German historian, Wolfgang Menzel. Just be aware he was a German Nationalist and Conservative (he was opposed to the Revolution of 1848), caught up in the dream of unifying Germany under a single strong monarchy. That said, his take on the outbreak of the war is quite accurate. But, there was more to it.

Careful readers will notice the reference to Germersheim and how it was made into a tiny French protectorate. Individual towns and cities were often traded in this manner. What the possessor gained was the revenues of all the dependent farmlands, hamlets, villages, and occasionally castles of said town or city. The actual town or city usually retained its ancient privileges and independence. Church property was rarely subject to deals like this. Fortresses like Philippsburg, built by the prince-bishop of Speyer, were a different matter, but even some of them, like Strasbourg, while having an occupying garrison, retained their local civil administration. Fortresses were problematic. Large garrisons cost money and there came a point when it was not worth acquiring a new fortress solely because it controlled the movement of armies. It had also to control a trade route. In other words, it was not only a matter of strategic positioning, it was a matter of revenue. Loss of revenue is one of the reasons why the League membership opposed King Louis.

The League of Augsburg was a project of the Holy Roman Emperor Leopold I, ostensibly aimed at countering French aggression, as Menzel describes, but with a secondary aim — to bring the northern and western German princes back into the Imperial fold, from which they had been straying since the Thirty Years War. On this occasion Leopold was able to leverage the German princes’ fear of French domination. Having done so, however, he then had to contend with their fear of his own domination. Created in 1686, the League was already defunct by the time war broke out in 1688.

The main signatories to the League were the Emperor, the King of Spain, the King of Sweden, and the Electors of Saxony, Bavaria, and the Palatinate of the Rhine. In the main, these were states worried more about the growth of North German power than of French aggression. France was merely a stalking horse. The French were always going to be a disturbing force in Europe and no defensive league would put an end to them. True, Spain and the Palatinate had some direct concerns, but Bavaria and Sweden (still technically a Continental Power) often used the French as a

counterweight to Habsburg ambitions and were on reasonably friendly terms with them. Even the Palatinate was heavily influenced by French 'soft power'. Saxony, though a North German state, was an opportunist, and its joining the league was solely due to some tricky manoeuvring by the Emperor. He was rather pleased to have driven a wedge into the North German bloc. As for Leopold himself, he knew full well the French had no greater ambitions than to nibble away at the Imperial border to enhance their own security. Let them... at least for now. After nearly losing it all at Vienna in 1683, Leopold had the Turks on the ropes; all he cared about was taking them to the mat. But to do that, he needed the backing of the Imperial princes, which he would not get if the North Germans gained too much leverage.

What of the French? They of course, wanted to project their soft power as far east as possible, but they did not want to conquer Germany. It is sometimes said they wanted to keep the Germans disunited. This was often said, forcefully, by 19th Century German Nationalists. But, in the 17th Century no one in France feared the Germans would unite. Rather, the French simply wanted to have influence with as many of the European states as possible. Better them than the Emperor, or Sweden, or Russia, or England, or Denmark, or...

In that case, why did war break out? Well, Louis XIV of France was predisposed to use war as a tool of foreign policy and as a means of enhancing his *Gloire* (his 'ambience' on the world stage). Also, he had a large reservoir of noblemen who needed an occupation. Also, insults had to be avenged — some points of honour could only be resolved by the sword. The mindset of the age and the tangle of interests in Europe meant one or more wars were always likely to break out. But this one went on far longer than originally intended.

John Childs, in his *Nine Years' War and the British Army*, argues that it is false to assume the French, let alone other contemporary powers, had an overarching grand plan, or even a coherent policy. He points out that the governmental institutions necessary for such things did not exist, and that the only guiding principle was King Louis' thirst for *La Gloire* tempered by the pushes and pulls of courtiers and departmental heads with their various schemes, the actions and reactions of his opponents, and gut feeling, the last a mix of fear and impatience.

However, some concrete reasons for the war can be given:

1) What might be labeled the 'Vauban Clique' pushed strongly throughout the last decades of the century for the 'rationalisation' of France's borders. These must be fixed on the Pyrenees, Alps, and Rhine. This logic led to, where possible, the acquisition of territory in the old Burgundian and Lotharingen lands — Alsace, Lorraine, and points north. This policy dovetailed with;

- 2) Old business, covering everything from the House of Bourbon's pathological hatred of the Spanish Habsburgs, to William of Orange's pathological hatred of Louis XIV, to unsettled minutiae from the 1670s Dutch War.
- 3) There were also a variety of personal questions involving the House of Bourbon. Three examples are, King Louis championing the exiled English King, James II; French sponsorship of one of the candidates for the Electorate of Cologne; the settlement of certain dowry issues for Louis' brother, the *duc d'Orléans*.
- 4) These matters could be better resolved if the Emperor remained distracted with his Turkish war. Unfortunately, the Ottomans were on the verge of folding. This (plus trading privileges) is a key reason King Louis switched from aggressive diplomacy to war, but point #3 was of greater personal value.
- 5) And, with regard to Spain, her own succession crisis. Which was of little immediate import when war broke out, but loomed large as it drew to a close, eclipsing some of the original reasons for the war and influencing the nature of the Peace.

Hard Borders

Louis' famous siege-master, Sébastien Le Prestre, *marquis de Vauban*, advocated 'rationalising' France's borders by annexing territories along the Rhine and the natural routes into and out of the nation, such as the Moselle. Most of the key positions already had fortifications; if they did not, fortifications were to be constructed. This strategy of 'aggressive defence' naturally threatened France's neighbours, because securing the gates to France meant that armies could pass out of the country, as well as in...

The Treaty of the Pyrenees settled the Franco-Spanish border once and for all in 1650. When war did come to the border in 1689 the Catalans, as ever opposed to the Castilian government, ensured French military force was projected into Spain and not the reverse. Among the Alps France enjoyed, or thought she enjoyed, a similar situation *vis á vis* the Spanish at Milán, because of their loyal vassal, Victor Amadeus of Savoy. In 1690 he proved them wrong, but as in Spain, the French almost always retained the upper hand. In the North, France was in proximity to hostile powers, but before the war England had been a secret ally, the Spanish Netherlands (Belgium) lacked the power to do anything, and Holland was riven by faction. French diplomacy skilfully turned the Spanish Netherlands into a buffer against the rising power of the formerly Spanish Dutch provinces, and used a powerful pro-French faction within Holland to threaten the rear of the Spanish Netherlands.

This left the valley of the Rhine. Alsace was already in French hands, the river secured by a string of observation

redoubts and all the key crossing places on the Upper Rhine were in their hands — save for Mainz, which was a problem. Lorraine, too, the Saar, and Deux Ponts (Zweibrücken in German) were French. Alsace was purely German in composition, but the Alsatians seemed to prefer French to Imperial rule. Lorraine and its neighbours were half-French, being the remnants of the old Kingdom of Burgundy, thus fairly secure. The House of Lorraine still lived, however, and for them, the French Occupation was a *casus belli*. North of Alsace the western half of the Palatinate was *not* in French hands, but it was usually under French influence, and the French controlled the high ground, from the Vosges to the Moselle River.

There was still a gap in the line between the Meuse and the Moselle rivers, filled by Luxembourg and Trier, with Cologne farther east. Luxembourg was owned by Spain but had no military power beyond a tiny garrison administered from Brussels. Occupying Luxembourg brought France's enemies little benefit because she held the line of the Meuse and Moselle and the Ardennes had never, throughout recorded history, been a place suitable for a westward offensive. If the French occupied it, however, they would have a base to threaten the open flank of the Netherlands, both Spanish and Dutch, and the rich plains of the Lower Rhine. The French did occupy it, bringing about Spanish involvement in the war, but they considered the price worth the risk.

The Princes of Guise and Vaudemont

The Houses of Lorraine and Habsburg would not be bonded by marriage until the 1730s. The dynasty was French in origin, its founder a Count of Paris. But that was in the days of Charlemagne, when France and Germany were one. The Emperor Henry III awarded the original branch of the family Metz and Upper Lorraine (also known as the Duchy of Lorraine), which was the base of their power, though this branch is known to history as the House of Alsace.

It was at the time of the French Wars of Religion, in the latter half of the 16th Century, that the junior branch of the family, known as the Guises, became prominent. Indeed, when Henry III was King of France, a Guise very nearly succeeded him. Mary, Queen of Scots, too, was a Guise, not a Bourbon.

Meanwhile, the elder House of Alsace had waned, to be replaced by another junior branch, that of Vaudemont, also Dukes of Bar. By Louis XIV's reign, the independent power of the Guises had been crushed in the Wars of the Fronde and they remained loyal vassals of the French King under their senior nobleman, the *duc* d'Elbeuf (whose name can be found in the list of Louis' generals).

In contrast, Vaudemont, otherwise Charles V of Lorraine, was forced by Bourbon designs on his lands to go into exile at Vienna. The duchy was annexed by France in 1669/1670. (It was returned to Vaudemont's heirs in 1697,

being awarded to France permanently in 1766 by a convoluted series of events.) Vaudemont never ceased in his efforts to harness Imperial backing for a *Reconquista* and was eventually given his chance in 1689. Unfortunately he died the next spring of a long standing illness.

Though Emperor Leopold was not one to tilt at windmills (unless they were occupied by Turks), he was sympathetic to Vaudemont's plight. The French occupation of Lorraine was a contributing factor to the Nine Years' War, if not a critical one.

Alsace

Alsace is often lumped in with Lorraine but that is because of the Unification of Germany in 1871. Though also part of the old dominions of Lothringia, it had a history of its own. Shown on maps as a solid block of land, in reality it was a patchwork of feudal properties and free towns, of which the most famous grouping was the Decapole, or Ten Cities. It was also known for its (comparative) religious tolerance. The fertility of the land and the prosperity of its trade led the Western Franks to covet Alsace from the moment it broke away from Charlemagne's empire. Its fragmentation made conquest (if not occupation) easier. There had been several French occupations, to which the existence of a few French enclaves bore witness.

Though it passed to the old Kingdom of Burgundy at one point, Alsace was normally a part of the Holy Roman Empire, quickly being absorbed by the Duchy of Swabia after the contraction of the Kingdom of Lotharingia into its own duchy during the late 800s.

In 1617 the Spanish Habsburgs made a secret treaty with their Austrian relatives allowing them transit across Alsace — the Spanish Road that supplied their armies in the war with the Dutch. In 1639 the French broke the vital link by again occupying Alsace. This time, they stayed. By the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) France was given Upper and Lower Alsace, except for a few small territories, such as Mulhouse, which had joined the Swiss Cantons. 'Upper-Upper Alsace', the Sundgau, next to the Swiss border, had been sold to France by the impecunious Austrians in 1646 — the bulk of Alsace being the personal property of the Habsburgs and not merely a state under their dominion. The end of the Dutch War in the 1670s placed most of the remaining free towns, like the Decapole, under direct French rule.

Alsace remained an anomaly, at least in the eyes of French bureaucrats, and was governed much like a province of the Empire. King Louis held sovereignty and enjoyed the tax revenues, but local laws and customs were still enforced. The French customs border, for one thing, was not advanced to the Rhine, but remained on Alsace's western border. Thus more trade was done with the Empire than with France. The University of

Strasbourg still catered to German students. German remained the primary language of administration.

Moreover, when Louis issued his revocation of the Edict of Nantes, Alsace received an exemption, though a program of 're-Catholicisation' was introduced. Strasbourg, the premier city of Alsace, long remained a free city. King Louis had to treat it with kid gloves. Protestant since the Reformation, its cathedral was given back to the Catholic Church, but that was all. In 1681 the French put a garrison in the city, contrary to the privileges granted by the city charter. This caused an uproar in the Empire, but again, the city was otherwise allowed to function with minimal interference by the new military governor.

During the war, Lower Alsace would become a target for Imperial raiding forces and a source of labour for the French military, leading to a certain amount of depopulation. Though a German region, it appears that many of the Alsatians either supported the French or at least made no trouble. There was some guerrilla fighting and a great deal of espionage, but some of the partisans and spies worked for the French, crossing the Rhine to do their mischief in Baden and Württemberg. Tens of thousands of labourers worked on French fortifications, not all of them by coercion. As in so many instances, this 'loyalty' may have come down to the fact that Alsace was a Protestant realm. The French king, ironically enough, tolerated their faith, after a fashion, which is something the Habsburg former owners would never do.

Old Business

The Franco-Dutch War

With respect to the Nine Years' War the Dutch War of the 1670s falls under the category of Old Business. The fighting between Spain and France had continued after the end of the Eighty Years War, and the Spanish Netherlands had become a haven for enemies of the Bourbon House, like the Guises of the House of Lorraine. Therefore, from the 1660s, once the Fronde had been crushed, King Louis became convinced that the only way to achieve a secure northeastern frontier was to eradicate the Spanish Netherlands. The Dutch did not much care for this idea. There is a reason Belgium has remained a separate entity for so many centuries. Getting rid of that buffer made them uncomfortable. And so, they began supporting their recent enemies, the Spanish.

In the War of Devolution (1667-1668) the French overran most of the Spanish Netherlands and had to be forced to relinquish it by a Dutch-English-Swedish political combination. This led to a second round of fighting, known as the Dutch War or Franco-Dutch War. First, French diplomacy detached Sweden and England from the combination. Sweden even agreed to attack Brandenburg if it tried to intervene, and England went so far as to supply the French with a corps of 6,000 men.

(This was one reason William of Orange had no qualms about deposing his father-in-law.)

The conflict became something of a precursor to the Nine Years' War, following a similar pattern. A short blitzkrieg against a limited target turned into a widespread attritional grind all along France's northeastern and eastern frontiers. Ultimately, the French were everywhere successful. Spain and Holland lost power and influence, Spain the more so and Holland imperceptibly, while France was acclaimed as the preeminent European power.

But why did the French attack the Dutch directly? Partly because they were the main prop to the Spanish in the region. Their army, not the Spanish, was the one to beat. And, partly, because the Republican faction under Johan de Witt acted provocatively. They were annoyed at the high tariffs the French were charging on Dutch goods. Also, Louis, an Absolutist monarch, despised republicans, viewing them as a political cancer.

Spain was the primary target, though. Holland received her captured territories back, and even gained tariff reductions, which pleased the Republicans, who did not much care for the House of Orange. William, of course, became Louis XIV's implacable foe when de Witt shut him out of the halls of power, but one cannot make an omelette without breaking eggs. Meanwhile, the Spanish lost Franche-Comté and several towns near the Franco-Netherlands border, such as Dinant and Courtrai. In practical terms, the Dutch War meant the French frontier was advanced well into the Spanish Netherlands. As a counterweight the Dutch obtained permission from the Spanish to garrison some of the more vital towns, like Mons, to act as a tripwire. The French would not be able to make war on Spain without making war on Holland.

The loss of Franche-Comté was probably the biggest alarm bell for the Empire. French encroachment in the North made the North German princes, and particularly Brandenburg, nervous, but at the same time many of those princes were pro-French, particularly Brandenburg. (This was factored into French calculations for their future projects.) It was also unclear if King Louis desired more territory in the north — probably not. On the other hand, the French acquisition of Franche-Comté, the heartland of the old Burgundian Kingdom lying against the western face of Switzerland, meant they now held the line of the Rhine from the Swiss border nearly as far as Mainz, without having to worry about enemy territory in their rear.

War of the Reunions

The War of the Reunions (1683-84) was an attempt to mop up unresolved issues from the Dutch War, to further Rationalise the Frontier, and to settle some Dynastic Issues. It also spurred the formation of the League of Augsburg. The French took advantage of Emperor Leopold's preoccupation with the Turks after the Relief of

Vienna in 1683; if the Emperor had been paying attention they would have been less likely to start a war.

The 'Chambers of Reunion' were special land commissions set up by King Louis to determine if his neighbours had truly ceded to him all the territorial gains he felt entitled to. These French-sponsored commissions naturally ruled that France was owed certain additional lands, most of which then changed hands without issue. This was because the lands in question were primarily districts affiliated with towns and cities which the French already controlled — as noted in the opening of this commentary, swapping urban population centers was a common affair, but one was supposed to receive the surrounding districts as well. King Louis had some justification for feeling cheated when he acquired towns and no land to go with them.

There were two contested claims: the vital fortress of Strasbourg, which both served to protect the newly acquired province of Alsace and acted as a bridgehead on the Rhine, and the Spanish-owned City of Luxembourg, which played a similar role *vis á vis* French gains in the Low Countries.

In the case of Strasbourg, the *city* was independent while the French controlled the surrounding lands. Without control of the city, though, those lands were unprotected. The Imperials had used the Rhine crossing at Strasbourg three times during the Dutch War. Thus, the French sought ownership of Strasbourg itself. This they did through a military occupation in 1681 which left the actual governance of the city in local hands.

In the similar case of Luxembourg, King Louis ordered its taking by a blockade and terror bombardment in 1681-1682. Operations dragged on, though, and in 1683 Louis' conscience got the better of him. He was persuaded that it would be Un-Christian to fight the Empire while the latter was engaged in a life-or-death struggle with the Turks. Only when the siege of Vienna was lifted later that year did the operation recommence. By then, Spain, the owner of Luxembourg, had declared war on France. This played into French hands. They blockaded and took Courtrai and Dixmude, and conducted a formal siege of Luxembourg City. A truce was signed (the Truce of Ratisbon) in August 1684. The truce was supposed to last twenty years. It lasted four.

This short war produced some ominous precedents. First, it rapidly expanded beyond its original scope when the Empire got involved. The French also conducted a major operation to punish Spain's bankers, the City of Genoa, destroying two-thirds of the city with a massive naval bombardment. And, the war was marked by greater than usual brutality. The French War Minister, Louvois, ordered the destruction of 20 villages in reprisal for the burning of two French barns.

Personal Issues

D'Orléans' Dowry and the Kurpfalz

The Kurpfalz, or the Electoral Palatinate of the Rhine, was at the very center of the Nine Years' War. In citing the Reunions as a *casus belli* and calling them the 'rounding out of France's defenses by the acquisition of a few small properties', let it be known that the very *large* territory of the Palatinate was one of those properties. More specifically, half the Palatinate — the French never attempted to annex the lands on the right bank of the Rhine.

What is a Palatinate, anyway? The term is a Late-Roman administrative one, and means a territory governed by a Count (*comitatus*) Palatine, in German, a *pfalzgraf* or *palsgrave*, and in plain English, a Count of the Palace. A *pfalzgraf*, who ranked higher than a regular *graf* or count, was originally a royal official sent out as military governor and personal representative of the Emperor. Charlemagne's predecessors, the Merovingians, borrowed the practice from the Romans, appointing roving palace officials to ensure loyalty in distant territories rather than relying on the good faith of the local nobility.

The Counts Palatine of Lotharingia were always the most important of these officials, because Lotharingia was the center of Merovingian, and later, Carolingian power, their dynastic capital being at Aachen. By the Middle Ages, such offices were hereditary, either because they had been distributed as rewards among the various feudal dukes, or because the royal officials had married into ducal families. In the 10th Century, the office was held by the Ezzonid family (who, like the later Neuburgs, had Imperial marriage ties). Their office covered Upper Lorraine, but their own lands were in Franconia, extending west to Bonn and Köln, and the Moselle and Nahe Rivers. Due to conflicts with the archbishops of Cologne, the family shifted its holdings south of the Moselle.

By the 11th Century Lotharingia was no longer an entity of any importance, and indeed the whole Counts Palatine concept had fallen into disuse. But the ruler of the lands, whatever his family, continued to be styled THE Count Palatine, and his lands were styled the County Palatine of the Rhine. The capital was alternatively at Bacharach, Mannheim, or Heidelberg, this last being the case at the time of the Nine Years' War.

The Ezzonids died out, to be replaced by a follower of Emperor Henry IV, one Heinrich von Laach. The Emperor clawed back much of the original lands, but awarded new holdings, shifting the center of the Palatinate southward. Laach was the first of a new style of Counts Palatine. As in olden days the office once again became open to appointment, until in the mid 12th Century Conrad, half-brother of Barbarossa, took it over. Conrad already had many other territories belonging to the Hohenstaufens,

such as parts of Swabia and Franche-Comté, so that there came to be a distinction between the Upper and the Rhenish Palatinates.

The Hohenstaufens did not last long, losing the Palatinate to the Welfs at the end of the 13th Century. When they were dispossessed the Hohenstaufen Emperor, Frederick II, did not reclaim the lands but awarded them to the South German Wittelsbachs. The Wittelsbachs were already dukes of Bavaria. In the 13th Century their elder line concentrated their power in Bavaria, which included the Upper Palatinate, while a junior line occupied itself with the conglomeration of lands known as the Palatinate of the Rhine, or Lower Palatinate. There was some intermingling of possessions — this *is* the Holy Roman Empire, after all.

The title may have been nominal, but the granting of it to all these powerful princes shows the position was still coveted. The *pfalzgrafs* were also Electors of the Empire and Imperial Vicars, senior administrators who, in a pinch, had the authority to run the Empire. No surprise then that the Counts Palatine married into the Imperial dynasty. This role made their conversion to Protestantism all the more dangerous, as was demonstrated when the Elector Palatine Frederick V, the Winter King, attempted to become King of Bohemia — in the Emperor's eyes a clear bid for the Empire itself — sparking the Thirty Years War.

The Palatinate became a Lutheran territory as early as 1530, then transitioned to Calvinism, even as the elder line of the Wittelsbachs remained staunch Catholics. This Calvinist line was known as the Simmern branch. The Winter King was stripped of lands and electoral rights, which were given to Bavaria. This is how Bavaria became an Electorate. Frederick's son, Charles Louis, was granted a truncated part of the family lands — the Lower Palatinate only — and given a new electoral rank, the most junior in the Empire.

The reader is probably aware of Frederick's connection with the English royal family, but his line also became connected to the House of Bourbon, which is of great significance to the Nine Years' War. In 1670, the daughter of the Elector Palatine married Philippe, *duc d'Orléans*, Louis XIV's younger brother. Louis considered this sufficient reason to claim the territory.

The Simmern line died out in 1685, giving Louis XIV the justification he needed. But, in making his claim, Louis butted heads with Philipp Wilhelm of Neuburg, the replacement Elector. Let it be noted that one of Neuburg's daughters was married to the King of Spain, and another to the Emperor. If one deliberately ignores King Louis, then blame for the coming years of war can be laid at the feet of Philipp Wilhelm. When Louis' emissaries told him to pay up he responded with the polite 17th Century version of 'make me'. Which was the wrong thing to say to the Sun King. His obstinacy led the French to conclude

that a systematic campaign of terror was required to ensure the other German princes never contemplated similar defiance. In company with the common military tactic of wasting frontier lands, the Palatinate was to be turned into a desert. In 1697 one of the concessions King Louis made was a renunciation of his claim, but by then the Palatinate was not a place anyone particularly wanted to own.

[Neuburg was also Duke of Jülich and Berg, which is why King Louis ordered those lands ravaged as well, spooking Brandenburg, who owned the adjoining lands of Cleves and Mark.]

In 1690, Philipp Wilhelm died. His son, Johann Wilhelm, camped out at Düsseldorf, his birthplace. In 1697 King Louis allowed him to repossess his devastated lands. Johann should not be painted as a lily-white martyr, however; after the war he forced his subjects to convert to Catholicism. (Mind you, that was one of King Louis' stipulations.)



[Phillip (left) and Johann (right) von Neuburg.]

Trier, Mainz, Speyer, Worms

Intermingled with the lands of the Palatinate were several important ecclesiastical territories, the Electoral Archbishoprics of Cologne, Trier, and Mainz, plus the Bishoprics of Speyer and Worms. The rulers of these states had a great deal of influence within the Empire, making them a target for French soft power, or if that did not work, hard power. Each one, like the Palatinate, straddled the Rhine. Ecclesiastical lands, however, were not for the likes of secular kings. France might occupy the left bank of the Rhine during a war, but would not (probably) annex these territories. Doing so would incur the wrath of both Emperor and Pope.

Cologne will be discussed a little later. Two other territories, Würzburg and Münster, also deserve a mention because they were important bishoprics which played valuable roles during the war, but they were not on the front lines. Münster's prince-bishop was a warlike fellow who actively supported the Coalition against France with several thousand soldiers. Würzburg also supplied some troops, but had a greater role in the political sphere.

The Archbishop-Electors of Mainz were probably the most important figures under discussion here. They were Arch-Chancellors, the highest ranking nobles of the Empire, responsible for calling Imperial Elections. Also, Rome and Mainz are the only two Holy Sees in the world, and the Archbishops were the *Pope's* substitutes north of the Alps. Two archbishops reigned during the war, Anselm Franz von Ingelheim to 1695, and Lothar Franz von Schönborn-Buchheim.

Anselm was a peaceable man. Rather than resist the French when they demanded access to Mainz, he opened the gates. King Louis had a semi-legitimate claim on Mainz, but it was mainly valuable as a potential bridgehead for his enemies, and there was a war on. He promised Anselm conditions similar to those given to Strasbourg, which at the time seemed acceptable. When French rule quickly became too oppressive, Anselm withdrew to Aschaffenburg, preferring to remain there after his city was liberated. Schönborn was a different kettle of fish, but not in a military sense. He was politically active, and as Bishop of Bamberg earlier in the war pushed for a Third Party of non-aligned German States.

With regard to Worms, three prince-bishops ruled during the war. The first was Johannes Karl von und zu Franckenstein. (*There are no indications that he experimented with electricity and dead bodies.*) He simply had the misfortune to be in the way. The French burned Worms to the ground in 1688 as part of their scorched earth policy rather than for personal reasons. The next two bishops, however, had targets painted on their backs.

The first was Ludwig Anton von Pfalz-Neuburg (1691-1694), brother of the Elector Palatine. He and his brother both voted for the Imperial candidate in Cologne's investiture crisis, blocking approval of King Louis' man. He was also Coadjutor Archbishop of Mainz. It should be obvious to the reader why the Sun King was gunning for him. The second was Francis Louis of Palatinate-Neuburg. The name says it all. He was a son of the Elector Palatine.

[Ludwig Anton was also Grand Master of the Teutonic Order until his death in 1694, when he was succeeded by his nephew Francis.]

Trier and Speyer were closely linked. Throughout the war Johann Hugo von Orsbeck was the incumbent Archbishop of Trier and Bishop of Speyer. Unhappily for him, the French occupied both territories, in 1688 besieging and capturing his best fortress, Philippsburg, which was his primary residence as bishop, and occupying Trier, his primary residence as archbishop. Speyer in particular became a stomping ground for both sides' armies, enduring the same devastation as the Palatinate. King Louis had no claim on any of his other properties, but Philippsburg was one of the few Rhine fortresses not controlled by France, and its acquisition was *the* main focus of the 1688 campaign on the Upper Rhine. Similarly, Trier, straddling the Moselle, had to be

occupied if the French were to assist their Candidate in Köln.

The Cologne Saga, or, Something Smells

Cologne was another independent archbishopric within the Holy Roman Empire. Like all such territories it was under both the Imperial and Papal umbrellas, and so enjoyed an independence of sorts. Cologne was deemed essential to the French scheme of strategic defence, but so long as its Archbishop was friendly there was no need for an expensive annexation. Its lands covered most of the Middle Rhine, threatened Holland's southeastern border, and bestrode the roads connecting Germany and the Low Countries. It was also one of the Imperial Electorates; that is, the archbishop's vote counted toward the elevation of the Emperor's successor. So long as it was pro-French, Cologne was one vote the Habsburgs could not count on.

The prewar Elector of Cologne, Maximilian Henry of Bavaria, died in June of 1688. He had always been friendly to the French, who already had plans for his chief councillor, Cardinal Egon Wilhelm (or Wilhelm Egon) von Fürstenberg, take over. The Fürstenbergs were a Swabian family, owning lands on the east side of the Black Forest. Most of the family's military men fought for the Coalition, but this Fürstenberg was not only a close friend of King Louis, he was also a French minister of state, the Bishop of Strasbourg.

Fürstenberg kept Max Henry in his pocket. This meant not only that Cologne was subservient to France, but that Fürstenberg easily managed to secure his candidature as the dying prince-bishop's replacement. If his election was confirmed he would be a member of the Imperial Electoral College, or in other words, a French agent at the Imperial Court. And, in time of war, Cologne would assuredly grant the French easy passage across the Rhine.

Fortunately (or not), the Emperor refused to recognise Fürstenberg's candidature and the Pope, who actually did recognise it on technical grounds, refused to confirm it. Emperor Leopold's own man was Joseph Clement of Wittelsbach, the 17-year-old brother of the Elector of Bavaria; critically, though riddled with French agents, Bavaria was at this time orientated toward Vienna — though much depended on whom the Elector talked to last.

The diplomatic wrangling was prolonged and heated. A two-thirds majority in Cologne's administrative Chapter might have secured Fürstenberg's appointment regardless of Imperial Will, but this was not achieved. In consequence, King Louis issued an ultimatum demanding his man's claim be recognised. This was ignored, but it set off alarm bells across Europe.

Fürstenberg was residing at Bonn when war eventually did break out and readily invited French troops into the Electorate; he also had command of all of Cologne's

troops, which he had preemptively put into garrisons at Bonn, Rheinberg, and Kaiserswerth. The newly installed Joseph Clemens, who wanted to be a soldier, not a bishop, resisted the French. He held the city of Köln itself, and had successfully repelled Fürstenberg's attempt to insert a garrison there. The Elector of Bavaria, incensed at both this invasion and the simultaneous ravaging of the Palatinate, broke off relations with France soon after the war began, and formally declared war in 1689. (Though the Emperor had to lean heavily on him to gain that declaration.) Fürstenberg's personal army would be swiftly defeated and mostly disbanded, and the French would find themselves fighting against superior German forces in this sector.



[Wilhelm Egon von Fürstenberg-Heiligenberg]

Reacting to Events

Succession Crises

Two succession crises emerged during the war, that of Spain and that of Poland. The Polish one did not affect French or Imperial policy immediately before the war, so it will be discussed at the appropriate time. The Spanish Succession is really an end-of-war issue, but still needs a brief mention, because it was a Political Question throughout the period which coloured European diplomacy.

The King of Spain, Carlos II, came to the throne in 1665 and it was evident from the start that he was the Last Habsburg (on that side of the family). 'Inbred Mutant' is probably the kindest way to describe him. In Spain, the

royal inheritance could pass through the female line. This meant that the men who married Spanish princesses were legitimate claimants. There were several such men, but the two most important were Louis XIV and Leopold I. Ironically, both wives were dead well before 1688 (1683 and 1673, respectively.)

In 1670 England agreed to support Louis' claim as part of the Treaty of Dover. That was when she was ruled by the crypto-Catholic Stuarts. One can understand why Louis was so upset with William of Orange when he overthrew his uncle (and father-in-law), quite apart from the unseemliness of deposing a relative. In 1688 William declared he was backing Leopold's claim.

As the war progressed, the claims of the main protagonists and those of lesser lights were used as political leverage, increasing in value as the years passed and Carlos grew ever feebler. Perhaps the best example of how the Spanish Succession affected the Nine Years' War is that of Maximilian Emmanuel, Elector of Bavaria. Duke Max, as he is known in these pages, was married to one of Leopold's daughters. By the middle of the war they had a son. Thus Duke Max and his son also had claims on the Spanish throne. Louis XIV used this fact to try and tease Duke Max out of his alliance with King William by offering to support his or his son's candidature. French diplomacy was successful enough that King William had to wage his later campaigns with one eye on his 'ally'.

The Hungarian Campaigns

The King of France had become increasingly concerned about the successes the Imperials were enjoying against the Turk. The Austrian Habsburgs and the Ottomans had been almost constantly at war since the 1660s. It was an open secret that France was backing the Turks in an effort to distract their Imperial enemies until they could secure a 'defensible' eastern frontier along the Rhine.

In 1683 the Ottoman Empire reached its military zenith when it besieged Vienna. The venture failed — the Turks were at the extreme end of their supply lines — and the Grand Vizier whose hubris inspired it was executed. But the war did not end. With Vienna liberated, Emperor Leopold began the centuries' long process of rolling the Turks back, all the way to the Aegean. This War of the Holy League was fought as intensely as the Nine Years' War, and was much, much longer.

In 1687, Buda, an Ottoman fortress for 150 years, fell to an Imperial army. King Louis became greatly alarmed. As already described, after the successful Dutch War of the 1670s, he had brazenly expanded French influence through the War of the Reunions, in which pro-French magnates were installed in a number of border principalities through a mix of diplomacy and aggression. Disunited, the German states along the Rhine and their potential allies were unable to resist, and the situation was normalised by the Treaty of Ratisbon. However, the

French needed time to consolidate, time the Imperials now seemed likely not to grant them.

Indeed, throughout the next few months after the siege of Buda, King Louis seems not only to have become alarmed, but to have actually panicked. The Turks were in peace talks with the Emperor. Although Leopold's demands were too harsh to be accepted and although the Turks were spinning the talks out as long as possible (more from force of habit than anything else), it was widely believed they would come to terms before the year of 1688 was out. Louis felt he had to act quickly. A military strike from the West would boost Ottoman morale. He had already issued one ultimatum, on the Cologne issue, now he issued a second one, on 24 September 1688. This was the infamous '*Mémoire des raisons*'. It made no mention of the Ottomans, but was a manifesto demanding that the Treaty of Ratisbon be made permanent (at the moment it was only good for twenty years) *and* that Cardinal Egon be made Elector of Cologne, *or else*. A deadline of three months was set, but Louis' armies crossed the Rhine before many of the German princes even had time to read the manifesto.

Quincy says Louis 'knew' that the Emperor, after forcing the Turks to call it quits, would swiftly bring his army west and, using the Imperial-controlled crossing at Philippsburg, try to reacquire Alsace and possibly Lorraine. Whether this was really possible without long preparation, the Sun King certainly believed it would happen. As always with this sort of gambit, the object was to shock and intimidate the opposition, seize more ground than was needed so as to have something to bargain with, and then seek peace. Sometimes the strategy works. This time it did not. It says something for the preeminence of French arms that she was able to achieve a stalemate after nine years of war. Ironically, Leopold's pigheadedness condemned his empire to a two-front, and later three-front, war for several years. His focus on Hungary was a major reason why the French, who ultimately waged a four-front war, were able to hang on.

[In 1689 the Imperials won a victory over the Turks, strengthening Leopold's will, later, things were not so rosy. Below: Charles of Lorraine and Türkenlouis meeting on the field of Mohács. Both men would lead armies against France.]



King Jamie and King Billie

The Turks were one reason the French struck so precipitately, but another reason was William of Orange. King Louis feared that William, commander-in-chief of the Dutch Army, coveted the archbishopric of Cologne. Louis therefore felt he should occupy the principality before William did. His soldiers would serve the dual purpose of keeping the Dutch out and perhaps scaring the Emperor's man away.

But to his surprise, Louis discovered William coveted something greater: England. While it is possible William switched his focus from Cologne to England because of Louis' occupation of the former, this is unlikely. William's preparations were already laid. A large enough segment of English society was discontented enough with his father-in-law (and uncle) James II, that a coup was possible. William's English mother had schooled him to aim his ambitions no lower than the English Crown; now he had the opportunity to take it.

In brief, James II had ascended legitimately to the throne of England in 1685, dealt handily with an armed uprising against himself, and proceeded to turn the country into a carbon copy of France. That, at least, was the opinion of the majority of his subjects. For the sake of stability, the country was willing to drift and let King James have his way. After all, he was already old and at his death one of his daughters, neither of whom seemed likely to lead the country into strange new dimensions, would replace him. One of them, Mary, was William's wife, so it was quite likely he would succeed to the throne simply by letting nature take its course. Except that nature took its course in a different manner. With the birth of a son to James on 10 June 1688, the spectre of an Absolutist and Catholic Britain arose.

About the time that King Louis issued his first ultimatum, William of Orange accepted an invitation, by prearrangement, to bring an army to England and overthrow James. Though the French made naval preparations to counter him, under the pretext of outfitting an expedition against the Algerian pirates (which actually did take place), they had no desire to face a war on two fronts. Still, they tried to frighten William — or rather, the Dutch Estates who were the basis of his power — by stating that an invasion of England would be a *casus belli* between France and Holland.

As a matter of fact, the regime change very nearly failed, the first attempt thwarted by the onset of the Autumnal Equinox, and the second when a mass uprising in support of William failed to materialise. In the end, however, King James did all the heavy lifting, virtually gifting the Three Kingdoms to William by his own loss of nerve.

And here, the Sun King made another mistake. After warning William that interference in English politics would mean war with France, he proceeded to launch his first

strike against the Palatinate instead of Holland. This was one of those mistakes made out of cleverness rather than ignorance or stupidity, and not just a matter of 'the plans are already written and we cannot change them'. Louis calculated that he would have to fight William at some point anyway, so claimed the moral high ground. He also calculated that William's attempt to overthrow James would fail, and that it would consume what was left of the campaigning season. This would allow the French to 'blitz' the Palatinate, secure Cologne, and either be sitting at the peace table or squared off against an isolated Holland by the time William had reorganised his forces for the next campaigning season.

Louis was almost right. William made the greater gamble, and nearly lost the game, and he did become bogged down in a long war away from the Continent, but Louis found himself facing greater than expected opposition from the Empire with an army that he had not bothered to augment from its peacetime establishment. Operations took longer than expected, his terror tactics backfired, and France found herself at war with all of Europe. This gave William, who would become the *de facto* leader of the Grand Alliance, time to secure his hold over the British Isles and begin mustering a defence of the Low Countries.

The situation was made worse by an event, which in fairness to Louis, was beyond his control: his longtime ally, Friedrich Wilhelm, Margrave of Brandenburg, died suddenly and the son who replaced him adopted a policy of hostility toward France.

The Margraviate of Brandenburg

Brandenburg-Prussia is too big a topic to do it justice here, and besides, although the 'Prussians' provided significant help to the Coalition during the war, they were not the superpower they later became. But the reader should know a few facts. Originally one of the Empire's march or border territories in the Northeast, centered on the Elbe River, Brandenburg was not a Hohenzollern possession until 1415. The original Hohenzollerns were neighbours of the original Habsburgs in Swabia, but there was also a Franconian branch, who became Protestants. It was they who acquired the March of Brandenburg.

Brandenburg was given the electoral privilege in 1356, and the Hohenzollerns retained it. In 1618 they also acquired the Duchy of Prussia — the easternmost section of what became East Prussia — and began to style their realm Brandenburg-Prussia. This was the weakness of the Hohenzollerns, that their lands were so widely scattered. They were also rather poor in comparison to the holdings of other princes, which is why Cleves and Berg, acquired in 1614, but over 100 Km to the west of Brandenburg itself, took on such great importance for them.

In 1688 the Elector of Brandenburg was Friedrich Wilhelm, then 68 years old. He had lived through the

Thirty Years War and the secondary explosions that followed it. He contrived to come out on the winning side each time; especially, he helped remove the Swedish presence from Prussia, which became an Imperial fief. The rebuilding of war-ravaged Brandenburg and the creation of a powerful army was made possible by French funding, and Friedrich was in general pro-French in outlook. He not only took money from them, his Court was francophile, made more so when he opened the door to Huguenot exiles.



[Friedrich V, Kurfürst von Brandenburg]

This did not stop him allying with the Dutch in their war with France, however, so that Louis XIV arranged for the Swedes to invade Brandenburg. Friedrich proved himself and his army by a classic countermarch that defeated the Swedes at Fehrbellin. He is also credited with the concept of *Aufstragstaktik*, the issuing of broad directives and

allowing subordinates to fulfill them in whatever way they saw fit (though this is something the French were also good at). And, he put much effort into building the economy; he achieved autocratic rule by exempting his nobles from taxation.

If he had lived, it is quite possible he would have kept Brandenburg out of the war, or even come in on the side of France, if King Louis made it worth his while — so long as Cleves and Berg were guaranteed, and especially if the French promised him spoils that would help join those territories to Brandenburg. But he died in April of 1688 and his successor, Friedrich V (later Frederick I of Prussia), favoured the cause of his maternal cousin, William of Orange — though he continued have French tastes.

Friedrich V, styled Brandenburg in these pages, will make numerous appearances in the narrative during the early years of the war. Initially, the French hoped he would pursue a policy of neutrality, if only to annoy the Emperor, and either did not factor his army into their equations or assumed he would be unable to mobilise quickly — the Prussians were considered a third-rate Power at this time. Possibly, it was the French occupation of Cologne that finally pushed him to enter the fray. After achieving his personal aims by 1689, however, he ‘waffled’ for a while before being persuaded by William of Orange that the French were an existential threat. Even then he made little effort to aid his fellow Germans in the south, but normally took his army into Brabant.

[His elevation to King in Prussia took place in 1700 and was his prize for siding with the Emperor in the War of the Spanish Succession.]

Jülich, Berg, Cleves, and Mark... and Guelders

The lands on the Middle Rhine between Germany and Holland do not feature much in the narrative of the war on the Rhine. And yet they are important enough to be mentioned. Only a little campaigning took place here, early in the war — some French raids out of Luxembourg, and the roll-back of the French push down the Rhine toward Wesel. The French were interested in the region for four reasons. It was wealthy. It straddled the communication lines between the enemy armies in Germany and those in Holland. Much of it was owned by the Elector Palatine, who was worthy of punishment. And, some of the lands were coveted by Cologne.

These territories were at all one time part of the Lotharingen inheritance and fell within the Holy Roman Empire. All emerged as political entities in the 11th or 12th Centuries. If one draws a rough rectangle with the Rhine as a line down through the center of the length of it, the top left quadrant contains Cleves, bottom left Jülich, top right Berg, and bottom left Mark. Guelderland lies along the edge of the northwest corner.

Guelders, a rich and extensive country, does not come into the war, apart from the rare French cavalry raid, but

has to be mentioned because of its historic ties to the other territories, particularly Jülich. It was acquired briefly by Jülich’s ruler in the 14th Century before the House of Burgundy took over in the 15th. The Burgundian Wars between that dynasty, the Emperor, and Valois France resulted in Guelders going to the Emperor Charles V after another brief rule by the dukes of Jülich-Cleves-Berg. The Emperor in turn gave it to the Spanish half of the Habsburg House. Most of Guelderland now lies in Holland, having joined the United Provinces during the Eighty Years War against Spain. At the time of the Nine Years’ War the rump, also known as Spanish Guelders or the Upper Quarter, was still part of the Spanish Netherlands.

Jülich, coveted by Cologne, had at one time turned the tables and acquired the latter, though not for long. As its own region Jülich was, from the 14th to 17th Centuries, part of a family conglomerate known as Jülich-Cleves-Berg, which also included The Mark, formed in 1521. Berg appeared a century later than Jülich and Cleves, and was originally ruled by a junior branch of the Ezzonids who ruled Lotharingia.

Long before, Mark had been a part of Berg. After it split under the junior line of Berg-Altena, it came under the suzerainty of Cologne, but won independence and expanded significantly in the other direction, at the expense of Münster. The ruler of Berg then inherited Cleves and became the latter’s duke, before all four territories were united in a personal union.

The line of the dukes of Jülich-Cleves-Berg ran out in 1609, sparking the War of the Jülich Succession. In 1614 the concluding Treaty of Xanten divided the properties between the extensive Wittelsbach dynasty, in the persons of the Counts Palatine of Neuburg (who, despite the title were not as yet *Electoral* Counts Palatine of the Rhine), and the Margrave of Brandenburg. The former took over Jülich and Berg (the southwest and northeast quadrants), while Brandenburg received Cleves and Mark (northwest and southeast). However, incorporation with Brandenburg-Prussia did not take place until 1666 and much of the land was occupied by the Dutch until 1672. The division of the spoils between Brandenburg and the Neuburgs was not generally acknowledged by everyone until that date, and there would continue to be disputes and quibbles into the 18th Century.

In short, these territories were politically sensitive — extremely so.

The Reich

Some of the players have been discussed above. The rest will be given their own rough sketches below.

The Empire was a political entity independent of the Habsburg Monarchy, except that the same man ruled both. As regards the Habsburg Monarchy, this man was an Absolute dynast, as regards the Empire, he was an elected king, elevated to the purple as 'first among equals' — a war leader in a confederation of Germanic states. It was a symbiotic relationship. The *Reich* needed a strong helmsman; the Habsburgs needed the lustre of an imperial role.

In the accretion of dynastic lands, the Habsburgs were doing nothing unique; what was unique was their hold over the Holy Roman Empire. The problem for the Habsburgs was that this position did not translate into a tool for unification. The normal pattern for a European monarchy emerging from the Middle Ages was of a family achieving hereditary title to the kingship of a region, and then gradually dominating their rivals until they remained as unquestioned rulers of the whole. France is the premier example.

In the early Middle Ages the Kings of France held a position even worse than the Emperors of Germany, having effective control over little more than their own domains — and even with these they were forced to bargain for power. But the kingship was hereditary, and over the centuries the dynasty's power waxed, rival nobles were crushed or drawn into the ruling family's orbit, and either way their lands were placed under the authority of the Crown. An independent bureaucracy and military was set up outside of the old feudal structure, composed of men who owed everything to the King. Then the old nobility were drawn in as well. By the end of the 17th Century, France was the most powerful — because the most centralised — state in Europe. Her military budget was ten times that of the Habsburg Emperor's.

The Holy Roman Emperors were unable to achieve such unification from the simple fact that the Germans could not be bribed into giving away their right to elect their king. Instead, the emperors were forced to concede wealth and lands and rights merely to ensure their House's repeated election.

Strangely, the desired title was not King of the Germans, but King of the Romans (hence the term *Kaiser* or Caesar). This title had been awarded to the first emperors by the popes in recognition of assistance rendered against their own Roman vassals, and became the key to achieving papal coronation as Emperor (also a gift of the popes, marking the Germans as Defenders of the Papacy), though by now the last step of a journey to Rome had been dispensed with, making election as King of the Romans sufficient to be acclaimed Emperor automatically — and thus placing even greater power in the hands of the Electors who did the voting.

The Habsburgs had been Emperors almost continuously since the 15th Century, mainly because they had the most wealth to spread around. The critical event was the division of Charles V's holdings amongst his heirs. Ferdinand I received the dynasty's Hereditary Lands, and, as he was already King of the Romans, earned an automatic promotion to Emperor after Charles abdicated. Electing the King of the Romans during the life of the Emperor became common practice, greatly increasing the chances of the next Emperor being a Habsburg as well. No other House had the power to compete in this way; they could merely obstruct and bargain for scraps.

Given its disunity, the Empire did not confer much power, but it did give the reigning House tremendous prestige and authority in European affairs (emperors being just naturally better than kings). Only as the last dregs of real power ebbed away in the late 17th Century did the Imperial Habsburgs begin to focus more on their 'Austrian' base.

By now they had succeeded in divorcing most of their own lands from the Imperial Administration, while turning much of the latter into an Habsburg Administration. Even so, the dynasty still lacked supreme authority within the Empire. They were required, on their accession, to agree to a set of traditional Electoral Capitulations, pledging to observe the customs and laws of the *Reich*.

For a pertinent example, when making war in a case that involved the *Reich*, the Emperor had to go to the Imperial Diet for permission, and it was the Diet that declared war. The Emperor, however, as 'commander in the field', had the right to make peace, only submitting his decision for approval to the Diet. (In the same way, the Emperor's own field commanders could make peace but not start a war.)

The states that comprised the *Reich* were not always submissive, either. Many had Protestant rulers. Some were in bed with the French, or the Russians, or the Swedes, able to use their ally as a counterweight to Habsburg ambition. None as yet had outside sources of power that gave independence, but those days were not far off. The Elector of Brandenburg would become King in Prussia at the turn of the century.

Over the centuries, legal grants made to obtain short-term co-operation included the right for some states to maintain their own armies independent of those troops needed to fill their *Reichsarmee* quotas, and even to contract alliances with foreign powers — so long as the Habsburgs were not the target.

The Structure of the Empire

The Emperor was chosen by the vote of the greatest of the German princes, the Electors. Theoretically, each Electoral seat belonged to a high official in the Imperial Court (Steward, Chamberlain, Cupbearer, etc.) who was also a prince in his own right (thus the Archbishop of

Mainz was Arch-Chancellor). Again, strictly speaking it was not the Emperor who was elected, but the King of the Romans, who would then be promoted by application to the Pope – but by now this last device had been discarded.

In theory, any of the Electors of the Empire were eligible to become King of the Romans, but the ecclesiastics (Mainz, Trier, Cologne) were discounted, leaving Saxony, Brandenburg, Bavaria, the Elector Palatine, and after 1691, Hanover (Brunswick), as rivals. The ninth seat was that of Grand Duke of Austria.

Also, the office of King of the Romans had to belong to a male, competent, and of age. It helped to be proven in battle, or at least to belong to a dynasty with a strong military tradition. For better or worse, as a general case the other Electors lacked the monetary and military resources to effect a change, except when the Habsburgs were going through a period of extreme weakness.

The elevation of Hanover during the war was very important. First, it caused a great deal of antagonism because Hanover and the Emperor hashed out the details behind closed doors and simply presented it as a *fait accompli*. Then too, as part of the bargain the Emperor got a bonus vote, that of King of Bohemia, which had been defunct since the Thirty Years War. Hanover's elevation very nearly caused an internal side war with his relations.

Both Bohemia and Austria, being part of the *Erblände*, were not subject to a lot of the Imperial legislation and thus had greater freedom of decision; Bohemia was not even a member of one of the administrative Circles (*Kreissen*) into which the Empire was divided.

Under the rank of the *Kurfürsten*, or Prince-Electors, were the Estates (*Reichsstände*). These came in various flavours, but were, as noted above, grouped into *Kreissen* for administrative purposes. The influence of each Circle varied depending on its composition. Those in the North were dominated by one or two powerful states, such as Brandenburg or Brunswick, while those in the South were, except for Bavaria's, composed of many small states. Within each Circle, the Estates were segregated and ranked into princes, prelates, counts, knights, free cities, and so on. Each group had a vote in the Imperial Diet (*Reichstag*), but the grouping was not done evenly. An individual prince would have one vote, and so would an entire 'college' of minor nobles.

[It should also be noted that northern and central Italy, though outside the Reich, were considered part of its structure, and were in the care of an imperial plenipotentiary. The Dukes of Savoy, for example, considered themselves imperial subjects, guardians of the Maritime Alps – at least when it suited them to do so. Certainly the Habsburgs regarded Piedmont-Sardinia as a client state. The Burgundian Kreis, containing domains outside the empire, and with a predominantly French population, was similarly intended as a buffer zone.]

The members of the *Reichstag* formed a number of councils, the most important of which was the Council of Electors. The Diet, which was originally summoned by the Emperor to wherever his residence happened to be, was settled at Regensburg in the 17th Century, transforming from a temporary convocation into a permanent congress of envoys from the various states. The Emperor was represented by a delegated prince, but was also entitled to a representative 'from the King of Bohemia' and another 'from the Grand Duke of Austria', giving him enormous influence.

The real power in the bureaucracy of the *Reich* was the *Reichshofrat*, or Imperial Aulic Council, located in Vienna. This was the supreme administrative, judicial, and constitutional body, and became the Habsburgs' main instrument in moulding the Empire the way they liked. Primarily it was a court of justice, directly subordinate to the Emperor. Its power derived from its use to settle grievances within the *Reich*.

There was a rival body, the Imperial Chamber Court or Imperial Cameral Tribunal (*Reichskammergericht*). This, in contrast, was an instrument of the Estates against the Emperor, but it had been settled at Wetzlar, far to the West, not at Vienna; it was also dreadfully backlogged. The Emperor was therefore able to use the power of the judiciary in the more effective Aulic Council to expand his own influence.

Comparatively few of those composing the Court and Administration of the *Reich* were Austrian. Aristocrats from the *Erblände* were naturally in the Emperor's service, because they had already had an 'interest' with the dynasty – centuries worth of accumulated family connections. But, a fair percentage were men of ability enticed into Imperial-Habsburg service from within and outside the Empire's borders. For much of the German aristocracy and their 'tails', Vienna was the place to be only because the Emperor lived there.

Torn apart by Bourbon-Habsburg rivalry, the Holy Roman Empire never became a centralised state, but it gave stability to Central Europe, and a focus for those middling princes not powerful enough to strike out on their own. For these, the Habsburgs held out the inducements of employment; for the great ones, they offered concessions such as international recognition and the electoral dignity. And Europe as a whole – even France – was content to let the Empire be, lest something worse take its place.

Imperial Finances

It is notorious that the Habsburg Monarchy was always short of cash. The bodies that required substantial funding were the Court, the Bureaucracy, and the Military. Of these, the latter took the lion's share – up to 75%-80% of state revenue in some years; Court and Administration never required more than 10%-15%.

There were two revenue streams, *Camerale* and *Contributionale*. *Camerale* sources paid for the Administration and covered Household expenses (including donatives, gifts, and pensions). The *Contributionale* was supposed to pay for the military (i.e., the Army, as the Habsburg Navy was miniscule), but the *Camerale* often had to be redirected to meet shortfalls.

Camerale money came from the dynastic domain lands, tolls, monopolies, mining, and through indirect taxation. Its collection was the responsibility of the Court Chamber (*Hofkammer*). Provinces that were not directly controlled by the sovereign had their own Court Chambers that collected their own *Camerale* income, a portion of which would be given to the central administration, usually after hard bargaining.

In the early days, the *Camerale* had paid for the Habsburgs' armed retinue as well, just as household revenue still did for the troops of smaller states. But it proved insufficient once the dynasty assumed suzerainty over the Empire. Funding of large, permanent or semi-permanent contingents for long wars, and even more importantly, funding for the Military Border in the Balkans, required extraordinary sources of income — thus, the *Contributionale*.

The *Contributionale* originated in the *Kontribution*, a military tax paid to prevent quartered troops from simply pillaging the region they were billeted in — a problem that arose in the Thirty Years War when soldiers had to be retained under arms for long periods. The *Kontribution* soon became permanent, with regiments tied to particular regions based on their wealth, and receiving the funds directly, either in cash or kind. The tax could also be paid through services, such as providing billets or repairing roads that the army was to march along.

The *Contributionale* also included extraordinary levies (such as the Turkish Tax) and the like, but it was basically a yearly tax paid by the landowners and clergy — even foreigners who owned land in the Habsburg realms were not exempt. Much of the time, the burden was passed on to the peasants. In Bohemia, the landowners paid no tax, the peasants assumed the entire burden; in Austria, the burden was shared. Towns were usually exempt from this tax (a big reason peasants fled to the towns) but were taxed in other ways, such as the payment of customs dues.

Still there was not enough money. Poor record-keeping by the landholding classes, and an inability to enforce punishment for infractions, meant that no one really knew how much money was available. Worse still, the *Hofkammer* was only one part of the official Deputation to the Estates; its administrative rivals the *Hofkriegsrat* and the Chancellery also participated, and the Chancellery frequently did its best to reduce contributions, instead of enlarging them. On the plus side, it was possible to obtain funds from outside sources directly, in the form of loans

from interested powers like England, and from the Church, who still own much of the land that was officially 'Austrian'.

As mentioned above, the *Camerale* was dipped into, but this always brought on a bout of interdepartmental wrangling. Banks contributed large sums, though not as a tax — the firm of Fuggers is a readily familiar name. The Jews, ironically for a regime that was virulently anti-Semitic, were a vital component; during the War of the Spanish Succession, the untimely death of a single Jew paralysed the Army finances (he was the 'Court Jew', and his own debts had gone unpaid because the Habsburgs never redeemed their loans). Ultimately the dynasty had recourse to foreign loans — from the Maritime Powers, of course, but also from the Pope. The Budget was thus little more than a wishful projection, yet the only one on which any plans could be formed at all.

The Hereditary Lands

The Imperial or Austrian branch of the Habsburgs was rooted in a region known as the Hereditary Lands, or *Erblande*. Following Germanic practice, the *Erblande* were initially divided among the heirs of Ferdinand (Charles V's son and heir of the 'Austrian' half of the House). Though reunited late in the 17th Century, this temporary sundering had the unfortunate effect of strengthening regional identities and adding a plethora of administrative devices to an already complex network of governance, which answers the question of why the Habsburgs had difficulty achieving centralised control of even their family lands — the various bureaucracies were not assimilated into one, they were just grafted together, producing an effect like the frontispiece to Hobbes' 'Leviathan'.

By the late 17th Century, the *Erblande* consisted of the following regions: Upper and Lower Austria (with the Enns River as the dividing line), Inner Austria (Styria, Carniola, Carinthia, and various lands by the Adriatic, such as parts of Istria, and Trieste), Tyrol and the *Vorlande* (the latter being the scattered collection of original holdings stretching across Swabia to Switzerland), the lands of the Crown of St. Wenceslas (a.k.a Bohemia, Silesia, and Moravia), and the lands of the Crown of St. Stephen (a.k.a Hungary, which at this time was much smaller than it became; Transylvania was sometimes part of Hungary and sometimes independent). There were also a few estates in Piedmont.

The *Erblande* was a federal polity. All the provinces were considered to be subject to the House of Habsburg, but each relationship was slightly different. Only some were ruled directly by the Emperor as his personal property. Others had governors, and still others were ruled by the landholding class, who regarded the Habsburgs as their suzerains, either in their capacity as Emperors, or as feudal dynastic lords. These last, as always, proved the most ungovernable. Finally, there were vast Church

holdings, such as Passau and Salzburg, essentially under Habsburg rule but subject to their own laws and the dual authority of the Pope.

Each region had, apart from the Emperor's domain lands, their own local governments — Bohemia and Hungary were kingdoms in their own right — their own methods of taxation, and their own jealously guarded privileges. This meant that careful negotiation was required whenever extraordinary funds and levies had to be generated; extreme care to be taken in lands such as Bohemia and Hungary, where anti-Habsburg sentiment was strong.

The economy of these territories was agricultural; in most cases a modified form of serfdom. Silesia, a duchy of Bohemia, was the most industrialised, and provided no less than a quarter of the state's revenue — which is why Prussia went to war for it. Upper Austria had extensive salt mines (coveted by Bavaria), and there were a variety of mines in Bohemia, the Tyrol, and Inner Austria. External trade was minimal, though. Some trade was done with the Turks, and Western Europe used the Habsburg lands as a source of raw material. Curiously, the State was Mercantilist by force of circumstance, not by doctrine like the Western nations. Much of Industry was a state monopoly. Internally, trade was hampered by an excessive use of customs barriers and tolls, which were also state monopolies, though sometimes of the local government, not the federal.

The governance of the *Erblände* had a single overriding object: to support the Imperial Army. (By 'Imperial' is meant the Army of the Habsburgs, as distinct from the *Reichsarmee* of the Holy Roman Empire.) Local issues were for the most part left in local hands, allowing the common people and minor notables to get on with their lives, in exchange for which they were to pay a variety of cash- kind- and service- taxes.

As in other countries, such as England, the Habsburgs had found it necessary to begin calling conventions of the lay and clerical nobility, known as Diets, in order to raise funds for a military that could no longer be supported out of their own domains. Originally called only as needed, these became annual affairs. But unlike England, where a Parliament developed to tackle all issues of governance, in the *Erblände*, the main issue became and remained the voting of the yearly Budget. Since the men who ran the local Administrations also comprised the Estates of the Diet, they fiercely resisted any enlargement of the State's authority. Since each region had its own Diet, a central 'government by Diet' remained a far off dream. The concept of an Estates General had been discussed, but not implemented. Instead, the dynast had to bargain separately with Estates whose regional demands (in exchange for approving the Budget) were either incompatible or overwhelming.

Compounding the difficulty was a religious issue: the Habsburgs were Catholics (and usually bigoted

Catholics), and the nobility comprising the Estates were often Protestant. In the 17th Century, many of the Estates rebelled *enmasse*, forcing a harsh crackdown — and making the Counterreformation one of the perceived pillars of unity in the Habsburg Monarchy.

Imperial Diplomacy

As in most 'Absolutist' states, foreign policy was derived through consensus. At its simplest the Court, from whom the monarch obtained his view of the world, would be divided into a war faction and a peace faction. There were few bureaucratic 'experts', usually despised in any case, with the advice expected from such being provided instead by those of the aristocracy with knowledge of the desired subject. Often, favourites, confessors, and mistresses played a key role in forming the monarch's opinion.

Under the Habsburgs the role of 'prime minister' was taken by the High Steward, who headed the various councils. First of these was the Privy Council (*Geheimer Rat*), but this had grown so large that it became useless as an 'inner circle'. That role was now assumed by the Privy Conference (*Geheimer Konferenz*), a permanently established working committee of the *Geheimer Rat*, which focused specifically on foreign matters. The *Geheimer Konferenz* was a deliberative body, without a bureaucracy of its own.

Two other bodies competed with the *Geheimer Konferenz*: the Imperial Court Chancellery (*Reichshofkanzlei*), and the Austrian Court Chancellery (*Österreichische Hofkanzlei*). The first was the highest executive body in the Holy Roman Empire, run from Vienna by the Imperial Arch-Chancellor (by tradition the Archbishop of Mainz). The second was its Austrian (i.e., purely Habsburg) equivalent, divided into administrative and judicial branches.

The *Reichshofkanzlei* was supposed to be an Imperial body, but in practice it became a tool of the dynasty. The daily running of affairs was conducted by the Vice-Chancellor, nominated by the Arch-Chancellor, but approved by the Emperor. Because everything was based on personal rule, it seemed natural that a body that served one man as Emperor should also serve him as dynast. And in the early days, most issues requiring resolution lay between the Estates and the Empire.

In fact, the *Österreichische Hofkanzlei* was originally a department of the *Reichshofkanzlei*. Aggressively expanding its role, by the 18th Century it later took responsibility for conducting the Empire's foreign affairs. While the *Reichshofkanzlei* lost influence, becoming a body concerned with internal Imperial affairs — mostly ritual — the *Österreichische Hofkanzlei* developed both a domestic-judicial department and a foreign affairs department. The Austrian Court Chancellor had a seat at the Privy Council, and input into the Privy Conference —

something it took a long time for the Imperial Vice-Chancellor to achieve.

Thus the Empire had only one diplomatic service — the Austrian one. This ensured Habsburg dynastic interests came first, and added the social dignity of being Imperial representatives to its diplomats. (Between the death of an emperor and the elevation of his successor, Habsburg ambassadors were only representatives of Hungary and Bohemia). The diplomatic service was not professional, except perhaps at the junior level. Most diplomats were aristocratic amateurs, often military men, sometimes with special knowledge of the country they were sent to, or with special interests; often, such service was seen as an onerous duty. Also, besides the official department, the Emperors relied on direct correspondence with foreign rulers.

There was one major exception in the realm of diplomacy. Until the 1750s, relations with the Ottomans were not dealt with through the *Österreichische Hofkanzlei* but through the Aulic War Council (*Hofkriegsrat*).

It should also be pointed out that the above is what took place in theory. In practice, any Imperial prince who thought himself strong enough was quite ready to make side deals within and without the Empire. Several dealt openly with France. Others dealt directly with William of Orange, as the 'true' leader of the Grand Alliance. After all, the Emperor could not be allowed to enforce his will as and when he pleased!

Leagues and Associations

The last decades of the 17th Century witnessed an oscillation of influence between the Emperor and the states of the Reich, played out against the backdrop of the Dutch War, War of the Reunions, and the Nine Years' War. Actually, there was a dual oscillation, the one between the Emperor and his chief princes, and the other between the North German states and the South German states, complicated by the fact that some dynasties held lands in the other sphere, and by the fact that the princes often, but not always, split on confessional lines. France was a useful counterweight. Some princes, like the aged Elector of Brandenburg, actually preferred the French to the Habsburgs.

The political tussles took the usual form — groups of lesser powers banding together in association to create temporary political factions with enough clout to accomplish some aim, then dissolving again. The underlying issue was control of the Reich, but it would be another 150 years before Prussia won that struggle. More immediate questions were those of princely rights and obligations, such as what was the Emperor prepared to give in exchange for the loan of troops to fight in Hungary, or inheritance issues, or questions of precedence. Also, if wars gave the lesser princes a chance to twist the Emperor's arm, they also brought danger; if the Emperor

had no troops to spare, collective defence at a local level was necessary.

Unfortunately there is not enough space to do this subject justice. Let the reader be aware that these sorts of political issues greatly affected strategy, and not only on the Rhine. Jealousies hindered cooperation, as did conflicting commitments. French diplomats were always on the lookout for chinks in the Imperial armour. After 1690 there were stiff penalties for even being in the same town as a French agent, but a prince who spoke harshly against the French might still find ways of communicating with them in secret if a neighbour was scoring brownie points with the Emperor.

The nature of the Empire's military administration lent itself to regionalism. The *Reichsarmee* was not an offensive weapon. It existed solely for defense of the Empire. Many regiments were with the Imperial army in Hungary, fighting the Ottomans, but that was a special case. Either they did so as auxiliaries, or as part of a Crusade under the Imperial banner.

Minor threats and internal squabbles that could not be resolved diplomatically were to be handled by the *Kreis* (Circle) — military district — most closely concerned. If the problem was larger, neighbouring Circles could get involved, but the threat had to be existential before the Emperor intervened militarily.

During the Dutch War of the 1670s, Emperor Leopold managed to manoeuvre himself into the driver's seat, and the most effective associations of states were the ones which he either created or was able to commandeer. Opposition to his top-down management came either from the northern (Protestant) princes who put up their own schemes as a counterweight, or from the French, or from both working together. The Nine Years' War, in fact, helped to swing the pendulum the other way, so that for all the war's hardships, some of the princes found French aggression very useful.

The key measurement of an association's validity was troop numbers, and the money to pay for them. This meant that roping in the many smaller states, while helpful, was not enough. They were easier to manipulate, since being weak they looked to Leopold for protection against neighbouring great princes, but they had few resources, even in combination. The reader is probably aware of those silly-sounding recruitment quotas of 'one man and half a horse' (which were in reality translated into money). The great princes, in contrast, could only be coopted with bilateral treaties, which were expensive.

A common perquisite for joining a league was immunity from the quartering of troops. Therefore, the association could not be too large. A Pan-German league would be completely impracticable. The League of Augsburg, formed in 1686, was the reincarnation of an expiring league the Emperor had sponsored. It was primarily a South German association, to which Brandenburg and

Saxony were appended. At the time, no troops were deployed and it was more of a device for asserting Imperial will. Two years later the League formed the basis of the Grand Alliance. The earlier association had also included Bavaria, Hanover, and even Sweden, so it was easy for those powers to justify rejoining as war broke out with France.

On the other hand, Leopold's control was weak, achieved only by playing the major princes against each other. In addition, his Turkish war was putting a huge financial strain on the Empire. Even the bigger states had difficulty meeting mobilisation targets when they found themselves caught in two simultaneous wars. The reincarnated League of Augsburg more or less collapsed as soon as the French entered the Palatinate — though not entirely. The Dutch, whom Leopold had ironically denied entry to the association when it was formed, saw the value in propping it up to distract the French.

On a political level, what the outbreak of war accomplished in the Empire was, beyond creating a very temporary solidarity, to give impetus to what was known as a Third Party. This was something the Northern princes had been working toward for some time. One of the reasons for the Southern associations was to provide a counterpoint; Leopold was then able to lure one or two key princes into his fold and break up the Third Party. The Third Party idea was simply to create an association of the middle- and heavy-weight states who would adopt a neutral platform, neither pro-French nor pro-Emperor. Brandenburg, Saxony, and Hanover, all of whom found the Emperor's military and financial demands onerous, led the way, further arguing that they should be the ones supporting the smaller states in their own regions (with a view to eventual absorption, naturally).

If any single man or pair of individuals may be said to have driven this effort it was the Schönborn bishops of Bamberg, also co-executive princes of Franconia. They were the ideologues of the Third Party. The second Schönborn became Bishop of Mainz in 1695, greatly increasing his influence. Postwar their idea lost efficacy though it did not entirely disappear. The princes preferred to follow the model of extorting concessions from the Emperor and then securing a royal title: Hanover (King of Great Britain), Saxony (King of Poland), and Brandenburg (King of Prussia).

Leaning toward a Third Party, instead of signing on to the Emperor's projects the Northern princes formed the Magdeburg Concert in October of 1688, essentially a northern version of the League of Augsburg, pledged to defend the Rhineland — but it was also a challenge to Imperial authority. Almost immediately they were forced to extend their sphere of influence to shield the Upper Rhine. While the help was welcome it was also resented since the northern princes demanded their pound of flesh, in the form of billeting and contributions. Since the southerners were already paying protection money to

both the Emperor and the French, the reader can understand why they soon formed their own conglomeration. The Franconians and Swabians created a solid association which lasted out the war and carried over into the next.

Of course things were not that cut and dried. This is the Holy Roman Empire, after all. Some of the Northern princes *had* joined the Imperial defense, as individuals, leading to a tangle of obligations. Others later made individual pledges to the Grand Alliance. Saxony did so in 1693, for example. Prior to that time the Saxon Army assisted the defense of the Upper Rhine as a) an auxiliary of the semi-defunct League of Augsburg and b) as emissaries of the Magdeburg Concert. Now the Elector allied directly with William of Orange and the other big players to enhance his status (he was planning a bid for the Polish throne) and siphon off some of the juicy subsidy money floating around. Ironically, thanks to a change in rulers, by 1694 the Saxons were withdrawing from the war!

Brandenburg and the other northern states went through similar ebbs and flows of commitment. The southern states did not have that luxury; they were on the front lines. By mid-war they were receiving regular subsidies from the Maritime Powers and were quite willing to send contingents to the Low Countries, but contributed only minimal support to the defence of the Upper Rhine where most of the action was occurring. Thus the Rhine theatre can effectively be broken into two halves, North and South. The French wisely did not push the Northern princes into a corner but encouraged the Third Party, which was in any case led by princes beyond their military reach. By the end of the war most of the princes were ready to engage in separate peaces they had sworn never to consider.

The defense of the South was strongest when there was a powerful Imperial representative commanding the armies. In 1689 Leopold sent Charles V of Lorraine, but he died early in 1690. His replacements were Duke Max of Bavaria and then the Duke of Saxony. Neither man was really suitable, being more interested in serving their own interests. (So was Lorraine, but his interests happened to be the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine, which generated a hard push against the French.) Fortunately, starting in 1693 Leopold was able to 'deploy' a man with enough clout and ability to organise a solid defense. This was Louis of Baden, known to the public as Türkenlouis for his exploits in Hungary. He was able to work within the existing networks and even strengthen them, ensuring obligations were spread evenly and that no one was abandoned to the tender mercies of the French raiders.

The Duchy of Bavaria

Bavaria was once the homeland of the Alemanni Confederation who gave the Romans bad dreams at night. The confederation of tribes who called themselves Bavarians coalesced in the 6th Century. Eventually, they were conquered by the Frankish Empire and Bavarian became a ducal territory; as the Carolingian Empire contracted it became what is known as a 'stem duchy' of the emerging Holy Roman Empire. Always a major player, it was given to the Wittelsbachs in 1180. Two hundred years later a Wittelsbach became Emperor and the duchy became extremely powerful, for its day. After that, the Germanic practice of subdividing territory among a prince's heirs broke the 'mini-empire' up. Still, the duchy played an important part in the Thirty Years War. By then its dukes were Electors of the Empire (1546), enjoying familial ties with the Habsburg emperors and with the Counts Palatine and several lesser principalities.

The current duke was Maximilian II Emmanuel, born in 1662 and duke since 1679. He was thus only 27 at the outbreak of the war. Born in Munich, his father was of the Wittelsbach House, the hereditary Electors of Bavaria, but his mother was a princess of the House of Savoy, and her own mother was a daughter of King Henri IV of the House of Bourbon. On his father's side he could also claim a Holy Roman Emperor (Ferdinand II), and on his mother's side a princess of Spain. Duke Max's eldest son, by his first wife, who soon died, was a prime candidate for the Spanish throne, but unfortunately this son died in 1699, which is one of the reasons the War of the Spanish Succession occurred. Duke Max's second wife was the daughter of the King of Poland, John III Sobieski. One of his other sons, Charles VII, would become Holy Roman Emperor (for a short time during the War of the Austrian Succession). The House of Wittelsbach was rather left in the dust by the scramble for demi-royal trappings by the German princes, which led Duke Max to organise his family into a strong voting bloc within the Empire — they held four electoral votes, more than the Habsburgs.

Like most of his contemporaries, he was a patron of the arts. Works in the Italian style he inherited from his parents, but he himself preferred the French style and, for good or ill, instituted the art form known as Bavarian Rococo. Duke Max inherited his father's titles when he was still a minor and remained under a Regency until 1680. In 1683 he fought at the Siege of Vienna, and in 1688 made his reputation by capturing Belgrade.

For the French, the critical period of dealing with Duke Max was in 1688. Prior to the war his Court was littered with French agents, who very nearly persuaded him to league with King Louis. Unfortunately, he talked with an Imperial agent just before making his final decision. Duke Max was like that. He was young, and he was ambitious, and he was also rather frivolous. The Emperor tempted him with dreams of riding through mounds of Turkish dead.



[Maximilian II Emmanuel, by Jean Nocret.]

Ironically, the year after Belgrade the Emperor decided he was the perfect candidate to defend the Empire in the West. Leopold felt that Duke Max's rival, Lorraine, would do better in the East, where his name alone was 'worth an army', and that Duke Max had just a great a stake in the West — the French had already raided his lands, and he was young and energetic. But Charles of Lorraine put on his best 'puppy dog' face — he wanted to command a crusade to regain his ancestral lands — and got the job instead, which occasioned jealousy.

In a sulk, Duke Max had to be adroitly coaxed by Lorraine to join the campaign of 1689. When Lorraine died before the next campaign opened in 1690, Duke Max found himself with the option of sharing command with another rival, the Duke of Saxony, or taking command of the Imperial forces in Italy. After fighting alongside his cousin Duke Victor of Savoy for a while, Duke Max was invited to become Governor General of the Spanish Netherlands. The appointment was a simple matter but the 'backstory' is somewhat complex. As a potential heir of the Spanish Crown — his son's claim descended from his own — he was qualified to act as a Spanish official. King William wanted to replace the current Viceroy, Gastañaga, with someone who did not always have to ask Madrid for permission, and the Emperor wanted to have someone who could represent Imperial interests. Though Duke Max had a deserved reputation as a good soldier, Duke Victor

of Savoy was less than impressed with his performance as his generalissimo and wanted to get him out of Italy.

For Duke Max himself, there was the possibility of extending his family's holdings when the Prince-Bishopric of Liège needed a new ruler. And so, he became Governor General, remaining in that post until the transfer of the Spanish Netherlands to Austria in 1714. Even then, since he fought on the side of France in the War of the Spanish Succession, living in exile in French-occupied Belgium much of the time, he retained ownership of Luxembourg and Namur. Ultimately, one of his heirs became Holy Roman Emperor, but Duke Max did not live to see the day. He died of a stroke in 1726.

Thanks to his complete lack of interest in the more mundane details of maintaining an army, or indeed any sort of Administration at all, as a military power Bavaria's army had definitely fallen in both size and stature since the generation of the 1640s. But the Bavarians were still accounted good soldiers, if anyone could actually get them into the field on time.

Saxony

There have been two Duchies of Saxony.. The first was Carolingian, carved out of the lands where the Saxon Confederation lived. The second grew out of the accumulation of land holdings made by the various families who were awarded the Electoral title of Duke of Saxony (a name which bore little relation to said lands) during the Middle Ages. In 1422 both the electoral privilege and the lands were awarded to the House of Wettin, who were the rulers of Meißen and Thuringia. The House's territories were hereafter known as Upper Saxony. In 1685 an inheritance dispute led to the division of the lands and family into two branches, the Ernestine and Albertine. Imagine a very rough rectangle, cut into quarters. The Ernestines claimed the northwest and southeast quadrants, and the Albertines the northeast and southwest. Ultimately the younger, Albertine branch became the Kings of Saxony in the 19th Century.

The Reformation saw Saxony adopt Protestantism like many of the other North German states. The Ernestine Duke gave protection to Martin Luther, though apparently remaining Catholic himself. There was strife with the Albertines, who remained opposed to Protestantism for some time, but eventually all of Saxony was made Protestant when the Emperor handed down his edict that each prince should be free to choose the confession of his own realm, provided everyone within it followed the same confession.

The religious struggles, however, especially during the Schmalkaldic War (1546-47) resulted in the loss of some Ernestine land. What they had left was then subdivided again and again until there were a host of minor duchies, Saxe-Coburg, Saxe-Meiningen, Saxe-Gotha, to name a few. By 1554 the Ernestines were left with only the Thuringian lands, basically the southwest quadrant. The

Albertines had permanently acquired the Electoral title and were styled Electoral Dukes of Saxony. Further adjustments took place in the Thirty Years War. The Elector of that day, John George, more or less successfully navigated his way through the war at the cost of his reputation and a number of concessions to the Emperor, for which he received some rewards.

Thus, by the time of the Nine Years' War, there were various kinds of 'Saxony'. In the primary sources, the Albertines are called the Electoral Dukes of Saxony, or *Kursachsen*. They had a fairly powerful *Kursachsen* Army, which, like the armies of Brandenburg and Bavaria, belonged to the State, in the person of the Elector. But there were other Saxon dukes or princes, some with their own small militaries, like Saxe-Gotha, belonging to the Ernestine branch. Some of these were, again like Saxe-Gotha, significant enough to negotiate on their own with the Emperor, while others participated in Imperial politics as part of the either the Upper Saxon or Franconian Circles (most belonged to the former, but often hired themselves out to the latter). For example, Saxe-Gotha contributed regiments to the Franconian contingent but also hired regiments out to fight in Flanders. *Kursachsen* regiments, in contrast, almost always served only under their Duke or his representative, the exception being units offered to the Emperor for use in the War of the Holy League (and even then the Saxons insisted on placing the units under their own commanders).

Three Saxon Electors reigned during the Nine Years' War. The first was Johann Georg III (born 1647, reigned 1680-91). He was the most militant of the three, appointed a Marshal of the Empire and nicknamed the 'Saxonian Mars'. Before the war he established a small but effective standing army on the model of Brandenburg. His relations with the Emperor were rocky. Leopold did not trust him and only called on him for help when he thought the Turks were going to capture Vienna (1683); after, though the *Kursachsens* fought as auxiliaries, they were treated as second-class citizens by the Imperial forces. Also, the Duke's Protestant subjects objected strongly to his aiding the Catholic Leopold. Johann Georg III's response to French aggression was mixed. He did not formally join the League of Augsburg, but he did have personal talks with William of Orange and the Elector of Brandenburg about collective action. During the war, he sat out the first campaign in 1688, but brought his army to support Charles of Lorraine's 1689 offensive and in 1690 actually commanded the Imperial forces in the West. Unfortunately he died of dysentery while on campaign.

His successor was Johan Georg IV (born 1668, reigned 1691-94). Johan Georg IV let himself be advised by his ex-Brandenburg army commander, Hans Adam von Schöning. In keeping with the trend toward forming a neutralist Third Party in North Germany, Schöning advocated a union with Brandenburg in opposition to Leopold. The Elector then approached the Emperor with

certain proposals which Leopold refused to agree to. In reply, the Elector pulled his troops out of the war (though he continued to support the Emperor in Hungary). Johan Georg IV was also embroiled in the Neidschütz Affair of 1692, where he attempted to murder his wife in order to marry his mistress. As this may suggest, he had very little interest in the war against France. He and his mistress died together, of smallpox in 1694.

The man who saw out the rest of the war was his younger brother, Friedrich Augustus I The Strong (born 1670, reigned 1694-1733). Friedrich, who was also called 'the Saxon Hercules' and 'Iron-Hand', really was physically strong. He used to break horseshoes with his bare hands. He had also managed to prevent his brother from killing the latter's wife, receiving a wound that might have crippled a weaker man. He is also famous for the large number of children he fathered. Like his brother, Friedrich was not much interested in the war with France. He reorganised and expanded his army, and fulfilled his Imperial commitments just to keep the Emperor off his back, but his main focus was on obtaining the throne of Poland, which he did in 1697, shortly before the war ended. This would give his dynasty power and authority outside the confines of the Empire — an example that would be followed by Brandenburg and Hanover.

[Johann Georg III (left), J.G. IV (right), and Friedrich Augustus (below)]



Franconia and Swabia

Franconia as a region lay in the center of Germany, touching the border of Bohemia in the east and reaching the rivers of the Main and Neckar in the west. Franconia as a Circle of the Empire comprised 25 small states, ranging from the fairly significant Prince-Bishopric of Würzburg and Margraviate of Bayreuth, down to a series of Imperial Free Cities, such as Nuremberg.

Swabia as a region lay south of Franconia, bordering Bavaria on the east and the Rhine on the west. Swabia as a Circle of the Empire comprised 119 small states, ranging from Imperial Free Cities and even individual monasteries, to the fairly significant states of Baden and Württemberg.

Militarily, these states had to pool their resources to fulfill their Imperial commitments, but some of them, notably Bayreuth, whose Margrave was related to the Electors of Brandenburg, Baden, whose ruler was an Imperial Fieldmarshal, and Würzburg, whose bishop was a mover-and-shaker, had significant personal influence.

During the war, the Franconians successfully leagued with the Swabians to create a political lobby strong enough to manipulate the Emperor and a military force strong enough to carry the ball for the Empire against the French.

Württemberg was an odd duck. As the largest Swabian state one would expect it to have a significant military force. Well, it did, but nearly all of it was either fighting in Hungary or under contract in the Low Countries. To this can be added the fact that for part of the war its Duke was a minor, living under an ineffective Regency. In any case, power in Württemberg was by custom diffused among several hundred noble families. When he was, by special dispensation, made Duke in 1693, the 16-year-old Eberhard Louis demonstrated a complete lack of interest in ruling. The French milked Württemberg for *Contributions* every chance they got.

The Prince-Bishopric of Münster

Münster, a member of the Lower Rhenish-Westphalian Circle lying between the Weser and Holland, was well away from the war zone, but deserves a mention for the role its small army played in the war. Its prince-bishop immediately before the war was Maximilian Henry of Bavaria, a militant soul who was granted leave and funds to build an army of 6,000 men. Like Brandenburg's father, Maximilian was pro-French, and assisted them during the Dutch War. Also like the Brandenburger, he died the year the Nine Years' War broke out, in June of 1688.

His replacement was Friedrich Christian von Plettenberg, an experienced diplomat. He had no interest in expanding Münster's geographical footprint, but he did retain his predecessor's army, which he took steps to modernise, and he saw no reason why it should not be gainfully employed. Several times during the war, notably in 1689

and in the last few years, the Münster division participated with distinction in the fighting either on the Rhine or in the Low Countries.

Hesse

The region known as Hesse was the land occupied by the Hessians, or, using the name they went by in Roman times, the Chatti (by the convoluted rules known only to linguists, the words 'Chatti' and 'Hessian' are related). The Frankish Empire split the tribal lands in two, creating a Frankish and a Saxon Hesse, the latter being a march, or border zone, facing the as yet unconquered Saxons. Hesse-Cassel derives from the former while the latter was eventually incorporated into Franconia. Geographically the region lies in west-central Germany, some distance back from the Rhine, but there were exceptions. Outlying Hesse-Darmstadt owned territory on the right bank, oddly enough, around the city of Darmstadt. Hesse-Rheinfels, a very junior branch, also held lands on the Rhine. Most significantly of all, the Hessians owned an ex-Imperial county called Katzenelnbogen, which straddled the Rhine south of Koblenz.

Initially Hesse was all one, the Hessengau, which in the middle of the 13th Century became a Landgraviate — that is, a province with its own ruler, rather than one administered directly by the Imperial Court, as a *gau* would be. In 1567 the newly deceased Landgrave's sons divided the realm among themselves, so that four new states were created: Hesse-Cassel, Hesse-Darmstadt, Hesse-Rheinfels, and Hesse-Marburg (to be pedantic, the last one already existed).

The various branches of the family were not always on the same page, politically. During the Thirty Years War Hesse-Darmstadt fought for the Emperor while Hesse-Cassel sided with Sweden and France. Both were Protestant, but Darmstadt was Lutheran and Cassel was Calvinist.

Charles I, Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, was an important figure in the Nine Years' War. Hesse-Cassel was primarily an agricultural region. Its economy was thus fairly resilient, but also fairly static. This is why the Landgraves, beginning with Charles, maintained oversized militaries and rented them out. Charles also welcomed Huguenot exiles (about 4,000) after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, which may have contributed to Cassel's anti-Bourbon stance. During the war he and his army fought both on the Rhine and in the Low Countries; like many of the princes he sought to counterbalance the Emperor's power by leaguings with William of Orange — fighting in the same cause but not serving Leopold's interests.

Hesse-Darmstadt was the only other Hessian state of significance in relation to the war. In this case the significance was political, though there were a handful of Darmstadt regiments. The Landgrave was Ernst Ludwig, whose love of French-style ostentation ran his small country into an immense debt. Of more importance to the

war effort was his uncle, Georg Ludwig, who ultimately became an Imperial Field Marshal, fought in Hungary, in Ireland and Flanders under William of Orange, and from 1695 as the Imperial commander in Catalonia. (A hero to the Spanish, he would die in their cause in the next war, falling at Barcelona in 1705.)

King and Emperor

Louis XIV Dieudonné (1638-1715); The Sun King

Even an inadequate thumbnail biography of Louis XIV would be longer than this entire Commentary. The reader ought, however, to be given some sort of rough sketch of his early years, to help explain his motivations.

His reign lasted 72 years and 110 days, longer than any other European monarch. Men were born, lived, and died knowing no other French king but Louis Quatorze. He was the personification of France.

Louis came to the throne at age 4, at a time when the monarchy was controlled by powerful ministers of state, first Richelieu and then Mazarin. Guided by the latter, Louis would work all his life to draw all power into his own hands and stamp out Feudalism.

His parents had been married for 23 years when he was born; his mother had suffered four stillbirths. Hence his nickname, Dieudonné, the God-given. His birth was regarded as a miracle.

By custom, his mother, Anne of Austria (who, despite her name was a Spanish princess) should have assumed the Regency, but Louis XIII did not trust her judgement (or perhaps he was afraid the Habsburgs would gain too much influence over French policy) and placed his son in the care of a regency council. Anne had this ruling annulled, however, and she was Regent from 1643 until 1653. Even after that, she retained authority in religious matters. Cardinal Richelieu having died about the same time as the King, she appointed Cardinal Mazarin as his successor. Mazarin was an able, if avaricious, minister, whose authority rested on the Regent's power. Despite chafing under Anne and Mazarin's rule as he entered his teenage years, Louis remained close to his mother his whole life. It was she who instilled the belief that he was Divinely appointed to rule France.

There then followed the Wars of the Fronde, armed rebellions against the central authority of Anne and Mazarin. Even nobles like the Great Condé, who supported the Queen Dowager, did so in hopes of controlling her and the King. Louis twice experienced the necessity of flight to the countryside, and once of being virtually besieged in his palace. He gained an understanding of high politics and foreign policy very young, and became deeply mistrustful of not only the Habsburgs, who sought to destabilise his regime, but of his own nobles. In response, he converted a hunting lodge into the Palace of Versailles. It had a dual purpose:

a home away from the tumult of Paris, and a genteel prison for his nobles.

Though Louis reached the age of majority in 1651, he did not actually assume the kingly authority until 1661, when Mazarin died.

'Up to this moment I have been pleased to entrust the government of my affairs to the late Cardinal. It is now time that I govern them myself. You [he was talking to the secretaries and ministers of state] will assist me with your counsels when I ask for them. I request and order you to seal no orders except by my command ... I order you not to sign anything, not even a passport ... without my command; to render account to me personally each day and to favour no one'.

In short: 'L'Etat, c'est Moi'.



[King Louis in 1690, by Jean Nocret.]

Though his mother had laid the groundwork, Louis was greatly aided in his bid to achieve absolute control over the State because most people were tired of civil war and he offered them Stability. The early years of his personal reign were spent reforming the Government, and indeed the conduct of domestic politics in general, and in squelching anyone, like the powerful finance minister Fouquet, who thought they could play by the old rules. Secure on his throne, Louis then turned his attention to foreign wars, partly to enhance his reputation, partly to give his nobility an outlet for their energies, and partly to put the rest of Europe in its place, as he had done to all

his domestic opponents. The Nine Years' War was the second such affair.

Leopold I, Holy Roman Emperor

The Habsburgs were a Swiss-Swabian family (the name comes from Habichtsburg, or Hawk Castle, located in what is now Switzerland but what was then Swabia). They first appear in the 11th Century. After only a few generations, they had spread their influence eastward and owned most of the region now known as Austria; at the same time, they became off-and-on Emperors of the *Reich*. By 1500 the family was powerful enough to marry into both the Burgundian and Spanish dynasties, so that under Emperor Charles V, the Habsburgs controlled Germany, the Czech (Bohemian) and Hungarian Crowns, the Low Countries, much of Italy, the Iberian Peninsula, and both the Spanish and Portuguese overseas empires. Such a vast conglomerate had little chance of holding together — Charles V found the effort so great that he abdicated, after dividing it between his two sons. By the 17th Century, the Spanish and Austrian Houses were quite distinct, with separate, sometimes antagonistic policies, though their enemies persisted in seeing a unified bloc. Reunification remained a dream of the dynasty, but only a dream.

A first cousin of the Sun King, Leopold Ignaz Joseph Balthasar Felician was born 9 April 1640, at Vienna, and died at Vienna on 5 May 1705. His was the longest reign of any Habsburg Emperor, almost 47 years. His father was Emperor Ferdinand III and his mother Maria Anna of Spain. As a second son, he only became heir apparent when his elder brother died in 1654, being elected King of the Romans in 1658. This meant that his early schooling pointed him toward a career in the clergy and he remained heavily influenced by Jesuit thinking and Jesuit ministers throughout his reign.

From a thin, sickly, bookish boy, he grew into a thin, sickly, bookish man, short in stature and with the usual Habsburg features. He was highly educated and preferred the company of educated people. He could speak and read five languages; Italian was the language of his Court. Since his mother was Spanish, he knew that language. German, of course, and one could not live in 17th Century Europe without knowing French. Official correspondence was always conducted in Latin. Like his father, Leopold enjoyed music and was quite talented, but he also had a strong interest in theology and metaphysics.

These attributes were counterbalanced by a lack of interest in military affairs — despite the many wars he fought — and a lack of courtly manners. One historical commentator wrote, 'His gait was stately, slow and deliberate; his air pensive, his address awkward, his manner uncouth, his disposition cold and phlegmatic.' In this he took after his Spanish mother. Spanish monarchs cultivated *gravitas* and Christian piety above all else. With

regard to military affairs, for Leopold war was never about acquisition or *gloire*, but about the preservation of the Reich and his House.



[Emperor Leopold I in 1672, by Benjamin von Block]

The War Machines

General Points

In broad terms, the various armies were much the same. The French were a single national force and the most advanced in tactical developments (except perhaps for the Dutch, who had developed the system of platoon-firing), the operational art, and siegecraft, but were hindered by King Louis's need to juggle resources for four separate fronts. Their opponents suffered the typical limitations of a 'coalition of the willing' but the individual armies were sound enough.

A given army's field force was divided into infantry and cavalry, with cavalry divided into horse and dragoons; some horse was 'heavy' and some 'light'. The infantry was primarily professional, but militia battalions could be employed in the line on occasion. Artillery and other specialists were professionals but semi-civilian in nature, except for the French, who had already turned the gunners into a formal branch of the military.

Armies had a commander in chief; in Germany this was a *Maréchal* for the French and the Emperor's *Generalleutnant* for the Germans. French marshals were given a wide latitude and even the power to conduct

diplomacy. These powers the German commander also had, but he was more tightly controlled. On the other hand, he had the full authority of the Emperor and out ranked everyone else. This was a necessity when commanding multi-state armies. Indeed, in practical terms the Imperial generalissimo only had full authority over the army under his direct command. This was the one serving on the Upper Rhine. Farther down the river, the local princes, particularly Brandenburg, did as they pleased.

The overall commanders were assisted by generals and lieutenant generals commanding the three branches of the combat arms, and by lesser generals commanding specific components of the army on the battlefield, acting as garrison commanders, or leading detachments.

Cavalry was the premier arm both in battle and in raiding or 'coursing'. During sieges, infantry was more important. Warfare was a matter of large armies manoeuvring, generally to initiate or lift a siege against some fortress, or simply to lay waste to a region, denying its resources to the other side and making a political statement. Battles were grand affairs, risky and rare. If detachments were sent out on *courses*, the main body functioned as a rallying point; the armies entrenched themselves in <hopefully> unassailable positions while such raids were being conducted.

The geography of the region, which will be described later, dictated where the armies could operate. But, one point that should be mentioned now is the fact that the limited space for manoeuvre on a grand scale, encouraged the construction of huge defensive lines, reminiscent of the Great War. The French dug several to cover various strategic chokepoints, but the Germans endeavoured to extend theirs across the whole of the Upper Rhine, from the southern end of the Black Forest, all the way to the Neckar River. Between these safe zones, the armies crisscrossed no-mans-land for nine years, turning it into a desert.

As to dress and equipment, the infantry on both sides wore similar clothes: the '*justacorps*' or overcoat, waistcoat, trousers with stockings exposed, shoes, and hat. Styles might vary. The Spanish, for example, sometimes wore their hats with the brims turned down while other nations pinned them up on three sides to make the 'tricorné'. The French led fashion among the Germans.

Equipment varied with the regiment and its particular mix of arms, but infantrymen would have either a musket or a pike (in general, pikemen were no longer armoured) and a sword or knife. Cavalry would have a sword, varying in nature between cuirassier or 'heavy horse', dragoon, and hussar, plus a carbine (musket for dragoons) and a couple of pistols. The Spanish maintained a tradition of close-quarter fighting with dagger and sword, while the French were pioneering the use of the bayonet.

'Musket' is actually a generic term; what the men carried would either be matchlocks or fusils. Matchlocks were muzzle-loaded smoothbore weapons fired by touching the end of a piece of smouldering rope known as 'match' to a pan of gunpowder. They were heavy enough to require a forked stick, or rest, to support the barrel when firing. One, older, version still in use was the arquebus. The advantage of the arquebus was that, although a matchlock, it was lighter and could be fired without using a rest.

Matchlocks were gradually being phased out in favour of the safer fusil, which was an early version of the familiar flintlock musket. Flintlocks were safer around gunpowder stores, so were often used by the guards to the artillery train, and aboard ship. They were also lighter, and did not require large coils of lighted match that might get entangled in a neighbour's gunpowder cartridges and set them off. 'Fusil' is simply the French word for flintlock. The tradeoff with the fusil was a lighter bore and less range and stopping power.

Cavalry carbines and dragoon muskets were fusils. Pistols could be flintlocks or wheel locks, the latter igniting the charge by a spinning wheel that sent off a shower of sparks. Wheel locks were far more reliable, but very expensive.

The war in the Alps helped drive the spread of the fusil among the French, despite the fact that regulations stipulated the use of heavy-bore matchlocks, thanks to Catinat's pre-war experiences fighting the Vaudois. However, the economic demands of the war naturally meant many units continued to use the older matchlocks. Ironically, militia and irregulars might well be armed with fusils while some line regiment was stuck with matchlocks, simply because of a particular unit's recruitment location or its colonel's 'contacts'. Even the 'backward' Spanish seem to have had a significant number of fusils in service by this time.

Experts are divided on just how much use the pike received this late in the 17th Century, but it seems clear that it was still an important component of battlefield tactics, though in just a few years it would vanish entirely from most armies. Pikes were, of course, replaced by the bayonet, but at this time the use of the bayonet was spotty. There were two basic types, the 'plug', which was stuck into the barrel of the musket and prevented firing, and the 'socket', which fitted over the barrel. (Ring bayonets were an early form of socket bayonet.)

On the question of how pike-and-shot formations worked at this date, there is still much argument. The Spanish pioneered the formation, first with their *colunellas* (from which comes the term 'colonel', the commander of a *colunella*), and then with the *tercio*. Originally, the *tercio* was an all-arms brigade group, but by the end of the 17th Century it had become a standard regiment by another name.

Administratively the infantry was organised by company, with the companies under the authority, or *regimen*, of a single colonel forming the regiment. On campaign, the companies were grouped into battalions, with 4-5 of these being grouped into a brigade, which was the primary manoeuvre unit. In neither army were the musket and pike elements separated by company, instead, each company had some pikemen and some musketeers. On the battlefield the men were separated by job description.

All regular infantry units fought their battles in linear formation, usually in six ranks. A number of pike/musket combinations were possible. Traditionally, the pikes were clustered in the center and the musketeers stood on the either side. The unit would advance rank by rank, the musketeers firing volleys (they would retire in the same manner), and when the fighting came to close quarters, the musketeers would either drop back behind the pikes or draw swords. If charged by cavalry they could take cover under the pikes, which were a good 5 metres long. Skilled troops could even continue to fire from this position. But the pikes could also be arranged in a line behind the musketeers, or placed on the wings for flank protection. As the number of pikes dropped, they tended to be used in this fashion more and more, since there were no longer enough of them for the musketeers either to shelter 'under their wings', or to press an assault.

A trend similar to that found in other long wars, both before and since, emerged after the first couple of years of campaigning. The regimental grenadiers began to be grouped into shock units of battalion and sometimes even of brigade strength. These would be seconded to the cavalry to form mobile strike forces while the bulk of the infantry held static positions. Only in large battles were the line infantry required to participate. The formation of the French *Carabiniers* regiment (really a small 'division') was part of the same trend, and the French were not the only ones to create elite units of cavalry in this manner. Under Louis of Baden between 16-18 squadrons of *gensd'armes* were formed from the best men in the line regiments, and even some squadrons of mounted grenadiers. Frederick the Great is well known for using artillery as a substitute for the manpower he lacked, and this also was true of the French. They began the practice of manoeuvring dedicated artillery batteries (and not just battalion support pieces) on the battlefield. (Evidence that the Germans copied them at this early date is lacking; perhaps it was not possible because their artillery came from so many different sources and could not be maintained in the field enmasse.)

Cavalry tactics depended on the way the colonel wanted to equip and train his men. Mostly, the horse charged in line and clashed with the sword. A variation was to advance slowly, discharge pistols, and then charge. Even the *caracole* was still employed, where the men would ride up rank by rank and pot at the enemy with pistols before turning away. The Imperials, after many years

fighting the Turks, preferred to organise their horse in tight, square formations and employ carbines and pistols, in preference to cold steel. There was fierce debate, especially in the French Army, of the best method to employ. Progressive colonels, however, disdained the *caracole*.

The artillery and engineering arms were for the most part represented by a very few professional officers. These would employ infantrymen as labourers; engineers might also work with civilian labour. The French were the first to truly militarize their 'scientific soldiers'. Casualties among these educated elites could be heavy, especially during sieges.

The French

In contrast to its enemies the French Army was a unified whole. It had its regional fault lines, but after a series of wars that had brought men from every corner of France to fight together, regional differences were becoming mere badges of honour. In the War of the Grand Alliance, King Louis' forces were split to cover the various theatres, but regiments were routinely shunted from one front to another as the need arose — the advantage of interior lines.

Overall command of the French Army was in theory arranged so that a number of *colonel généraux* had administrative control of each branch of the service, and the army in a given theatre was commanded by a *maréchal*, who would be one of the high nobility and in addition might be one of the *colonel généraux*. In practice, King Louis had vested the authority of all the *colonel généraux* in his own person. For political reasons he went so far as to abolish the position of colonel general of infantry. Louis' desire to have full control over his Army was married to War Minister Louvois' ruthless drive for efficiency, forging a fearsome weapon.

In Italy and Catalonia, the overall commander was initially a senior general, later promoted to marshal for the usual reasons of reward for good service, the morale of the officer corps, and the recognition that they were doing a marshal's job. In the Low Countries, a general also commanded at the outset of the war, but he did such a poor job that instead of being promoted he was replaced, first by France's outstanding marshal, the *duc* de Luxembourg, and then by a pair of marshals, Villeroi and Boufflers (of whom the latter was much better); the sheer number of men under arms necessitated a divided command. No new marshals had been created since the death of Turenne at the end of the Dutch War, but in 1694 several were appointed, including Boufflers and Villeroi.

The theatre commanders were assisted by various *lieutenant généraux* in command of the infantry, cavalry, and artillery. These in turn were assisted by major generals known as *maréchals de camp*, and under them the lieutenant colonels actually commanding the regiments. The rank of brigadier had recently been

introduced as a reward for lieutenant colonels who demonstrated great ability but who lacked the social status to climb the traditional ladder to the rank of general unaided.

[The *maréchals de camp* had an administrative role and used a separate chain of command, under a *maréchal de camp général*. But on campaign they not only served as assistants to the *lieutenant généraux*, but could be given independent commands while on campaign, and on the battlefield functioned as major generals, leading brigades or wings of the army.]

Louvois tried and failed to come up with a standard format for naming regiments. Only the *Vieux* and *Petite Vieux* regiments (the oldest of the old) and the Royal regiments had fixed names. The Royal regiments all had members of the royal family for colonels, and in fact the ownership of a regiment was one of the *apanages* (perquisites) allowed a member of the royal family. The majority, the Gentleman regiments, were named after their current colonel.

French infantry regiments usually had 1 battalion in peacetime, and 2 or sometimes 3 during war. The King's regiments, the *Vieux* and *Petite Vieux* regiments, and the Swiss and German mercenaries maintained 3-4 battalions at all times. *Régiment de Dauphin* at one point is recorded with 5 battalions. Each battalion usually had 13 companies, of which one was grenadiers. Companies averaged 45-50 men, and as in most other armies were the basic administrative unit. The Swiss regiments had 200 men per company, but fewer companies overall; Swiss battalions were thus roughly the same size as the others.

Ratio of pikes to muskets in a battalion typically varied from 20% to 80%. However, some units were now fully equipped with musket and socket bayonet; fusils predominated. The French also experimented with the tactic of not stopping to fire when attacking. In the descriptions of the Battle of Staffarda, special mention is made of this. Though that particular assault was repulsed, it was at least carried through to contact, whereas the battalions might have become stuck in place if they had started trading fire.

The French in this period are often described attacking 'in the Turkish style'. This was a combined-arms tactic, where the cavalry would push through the defences and isolate the enemy infantry, which would then be assaulted by the French infantry. The practice of erecting earthen redoubts, not just as part of a siege line but even on the battlefield, aided the growth of this tactic.

The French also regularly employed *milices provinciales* (provincial militia). These battalions were comparable with the *landwehr* employed by the Prussians and Austrians in the Napoleonic period. They were always a source of drafts for the line regiments, but starting in 1690 they began to fight as units, not only in Catalonia and Italy, where the numbers of regulars were low, but in Flanders

and Germany, where they served to garrison the defensive Lines constructed during the war. Some even participated in the major battles. Their performance was usually quite good, for what they were. Typically, an understrength brigade would be given a militia battalion to round it off. A lot of the *milices provinciales* raised during the war came from the Walloon population in southern Belgium, which was under French occupation.

The French cavalry had gone from being the best in Europe to a rather unreliable body in the middle of the century, but had by now climbed back to a position of preeminence. Horse regiments (*chevaux-légère*) were equipped and fought in much the same style as those of other armies. The cuirass was not used, though required by regulation. Like the Foot, they were organised administratively into companies, but in battle fought by squadrons, which comprised 2-3 companies each. Again like the infantry, the regiments were divided into Royal and Gentlemen, plus a few foreign ones. As with the infantry, the Gentlemen regiments were known by their colonel's name and the Royal regiments all had members of the royal family for colonels.

Three cavalry units require special mention. These are the *Maison du Roi*, the *Petite Gendarmerie* and the *Carabiniers*. In 1679 the French added 2 carabiniers, equipped with rifled carbines, to every *chevaux-légère* company. They were to function as a security and scouting detail, and could be used as snipers. In 1690 these men were permanently grouped in their own companies, and in the Italian campaign of 1691 reference is made to 19 companies fighting as a single body. However, it was not until 1693 that all the companies were formally stripped from their regiments to form *les Carabiniers Royale*. This unit was composed of 100 companies, arranged in 5 brigades, each brigade being about the same size as a normal regiment. According to the records, 3 brigades fought in Catalonia, and 2 on the Rhine and in Flanders.

The *Petite Gendarmerie*, successors of the *compagnies des ordonnances*, served mainly on the Rhine and in Flanders (this author has elsewhere incorrectly stated they spent most of their time in the latter place). They were present in Italy in 1693 and 1696. This corps, also known as the *Gendarmerie de France*, was not of the *Maison du Roi*, or Household troops, but the most senior unit of the Line, and enjoyed a special status as 'almost guards'. Its members were of the poor nobility. In 1694 there were 16 companies in 8 squadrons; each company had 80 men. This made the unit equivalent to 3 or 4 regular line regiments (depending on how many squadrons the latter might have). Though 'heavy' horse, they were no longer fully armoured. Half of each squadron were true *gens d'armes* (heavy men-at-arms) and the other half *chevaux-légère*. As an elite force, they naturally had the best mounts and the most skilled riders.

The *Maison du Roi* were the crème de la crème. The unit's 'classic' form was actually quite new at this date. Louis XIV made a general reorganisation in 1671. Before then it was known as the *Sergens d'Armes* (sergeants at arms) or *Porte Masses de la Garde des Rois* (gate corps of the kings' guard). After the reorganizations there were two divisions: the *Gardes du Corps*, of four companies, led by the commander of the Scots company (which had a built-in command staff) and the *Maison Rouge*, comprising the remaining units: *Gendarmes de la Garde*, *Chevaux-Légers de la Garde*, *Mousquetaires Noir et Gris*, and *Grenadiers à Cheval de la Garde*. The *Petite Gendarmerie*, technically only the premier regiment of the Line, were conventionally treated as a third, reserve division, though they did operate independently. In theory the *Maison du Roi* accompanied the King or whatever member of the royal family was present on campaign, but in practice, one element of the formation might be in attendance at Versailles while the rest campaigned under a senior marshal. Elements went with the Dauphin on his visits to the Rhine (and there is some evidence certain elements served there independently prior to and after his arrival) but otherwise the formation fought exclusively in the Low Countries.

Dragoons were a relatively new development. The French, convinced of their utility, already had 15 or so regiments when the war broke out, and they raised more. Capable of fighting on foot or mounted, the latter role was becoming the norm, but they also served as dismounted security detachments and even as part of the assault force in sieges. They could rapidly deploy to provide covering fire from trenches near the breach. The French also experimented with Hussars, forming one small unit of 60 men out of a mix of volunteers and German deserters. The Imperials employed just 2 regiments of hussars on the Rhine but their effects were so out of proportion to their numbers the French were convinced of the arm's potential.

The artillery and engineering arms were where the French had an overwhelming superiority. King Louis had recently ordered the formation of two complete regiments of gunners, one of field cannon and the other of heavy guns and mortars for siege work. The *Fusiliers du Roi* was a 6-battalion regiment that combined the roles of train guards and mechanics; as in other armies the actual gunners were specialists. In 1693 the unit became the *Régiment Royale de l'Artillerie*. The other regiment, the *Royal-Bombardiers*, was smaller, and as its name suggests, performed a similar role with the siege guns and mortars. Mortars were the 'terror weapons' of their age, used to indiscriminately bombard towns.

This was the Age of Vauban, the man who could predict to the very kilogram how many stores would be required to prosecute a successful siege and how much time, to the very hour, it would take for a fortress to fall — and then list exactly what was required to prevent such an

event. Unfortunately, most French generals wanted *gloiré* rather than dull success, and Versailles operated on unrealistic timetables. So, French sieges usually involved high casualties. Nevertheless, they were still the masters of the art.

One great strength of the French Army was its system of frontier depôts, along with the rear echelon infrastructure to keep them supplied. The Allies lacked much of this preexisting infrastructure, though on some fronts it was replicated during the war. True, the system psychologically inhibited 'deep penetration of enemy territory' by large armies, but this limitation already existed in physical form.

Mention should also be made of *La Marine*, the French Navy. Suppressed by the presence of the Royal Navy and its Dutch equivalent most of the time, it served to support the campaign in Ireland until 1691 and after that gave the Coalition High Command ulcers, both in the Mediterranean and along the Channel. It did not, however, support the fighting along the Flanders coast in the same way the Coalition ships did, primarily because it was based at the wrong end of the Channel.

The Germans

The Imperial Army (colloquially, 'Austrian' Army) dated from a decree of 1649, as an attempt to deal with the dangers of the condottieri system of the Thirty Years War. So, it had only been around for a single generation, and in fact had been created within the lifetime of the reigning Emperor.

Out of that decree and various earlier institutions the Imperial military machine was divided into five components:

- The standing army and border defence. Nominally, the Emperor commanded the army, but in practice a *Generalleutnant* was assigned to that task. Two men held this post during the war: Charles V, Prince of Lorraine (1680 – 90) and Ludwig Wilhelm von Baden-Baden (1691 – 1707). Neither appeared in Flanders.
- During the war the bulk of the Army served in Hungary, fighting the Turks. 'Hungary' in those days referred to all the Habsburgs' eastern and Balkan possessions, though a distinction could be drawn between Hungary as the interior and the Border as... the border. The Border forces were militia, raised locally and partly paid with land and in kind, much like the Ottoman system.
- The Provincial Estates. These handled the emergency feudal levies and peasant militias on the Habsburg Hereditary Lands or *Erblände*, which were scattered throughout southern Germany.

[The Hereditary Lands had their own higher military administration that was not absorbed into the main command structure until 1705.]

- Auxiliaries. These were significant corps or divisions, to use modern terms, that were provided by the larger ducal states within the Holy Roman Empire, such as Brandenburg, Bavaria, and Saxony. Such forces belonged to their respective duke's own standing armies, as opposed to other forces raised under the aegis of the *Kreistruppen* and *Reichsarmee*.
- Circle (*Kreis*) Associations which raised forces for defence of the Empire within their own areas of responsibility. The Empire was at various times divided into as many as ten Circles, such as the Upper Rhine, Lower Rhine, and Saxon. Confusingly, a Circle might have the same name as one of the major states (e.g., Saxony) but overlap its jurisdiction with a multitude of smaller territories or even with other dukedoms. The Associations were somewhat experimental in nature and usually ad hoc. They appear from time to time as a response to Imperial inertia in the face of an immanent threat. The League of Augsburg was in part such an Association, and like most of the others, proved ineffective until backed by Imperial authority.
- The 'official' defence of the Reich was entrusted to the *Reichsarmee*, which drew a specific allotment of forces from each of the Circles. The Imperial administration would decide whether this would be the 'basic' requirement or a more intense commitment. Things become somewhat confused when one realises that members could send money instead and that money could be used to hire regiments from a ducal standing army, or that said regiments could be loaned to the *Reichsarmee* in exchange for ducal privileges while the rest of the ducal standing army fought as its own corps (or remained out of the fight). The Habsburgs ruled their empire through a never ending series of bilateral agreements.

At the very top of the Emperor's military institution was the Aulic War Council (*Hofkriegsrat*), responsible for implementing the will of the Emperor and giving him council, for field and fortress commands, for formations, for legal matters pertaining to the army, for officer postings, and, uniquely, for diplomacy with the Sublime Porte. There were no midlevel administrative bodies between the *Hofkriegsrat* and the regiments. Organisations like brigades, divisions, and corps — even armies — were *ad hoc*, field formations only. The *Hofkriegsrat* had eight members, not all of whom were military, though the names are those of aristocratic military families. One part of the *Hofkriegsrat* was the *Generalkriegskommissariat* (General War Commissariat), responsible for inspecting fortresses, mustering recruits, quartering and supplies, and the Budget. This body was not universally respected, since its often civilian inspectors routinely annoyed honest hardworking regimental officers.

Independent of the *Hofkriegsrat* was the Court Chamber's (*Hofkammer's*) own supply department, the

Obristproviandamt. This department sent detachments into the field with the army, and was essentially responsible for its 'train'. Since these detachments were always insufficient, they wound up hiring civilian contractors.

The last administrative body of any note was the *Obrist Schiff- und Brückenmeister-Amt*. This department was responsible for the pontoon train and water transport. It also had a civil role in the transport of salt, collection of river tolls, and conduct of Court boating excursions. The unhappy personnel of this department were simultaneously subordinate to the *Hofkriegsrat*, the *Hofkammer*, and the *Generalkriegskommissariat*.

As to the Army field command, the General Headquarters was known as the *Generalstab*, but this term was a very loose one, quite different from what we understand as a general staff. It comprised the command elements of the headquarters as well as the Staff. Further distinctions were made between the *Große Generalstab* and the *Kleine Generalstab*. The Great General Staff included every general serving with the army; the Small General Staff covered the auxiliary services such as quartermaster-general, adjutant-general, and the 'Corps of Engineers'. At the highest level, supply was handled by the *Kriegsfaktoren*, who advanced credit and purchased or requisitioned the necessary stores from the civilian economy.

In the field, the *Generalleutnant* could count on the advice of his *Kriegsrat*, or council of war. This was an advisory body consisting of the leading generals. At all levels of command, but especially the highest, decision by committee was encouraged; a general who ignored the advice of his peers was considered an idiot, or on an ego trip. The drawbacks to this method are obvious, and are often cited as a cause of the poor operational performance of the Habsburg Army, but it was deemed necessary due to the large number of auxiliary contingents present, since protocol — and service contracts — demanded that auxiliary commanders have an equal say, particularly since some auxiliary commanders were rulers of their own states.

The Officer Corps

The highest rank was that of *Generalleutnant*, appointed deputy of the Sovereign. He was not supposed to be a member of the dynasty, but an outsider, like Montecuccoli or Eugene of Savoy, displaying *personal* loyalty to the Emperor. When no officer of sufficient standing appeared members of the dynasty stepped in, but this was always a last resort.

In descending order, the General Officer ranks were *Feldmarshal*, *General der Kavallerie*, *Feldzugmeister*, *Feldmarshallieutnant*, and *Generalfeldwachtmeister*. The rank of *Feldzugmeister* is often used promiscuously, but it should be applied to Generals of Infantry. It can also be used for Generals of Engineers, but usually engineer

generals were simply generals of some other sort with expertise in that field. Similar rank structures were present in the various ducal armies, though sometimes the terms *generalleutnant*, *generalmajor*, and brigadier were employed. In these instances the names carry their modern connotations. Imperial rank was always regarded as one grade higher than the equivalent rank in a ducal army.

Most generals came from outside the *Erblände*, or Habsburg property, since the men of rank within it preferred Court service. Even in the highest administrative body, over half the members were neither Austrian nor Bohemian. In fact, the officer corps had a decidedly cosmopolitan flavour. Poles and French were not well represented, but Italians were, *Reich* Germans, of course — often seconded from other armies — and Irish.

The Habsburgs encouraged the importation of officers. It ensured a larger talent pool, but most importantly, it ensured loyalty to the dynasty rather to the province of origin. Ironically, the men were attracted by the offer of land and titles within the Habsburg realms.

Until the reforms of Maria Theresa, the Military was run in a decentralised manner, with the Regiment as the focal point. Regiments were assigned to provinces and obtained their funds, recruits, and supplies locally (except that substitution, if practised, allowed recruiting elsewhere). However, funding and the buying and selling of regiments was monitored by the State.

The Colonel-Proprietor, having paid the Emperor a sum for the privilege of raising a regiment, treated it just like any other investment and could run it more or less as he liked. He ruled like a feudal lord, having the power of life and death over his human 'property', the right to nominate officers for promotion, the right to permit officers to marry, and the right to drill the regiment as he desired. He was also entitled to a share of a dead officer's estate if the man died intestate.

In the case of an established regiment, whenever there was a vacancy the Colonel-Proprietor was appointed by the Emperor, according to strict seniority. This meant that *regimental* seniority was not based on the age of a unit, or its status, but on the seniority of its commander. Due consideration was given to merit, as well as seniority, but seniority was the key factor to promotion. This was actually a good thing, as aristocratic younger-son amateurs were restricted in their entry rank. Many of the lesser officers were commoners.

As in most regimental systems, the Colonel-Proprietor did not 'fight' his own regiment; he was always a General Officer. Actual command devolved onto the Lieutenant Colonel, with a Second Colonel given all the mundane chores.

The standing army of the Habsburg Monarchy originated, like those of the rest of Europe, in the periodic hiring of mercenaries and the mustering of militia for long campaigns. Paid by the Crown, they were politically reliable (most of the time), unlike feudal hosts. In the beginning, men were attracted to the colours by recruitment bounties, paid per campaign. But as the wars got longer, it became cheaper to retain soldiers under arms instead of disbanding them in the winter. Often the same men were being paid for each campaign; often they refused to fight until they had received their bounties.

The first standing army was run by the Habsburg Estates, but the fledgling apparatus was destroyed during the Thirty Years War and replaced by the familiar entrepreneurial system, where military captains contracted with the State to provide bodies of troops. The most famous of these men was, of course, Wallenstein. He was also the last of the great mercenary captains, being murdered on the Emperor's orders after he got too big for his boots.

The dangers inherent in hiring mercenary armies who were only loyal to their paymaster led the Habsburgs to follow the prevailing European trend of subjecting the Army to the State, though some of the entrepreneurial spirit survived. Unlike some states, the Habsburg Monarchy went so far as to use conscription, arguing that the men were eligible under the laws for serving 'in defence of the realm' (i.e., the men were called up under the regulations for the old feudal levy). Conscription was necessary because voluntary enlistment would not yield the required numbers.

The methods used when filling quotas varied. Some districts simply rounded up undesirables and shipped them off. Others contributed money in substitution, so that the regiments in their area could send recruiting parties off to exotic locales in the *Reich*. Subcontracting was permitted. Eventually a routine developed across the Monarchy: in peacetime, the regiments did their own recruiting, usually of experienced men and NCOs, ensuring they maintained a reasonable cadre, then in wartime the so-called *Landrekrutenstellung* conscripted raw manpower. Perhaps half of these came from the Habsburg Estates; the rest were obtained from the Empire and elsewhere.

Tall men were preferred, since in theory they could handle a musket better. Average age was 25-30. Apart from Germans, the regular army had many Czechs and Hungarians. Walloons and Italians were well represented, but also Poles, Jews, and even French. (Gypsies were *officially verboten*.) In the 'German' regiments, everyone had to learn 'Army German'; in the 'national' units, the men spoke their own language.

The Standing Army (or Habsburg Army) consisted of 19 cuirassier regiments and 11 dragoon regiments. For the current war, and after, Württemberg supplied an

additional regiment of each on a longterm contract. One of the dragoon regiments began life as a free corps, and another was only raised in 1691, replacing one that was disbanded the same year. There were 4 official hussar regiments, 2 of which served on the Rhine from 1690. Dragoon and Cuirassier regiments were supposed to be of 1,000-1,200 men in 6 squadrons (12 companies plus an elite company of grenadiers or carabinieri, respectively). Hussar regiments were also 1,000 men strong, but in 5 squadrons (10 companies).

The infantry consisted of 23 prewar regiments of 2 battalions each, most of which were augmented to 3 battalions in 1695, 7 single battalion regiments, most of which were disbanded mid-war and none of which served in the West, 1 regiment of 3 battalions hired on a long contract, and 8 regiments of between 2-3 battalions raised or hired during the war, mostly for service in Hungary and Italy. There were also 5 official Haiduk (Hungarian levy) regiments of 2 battalions each. One regiment fought on the Rhine late in the war. A 3-battalion line regiment comprised 15 fusilier and 2 grenadier companies – 5 line companies per battalion. Infantry battalions were nominally around 1,000 men each.

The Artillery was divided into *Feldartillerie* and *Hausartillerie*. The latter included both fortress (garrison) and siege guns. The same organisation ran the arsenals and artillery depots, rather like the British Ordnance Board. The field artillery comprised the battalion guns used by the infantry, and the larger 'battery' pieces, most of which were not very manoeuvrable.

Until 1700, artillery personnel were seconded to the Army for individual campaigns without being a part of the institution, much like the supply services. Although the number of companies was reduced from 6 to 4 in 1695, the number of personnel continued to be 600. They had their own ranks and pay scale, their own administrative bodies. As technicians, gunners were rated more highly than their equivalents in the cavalry and infantry, and the arm as a whole had great prestige, even before Liechtenstein's reforms made it the best in Europe. Higher pay meant there was no shortage of recruits, but the men had to be literate. A good proportion came from Bohemia; indeed, foreigners were not permitted to serve as 'other ranks', thanks to the 'cutting edge' technical nature of the work. Infantrymen made up the labour force.

Gun calibres were of the usual types, 3- 6- and 'light' 12-lber field guns and 'heavy' 12- 18- and 24-lber 'positional' artillery. There were 7' and 10' howitzers and 10- 30- 60- and 100-lb mortars; also 'perriers' — mortars firing stone grapeshot. These calibres were also used by the French. Much of the artillery park used on the Rhine was stored at various cities in the region, such as Stuttgart and Frankfurt am Main. For a major effort, such as that of 1689, extra cannon had to be brought in from as far away as Prague.

The administrative body for the Artillery was called the *Obrist Land- und Hauzeugamt*, directly subordinate to the *Hofkriegsrat*, and often run by one of its members. Under it were the various field corps. Originally there were three corps: German, Netherlandish, and Lombardic. However, despite their regional affiliations, members of any corps could expect to serve in any theatre. There was also the — garrison artillery. Miners were considered part of the Artillery, but not the Engineers.

The arsenals and gun foundries coming under the *Hausartillerie* were administered in a hierarchy stemming from the principal arsenal at Vienna, except for elements relating to the field artillery which were incorporated in the *Feldzeugamt*. The department responsible for command and administration was called the *Artilleriestab*. Finally, there was the *Rosspartei*, which arranged for transport.

The Pontoon Corps was as much a branch of the Navy as of the Engineers, since many of its personnel were watermen of one form or another. It was a separate organisation, the *Obrist Schiff- und Brückenmeister-Amt*.

Supply services were largely contracted civilians; this included the teams needed to pull the guns and supply wagons, plus the sources of food, clothing and equipment. Medical services were integrated into the regimental system. They improved as the century wore on, but the Habsburg medical branch was always accounted one of the best in Europe (keeping pace with European modernisation); unfortunately they had no ambulance service, and had to use supply wagons (which rested on the assumption that the drivers would not flee the battlefield).

Forces of the Reich

Within the Empire, military units fell into three categories: those belonging to a prince's own standing army, typically called ducal or '*kur-whomever*' regiments (though some belonged to lesser princes like the Landgraves of Hesse), those raised to fulfill the commitments of a Circle or *Kries*, known as *kreistruppen*, and regiments raised specifically to serve the Emperor or to be hired to other states.

As a rule of thumb, ducal armies were better troops, because the princes had great influence among the states comprising their Circles and naturally kept the best for themselves. However, some of the *Reichsarmee* troops were of decent quality, particularly the Swabians and Franconians. Those Circles formed a defensive league which lasted most of the war, or in other words, they militarised themselves, allowing them not only to fight the French but compete on an equal footing with the ducal armies.

In dress, equipment, and doctrine, they followed the Western European trends, modelling themselves on the Dutch, French, or Austrians, depending on where their states were located and the enthusiasms of their princes.

The German armies employed the usual colonel-proprietor system, where regiments were raised as investments and run for profit. It appears that the pike had been abandoned altogether, though this may not be true. Cavalry was expected to charge with the sword after a slow approach, the usual shooting off of carbines and pistols, and closing at the trot. Charges were executed by squadrons arranged in three ranks. This was the German Doctrine.

Bavaria, the backstop of South Germany, contributed only 1 regiment to the *Reichsarmee*, and it started out as a militia unit. The ducal army was fairly powerful, but about half of the regiments wound up fighting in the Low Countries and another quarter in Italy, so that from 1691 it lacked the strength to defend its own region. There was a strong guard element, both horse and foot, 3 regiments of horse, 2-3 regiments of dragoons, and 6-7 regiments of foot, of from 1-3 battalions. There were perhaps 3 batteries-worth of artillery.

At its height the Swabian Circle, which included Württemberg, included 3 *reiter* (horse) and 2 dragoon regiments and 8 regiments of foot. The latter tended to be large — 3-4 battalions each. There were also 2 formal *landmiliz* (militia) battalions in Württemberg. Because most of the latter's standing army was in the pay of Holland or serving in Hungary, many of the regiments serving on the Rhine started life as bodies of militia. The Franconians, including a sizeable corps hired from Saxe-Gotha and the troops of the ecclesiastical states of Kurmainz and Würzburg, amount at peak strength to 3 *reiter* regiments and 6 dragoon regiments, and 15 regiments of foot. Franconian regiments usually numbered between 1-3 battalions. Ansbach also contributed a 2-battalion regiment in 1697. Very often, such regiments were only raised to fill gaps created by the withdrawal of other member states. These Circles had some artillery of their own and a number of experienced artillerymen and engineers. These two Circles were aided by so-called Union regiments of the Upper Rhine Circle, which contributed 2 small cuirassier regiments, 4 battalions of line infantry (2 of which served multiple years in Brabant), and a militia battalion.

Moving north, the Upper Rhine Circle consisted of troops from Hesse — primarily Hesse-Cassel and Hesse-Darmstadt — and the Palatine Electorate, or Kurpfalz. For political reasons a number of the smallest states combined in a Union which preferred service with the Swabian-Franconian bloc. Thus the Hessian and Pfalz troops can almost be considered 'ducal' armies. The Hessians, under the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, covered the zone from Koblenz to the Neckar, though they intermittently fought in Brabant. In one sense the Landgrave had an unenviable job similar to that of the French *maréchal* Boufflers whose troops lay on the opposite side of the Rhine — straddling two theatres and acting as a fire brigade for both. The troops of Kurpfalz

mutinied enmasse in 1688 due partly to divided loyalties but mostly to the fact they had not been paid in a year and a half. However, by 1690 most of the Elector Palatine's regiments had been rebuilt. As a rule they served on the Middle Rhine and around Mainz until the latter years of the war, when they were seasoned enough to take the field under Louis of Baden. At greatest strength Kurpfalz had a small guards contingent, 1 *reiter* and 3 dragoon regiments, and 6 regiments of foot, of 1-2 battalions except for the Leibregiment, which had 4. Hesse-Darmstadt's military was very small; indeed in the early years the territory was virtually defenceless. There were perhaps 4 squadrons of cavalry, 2 battalions of guard infantry, and 5-7 battalions of militia. Hesse-Cassel was another matter. It had a guard component, 2 cuirassier and 4 dragoon regiments, 8 regiments of foot (1-2 battalions each), and 8 battalions of militia, but only a small artillery train. Not all the regiments were in service at the same time.

There were two other Rhenish Circles, the Lower and the Electoral. Of the former, the most influential state was that of the Prince-Bishopric of Münster, with an army of 2 cuirassier, 2 dragoon, and 7 single-battalion foot regiments, plus a small artillery train. Paderborn supplied a 2-battalion regiment by treaty. Münster played a key role in the siege of Bonn in 1689 and augmented the garrisons of the Middle Rhine in 1690. Between 1691 and 1694 the Bishop allowed himself to be wooed by the French and distracted by local matters, but between 1695 and 1697 his troops were to be seen either in Brabant or on the Upper Rhine. The Electoral Rhenish Circle comprised the electorates of Trier and Cologne. Trier had very few troops, perhaps 1-2,000 documented as garrisons. Cologne's prewar army was quite powerful but it was the tool of Cardinal Fürstenburg and disbanded when he was ousted after the siege of Bonn. A new, smaller army was built up during the war for garrison duty within the electorate; the guard element briefly saw duty in Brabant. The 'French' version included a guard horse and guard foot regiment, 3 *reiter* and 1 dragoon regiments, and 6 regiments of foot, of 1-2 battalions. Some of the units may be ephemeral because the army was still being formed when war broke out. The post-Fürstenberg army included reformed guards regiments, 4 battalions of foot, and a militia regiment.

The troops provided by the Upper Saxon Circle consisted exclusively of the ducal armies of Brandenburg and Saxony. Smaller states either supported these forces, sent contingents to Hungary, or hired themselves out to less demanding taskmasters. Both states fielded powerful armies. The Brandenburgers had the edge in organisation (of course); the Saxon Army went through a series of experiments during the war which did not help its performance, though the quality of the individual soldiers (and horses) was probably better than that of Brandenburg. Officers from each of these dukedoms often bounced back and forth between them and

Brandenburg had a large Huguenot element. The prewar commander-in-chief, Schomberg, was a Huguenot.

The Brandenburgers, who had a surprisingly low reputation at the outset of the war, saw service most years on the Middle Rhine or in Brabant (almost exclusively the latter theatre from 1695). A number of regiments were also sent to Hungary and Italy. At its peak the army had a strong guard element, 6 *reiter* and 5 dragoon regiments, and 22 regiments of foot, of 1-2 battalions each (the Leibregiment had 4). There were also various minor garrisons. A watch had always to be kept on the Swedes and Poles. Counting the regiments is a little tricky in the early years because for the offensive in 1689 companies from various regiments were grouped *ad hoc* and were in some cases then formed into new regiments. There were also 9 companies of gunners.

The Saxon Electoral Army also had a strong guard element, 7 *reiter* and 2 dragoon regiments, and up to 11 regiments of foot (1-2 battalions), plus 8 battalions of militia, various minor garrisons, and a sizeable artillery train. As mentioned, experiments were tried, so that a regiment in 1689 is not the same animal as a regiment in 1695. Regiments sent individual squadrons or battalions to Hungary and the quantity of subunits changed dramatically without really changing the overall numbers. In 1694 Saxony scaled back its war effort significantly, diverting troops to the Polish frontier, and from 1695 only 2 foot battalions were present on the Upper Rhine, paid for by the Empire. In the earlier years, however, the Saxons were a critical component of the Empire's defence on the Upper Rhine.

The armed powers of the Lower Saxon Circle consisted of Celle-Lüneburg, Lüneburg-Wolfenbüttel, Hanover, and Holstein-Gotthorp. The first three were ruled by the same dynasty, the Welfs, but all were jealous of each other. So jealous in fact that when Hanover was made the Ninth Elector a war nearly broke out between them. Most of their troops, when not keeping anxious watch over each other, fought in Brabant. Only in 1689 did they participate in the fighting the Rhine in any significant way, though the odd regiment was sent to the Middle or Upper Rhine to garrison places that were short of troops. Holstein-Gotthorp, despite being the most northerly, actually saw the most service on the Upper Rhine, because the regiments were hired out. The difficulty in determining the strength of these armies lies in the propensity of the officer corps to play 'round robin' with their regiments. At its peak strength Celle had 3 *reiter* and 2 dragoon regiments, and 6 regiments of foot, mainly of 1 battalion each. Wolfenbüttel had 3 *reiter* and 2 dragoon regiments, and 10 regiments of foot, of 1 battalion each, plus 2 battalions of militia. Hanover had 8 *reiter* and 3 dragoon regiments, and 14 regiments of foot, also mainly 1 battalion each. All three states had a guards element of both horse and foot, and all their cavalry regiments were small, 2-3 squadrons each. Each had its own small train

of artillery. Holstein-Gotthorp had a guard dragoon regiment of 2 squadrons and 6 regiments of foot, including the guards, all of 2 battalions.

The Theatre of War

[The reader may want to refer to the maps on pp. 35-36.]

For geographical purposes the Rhine is divided into a number of segments, from the sources in the Alps and the section that drains into Lake Constance, all the way to its delta. The segments of interest in this narrative are the Upper and Middle Rhine. Significant fighting on the Middle Rhine only took place in 1688 and 1689, unless one includes the minor siege of Rheinfels. The Upper Rhine was fought over for the entire war.

Above Basel the Rhine runs through hilly country but after its northward bend at that town it rapidly widens out into a flood plain. At Mainz it strikes a long wooded ridge of land running from southwest to northeast, called the Hunsrück west of the Rhine and the Taunus east of the river. The river flows west along this range before finding a way through at Bingen, entering the scenic Rhine Gorges district. Here the Middle Rhine begins.

The flood plain is wide on the left bank, narrow on the right, but cut on both sides by numerous rivers and streams, some of them very significant, like the Main and Neckar. The flats on the right bank vary in width from 10-20 Km, with particularly narrow necks at Lahr, Baden, and Heidelberg.

The Black Forest, with peaks as high as the 1,493 metre Feldberg, rises out of the level, extending eastward for between 40-50 Km. Beyond the Forest the land is gentler and more populated, watered by the Danube and Neckar, and their tributaries. In particular, the Neckar, which meets the Rhine at Mannheim, follows (against the flow) a curving path around to Heilbronn, 40 Km due east of the Rhine, past Stuttgart, then round to the west, issuing from the eastern side of the Black Forest. Paths through the Forest suitable for an army were few. There was one along the Rhine above Basel, dotted with communities known as the Forest Towns. The best route farther north was the Kinzigthal, running in a line southeast from Strasbourg and mounting the watershed to meet the valley of the Neckar on the other side.

The north face of the Black Forest peters out around the latitude of Karlsruhe. (Karlsruhe, was only one of the Duke of Württemberg's palaces at this time, and still under construction.) This 'gap' between the Black Forest and the Neckar is rolling terrain, with scattered towns and large patches of woodland. The primary march routes were either up from the Rhine Valley at Ettlingen, around the northern edge of the Black Forest to Pforzheim on the Enz (an east-flowing tributary of the Neckar), up from the Rhine Valley at Bruchsal to Bretten, or up the valley of the Kraich from Ubstadt to Gochsheim. From the Bretten-Gochsheim district an army had numerous choices, all

terminating in the Enz or Neckar, which encircle the region. The towns that receive the most mention in the campaign histories are Eppingen, midway between Pforzheim and Heilbronn, Sinsheim, a day's march to the north, about halfway between Heilbronn and Weisloch, and Dürrmenz, a similar distance to the southwest, on the Enz. Weisloch, Bretten, Ubstadt, and Bruchsal, all on the floodplain below, are likewise the most mentioned. The reader will become very familiar with them.

Two other towns crop up again and again in the sources: Mannheim, at the confluence of Neckar and Rhine, and the strong fortress of Philippsburg. Imagining a triangle with its apex pointed west, Philippsburg, Weisloch, and Bruchsal are each at one of the points. This triangle was the main stomping ground of the French armies when on the offensive. The German armies camped along the Neckar and Enz, with outposts a day or two's march to the west — at Sinsheim, for example.

Many of the urban centers south of the Neckar had defensive walls, but none were particularly strong, save Philippsburg and Breisach, both owned (since 1688 in the former's case) by the French. In the Black Forest the locals erected many hilltop entrenchments and roadblocks, and fortified their villages, but in the more open country towns tended to either open their gates or pay the French to go away. Mannheim, Heidelberg, Heilbronn, and perhaps Stuttgart, were the only other places capable of prolonged defence.

Breisach had been a significant prize in the Thirty Years War, and was still very important as a bridgehead. The French acquired it in 1648, and like all such places, it was modernised using Vauban's system. Oddly, it played only a small role in the Nine Years' War, though it was one of the prizes listed in the peace treaty, and would regain its fame in the War of the Spanish Succession.

Philippsburg, lying in the bend of an oxbow that has long since turned into a boggy lake, belonged to Speyer. The Bishops of Speyer had a tendency toward using military force to acquire things. The French took it over at the end of the Thirty Years War, but gave it back in 1676, only to besiege and capture it in the opening campaign of 1688. It became the key crossing point for their campaigns east of the Rhine; Strasbourg, being on the French side of the Rhine and much farther south, was not quite as useful. The actual crossing point behind the fortress led into another bow of the Rhine and a patch of land known as Petite Holland (more formally, the village of Mechtersheim). This is where French armies would concentrate prior to making the crossing. Karl von Clausewitz once wrote of the siege, "Philippsburg was a perfect example of how not to site a fortress. Its location was that of an idiot standing with his nose against the wall" (*On War, Book VI, p.483*). But this was from the German perspective, knowing that a French army could cross the Rhine at Strasbourg and encircle it. The Germans could not do the same because the only

crossing point they held was at Mainz and the French could (and routinely did) interpose a blocking army to cover the whole gap between the Rhine and the Vosges.

[The old French campsite at Petite Holland is today occupied by a nuclear power station.]

Mannheim lies in the narrow wedge of land between the Neckar and Rhine. Now part of Baden, it originally belonged to the Palatinate. Destroyed in the Thirty Years War and rebuilt, its defences were already antiquated. The French took it in 1689 and periodically held it, not so much as a bridgehead as a block on river traffic; at other times it was entirely abandoned. There were no permanent bridges over either river, only pontoons. Built on low-lying ground, it could only be attacked from the east, but was in that direction very vulnerable, especially from cannon and mortar fire.

Heidelberg lies on the Neckar, about 18 Km upriver from Mannheim. Famous for its university, and an Imperial City, it was also the capital of the Palatinate. This fact, and the fact that it was the southern terminus of the Bergstrasse, a critical trade route, made it a target. Sitting on the left bank of the Neckar, the town is nestled in a tight valley, with hills to the south, east, and to the north on the other side of the river. The northern hills had some redoubts placed on them, but in general the place was badly sited for defence against a 'modern' army, its walls being completely overlooked by those same hills.

Heilbronn, in contrast, was much easier to defend. It lies roughly in the middle of that section of the Neckar which flows from south to north, some 60 Km from the Rhine, and crucially, was located on the right or eastern bank of the Neckar. All the high ground was behind it, wooded hills arranged in a semicircular ring at some distance from the town.

Stuttgart, 40 Km south of Heilbronn and 70 Km from the Rhine, needs only a brief mention. It was never the object of a formal campaign, though it was raided more than once, and since its defences had been neglected, put up no resistance but paid the *contributions* demanded.

The terrain north of the Neckar is not conducive to campaigning for 17th Century armies. This is the Odenwald, a region of hills and forests as hard to traverse as the Black Forest. The Neckar runs through its southern fringes and it extends in a northeasterly direction far back into Germany, and as far north as the Main River. The French did march north along the Rhine plain, but they were always under threat of raids on their lines of communication from out of the Odenwald. In theory they could use this route to shut Mainz's backdoor, but they would risk being pinned along the Rhine if they tried. Economics made this sector strategically important, however. This was the Bergstrasse, traversed by the Bergstrasse, a raised highway connecting Heidelberg and Frankfurt am Main. The region was frequently raided. It usually fell to the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel to maintain

a motley blocking force, which could also be called upon to hasten south to the Neckar, or north to the Main.

Because the Germans held Mainz for most of the war, the French never campaigned up the Main, where a number of important towns lay: the free city of Frankfurt am Main, Hanau, and Aschaffenburg. The Main creates a gap in the rolling mass of woodland, which widens out to the northeast beyond Frankfurt, the northern terminus of the Bergstrasse. The Taunus forms the northern edge of this gap. The French, after occupying Mainz in 1688 and 1689, never sought to recapture it, so probably, they never had designs on Frankfurt.

With regard to the left bank of the Rhine, most of the flat land was under French control. From south to north, the Sundgau, Upper Alsace, and Lower Alsace, extended as to the Lauter River, where the lands of the left-bank Palatinate began. Just north of Basel the French occupied a series of redoubts at Huningen which prevented an enemy army from turning their strategic flank without annoying the Swiss. Owning Breisach on the right bank meant also they controlled the Breisgau, a buffer zone. As already mentioned there was little fighting in this neighbourhood.


Since the French were unable to retain Mainz, Alsace was naturally threatened from the north. But, by devastating all the lands below the border of Alsace, the French not only made a political statement, they hindered their enemies from advancing on them. They also made excellent use of the terrain. Though much of Alsace was either flood plain or open farmland, there were several wedges of swampy forest stretching between the wall of the Vosges and the Rhine. In each case there was a gap by the river and a gap by the mountains never more than 3-5 Km wide, and in each case the gap was occupied by a fortified town or city. The two most northerly blocking positions were actually within the Palatinate, the first on the Speyerbach, with the twin bastions of Speyer and Neustadt. Farther south was the Queich River, where the key town was Landau, a place occupied by the French before the war, because it was an enclave of Alsace. Behind that was the Lauter and the towns of Lauterbourg and Wissembourg. Only after breaking through all three lines would a German army actually be in Alsace; once there, the blocking positions multiplied.

Strasbourg, capital of Alsace, was of course the most significant city, midway between Breisach and Philippsburg, but on the left bank of the Rhine. The crossing point was covered by Fort Kehl on the right bank. Strasbourg lies at the confluence of the Ill River and the Rhine, and was surrounded by a network of wet ditches. The Ill runs roughly parallel to the Rhine for many kilometres, making a direct Coalition offensive over the Rhine into Upper Alsace rather difficult.

Middle Rhine Theatre of War 1688-1697

Scale & Legend

●	Town
◆	Fortification
—	Shore/River
<hr style="width: 50px; margin: 0;"/> 15 Km	



There are two main gaps in the wall of the Vosges, which face the Black Forest to the east and extend much farther north. The southern one is the Belfort Gap, which is really at the bottom of the Vosges, and leads southwest around the borders of Switzerland. The northern one is at Saverne, about 35 Km northwest of Strasbourg. The hills narrow appreciably here from both sides, widening the Rhine plain. In theory a German army could use this pass to enter France proper. In theory, that is. The only other gap led into the Saar, from Mainz or Worms southwest to Kaiserslautern and beyond.

Crossing the border into the left-bank Palatinate, the terrain is much the same, with the Vosges following the Rhine and successive bands of woodland running east-west, leaving only small gaps: 12 Km at Landau and a mere 3 Km at Neustadt. Landau was legally part of Alsace, though deep within the Palatinate, and so had a garrison. (Curiously, Mulhouse in the Sundgau was legally part of the Swiss Cantons and so was *not* garrisoned by the French.) Neustadt received a French garrison when the Palatinate was initially overrun and was one of the muster points used when preparing for campaigns. North of it, the plain had no real defences until one reached Mainz.

In the latitude of Worms, the Vosges begin veering away from the Rhine and break up into the far ranging jumble of lesser ranges of the Hunsrück and Eifel. Traveling west and southwest from Mainz would take an army to Saarbrücken on the Saar River, Trier and Metz on the Moselle, and Luxembourg City. But that sector was too rough and too far from anyone's bases for major campaigning. The French routinely wasted the land in the bend of the Rhine to prevent any such campaign. They occupied Bad Kreuznach and other towns in the bend to hem the Germans in at Mainz; towns like Speyer, Worms, and Frankenthal near the mouth of the Main, were levelled in 1689, partly as a terror tactic and partly for this scorched earth policy. Their own reinforcements from Flanders would come through Kreuznach, turning south to muster at Neustadt. The Saar and Moselle were used for transportation and supply, being navigable for long distances.

Mainz, on the left bank of the Rhine opposite the confluence of the Main River, was owned by its Archbishop, whose possessions comprised quite a large area, mostly on the right bank of the Rhine. In 1688, the Archbishop allowed the French to browbeat him into granting access to the city. It took a prolonged siege the following year to dislodge them. After that, however, the French made no attempt to retake the place. Its situation was quite strong, easily supplied over bridges from the right bank and augmented with modern fortifications which the French had thrown up in record time.

Below Mainz, the Rhine bends southwest until it reaches Bingen, forming the Palatinate's northern edge. Past Bingen, which, though a small place, was a key crossing

point that could be used by Coalition forces to attack the French in flank, the river bends north and heads into its famous series of scenic gorges. Hilly country and a string of fortified towns protected this sector from the ravages of passing armies.

The passage through the Taunus/Hunsrück is about 45 Km long. On the east, the hills remain fairly close to the river, but on the west an open basin is formed downriver from Koblenz, roughly 30 Km in width. The hills close in again for another 35 Km or so until Bonn is reached. On the west the hills become the Eifel, and on the east, the Teutoburger Wald. Neither region was good for campaigning with large forces. However, the Moselle joined the Rhine at Koblenz (which is on the south side of the Moselle). This river was navigable far into the interior of France, allowing the rapid movement of troops and heavy equipment.

The city of Trier is 95 Km upriver from Koblenz, as the crow flies, and much farther by boat, for the Moselle winds dramatically as it winkles its way through the hills down to the Rhine. The French overran the western half of the Electorate in 1688 and 1689, and held onto most of it. The Archbishop had few troops. Koblenz, however, was held by the Coalition throughout the war, though it suffered a terror bombardment in 1688.

The French created a base of operations at Mont Royal, from which they could dispatch reinforcements south or launch raids in all directions. Mainly, the post was intended to block passage up the Moselle. Sited on the left bank, Mont Royal was actually owned by the Palatinate, not Trier, which had made it possible for the French to occupy the place without a fight while the political situation was still rather confused. The Moselle, as already stated, has many sharp bends and Mont Royal sits on a teardrop shaped eminence protruding south; if not for a connecting ridge the river would have created an island here. It was not possible to move boats past Mont Royal in safety; its north-facing cannon could aim nearly 8 Km straight down the river to the next bend.

To return to the Rhine. At Bonn, the Teutoburger Wald continues as far as the right-bank tributary of the Iser, which joins the Rhine at Duisburg. The land is more open, with a fairly wide plain beside the river. On the left bank of the Rhine, the hills and forests end at Bonn. Here is the main route to the valley of the Meuse, by way of Aachen to Maastricht, and farther north still the land is more or less flat, though cut by numerous rivers and streams, and in those days featuring extensive marshes, heaths, and clumps of woodland.

If the French had managed to take Liège as they threatened to do in the middle of the war, they could have sent a corps to the Rhine and begun a two-pronged advance down the Rhine and Meuse into Holland. However, this does not seem to have been seriously considered. It was attempted during the Dutch War but

the experience was not a pleasant one. Instead, fighting north of the line Liège-Aachen-Bonn ceased with the taking of Bonn by the Brandenburgers in 1689 and it was the German armies who used the route to send reinforcements into Brabant every year. The area as a whole was raided by the French on numerous occasions, issuing forth from the Eifel from their bases in Luxembourg and at Mont Royal. The lands north of the Eifel belonged to Cologne, to Jülich, and to Cleves, well worth a raid whenever troops could be spared.

The campaigns of 1688/1689 will be described shortly, but they started at Rheinberg, on the left bank just south of Wesel, because that town was owned by Cologne, whose property extended in a broad strip up and down the river. Rheinberg was actually a pocket of territory, with the independent Imperial County of Mörs cutting it off from the rest of the country. Cologne also owned large tracts east of the Rhine, beyond the lands of Cleves. The French and their allied Cologne troops garrisoned Rheinberg and the other river towns owned by Cologne, particularly Kaiserswerth, which sits on the right bank and acted as a bridgehead into Brandenburg's possessions. The Elector of Brandenburg put all other considerations aside until he had cleared the Rhine as far as Bonn, the last stronghold of the French faction (Köln had remained in the hands of Imperial partisans throughout). From north to south this involved a march of over 100 Km.

1688 – Faux Pas

In sending you to command my army, I am giving you an opportunity to make known your merit; go and show it to all Europe, so that when I come to die it will not be noticed that the King is dead.

Louis XIV to his son, the Grand Dauphin

The day after Louis' *manifesto* was issued, the French invaded the Palatinate. It goes without saying when diplomatic news travelled by courier and courts took days to deliberate over the most potent happenings, this was hardly fair. The 'three month' deadline in the *manifesto* was intended to coincide with the projected termination of the war.

Historians often portray Louis' decision to send his armies to the Rhine as a major mistake. With William of Orange leading the flower of the Dutch Army to England, the Low Countries were wide open. A right-hook down the Rhine to the sea could have bullied the Dutch Estates into standing down and isolated the Spanish possessions in Belgium so that Madrid would choose to remain neutral. With only scattered forces of the Holy Roman Empire in the field, and the Emperor faced with a war on two fronts, Savoy would have likewise stayed neutral. Possibly, the Emperor, pressed hard by the Turks as he turned to deal with the French threat, would have come to terms.

However, no one could have foreseen that William of Orange would pull off his English coup. As far as the French knew, his plans had been foiled by bad weather

and his troops would all be wintering in Holland. Moreover, King Louis had ordered the seizure of all Dutch shipping in French ports.

Besides, this was supposed to be a short punitive action, not a war. The French were not technically at war with anyone when they began to move. Not only was their army at its peacetime establishment, but the exchequer was low, thanks to a massive canal project on the Eure River. However, although Louis had not mobilised for war, his standing forces had been concentrated, and sufficient stores laid in.

The war on the Rhine only went through two phases over the whole of the conflict. There was the initial 'blitzkrieg' by the French and the German counterpunch, and there was a war of manoeuvre which resulted in no major battles and no major sieges. Both sides would invade their opponent's side of the Rhine more than once, but the Imperials always held the line of the Neckar, at the extremity of the French logistics net, and the French, though faced with a German lodgement at Mainz, kept their opponents out of Alsace (more or less).

The Germans usually had larger armies, sometimes twice as great as the French, but their princes were jealous of each other and unwilling to commit all their resources when a rival might take that opportunity to launch a small side war against them. Perhaps more importantly, the Constitution of the Reich did not provide for wars of conquest, only of defense. Only where a particular commander, such as Charles of Lorraine, had a special agenda, were major offensives launched.

Also, many of the German contingents came from a long way off. It took time to reach the scene of the fighting and time to go home, leaving only a few weeks for active campaigning. The reader may ask, why did they not go into winter quarters on the spot? First, the region could not support those numbers, especially with the French laying it waste every summer, and second, the local princes opposed the idea, since it was they who would have to pay the price. The Saxons were considered the worst extortioners and the Hessians not much better.

The French put as many men on the Rhine as they thought the theatre could support, and no more, which meant they lacked the strength for a full offensive. A case can in fact be made that the Germans contributed greatly to the war effort simply by pinning 40,000 French in the defence of Alsace. But, Louis deemed the province a vital one and worth the price. Occasionally the Grand Dauphin was sent with reinforcements, but this was more in aid of adding lustre to his name rather than making some strategic gain.

At the very outset the chief military goal was to capture the key Rhine crossing of Philippsburg. This would forestall the Emperor's own longterm plans (as perceived by the French) and hearten the Turks. The political goal was to place the Rhineland 'under contribution' to force


Upper Rhine Theatre of War

1688

Scale & Legend

●	Town
◆	Fortification
—	Shore/River
@10 Km	

1. Duras' march from Strasbourg
2. Siege of Philippsburg 27 September - 30 October 1688
3. French raids; no opposition
4. Boufflers occupies the left-bank Palatinate
5. Siege of Mannheim 4-11 November 1688
6. Siege of Frankenthal 15-19 November 1688



the German nobles to acquiesce to Louis' demands — the conversion of the Treaty of Ratisbon into a permanent settlement and the installation of a French puppet at Köln, per the Manifesto.

Since the French already garrisoned the other crossings or 'outworks' on the Upper Rhine, namely, Strasbourg, Breisach, Freiburg im Breisgau, and Huningen, holding Philippsburg would secure the entire line. (Fort-Louis would only be completed in 1690.) Alsace, formerly part of the Empire, was a newish acquisition and had suffered several Imperial raids during the Dutch War. The Middle Rhine was not so important. The French defended in depth in the Low Countries, the Saarland was well fortified from Landau to Saarlouis, the Moselle would soon be covered by the fortress of Mont Royal, and having Cologne as a friendly power would secure the 'hinge'. Moreover, the French intended to devastate the right bank of the Rhine, making the muster of any large Imperial force nearly impossible, or at least too expensive to contemplate.

Philippsburg (27 September — 30 October, 1688)

[Refer to the diagram on p. 42. In the account that follows it should be realised that when speaking of the Rhine above and below the fortress, one is speaking of west and east, not north and south.]

While French raiding bands got to work, their main force approached Philippsburg. The fortress was regarded as a technical challenge. Clausewitz' opinion has already been cited. He believed the fortress should have been built two or three days' march distant from the river, where its garrison could interfere with any crossing while not coming under threat. But, his ideas germinated during the Napoleonic Wars. For the armies of the 17th Century, Philippsburg required a major effort.

Though owned by the Bishop of Worms, Philippsburg rated as an Imperial fortress. Its garrison, under Governor Starhemberg, brother of the man who defended Vienna in 1683, consisted of 2,000 infantry and 300 cavalry. The fortress, which was well provisioned, was on the right bank of the Rhine, sandwiched between the river and an extensive marsh. In those days, the river made a number of loops, now bypassed by a straight channel, and the town was sited on the south side of a large oxbow, still recognizable today, but only as a small stream overgrown with vegetation.

[The garrison included at least 1 battalion of Starhemberg's regiment. The other battalion is reported at Köln, but that may have been after the garrison surrendered. The cavalry will have been troops from the Reich, since no Imperials were present in 1688. They were probably Swabians; those of the Palatinate mutinied. This narrows it to either the Prinz Ludwig von Württemberg or Bronkhorst von Gronsfeld regiments of horse.]

Though 'on' the Rhine, the fortress did not truly incorporate the river into its defensive system, other than as a block on its northern side. The town possessed an

extensive 'wet moat' but this appears to have been fed by the surrounding marshes and streams, and not by the river. The French found the best place to dig trenches was between the fortress' fosse and the riverbank.

The fortress had 7 bastions, with demi-lunes between most of them, and a hornwork facing the Rhine (that is, toward the north), reinforced by a crownwork. This covered a 'flying bridge' (not shown in the diagram) leading to an outwork called the Fort du Rhin. As shown in the diagram this fort possessed a half-bastion at either end and a full bastion in its middle. The trace of Fort du Rhin can still be seen in satellite images, located on what used to be the far bank of the oxbow, just north of the town and east of a nuclear power plant. The road still exists, but the modern bridge is trivial, and permanent. Likewise, much of the Hornwork and the covered way that circled the town is still distinguishable.

The besieging army, with the *duc* de Duras and the Grand Dauphin leading 29 battalions, 33 squadrons of horse, and 12 squadrons of dragoons (30,000 men), crossed the Rhine at Strasbourg, 90 Km upriver. The regiments consisted of the Gendarmerie, line horse of the Cuirassiers du Roi, Colonel Général, Grignan, Villeroi, Florensac, Roussillon, Le Roi, Rohan, Vivans, Tallard (incorrectly identified by Quincy as a foot regiment), the dragoons of Fimarcon and Peyssonnel, and the foot of Champagne, La Reine, Auvergne, Artois, Royal, Vaubecourt, Feuquières, Le Roi, Grancé, Normandie, Limosin, Poitou, Piedmont, Anjou, Jarzé, Roüergue, Roussillon, Bourbon, and Sault. A battalion of Fusiliers accompanied the artillery train.

[This list is from Quincy. There were 12 squadrons of dragoons, which suggests 3 regiments, not 2. The third one may have been Colonel-Général.]

Quincy names Duras' subordinates: *lieutenants généraux* Joyeuse, Montclar, Vauban, Tiladet, La Fraisselière, Rubantel, Catinat, and the *marquis* d'Uxelles. Of *maréchaux de camp* there were Vivans, Nesles, Bordage, Sepville, Harcourt, Monchevreil, and Vertillac. (Lieutenant generals and major generals tended to be paired, especially for siege work.) Of infantry brigadiers there were Polastron, Feuquières, Colbert, Vaubecourt, Medavi, d'Escaut, Maloze, Sendricourt, and Le Perré, and of cavalry brigadiers Bourg, Marsin, Lanyon, Florensac, and Bezons.

There were also 48 volunteer gentlemen of high rank, including 2 *marquis* and the princes of the blood du Maine and de Conty. All, including the princes, were 'under discipline'. That is, they were required to stay with their assigned regiments on pain of imprisonment.

The Dauphin and his entourage, including 250 of the King's Musketeers (both Black and Grey Companies) left Versailles on 25 September. His route was by Meaux (25 September), Montmirel (26), Fère-Champenoise (27), 'Arsilleon' (Arcis-sur-Aube?) (28), Stainville (29), Toul

(30), Vic-sur-Seille (2 October), Saarbourg (3), Pfaffenhoffen (4), Wissembourg (5), Philippsburg (6). These are marches of 40 and occasionally 80 Km per day, roughly straight east from Paris to the Rhine.

Louis de France, le Grand Dauphin (1661-1749)

The Grand Dauphin was the eldest son of Louis XIV. He was called 'le Grand' after the birth of his son, 'le Petit Dauphin', in 1682. He was married to the Duchess Maria Anna of Bavaria, sister of Duke Max, the Elector. According to one biographer, Philippe Erlanger (p.177 of his book Louis XIV):

"Louis XIV secretly nursed the same suspicious jealousy of the Grand Dauphin that Louis XIII had once shown to himself. No prince could have been less deserving of such feelings. Monseigneur, as the heir to the throne was now known, had inherited his mother's docility and low intelligence. All his life he remained petrified with admiration of his formidable father and stood in fear of him even while lavish proofs of 'affection' were showered upon him. The best way for Monseigneur to do someone an injury was to commend him to the royal favour. He knew it, and did not conceal it from his rare petitioners.

Louis XIV saw to it that his son's upbringing was quite the opposite of his own. Instead of a devoted mother and an affectionate and likeable tutor, the Dauphin had the repellent and misanthropic Duc de Montausier, who ruthlessly applied the same methods that had so disturbed Louis XIII. They annihilated his grandson.

[...] By the age of eighteen, Monseigneur had assimilated almost none of the knowledge amassed to so little purpose, and the apathy of his mind was second only to that of his senses."

It was said he could spend an entire day just tapping on his foot with a cane. But, being a kind and generous man, he was very popular with the people.

From this one can gather that his military skills were slight. However, he showed great courage at Philippsburg and his presence inspired the soldiers (though he was also a magnet for cannon fire). Henceforth, he was known to the men as Louis the Bold. After, his old governor wrote to him:

I shall not compliment you on the taking of Philippsburg; you had a good army, bombs, cannons and Vauban. I shall not compliment you because you are brave. That virtue is hereditary. But I rejoice with you that you have been liberal, generous, humane, and have recognised the services of those who did well.

His other appearances at the front were less auspicious. Though only a figurehead, his word was final, and though surrounded by able men, they were unable to override his lack of aggression by simple disobedience. On wonders if King Louis sent him out just to make sure his generals did not run riot.

The Grand Dauphin died in 1711, aged 49, one of the victims of the smallpox epidemic that nearly wiped out the Sun King's entire family.



[Le Grand Dauphin in 1688, by Hyacinthe Regaud]


Meanwhile, the cavalry vanguard, under Montclar (or Montclair), crossed the Rhine at Fort Kell (Kehl), the fort guarding the crossing at Strasbourg, and masked Philippsburg on 27 September. He had with him the Gendarmerie, 6 regiments of horse, and 2 regiments of dragoons. This force stationed itself opposite the Capuchin monastery [*just beyond the bottom righthand corner in the diagram*]. Montclar divided his men up into small parties, sometimes of platoon strength. Some dug entrenchments at key spots, while others patrolled between. The order of the day was 'saddle and bridle'.

On 29 September, Monclar erected a bridge opposite Gemersheim, 7 Km southwest [*off the top edge of the diagram*] of the fortress (the town being on the left bank). Duras crossed there the same day, and inspected the plan of the lines, which were something like 12 Km in circumference, on 30 September. His army followed on 1 October. He would command the covering force while Vauban ran the siege. The Grand Dauphin's presence would add 'tone' to the proceedings. Work began immediately, with lines of circumvallation to protect the besiegers. The lines ran from Oberhausen [*just beyond the bottom righthand corner in the diagram*] (which was on the riverbank in those days) to Reinhoüem (Rheinsheim) [*just beyond the top edge of the diagram*].

French Camps
here
& to Rheinsheim

Siege of Philippsburg

27 September -
30 October 1688



Rheinsheim
Monclar's HQ
@425m from
edge of map

Rhine River

Oberhausen
Royal HQ @200m from map edge
Capuchin Monastery @500m

- A - Town
- B - Hornwork & Suburbs
- C - Crownwork
- D - Fort du Rhin
- E - Cemetery
- F - Chateau
- G - Bastion de Guiche
- H - Bastion Despernana
- J - Bastion du Roi
- K - Bastion Dauphin
- L - Bastion d'Aumont
- M - Bastion de Turenne
- N - Bastion d'Engien
- O - Counterguard de Guiche
- P - Porte de France
- Q - Porte du Rhin

- 1 - breach v. Town
- 2 - breach v. Hornwork
- 3 - re-entrenchment post-assault
- 4 - 10 mortars
- 5 - 12 mortars
- 6 - 'pierriers'
- 7 - attack on Fort du Rhin



French Camps

French Camps

At Rheinsheim a bridge was thrown across the Rhine, covered by the *dragons* de Fimarcon.

The horse regiments of Grignan and Villeroi covered the lines from the river to Oberhausen, where Duras placed his and the Dauphin's HQ. On their left were the foot regiments of Picardie, Dauphin, and Roussillon. Then came the Gendarmerie, and the horse regiments of Florensac and Roussillon. Then, the foot of Champagne and La Reine, the Colonel-Général cavalry, the foot of Auvergne, Artois, Tallard, Royal, Vaubecourt, and Feuquières. The artillery park came next, guarded by the Fusiliers. Then, the regiment of Le Roi, the cavalry of Vivans, the foot of Grancé and Normandie, and the horse regiment Le Roi. The *dragons* de Peysonnel occupied a marsh hamlet called Kenhaudem, and beyond them were the foot regiment of Limosin, the cavalry of Rohan, the foot of Poitou and Piemont, the Cuirassiers, and the infantry regiments of Anjou, Jarzé, Roüergue, and Sault.

Vauban's first objective was the Fort du Rhin, which covered the enemy's flying bridge. Two brigades under the marquis d'Uxelles (commanded by Vertillac and du Perce) had already approached it on 29 September. While Duras inspected the plan of the lines, Vauban, carrying a fusil like a common soldier, and accompanied by only two men, made a close reconnaissance of the fort's defences. A short action ensued when he ordered up 6 Gendarmes to clear away some suspicious persons. The enemy sent out more men of their own, so Vauban requested another 6 troopers. Their commander, the *comte* du Bourg, chose to send an entire squadron instead. The troopers rode very close to the counterscarp and were fired upon by 3 cannon. One ball killed a horse and tore the arms off two men.

Little more happened for a couple of days. The French regiments were still coming in. While waiting for his army to mass, Duras had a battery bombard the flying bridge, just to interfere with the fortress' communications. The taking of the Fort du Rhin was accomplished very quickly. The trenches opened on the night of 3/4 October and the redoubt was captured on 5 October. The *marquis* de Dussies directed the attack. Two cannon and one mortar battery were erected, the cannon firing against the rear of the fort from the right bank of the Rhine, where trenches were beginning to be prepared against the main fortress. They fired against the fort and against the bridge itself, which was broken. Fire was also directed against a nearby brickworks where two enemy cannon were emplaced. After the mortars had lobbed around 50 bombs, Dussies led an assault, sword in hand. By 10am the place was taken. The Germans quickly abandoned their post, fleeing by boat to the main fortress. Dussies captured the two cannon in the brick works. The French lost one officer and 5 or 6 men.

[The brickworks is quite possibly the rectangular structure shown on the riverbank just above the Fort du Rhin.]

After taking the remains of the bridge, preparations began against the Hornwork. A battery of 8 guns was erected, which was unmasked on 6 October. On the night of 5/6, the bulk of the siege train arrived, floating down the Rhine and landing in the dawn at Oberhausen. This was a risky operation because as far as the convoy knew they would be taking fire from both the Hornwork and Fort du Rhin. But, as can be seen from the diagram, the only suitable approach for the trenches was from the east. There is some high ground to the south, but it was hemmed in by woods. Landing at Rheinsheim and hauling the guns around the perimeter would have taken far too long. In the event, the 100 fusiliers guarding the convoy only suffered some musket fire from the shore. (An officer was posted in each boat to prevent panic.)

On 6 October the Dauphin and his coterie arrived, crossing the Gemersheim bridge. Duras gave him the grand tour, took him on reconnaissance, and gave him supper.

The Grand Trench, though started on the night of 7/8 October, was not officially opened by the Dauphin until the night of the 10th. He told his gentlemen where they should post themselves, but did not interfere with Vauban's plan. This was to conduct 3 assaults, the first, launched from the completed Grand Trench, was diplomatically named L'Attaque de Monseigneur le Dauphin, and was intended to capture the bastions of De La Londe and de Reen [*named Guiche (left) and Enghien (right) on the diagram, which was drawn up after the French renamed them all*].

Subsidiary attacks were to be made above and below the fortress along the banks of the Rhine, which were elevated enough not to flood. Upriver, the trenches would be pushed forward into the ditch on that side of the Hornwork proper. Command here was given to the *marquis* de Rebe. Downriver, the trench — the work being commanded by the *marquis* de Nesles — would split, with a communication line to connect the riverside approaches and an approach against the right side of the Crownwork. Quincy's text seems to suggest there was also to be a trench connecting the riverside works with the Grand Trench, but this is not shown in the diagram. It may have been planned and deemed impracticable.

There was a delay in starting the Grand Trench, possibly due to its inconvenient location, so the French concentrated on their subsidiary operations. Work on the downriver trench was dangerous. The enemy gunners showed skill and wrought havoc among the labourers, who included men of the Bourbon regiment (which must have been a late arrival since it is not listed in the camp dispositions), killing an engineer and wounding others; they could not be suppressed because no battery had yet been erected to face them.

On 10 October, the Dauphin and Duras, along with Vauban, examined the trace of the Grand Trench, coming

under fire as they did so; two grenadiers were struck down only 10 yards from the Dauphin. Seated on horseback, he dismounted and stayed for 2 hours. This had a good effect on the troops, who had already dug some 1,950 meters worth of trench.

[1,950 meters (converted from 1,000 toises) must be the overall total. The distance from the camp lines to the first parallel at the Grand Trench is only about 1.5 Km.]

The Dauphin also visited the downriver trench, where others of the senior staff, the *duc* de Beauvilliers and the prince de Conty, had spent the night, encouraging the men. That trench was pushed as far as the palisades on the night of 10 October. Losses for this day were comparatively light: 'inconsiderable' at the Grand Trench, and 15 killed and 35 wounded at the downriver trench. The upriver trench was also pushed forward to the glacis, where *régiment* Piémont made a lodgement with the loss of only 4 killed and 6 wounded.

Then, the Grand Trench was formally opened. *Maréchal* de Joyeuse commanded that night, with M. de Polastron as his Brigadier, or second in command. Opening a trench, especially when a Royal was present, was always a grand ceremony, but this one was conducted in silence, the men filing to their start lines in good order. The garrison appeared not to notice the event, concentrating their attention on the subsidiary attacks.

Work proceeded swiftly. The ground, though marshy, was not completely sodden, and another 1,830 meters-worth of trench was dug on the first night, the lines snaking between puddles and bogs. Only one man was wounded. The same night, two batteries were erected, each of 10 cannon.

Quincy recounts that a party of gentlemen volunteers got ahead of the work parties and came under fire from the covered way, receiving more than 30 musket shots. Apparently no one was hurt.

On the night of 11/12 October, the Grand Trench was advanced another 275 meters without loss. The Chevalier de Tiladet commanded this night. On the other side, the downriver trench was advanced 260 meters and connected to the upriver trench. There was a narrow channel, used to supply the garrison by boat, which had to be bridged to connect the works. It was probably here that this night's casualties were suffered: 15 men and 1 officer from the *régiment* Vaubecourt.

Quincy says the Grand Trench was completed on October 12, with a further loss of 4 wounded. Probably, he means the first parallel. Communication trenches were also dug to outlying batteries, as can be seen on the diagram. That night saps were pushed forward to the Ditch (the line of the second parallel), and the first assault was made, led by the *marquis* de Presle.

The immediate objective was a detached redoubt in front of the southern defences, near the cemetery. It had its

own wet ditch and was connected to the covered way by a bridge. Using only a detachment of grenadiers, Presle hoped to carry the place in a rush across the counterscarp, but the defenders resisted, the impetus was lost, and the French became stuck in the shallow ditch in front of the redoubt. They could climb it, though, and both sides shoved their muskets through the palisade to fire at each other. With great daring, Presle tossed his sword over the fence and inspired 20 grenadiers to help him recover it. The redoubt was taken and the garrison butchered, except for 3 men taken prisoner. Presle was wounded in the hip. Unfortunately, he and his men were too far ahead of their supports and they were all forced to retreat.

This seems to have stirred the garrison into making a heavy bombardment, which did little damage. The same night a battery of 12 mortars was erected [*position #4 on the diagram*], which immediately opened fire on the enemy embrasures. Quincy also says the Grand Trench was connected to the riverside works this night. Based on the diagram, it is more likely the second parallel was completed.

On the night of 13/14 October the upriver trench was advanced into the angle of the covered way formed by the junction of Hornwork and Crownwork. 6 French were killed and 10 wounded. On the other side, the downriver trench was pushed into the glacis of the covered way on that side, and a battery of 6 guns erected to fire on the walls from close range.

On 14 October the garrison at last made a sortie. This was in strength, against the Grand Trench itself. Unfortunately for the garrison, *lieutenant général* Catinat was officer of the day. He immediately launched a counterattack with massed grenadiers, who chased the garrison back as far as their own palisades at a cost of 20 men dead and 1 officer wounded. Catinat himself took a bullet through his hat which grazed the top of his head. (This would happen to him again in Italy, where his heavy wig saved his life. On another occasion a grenade would blow up in his face, doing absolutely no damage. 'He was one of those guys with that weird light around him...')

A second sortie was made against the upriver trench, without effect. Losses were heavy enough that the Governor requested a truce to bring in his casualties. Catinat agreed, with the stipulation that the French carry the bodies in. The reader might expect this would be refused as an obvious ruse to gain a lodgement, but the Governor agreed, and the French made no attempt to secure a position. However, Catinat did take the opportunity to acquire intelligence. He disguised two of his engineers as common soldiers. They noticed two items of importance about the demi-lune that covered the targeted bastions. On the pretence of needing a drink, one found that the water in the ditch was only two feet deep. The other noticed that there was a dike through the marsh where 8 men could advance abreast.

The Dauphin made a second reconnaissance, this time into the saps of the Grand Trench; again a grenadier was killed near him. Sometime that day, the *marquis* de Nesles was shot in the head. After the Dauphin's reconnaissance, the French mortars pounded the covered way in front of their saps.

This allowed the besiegers in the Grand Trench to move up to the covered way in strength and extend their lines along its edge (the third parallel shown on the diagram). Heavy rains continued for some days, slowing progress, as did the heavy fire they were now receiving from the fortress.

On the Rhine-side, the *duc* du Maine, a bastard son of King Louis, was serving as a volunteer with the *régiment* du Roi. A poor to indifferent general, he at least inspired the men 'with his largesse' to achieve two small lodgements in the angle of the counterscarp on the upriver side.

15 October was a day of great bombardments, on both sides. The town was set on fire, while the French suffered 30 dead. The Dauphin got another man killed while inspecting the saps of the Grand Trench. That night, the pair of lodgements against the Hornwork were connected. Quincy also says two saps were dug 'on the right of the marsh'. This is most likely the pair shown at the cemetery; the going here was difficult. The mortar battery was also advanced [*position #5 on the diagram*]. The ground was so waterlogged the trenches skirting the marshes had to be filled with fascines so the men would not disappear in the mud.

17 October the batteries concentrated on the downriver half-bastion of the Crownwork, while the saps of the Grand Battery were pushed to the counterscarp of the Redoubt De La Londe [*Counterguard de Guiche on the diagram, and not to be confused with the bastion behind it*]. A sortie was made in the vicinity of the cemetery, which was countercharged by the *régiment* Bourbon and vigorously pushed back, even beyond the covered way. Meanwhile the angle of the counterscarp on the upriver side of the Hornwork was secured. Work was begun draining the ditch by means of a trench. This was not done easily, 12 or 13 soldiers were killed, along with 2 gunners, and 6 officers and over 20 men were wounded.

18 October: M. de Villandry was wounded by a grenade, a French cannon was dismantled, and an artillery officer killed by a ball. A barrel of gunpowder was struck, which blew up, erasing two soldiers. That night, the French gained a lodgement on the covered way of the Redoubt De La Londe and Vauban ordered the water in the ditch in front of the Grand Trench drained into the Rhine (using the drain being dug at the Hornwork) and the whole filled with fascines. On the first day of this lengthy operation, difficult because the ditch was deep, the *marquis* de Bordage was mortally wounded and the *comte* de

Chateau-Villain lost the tip of an ear, apart from a number of plebeian dead and wounded.

19 October, grenadiers of *régiment* Normandie, wading through waist-deep water, drove the enemy off a dike (probably the one cutting across the marsh) but came under such heavy fire they had to retreat. The ditch continued to be filled, and the attackers inched to within 4 meters of the Hornwork's main defence line.

That night, the work of filling the ditch in front of the Grand Trench was completed. The *marquis* d'Uxelles, wounded in the shoulder during the preparations, immediately led an attack across the now-filled moat. His men quickly came under fire from their right flank, where a small party of defenders had ensconced themselves on an access road across the marsh (roughly where the eastern stream is shown exiting the wet ditch on the diagram). There were only 8 or 10 of them, and d'Uxelles diverted a lieutenant and 10 grenadiers to drive them off. This was done, at a cost of 8 of the grenadiers; the lieutenant was wounded. To prevent the garrison from reoccupying it, the position was connected by a trench to the French lines, dug under heavy fire which ultimately cost them more than 60 men, including several engineers. On the Rhine-side, the French endeavoured to continue the draining, employing 6,000 fascines, and losing around 40 men, but some 4 feet of water remained in the ditch.

[The trench to the access road does not appear on the diagram, nor does the road. But the fact that the garrison could set up a position outside the walls in this sector adds weight to the idea that the French never did connect their two sets of works with a trench.]

The next day, 20 October, the garrison sallied to recover their forward post on the marsh road, which the French had decided not to hold after all. Meanwhile, the besiegers spent a long day completing the filling of the ditch at the Hornwork.

That night, a breach being made in the downriver half-bastion of the Crownwork, the decision was made to assault it. Quincy uses the phrase, 'insult the horn-work, with sword in hand'. The French had filled the passages across the moat and dug 3 saps within striking range, one of which was opposite the breach. The *marquis* d'Harcourt was Officer of the Day, his second, M. de Vertillac. The signal for the assault was to be the firing of 6 mortar bombs. Although the last 2 were duds, the attack proceeded anyway.

[Quincy describes this attack taking place at the Hornwork, but from the diagram and the narrative it is clear the Crownwork was the initial target.]

4 companies of grenadiers led the attack, from the regiments Picardie, Champagne, Roi, and Dauphin. The approach was made noiselessly; once stuffed into the sap they waited for the signal, and when the defenders ducked to avoid the shell splinters from the bombs, they

rushed into the breach shouting *vive le Roi* and waving their regimental flags.

The breach was defended by 150 men, most of whom were cut down and the rest made prisoner. One of the former was a well known officer named Count Arc, or Arco, who refused to yield and was carried off with 10 bayonet wounds. The French lost about 20 men, including a brigadier and the Chevalier de Courtin. Quincy says he forgot the password for the rally point, presumably meaning he was shot by his own side.

This assault gained a deep lodgement and allowed the erection of a battery within the work, to fire on the far side of the complex.

On 21 October Vauban ordered the draining of a pool which lay between the French trenches and the counterscarp in the Grand Trench sector. The trench to the debated post on the marsh road seems also to have flooded; it was ordered cleared. It is not clear why the French first abandoned that post after losing so many men securing it; perhaps it was a matter of withdrawing for the night, which was often done, and perhaps the town garrison simply reoccupied it first the following day.

The next day, work on the Grand Trench progressed with few casualties. That night, the grenadiers of the *régiment du Roi* assaulted and took the Redoubt De La Londe. The attack was so rapid the garrison only had time for a single volley. 5 of the defenders were made prisoner and the rest killed. The attack was so vigorous that it carried on into an associated retrenchment. In this action the *duc* du Maine took a notable part, and an engineer was killed. The French also secured a lodgement on the covered way on the upriver side of the Hornwork.

Minor attacks were pressed on 23 October, with only 10 casualties in all; the Dauphin went up to inspect the Hornwork complex from within. That night, the two lodgements on the covered way in front of the Grand Trench were linked, at the cost of a couple of engineers.

[Edifices like the Hornwork were huge. It was entirely possible to spend days fighting in the enclosed space, using the same techniques as were employed to get there in the first place. Usually, however, a garrison would abandon the works once a counterattack had failed.]

Nothing of note happened on 24 October, except that the Dauphin, anticipating the fall of the fortress, went on a ride to see how he could succour the place if the Germans laid siege to it some other time. That night the trenches on the covered way were extended for about 50 meters left and right. At this, the garrison made a small sortie against the French Left, but with only 10-20 men, who were easily repulsed by the grenadiers of a regiment under a Colonel Courtenvaux.

25 October: the works along the covered way of the Hornwork were strengthened and extended, and 18 cannon erected within the Crownwork to fire on the

bastion at the head of the Hornwork [*position #2 on the diagram*]. These began firing on 26 October and soon created a breach 50 meters wide. Counter-fire struck in Courtenvaux's sector; he himself was injured in the thigh by a cannonball, though sandbags cushioned the blow, and the same ball killed 2 grenadiers.

27 October was a busy day. The saps of the Grand Trench were spread along the line of the palisade, which gave the French good cover. Progress on the upriver works was halted because a pair of 'corps de garde' — enemy advanced posts, of 15 and 13 men respectively, protected by palisades — had appeared. These enfiladed the covered way. It was common practice to isolate enemy saps by retrenching on the flanks of the covered way or other means of access. Much time could be wasted removing these obstacles, and sometimes nothing was done about them. However, in this case the Officer of the Day, the *marquis* de Septville, decided to clear the enemy out. Only 20 fusiliers were needed. They rushed the palisades and tore them down, at which the defenders fled, leaving 7 or 8 dead and 2 prisoners at the cost of 3 French dead, including the officer leading the attack, and 1 wounded.

Meanwhile, another battery was erected so that the Hornwork's central bastion now sustained the fire of 22 guns. From prisoners it was learned that the Hornwork had not been properly countermined. There were only some hasty entrenchments and a few mortar bombs strewn about which would be lit to cover the garrison's withdrawal, if needed. And they would be — the prisoners also reported the garrison had suffered some 600 casualties.

On 28 October both the works of the Grand Trench and those on the upriver side of the Hornwork were further extended, while more cannon were unmasked on the downriver side. By this point the initial breach in the Hornwork's bastion was wide enough for 8 men to enter abreast, and 2 more breaches were developing on the upriver side. The French also threw bridges over the ditch which encircled the Crownwork. The *marquis* d'Harcourt was shot in the foot trying to observe activity within the enemy's defences; elsewhere the *comte* d'Estrées took a musket ball in the thigh.

D'Harcourt, unable for some reason to take proper observations, that night sent out a pair of volunteers — a sergeant and fusilier — who swam the ditch in front of the breach, mounted it, made a count of the defenders, took a few potshots, and withdrew safely.

Based on their information, on 29 October, Vauban declared the breach in the Hornwork practicable. The assault was to be led by the Musketeers and a detachment of grenadiers. In support, the *régiment du Roi* would go in on the left and that of Anjou on the right.

In preparation, 'the Miner' was sent forward to widen the right of the breach. The 'Miner' crops up in a number of

French siege accounts. Although the word is not capitalised in the source material, it is singular, and does not seem to refer to teams of miners, but to a specific engine, possibly used to pry apart already shattered walls; sometimes it appears to be used against the base of a wall, to create a hollow for packing explosives. In this instance the object seems to have been to create a more stable ramp for the assault force to use. But, it is quite possible Quincy only meant a miner detachment.

Security was provided by 10 grenadiers, who obtained a lodgement low down in the breach. Coming under sustained fire, they asked for reinforcements and 20 more grenadiers were sent up. While holding this position they made a reconnaissance. Their information prompted Vauban to send up the best part of a company of grenadiers. The French now occupied the crest of the breach and some pushed down the other side, while those of du Roi and Anjou assaulted the flanking half-bastions in their respective sectors. Both of these were taken with few losses. Duras appeared at the breach and ordered it fully secured. [*Position #3 on the diagram shows the hasty entrenchments dug to secure this lodgement.*]

Governor Starhemberg was holding a council of war as this action was developing. He was apparently aware of the composition of the assault force, but was expecting the main assault to occur the following night. But, as often happened in French sieges, local commanders had taken the initiative and their superiors had supported their decisions — so the breach was already taken.

On learning of the French success, Starhemberg quickly decided not to counterattack, but to surrender, and ordered the *chamade* beaten. Hostages were exchanged, then other hostages brought the articles of surrender — the usual ‘boilerplate’. The garrison would immediately hand over a gate, plus the defences facing the Grand Trench, and on 30 October march out with drums beating, banners unfurled, armed, with lit matches and with musket balls in their mouths. They were to keep all their baggage, plus two 24-pounder and two 12-pounder cannon, and about 100 carriages for the officers, plus sundry items.

This was agreed to, although things moved a little slowly. The *régiment* Picardie having secured the promised gate only on 31 October, the garrison marched out with full honours of war on 1 November, with the French lining their march route. Starhemberg dismounted to meet with the Dauphin, saying it was some consolation to have surrendered to so great a prince.

The *régiment* d’Auvergne was placed in garrison, under M. Desbordes, the new governor. He discovered the fortress was still well stocked, having 124 cannon, 150,000 charges of powder, 22,000 musket balls, 16,000 sacks of flour, and a good deal more. French losses amounted to 588 killed and 953 wounded. Quincy does

not report the final losses of the garrison, but it was probably not much more than the 600 odd reported earlier.

Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban, Marquis de Vauban (1633-1707)

Probably the most famous military engineer of all time, Vauban was born in Saint-Léger-de-Foucheret (now Saint-Léger-Vauban), in Burgundy. Orphaned at 10, he survived among the peasantry of his region until taken in by the Carmelites, who gave him an education, in which he excelled at maths, science, and geometry.

He joined the *Régiment de Condé* at 17. At 18 he declined a commission because of his poverty. At this time the wars of the Fronde were raging, and his regiment, being Condé’s was on the wrong side. After gaining experience helping the Great Condé fortify Clermont-en-Argonne, he was captured, but was well treated and became a protegee of Cardinal Mazarin, who brought him to the King’s notice. Vauban became a committed supporter of Louis XIV.

Now began his career of building, destroying, and rebuilding fortifications. His first siege under the King was that of Sainte-Menehould, which he had helped take as a Frondeur, and this set the pattern. His second siege was of Clermont, the first fortress he had helped erect. In 1655 he was made *ingénieur du roi*. The engineers did not enjoy high rank or privileges, but there were few of them and they were indispensable. Over a period of four years, from 1655 to 1659 he took part in 10 sieges, was several times wounded, and was awarded a company in the *Régiment de Picardie* — this was not a combat command but a means of improving his status and finances. They improved sufficiently for him to marry. But he was not made *maréchal de camp* until 1676, at the end of the Dutch War, after taking part in another 9 sieges. In 1683 he was made *lieutenant général* and conducted two sieges during the short War of the Reunions.

After conducting several sieges during the Nine Years’ War, his last siege took place in 1703 at Old Breach, which he took in only two weeks. As a *maréchal de France* (January 14, 1703), he was no longer allowed to get his hands dirty.

Vauban only took part in one defence of a fortress, at Oudenaarde in 1674, but planned and constructed, or improved, hundreds of fortifications. Roughly 300 cities had their defences improved by him, not to mention several naval harbours, and he, from scratch, directed the building of 37 new fortresses. Name an important French town, port, or frontier defence line of his era; Vauban built it.

[*12 of his works are now UNESCO World Heritage Sites.*]

Having devised a powerful system of defence, he also studied and perfected the art of taking fortifications. The method of digging a contravallation out of which approach

trenches were pushed, from which parallels were dug to house artillery, was his idea (though it is also said he borrowed it from the Turks). Most of his ideas were not new, but they were better implemented and improved on. He introduced professional companies of miners and developed that science. Over the years he progressed in his thinking, producing a 'Second System' that enabled fortresses to last longer, and toward the end of his career, a Third System. These defensive plans led him to improve the art of the attack, with 'ricochet fire', the use of mortars, and 'vertical fire' by cannon for shooting at concealed defenders from close range.

During the 1660s and 1670s Vauban wrote treatises for the Government, his peers, and for general interest. Not all were military manuals. He wrote on economics, husbandry, and colonisation, and was an honorary member of the Academy. He also spoke his mind, calling for a flat universal tax, the improvement of the peasant's lot, and toleration for Protestants. But he was loyal to the Crown, and tried vainly to recall one of his books on economics then in circulation, not because of its radical proposals, but because it had been published without royal permission.

Vauban's reputation suffered during his last years, because France's enemies were able to capture so many of her fortresses. But, they were using his own techniques. Vauban was not too discouraged. At the time he died, he was trying to work out a Fourth System of defence. It was panned at the time, but became the foundation of fortification methods in the 19th and 20th Centuries.

He died at Paris, of inflammation of the lungs. The Revolutionaries dug up his body, burned it, and scattered the ashes, as they did with so many of the Ancien' Regime notables, but Napoleon located his heart and had it placed in Les Invalides. From the balcony overlooking Napoleon's massive marble tomb under the Dome des Invalides, the second story of the Cathedral Saint-Louis-des-Invalides stretches north, its walls lined with plaques and busts commemorating France's great generals. There is one for Vauban.

[Opposite: Vauban]

The Rest of the Campaign

Not until Philippsburg fell did Duras' small army attempt to deal with any other sites. His army moved out on November 2. Most targets opened their gates immediately, apart from the first and last objectives. Trenches had to be opened against Mannheim, 29 Km (2 days' march) north of Philippsburg. [Refer to the diagram on p. 49.]

Old Mannheim was situated on a triangular spit of land at the confluence of the Rhine and Neckar rivers. On November 4 *baron* Monclar crossed the Neckar and with his corps took up a position across from the town. The



marquis de Joyeuse remained on the left bank with another, establishing positions across the base of the triangular spit. Trenches were opened by Joyeuse on November 8. One, beside the Neckar, focused on the town defences, and the other, along the Rhine, targeted the Citadel. The garrison responded with an all-night cannonade, which did little damage. Quincy gives the names of three officers killed, but overall casualties were about 9 or 10.

On the night of 8/9 November the French pushed their trenches forward 1,950 meters (1,000 *toises*, which seems a stock phrase with Quincy and so may not be entirely accurate), and made a lodgement in the defensive outwork that secured a crossing point over the Rhine. A number of batteries were erected; one mortar battery began firing in the morning and soon set a number of districts in the city on fire.

On the night of 9/10 November the trench against the Citadel was pushed another 75 meters, beyond the covered way, while that against the town also reached the covered way and into a *place des armes*. In the morning, all the batteries started firing again. Later that day the town offered to capitulate. It was quite common for a town

Siege of Mannheim

4-12 November 1688



 Battery

Redoubt guarding
flying bridge

Rhine River

Neckar River

abandoned
redoubt

Citadel


Town




 Batteries

Montclar's Corps

Joyeuse's Corps



to be yielded and the garrison to retire into the citadel. In this case, as usual, provision was made for the protection of civilians, guarantees of life and property from the besiegers and a warning that if the town were fired upon by the citadel, the garrison would be given no quarter. The town duly gave up a gate on 11 November.

That day, 3 French batteries were turned on the Citadel, but the Governor, a man named Seliger, was unable to make further resistance because his troops mutinied. They had received no pay for 17 months.

Frankenthal was the only other place to offer resistance (15-19 November); it required some spade work and a short bombardment which ended the siege when the town was set on fire. These acquisitions were not random prizes. Mannheim and Frankenthal were not merely the property of the Elector Palatine, but properties on which Madame (the wife of King Louis' brother, the *duc d'Orléans*) had claims, which Neuburg had refused to recognise.

While Duras was thus occupied, *lieutenant général* Boufflers, operating with a detached corps based on the Moselle, came south and took Neustadt, Oppenheim, Worms, Bingen, Alzey, Bad Kreuznach, Bacharach, Kaiserlauten, Trier, Speyer, and Mainz. In other words, all the principal towns of the left-bank Palatinate. Speyer was the judicial seat of an independent bishop and Mainz was the official First Electorate of the Empire. The most northerly prize was the small town of Bacharach on the Rhine, about 80 Km northwest of Mannheim, by the border of the Palatinate, where the river cuts through rough country. It was occasionally used as a capital by the Electors Palatine. The most southerly of the western towns were Neustadt (25 Km SW of Mannheim) and Speyer (20 Km south of the Mannheim), both on the Speyerbach, a tributary of the Rhine.

The situation at Mainz provides an example of why the French expended relatively little effort in this campaign. Like other senior officers Boufflers was empowered by the King to treat with the Elector and the cathedral chapter that served as his 'parliament'. Louis XIV had a quasi-legitimate claim to the town, a claim to which the Chapter agreed (possibly to spite the Elector). In consequence the French were invested with the formal authority to control Mainz by its own citizens. Louis' claim was presented on October 1 and ratified on October 21. The Elector soon had enough of the French and slipped away to Achenburg, up the Main, by late November, and then to Erfurt. His flock did not have that option.

Meanwhile, Heidelberg, Pforzheim, and even Heilbronn fell to Duras, or rather to Monclar's cavalry corps, which followed the line of the Neckar. Heilbronn, an Imperial City within Württemberg, was the farthest away, about 60 Km from the Rhine. These too, were important prizes. Heidelberg, in fact, was the Elector Palatine's seat of government. The Dauphin visited the place in person on

10 November and obtained the undefended town's surrender. Stuttgart, Esslingen, and Tübingen were also 'touched' for contributions. Württemberg was rich, and Württemberg had sent troops to aid the despised Dutch. However, not of these places were garrisoned, or even intended to be garrisoned. By December Monclar was under pressure from strong German forces and began to withdraw.

(It is curious that the only places which put up any resistance were the ones on which the French Crown had claims.)

On the Middle Rhine, only Koblenz, garrisoned by Hessians and Hanoverians, and Köln, garrisoned by Brandenburgers and troops from Münster, continued to bid the French defiance. *Lieutenant-général* Boufflers was instructed to bombard Koblenz, an affair which took place on All Saints Day (1 November). The fires raged out of control for three days, burning half the city. Koblenz surrendered, but the French left it unoccupied after being paid to go away.

This was the first of many 'terror bombardments' using batteries of mortars to gut a target without having to breach its walls. Like the aerial bombardments of World War II, such operations were not as effective as their proponents tried to argue. However, it should be pointed out that the object was not so much enemy morale as enemy economics. Not to cause the civilian population to lose heart but to hit the pocketbooks of the town's owner — in this case, the Elector of Trier. Vauban was always opposed to such actions, even though he was sometimes forced to carry them out, but King Louis and War Minister Louvois were convinced they were effective (and cheap). In Koblenz' case, Boufflers work was extremely thorough.

The only other resistance came in the form of German cavalry and the feared *Schnapphahns* or *Snaphaunces*, both operating against French raiding parties. The *Schnapphahns* were the German iteration of partisans. Not perhaps as vigorous as the *Vaudois* in the Alps or the Catalan *Somatén*, they would be an important element in the defence of the German frontier, and they would make the lives of the French soldiers on the Rhine just as miserable as their compatriots in Italy and Spain.

Jacques Henri de Durfort, Duke of Duras (1625-1704)

Oldest son of the marquis de Duras and the sister of Turenne. He served under Turenne and the Great Condé, and in the wars of the Fronde at first followed Condé into rebellion but afterward rejoined the King's service. Before the war he was Governor of Franche-Comté, which he had helped conquer. He was a great favourite of King Louis and able to speak his mind without fear of the consequences, primarily, it seems, because of his forthright character. English sources tend to ignore him. He was neither 'one of the greats' nor a piñada for English generals to thwack. But, as a pupil of Condé and Turenne, his military skills may be taken for granted. The Sun King did not suffer fools to speak their mind.



[Maréchal Duras]

Politics

While the siege of Philippsburg progressed, the German princes met to determine a common strategy. Using the device of the League of the Augsburg, originally created as an ineffective challenge to the Reunions, the most militarily powerful princes — Brandenburg, Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Saxony, and even the normally pro-French Bavaria — agreed to unite against France. This was the Magdeburg Concert. Technically, they were to act as Imperial vassals in the usual manner, defending the Reich while the Emperor was absent, which meant their campaigning would be within the Empire since they lacked the legal authority to wage war outside it. The

League was very loosely defined. The Northern princes formed the core of it, as part of the political initiative known as the Third Party. Bavaria got on board as a Friend of the League to avoid being under the Emperor's thumb. The association went 'global' when the Dutch joined 26 November. Their own schemes had been turned down by Leopold. Like Bavaria, they only held associate membership, but unlike Bavaria they were prepared to pay the dues. By this, the local defensive networks of the Reich were linked to the wider struggle. The other vital effect of the alliance between the Magdeburg Concert and the Dutch was to draw the Emperor actively into the war. For all his activity with the League of Augsburg and its successor, he had still hoped to keep the conflict between France and the Reich as informal and low key as possible. A formal declaration of war was issued by the Imperial Diet on 24 January, 1689.

The Rape of the Palatinate

Général Boufflers' campaign has come to be known as the Rape of the Palatinate. The ruination it caused was a policy decision. But, of course, the troops on the ground got out of hand, as they always do when implementing such policies.

As previously explained, King Louis and his ministers, particularly Louvois and his aide Chamlay, decided they needed to create a belt of devastation along the German frontier. Shortly before Philippsburg fell, on 27 October, Chamlay wrote a letter advocating the demilitarisation of all the key towns between Breisach and the Moselle through razing their defences. This was also to be done at Heilbronn — which is why the French travelled so far east.

So much was common practice, though perhaps more systematised than usual. But Chamlay's letter also stated:

"I would dare to propose to you something that perhaps will not be to your taste, that is the day after we take Mannheim, I would put the city to the sword and plow it under."

[Quoted in Lynn, p. 196.]

As recounted above, Mannheim fell easily on 11 November. On 13 November Versailles got the news, and on 15 November, Louvois was heard to comment that the King was in favour of flattening the city as an example.

On 18 December, Montclar, in the midst of his withdrawal from the Middle Neckar, received instructions urging him to destroy as much as he could. Two days later, Louvois presented a map to Louis on which all the targets for destruction were pricked out. The King approved the list, only exempting some religious buildings. The population was to be forcibly evacuated or driven off; mass killings were to be engaged in if villagers attempted to return to their old homes. Typically, the inhabitants were only given a few days to fold up their lives and clear out.

Beginning as the planned creation of a buffer zone, the mere levelling of potential enemy defences and clearing

out of supplies, the work grew into an orgy of destruction as Louis and his ministers sought to both to hinder the feared approach of Imperial forces and to exact revenge for the frustration of their plan for a short war. The rape continued well into June of 1689, peaking in the spring.

Heidelberg was burned on 2 March. Fortunately, the locals were tipped off and fled, then returned to put out the fires so that less than 10% of the city was lost.

Mannheim's death order was issued on 13 January. The population was to be forcibly emigrated to Alsace. The town fathers were informed on 4 March, the French encouraging them to make the people tear down their own homes in the name of 'orderly conduct'. Mannheim, constructed mainly of wood, was reduced to ash, its walls pulled down and its ditches filled by the work of French troops and forced labour. Its associated villages within a radius of 16 Km were likewise destroyed, in many cases due to set fires, which spread uncontrolled into the countryside.

At least twenty other locations and their environs were similar destroyed, including Oppenheim and Worms (31 May), Speyer (1 June), and Bingen (4 June). Possibly through the intervention of *maréchal* Duras, the resettled populations of the towns just named were to be exempted from taxes for ten years.

Most of Louis' generals were of two minds about the whole campaign, but they obeyed orders. As might have been expected, things quickly spiralled out of Versailles' control, with general pillaging, wanton violence, reprisals and counter-reprisals. In the 21st Century such activities are *de rigour*, but in 1688-89 they were unheard of, the horrors of the Thirty Years War notwithstanding. What shocked the most was the ruthless way the destruction was carried out.

By the summer of 1689, however, the French were falling back on their fortress lines in the face of ever-growing German opposition.

The Advance on Holland

Though the Upper Rhine was the primary sector in the German theatre, there was some activity toward Belgium, significant enough for the Dutch Estates to quibble about allowing the Prince of Orange to take off on his harebrained overseas adventure. Only with the arrival of a large number of German and Swedish mercenary regiments very late in the 1688 campaigning season did they feel secure enough to let him go.

Though France and Spain were supposedly not yet at war, the French did secure their flank by occupying Spanish-owned Luxembourg. This annoyed the Spanish, but what really made them and the Dutch worried was French raiding into the Prince-Bishopric of Liège. Cavalry columns were also spotted as far away as Maastricht (a Dutch enclave within said Prince-Bishopric) and Aix-la-Chapelle (Aachen – an Imperial City). While some of this

was related to supporting the current activities in the Electorate of Cologne, there was another political objective.

Liège, like Cologne, like all the Rhineland duchies, was riven by pro- and anti-French factions. By establishing a presence and levying 'contributions', the French were attempting to coerce its prince-bishop into joining them. That would give them control of the Middle Meuse and tear the Dutch and Spanish defences wide open. A campaign against Holland could be made either by the Rhine or the Meuse. However, the city of Liège sat at the western end of a lateral line of communication, by road, through Aachen to Köln. Holding Liège *and* Köln would allow French armies to conduct a coordinated offensive down both rivers through the fertile territories of Jülich and Guelderland, or, given different circumstances, move rapidly from France to the Rhine along the old Roman route (Brunhilde's Way), bypassing the Ardennes and Eifel through better campaigning lands than the Moselle Valley provided.

Of course, the French could also invade Belgium and march cross-country to Holland, but that would mean fighting both the Spanish and Dutch in a land studded with fortifications. The Dutch, naturally enough, believed they were the prime target of King Louis' wrath, not the Emperor or the Spanish, and were afraid the French were engaged in bypassing Belgium solely to make that coordinated push down the Meuse and Rhine. Such a move might allow Spain to avoid getting involved.

But, when the Estates saw that their enemies were actually focused on the Middle and Upper Rhine, they relaxed. Though the fighting in the Low Countries and on the Rhine would each impact the other, after 1689 concerns that the French would make a repeat of the Dutch War receded. They would, instead, merely manoeuvre for advantage in both theatres.



1689 – Rache!

“Unstringing the bow does not heal the wound”

Motto of the House of Lorraine

Strategy

France’s northeast frontier would entertain the heaviest fighting and largest troop concentrations throughout the war, but at this point King Louis and Louvois still saw the Rhine as the strategic ‘center of gravity’. It needs to be emphasised that prior to the war the involvement of the Empire was not guaranteed, nor even desired by the Emperor. But, the surprise French offensive stirred up a hornet’s nest in Germany. The *Kriese* (military district) system was intended to match response to threat. Members did not — were not allowed to — operate offensively. Giving local rulers that much power would give certain princes the means to overthrow the Habsburgs. (Brandenburg-Prussia comes to mind, but in this period it would more likely be Bavaria or Saxony.) The Empire’s traditional *modus operandi* was to allow the formation of defensive leagues — the League of Augsburg, for example — to deal with local threats. As the scale of the threat increased, so did the number of players. Final authority rested with the Emperor, but he need not get personally involved. Existential threats, such as the Turks, involved everyone, with the Emperor heading up a grand coalition, as was taking place at this very time in Hungary. The French were not regarded as an existential threat, but they needed to be punished. The Rape of the Palatinate had not intimidated the Germans, it had, however temporarily, united them. By pushing forward to the Rhine, the aggressors had entered the Empire’s defensive zone and could expect counterattacks along the length of the river.

And, the Germans were no longer alone. By the spring of 1689 Spain would join what was becoming known as the Grand Alliance and William of Orange, King Louis’ most implacable foe, would soon take direction of the coalition, bringing England in to join the Dutch. In all three cases the French mismanaged things badly. King Louis found it intolerable that a legitimate monarch like King James of England be overthrown by some upstart *rentier* whose family came from the Dauphiné, and issued yet another ultimatum. Originally, he hoped Spain would join with France in aiding James II’s restoration. With Spanish hostility growing daily, he now felt compelled to hand out declarations of war all round, preemptively.

Meanwhile, in accordance with their rules of engagement the German States called upon the Emperor for aid. Those particularly concerned included the electors of Brandenburg and Saxony, the Duke of Hanover, and the Landgrave of Hesse. Plus, of course, the Elector Palatine. Interestingly, Duke Max of Bavaria was not involved in this round of talks. He was still trying to make up his mind. William of Orange sent encouragement and

promises to the Emperor as well. It was in his interest to have Leopold join the fight.

Emperor Leopold could not ignore his Imperial obligations. He regarded the capture of Philippsburg, an Imperial fortress, as a formal breach of the twenty year truce between himself and King Louis. (The sufferings of his vassals does *not* seem to have been sufficient cause.) There were also the family ties with Spain to consider. Rather tenuous now, but they still existed. Besides, there might be an opportunity to reacquire Alsace, a comparatively recent Imperial loss to France. Leopold was prepared to send limited assistance to the Rhine. What may have been more important, the Emperor issued orders expelling all French agents from the Reich and instituting stiff punishments both for those who ‘went underground’ and those who continued to have dealings with them.

Mainly, Leopold wanted the French off his back so he could concentrate on the Turks. The latter had almost given in to his demands when the French attacked. Now they wanted better terms. The Emperor’s initial proposals had been outrageous, but the Turks had seen no way out, until now. It should also be realised that the Emperor’s Turkish war was not entirely a vanity project. Both the Poles and the Venetians, whose relationships with the Empire were always tricky to handle, insisted he remain in the fight. This was the War of the Holy League, not the War of Leopold.

The French tried one last time to avoid direct Imperial involvement by offering to trade Philippsburg (with its defences razed, of course) and Freiburg for the installation of Cardinal Fürstenberg at Köln, a Perpetual Peace, and French occupation of all the forts along the Rhine on their own side of the river. They claimed such a deal would be in accordance with the earlier treaties of Nijmegen and München. Considering this would place a sixth of his Empire within the French economic sphere, Leopold refused to listen to the suggestion. That meant the military option was Louis only option, for the present.

If — and it was a big if — the French were successful on the Rhine, they could move downstream into Holland, forcing the Dutch in Flanders and Brabant to abandon the Spanish and perhaps even causing the Dutch Estates to panic and surrender. Left to themselves, the Spanish would be sure to give in to French demands. By the time Leopold’s men arrived from Hungary, if they ever did, he would be fighting alone. But this has been hashed over before and shown to have been impractical. The most realistic scenario would see France finishing her devastation of the Rhineland, securing the crossing points and Cologne, and then retiring to better positions until her full strength could be mobilised. Leopold did not envisage the worst case, which was beyond his capability to address.


Upper Rhine Theatre of War

1689

Scale & Legend

●	Town
◆	Fortification
—	Shore/River
@10 Km	

1. Feuquières' winter raid to Bavaria
2. Lorraine besieges Mainz 22 July - 8 September
3. Lorraine's corps crosses Rhine at Koblenz; envelops Mainz
4. Duke of Bavaria probes Philippsburg & Fort-Louis
5. Duras attempts siege of Heidelberg; loots Baden; raids Pforzheim
6. Germans counter French attempt on Heidelberg



Beginning to realise he was facing a long war, over the winter King Louis commissioned the raising and expansion of many line regiments, as well 25,000 new militia, plus the 'Ban' (a rudimentary Catholic *levee en masse* for local defense against the Huguenots) but few of these new troops were ready to take the field immediately. Furthermore, not only were the French still fighting on the Rhine, they would have to open a new front in Catalonia, and were already preparing an expeditionary corps to send to Ireland to assist King James; many militia, and even some regular units, also had to be held back for internal security, because the Huguenots were being stirred up by activists sent from The Hague.

[The realization that this would be a long war seems to have come early to the French, earlier than some historians assume. In 1689 King Louis had all the silver plate and furnishings at Versailles melted down to mint coins for his army. Louis might be pretentious and ostentatious, but he could also be practical.]

Though the French would eventually field 250,000 men this year, plans were modest: simply cover the Frontier and prevent any Allied thrusts from doing too much damage. Local commanders were still to advance into enemy territory, it being French policy always to wage war at their enemies' expense. This was especially true in Germany, where some important districts seemed likely to respond favourably to harsh treatment — in particular Württemberg and Bavaria, which were virtually defenceless, their troops having either gone to Hungary or (in Württemberg's case) been hired by the Dutch.

The weight of French military power in Germany lay at Mainz, under *maréchal* Duras. He also commanded three smaller corps on the Moselle, the Saar, and in Alsace. Duras had as his lieutenants the *comtes* de Choiseul, de la Feuille, and d'Auvergne, the *ducs* de Villeroy and Vendôme, *baron* Monclar, and the *marquises* Boufflers and de Bis. His *maréchals de camp* were the *comtes* de Tessé and Tallard, and the *marquises* d'Harcourt, Vivans, and Neuchelle.

The province of Lorraine was held by the *marquis* de Bissy, the Electorate of Cologne (minus its capital and the lands east of the Rhine) by the *marquis* de Sourdis, the city of Strasbourg by the *marquis* de Chamilly, Luxembourg by *général* Catinat, Mont-Royal on the Moselle by M. de Montal and Mainz by the *marquis* d'Uxelles.

Sourdis was engaged in helping 'Archbishop' Fürstenberg secure his position. French troops were added to Kaiserswerth and Neuss. This seemed to threaten the southeastern Dutch province of Guelderland but the French were at the end of a very tenuous supply line.

The French commander assigned to the Northeast Frontier was *maréchal* Humières, a rather lacklustre general whose subordinates nicknamed him '*maréchal sans lumière*' — Marshal Dim. Humières' tiny field army,

14,000 foot and 5,000 horse, supported by an independent garrison force occupying the Lines of the Scheldt north of Lille, were ordered to remain on the defensive. On the Pyrenees, a local aristocrat, the *duc* de Noailles, took charge of what would be a primarily defensive mission.

The Alliance followed much the same strategy as the French. Despite a lot of talk about taking the fight to the enemy there was not much else they could do. On France's northern and eastern frontiers the Alliance fielded one Spanish, one Dutch, and three German armies. The 'Dutch', a mixed bag of States regiments and German and Scandinavian mercenaries, was commanded by the Prince of Waldeck, an experienced but elderly general, severely hampered by a divided command, because the Dutch, Spanish, and Germans each had their own agendas; he had essentially been promoted to a post above his abilities. The Spanish, under Governor General the *marqués* de Gastañaga, faced off against the French Lines of the Scheldt, guarding Flanders with something over 10,000 men.

The three German armies, under the Elector of Bavaria in Baden, the Prince of Lorraine at Frankfurt, and the Elector of Brandenburg in the Duchy of Cleves, each covered that section of the Rhine which corresponded to their own area of interest. Despite Vienna's assumptions that they would cooperate, they showed little interest in doing so. Nonetheless, some 150,000 German troops would serve along the Rhine this year.

Motivations

The motivations of each of the three German commanders have been discussed earlier, but can be summarised again. Lorraine was the most committed. Charles V, *duc* de Lorraine, wanted his lands back. The French, when they saw that opposition was growing, actually offered to return his estates if he would persuade the Emperor not to interfere. For some reason the deal fell through. It is not clear whether he refused to act as go-between on a point of honour, or whether the Emperor refused to listen.

Over the winter of 1688/89 Lorraine became more forward in his discussions with the Emperor, pointing out that France now faced multiple enemies (England, at least, since Spain had not yet declared herself), and that he himself had the political support of Spain and the Papacy; the Italian States and the Swiss also favoured his cause. The Emperor seemed willing to give him a chance — here was a *generalleutnant* Leopold could trust to unite the Germans and act aggressively. Lorraine was a good general, unfortunately he suffered from a chronic illness which laid him up for some weeks at Innsbruck. He would, however, be fit enough to start the campaign in the late spring.

The old Elector of Brandenburg, it will be remembered, died in 1688, and his heir was decidedly anti-Sun King.

However, he was also only interested in the war as it affected him. He did not want the French anywhere near his possessions and so was prepared to bring force to bear to drive them out of Cologne. As for aiding either Lorraine on the Upper Rhine or Waldeck in Brabant, he might, if they offered a big enough reward. In 1689, though Brandenburg made a number of promises to help, events showed he only did so in order to obtain assistance for his own projects.

King Louis had hoped Bavaria, an on-again off-again ally of France — after all, Duke Max's sister was married to his son — might be persuaded to abandon the Alliance or only give it lip service, but the Elector proved obdurate. Maximilian II Emanuel, of the House of Wittelsbach, was 27 in 1689. He was young, and he was ambitious. The year before he had taken the Turkish city of Belgrade and was very full of himself. He was also married to a daughter of the Emperor, who initially chose him over Lorraine as his official representative in the West. (Leopold felt that Lorraine's name alone was 'worth an army' against the Turks, and that Duke Max had just a great a stake in the West — the French had already raided his lands. He was younger and more energetic.)

But, Duke Max had that bad habit of accepting advice from the last person he talked to. The possibility that the French, who had plenty of agents at his court, could talk him round was not theoretical. Should he remain the Emperor's man, he might be persuaded to seek a second command against the Turks, which would keep him out of reach of Versailles' blandishments. Ironically, the French themselves angled to have him put out of the way in just such a fashion; they only narrowly failed, the job going instead to his neighbour, Louis of Baden. Charles of Lorraine, needing allies, managed to turn Duke Max's thoughts to winning glory on the Rhine. This had not been an easy task, as will be revealed when Duke Charles' travails are narrated below. The price Lorraine paid for Bavaria's services was the creation of a separate command.

There is an alternative version of how the Emperor chose between Lorraine and Bavaria in which Lorraine was given the choice of an eastern or western command, but bounced the ball back to Leopold, who 'deliberated' for a few days and told Lorraine to head west, which is what he knew the prince wanted.

Charles V, Duke of Lorraine and Bar (1643-1690)

Charles of Lorraine was born in exile, at Vienna. The Treaty of Nijmegen (1679) confirmed his titles but the French retained his lands. As husband of the old King of Poland's widow, he was eligible for that throne, and actually stood for election twice, unsuccessfully. Most of his life was spent pursuing a military career in the Imperial Army. He was made *Generalfeldmarschall* in 1676, and commanded the army which relieved Vienna in 1683.

Paraphrasing his biographer, Jean Garrel (p.341), Charles of Lorraine was tall, with a nobility of bearing, and must have cut a fine figure when he was younger; he was now overweight and in ill health. He was modest and wore simple clothes. He was renowned for his bravery and martial skills. At the same time he was a lover of literature and a student of history and politics. He spoke German, Italian, and French perfectly and had a good understanding of Latin. He spoke little. When he did speak it was always to the point, but not blunt; he expressed himself well. With foreigners he was grave and serious without affectation. With his own people he was pleasant and amusing, and a good friend. He had no time for trifles and always reasoned things out thoroughly. He enjoyed debate, but though he always put forward his opinions with determination, was more interested in bringing out the other person's thoughts and character than in winning. He practised liberality, while remaining within his limited budget, kept his word, only making vows when the project was important, and he passed over insults. His life was devoted to the restoration of his House's fortunes. He was of an exemplary devotion, maintaining an even disposition in both prosperity and adversity, and trusting in Providence.



[Charles V of Lorraine]

The Campaign — The Upper Rhine

The Empire prepared for war. A Diet was held at Ratisbon which resolved that France was an aggressor, had broken solemn treaties, had stabbed Germany in the back, and so forth — the usual. It was further resolved that the Empire as a whole would declare war on France and that Catholic and Protestant states would put aside their differences to face the common foe (the French were notorious for stirring up sectarian quarrels). There would be no separate peace. The Empire's neighbours would be informed of these decisions and their aid (or neutrality) requested, and a speedy peace would be sought with the Turks. These resolutions lasted until the ink was dry. Meanwhile, the princes of Saxony, Hanover, and Hesse met separately at Frankfurt-am-Main to discuss how these declarations would affect their relationship.

Leopold recalled some of his troops from Hungary, ordered the construction of depôts, and began raising levies, meaning primarily, the calling of the general levy in accordance with the Empire's collective responsibilities. The troops recalled from Hungary comprised 6 regiments of cuirassiers and 1 of dragoons, and 6 regiments of foot. Starhemberg's infantry regiment was already in garrison on the Rhine, and Leopold hired a cuirassier and a dragoon regiment from the Duke of Württemberg.

[At this time, Imperial regiments had 2 battalions each, not 3 or 4.]

Lorraine's full order of battle would include 13 regiments of horse, 4 of dragoons, and 18 of foot, totalling 40,000 men. The Elector of Saxony would contribute another 17,000 and the Landgrave of Hesse 12,000 more. The Elector of Bavaria was (supposed) to join him with 10,000 of his own men, 7,000 Imperials, and 4,000 Swabians. If Brandenburg's army was added to the mix, this would give the Germans 105,000 men against about 40,000 French.

With the Elector of Brandenburg moving his independent command into Cleves, and Lorraine and Duke Max beginning to muster, the French troops in the Palatinate ramped up their scorched earth policy. Having failed to win over or redirect Duke Max into some other enterprise, the French *marquis* de Feuquières had been ordered to lay Bavaria under contribution. This simple instruction involved a winter's ride of 800 Km through hostile territory. Nonetheless, Feuquières succeeded in extorting 500,000 *livres* from Württemberg and Bavaria. Feuquières moved too fast and too early in the season for any opposition to coalesce. Crossing the Danube at Lavinghen, he easily routed the mere 100 dragoons opposed to him. Pforzheim, Wurzburg, Nuremberg, Ulm, and Augsburg were all forced to empty their pockets.

On 7 January, at Neuburg, near Pforzheim, Feuquières also exacted vengeance for the murder of some French invalids by a body of 200 German dragoons. The men were tracked to Neuburg and attacked in their billets, the

French breaking down the doors with axes. Feuquières entered the commanding officer's residence and neatly deflected the man's pistol with his cane while another officer shot the man dead. The French killed all but 7 of the dragoons; the survivors managed to escape.

This series of events may seem trivial, but the ability of the French to exercise their will east of the Rhine troubled Duke Max. Only his 21,000 men stood between the people of South Germany and the devastation that was beginning farther downriver. It added weight to his demand for a separate command. Technically, the Upper Rhine was under the Emperor's command, not his, in the person of one *feldmarschall* Caprara, with whom Duke Max had 'issues'. This was the price he paid for being awarded 'one quarter' of the Imperial forces to play with. To avoid a spat, Lorraine sided with Duke Max. The 'Bavarian Army' would muster at Heilbronn and its numbers be increased to 30,000.

Duke Max's immediate response to Feuquières' *chevausée* was to organise a strong defense of his sector with the men on hand. This involved calling out the militia to fortify their villages and man roadblocks, the gathering of stores, and the like. A defensive line was established on a series of preexisting entrenchments within the Black Forest, leaving the plains to the French. Over the years this line would increase in strength. Though manned by relatively few forces, the French rarely dared venturing into the 'deep dark woods'.

The muster of Duke Max's army duly took place at Heilbronn about the end of May, in step with Lorraine's efforts on the Main River. His command consisted of the following: *feldmarschalls* Caprara and Dünnewald, each with their cavalry regiment, *generals der kavallerie* Pálffy and the Markgraf von Bayreuth with their cavalry regiments, *feldzugmeisters* Prinz Ludwig Anton von Neuburg and Graf Wallis, with their infantry regiments, *feldmarschalleutnants* Montecuccoli (with his cavalry regiment), Prinz Commercy and Herzog von Württemberg (cavalry regiments under Lorraine), and Eugene of Savoy with his cavalry regiment, and finally FML Max Starhemberg (whose regiment was also under Lorraine's command).

[Lorraine's biographer states that Neuburg had with him the Hoch-und-Deutschmeister. This regiment was raised by him for Imperial service only in 1695. However, there was an 'ordinary' line regiment called Pfalz-Neuburg and the reader may recall Neuburg was the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order, otherwise known as the Hoch-und-Deutschmeister of the Order. Regarding the Imperial leadership, there were only another 11 generals in service, all in Hungary.]

Leaving Vienna on 18 April Lorraine paused to take a cure at Innsbruck, arranging for the muster of his army to start at Frankfurt am Main on May 25. He himself left Innsbruck about 16 May. The troops moved slowly. The Hessians camped at Höchst, farther up the Main, while the Saxons were still organising at Leipzig; the

Hanoverians were roughly the same distance away in their own country. Meanwhile the local Franconian troops and the Imperial regiments sent to Frankfurt had paused to react to a French *chevaussee* that threatened Heilbronn; it was feared the French were bound for Bohemia.

Bohemia, coincidentally, was where Lorraine's field guns still resided; his siege pieces were still in Hungary. Not that enough supplies had been gathered to actually field an army, anyway. This was a systemic problem with the Empire's mobilisation, everyone waited for their neighbour to get to work before they did. There was also the problem of the Rhine River.

At this time of the year the Rhine could not be crossed — save at those spots the French controlled — above Koblenz. There were no permanent bridges, either. That meant a pontoon bridge, possibly two. No pontoons had been collected. The French had scooped up all the boats and barges and were hoarding them on their side. They had also sunk 20-30 stone-filled barges in the Main near its confluence with the Rhine to block river traffic and had made improvements to Mainz' defences, meaning any bridge erected near Mainz would probably not last a day.

Word was also received from Trier of Boufflers' corps forming camps on the Moselle and Hunsrück Rivers, suggesting an offensive against Koblenz. After last year's bombardment it was in no condition to defend itself. For these reasons, Lorraine felt compelled to take part of his army to Koblenz. As a silver lining, once Boufflers was pushed away and the bridge built, it would be possible to march up the left bank of the Rhine and properly surround Mainz.

At the end of May therefore, while the French devastation was at its height, he brought his army, currently numbering 40,000 men, down from Frankfurt to the Rhine across from Mainz (a distance of 35-40 Km). After the fall of Kaiserswerth (described later) Brandenburg, Saxony, and Hesse held another conference at Frankfurt, but their corps were still not ready. When they did appear Lorraine would have roughly 60,000 men under his direct command.

At this later conference it was agreed the Lorraine would hold the supreme command as representative of the Emperor and that no one would make a separate peace until his lands were restored. Also, it was agreed that Mainz and Bonn should be the primary targets of this year's campaign. This was in accordance with the Emperor's directive that France be invaded as a reprisal, either by occupying Alsace directly, or by passing through the Saar or up the valley of the Moselle. If the latter were attempted Mont Royal was the critical target. There was much discussion throughout the war about the need to take it, and several attempts were made over the years, but none were ever followed through. Ultimately, it was cheaper to make noises and scare the French.

Bonn, however, was crucial to complete the defensive line on the Middle Rhine. Only with this line secured could offensives be made up the Moselle in the first place. Mainz was another obvious target. It would give the Germans a springboard to attack Alsace or go west to the Saar, as the Emperor directed. But, as a matter of fact, Strasbourg, capital of Alsace, and not Mainz, was the fortress Lorraine and the Emperor originally intended to attack. It was far more valuable, and Lorraine would be more able to count on Bavaria's aid. Also, since Mainz had been 'legally' given to the French, the Emperor felt better justified in capturing Strasbourg, one of Lorraine's old properties. But, pleas for help from the oppressed population of Mainz caused the locals at Frankfurt, with whom they traded, to beg Lorraine to succour the place.

Taking Mainz would not be easy. Apart from the work the French had put into it, it had been modernised within the last decade and sported 14 bastions. The French had been given the keys, so there was no siege damage to repair. The commandant, d'Uxelles, had 10 battalions of veteran troops (the wording in Quincy's text suggests the regiments of the Old Corps), a company of the Bombardiers de Camelin, a regiment of horse and another of dragoons (Barbesieres). This made 8,000 men (10,000 in some accounts) and they had spent the winter in ceaseless activity. *Maréchal* Duras also placed 30 companies of grenadiers in deep reserve, ready to be committed to the relief of any siege.

Duras arrived in theatre with his staff at the end of May. Basing in Alsace, he camped his cavalry near Philippsburg and on 1 June sent 1,500 horse and 200 dragoons, under the *comte* d'Auvergne, to Ingelheim, a day's march west of Mainz, close to the Rhine. D'Auvergne probably had his HQ here, but his men were set out in a cordon from Bingen to the city (a line of about 26 Km).

On June 4 Bingen was burned on orders from Versailles, though the church was spared on King Louis' instructions. Ironically, this was one of the towns formally given to France by the Elector Palatine. The cordon may have been a screen for foragers and a set of observation posts rather than a real blocking position, for on 13 June d'Auvergne rejoined the main army. A small action was fought by Bingen as French picquets occupying a couple of houses on the far bank of the Rhine attempted to disengage, which they did one house at a time, suffering only 1 casualty and inflicting, according to Quincy, 60 on the enemy.

Duras now extended his cordon on his right, keeping his infantry quartered in the Rhine villages, supported by two flying camps, one at Worms under the *marquis* de Tilladet, and the other at Speyer under the *comte* de Tessé. The line ran from Mainz to within 8 Km of Landau, 27 Km southwest of Speyer, and was primarily intended to guard against an approach along the Neckar. A fort was constructed at Mannheim, garrisoned by 400 men

and 9 cannon, and serviced by a bridge of boats. In future years the French would develop positions like these into permanent Lines, and the Germans would do likewise.

The *comte* de Choiseul camped on the upper reaches of the Rhine, between Basel and Huningue. This sector featured a string of riverside redoubts. Choiseul's job was to keep the Swiss cantons on-side, and to eat up the lands of the Marquisate of Durlach across the river. Currently the Swiss were holding their Diet. Though there was a strong French faction among them it was deemed necessary to add a certain armed 'presence'. Choiseul also had the job of observing Duke Max, so on 10 June he crossed the Rhine at Basel and came down the river to the site of Fort-Louis with 4-5,000 men. He was to link up with Duras if Duke Max joined Lorraine.

Responding to Lorraine's request for a diversion, and also perhaps to bolster local morale, Duke Max appeared at Bruschal, 25 Km southeast of Speyer, on 2 June, with 4 regiments of horse, 2 of dragoons, and 4 of foot. This constituted the core of the Elector's army; the infantry regiments had 2 battalions apiece. Here he paused, waiting for his train and some of his Imperial auxiliaries.

On 4 June M. Desbordes, Governor of Philippsburg, acting on a report that 300 enemy horse had been seen at Kostheim, across the river from Mainz and north of the Main, sent out a lieutenant and 300 grenadiers to deal with them. The enemy turned out to be only 100 strong, all holed up in one fortified house. The French stormed the place and killed all but one man, then burnt the village.

After this Duke Max marched on Fort-Louis, breaking camp on 11 June. Still a construction site, Fort-Louis, 35 Km downriver from Strasbourg, was situated on an island at a spot that could be converted into a crossing. The fort's governor went out to meet the enemy's scouts with a couple of cannon, but one exploded, killing him.

Général Monclar, with an independent corps camped on the left bank near Fort-Louis, observed the approach of the Bavarians and rushed reinforcements up. These, and news that Choiseul was on his way, discouraged Duke Max from pressing the attack. He withdrew from the Rhine.

Siege of Mainz — 22 July (officially) to 8 September

[Refer to the diagram on p. 60.]

Lorraine began his envelopment of Mainz on May 30. The Imperial columns, including the Franconian contingent, set out from Frankfurt at 2am. The Hessians were still camped at Höchst, but marched the same day. About 2pm, the advance guard of Imperials appeared at Hochheim am Main on the right bank of that river, about 5 Km short of the Rhine. From Hochheim the Germans defiled onto the plain across from Mainz, within range of the guns of Fort Mars, a redoubt (see diagram) which took them under fire for some time. They could then be observed by the French in Mainz making their afternoon

march along the right bank of the Main to Mosbach, 11 Km northwest of Hochheim in what is now a suburb of Weisbaden, putting them directly opposite the bend of the Rhine where it turns west.

[There is a community called Mombach on the left bank, below Mainz; one needs to be careful not to confuse it with Mosbach.]

The appearance of Lorraine's army triggered the flurry of 'scorched earth' efforts by the French. By a prearranged chain of signal guns, the message was sent up to Oppenheim, Worms, and Speyer. As soon as the signal was passed on from a given location the French there began their work of devastation. The three named towns were burned to ash by the following day. But, much destruction had already been wrought, on both sides of the river, and most of the population had already either fled or been evicted. Heidelberg was deserted, the Elector's castle having been blown up on April 2.

The French sent dragoons across the river to test Lorraine's columns, resulting in some skirmishes; they were forced to retire. The march, though short in distance, was lengthy in execution, for the advance guard camped beside a hill at Mosbach around 7pm while the Hessian infantry only left Höchst at 5pm.


The next day, 31 May, the Germans assembled 2 regiments, probably of Hessians, 1,000 metres north of Kostheim for an attack on Mars, while Lorraine made observations. The attack took place at 11pm. Mars was a fairly significant complex, including detached redoubts. As can be seen in the diagram it sat on its own island, the Isle of Mars, separated from the mainland by the Mündung Estuary. The main fort was elevated above the surrounding flood plain. A flying bridge connected the complex to the city.

The Germans needed to secure at least part of this complex to prevent their camp coming under constant fire. 60 men of the *régiment* Dauphin held the small redoubt on the mainland for some time before setting fire to the place and retreating to the redoubts across the channel in a couple of boats. When they could no longer hold there, they retreated to the main fort, with the loss of only 1 man. Quincy says that d'Uxelles ordered a bridge to be burnt, probably a pontoon bridge used to service the outlying redoubts.

D'Uxelles also stationed boats to support Mars. 12 crewmen were posted at a house on the riverbank, and 10 more took a large boat with 40 soldiers to a spot just above the confluence with the Main (off the bottom left corner of the diagram) where they could see what was happening on the Main. 2 more boats, one with 24 men and some 'falcons' (5 or 6-pounders) and another with 4 heavier pieces, were placed at the spots where Mars' moat connected with the Rhine, about 4 meters from shore.

Siege of Mainz

22 July - 8 September 1689



- A. Citadel
- B. St. Nicholas Bastion
- C. St. Catherine Bastion
- D. St. Alban Bastion
- E. St. Jean Bastion
- F. St. Philippe Bastion
- G. St. Martin Bastion
- H. St. Boniface Bastion
- J. St. Alexander Bastion
- K. St. George Bastion
- L. St. Paul Bastion
- M. St. Leopold Bastion
- N. Ste. Felicité Bastion
- P. St. Damien Bastion
- R. St. Raimond Bastion
- S. Grand Battery
- T. Gloirette
- U. Palace

[Regarding artillery terminology, it is safer to use the old name, 'falcon', in place of the term 'six-pounder'. Falcons were lighter than standard field pieces, or Feldschlangen in German. A viertel-Feldschlangen used a 4 or 5 pound ball, the halbe-Schlangen a 9 pound ball, and the Ganze (full) Feldschlangen an 18 pound ball. A falcon, with a 5 or 6 pound ball, fired a slightly heavier shot than a viertel-Feldschlangen, but it had a shorter barrel, 27 calibre as opposed to 34 calibre. These are the specifications for German cannon. As yet no one had a proper 'system' for artillery, but the French did employ the familiar 4- 8- and 12-pounder scale. The falcons mounted on the boats may have been French, or they may have been captured German pieces. Falconets were half the weight of a falcon with a barrel at least 25% longer than a falcon's.]

On 1 June the Hessians set up a cannon by the church at Kostheim to hinder work being done on one of the smaller redoubts but were fired on by Mars' guns and forced to displace. Quincy says this redoubt was on the Main, perhaps at the eastern end of the entrenchments covering Mars. As shown on the diagram, Kostheim, or Kosthiem-Kastel, or Cassel, as it is variously known, was in ruins.

The Germans were as yet unable to interfere with the watermills along Mainz's esplanade, which d'Uxelles ordered to continue churning out flour.

[In Die Belagerung von Mainz, the author claims Mars was completely taken and razed on June 1, and the flying bridge burnt by the French. He also says the attack was launched at 7pm. One would think this would be definitive, but it is not. Quincy is not clear about Mars' fate. Lynn says it was taken on 11 July, which cannot be right since fighting was still taking place there on 15 July. Most likely it was abandoned on the night of July 20, when the flying bridge was broken, though it may have held out until the 28th or 29th. What the Mainz journal describes must be the razing of the small mainland redoubt and the burning of the connecting pontoon bridge.]

2 June saw the first artillery duel, while 2 more German regiments entered the Mosbach camp. Nothing of note took place the next day. The Imperial regiments Dünnewald and Neuburg were sent to Koblenz to protect the bridge construction work in that place. 2 flying bridges were planned.

On 4 June, the 'Main' redoubt fired 3 guns at the enemy's Kostheim positions from 2am to 10am. The Germans responded in kind. More regiments appeared in the German camp, including some 'Saxons'. These regiments were in Franconian service and not under the Duke of Saxony, and camped separately, south of the Main at a spot picked out for them by Lorraine called Gustave's Fort (now Gustavsburg, 3,000 metres southwest of Hochheim). FML Thüngen, an Imperial officer currently in the service of the Archbishop of Mainz, was placed in command of this camp. By arranging his camps like this Lorraine prevented raids against Darmstadt south of the Main or the Rheingau north of it.

More troops arrived daily, but little else happened for some time. On June 6 the Landgrave of Hesse and the Duke of Saxony arrived in camp for a conference.

On 11 June there was an artillery duel. Kostheim was bombed by French mortars, while one of the French boats was sunk. Its cannon were lost but the crew escaped, and the boat was instantly replaced.

12 June word came from the Elector of Brandenburg: he was about to lay siege to Rheinberg, the most northerly of the enemy's posts on the Middle Rhine. He intended also to take Kaiserswerth and Neuß before heading for Bonn.

This same day Duke Max arrived at Frankfurt. An episode now took place which reveals something about the character of Lorraine and the relationships of the princes. Duke Max had an idea. He wanted to requisition all of the Duke of Saxony's troops for an attack on Philippsburg. It would be glorious! It would also take place in his own backyard, under his auspices. Lorraine saw the folly of the idea but kept his mouth shut. He let Saxony whinge about having to serve under that young whelp for a while, which allowed him to adopt the position of neutral mediator, then when things were getting a bit heated, took Duke Max aside and persuaded him that while Philippsburg must certainly be retaken, nothing could be done until Mainz fell, because they would need to ferry the necessary stores down the Main and up the Rhine. As for glory, what could be better than to take part in the greatest siege of 1689. Duke Max took some persuading — he did not like the idea of serving under that senile greybeard the Duke of Saxony — but Lorraine demonstrated to him that since Philippsburg was off the table for the moment, it was either Mainz or sitting in his palace twiddling his thumbs. He and Duke Max then went to the other commanders and 'jointly' presented a plan of operations. The others agreed to let Lorraine arbitrate. Thus, face was saved all round and Lorraine could get on with his projects. This sort of thing happened on a weekly basis. General Eisenhower had it easy.

The Plan, incidentally, was Lorraine's original one. In it he made the case for why Mainz should be attacked in preference to other places (pretty smooth considering he had been ordered to attack Strasbourg). There would be 3 approaches, plus a false approach. The townspeople should be contacted and used for intelligence and eventually for sabotage. Thorough spadework was emphasized (it always has to be; soldiers are naturally lazy). There was encouragement, too. They had 60 cannon and mortars on hand with more available in Saxony, plenty of ammunition, many troops in reserve, and enough food and fodder to last for months. The only difficult part was the actual crossing of the Rhine.

Imperial troops had been sent to Koblenz in the third week of May. North of the confluence of the Main and Rhine is a pass through the Taunus leading to the valley of the Lahn. From here FML Starhemberg and an

advance guard of about 4,000 men marched to Monbourg, 16 Km from Koblenz (Monbourg is probably Montabour, northeast of Koblenz). A march of perhaps 80 Km. They were to take position on the heights of Karthause, on the southwest side of the city, south of the Moselle, and begin entrenching. About 23 May some of Starhemberg's men were pushed farther out to create a cordon on a line from Andernach/Weißenthurm, 15 Km northwest of Koblenz, to Cochem, 38 Km up the Moselle from Koblenz. This was to protect Brandenburg's operations as much as his own, to succour the lands of Trier not yet in French hands, and to make a pretence of threatening Mont Royal.

[Karthause, 'charterhouses' in English, is what the monasteries of the Carthusian Order were called. There was one at Mainz, too, known usually in the sources as the Karthaus. It can be seen on the diagram, beside the Rhine.]

Lorraine discovered a great many refugees camping out on the islands in the Rhine. These he sent to Koblenz to help as labourers. The local nobles were requested to send provisions. The vital pontoons were requisitioned from within the Electorate of Trier. The electorate straddled the Rhine and had two important river connections, the Moselle on the left bank and the Lahn on the right. Even on the Moselle, the French presence was only noticeable in certain sectors, so it was possible to slip boats away under their noses. A Bridge Master was also summoned from Trier.

In addition to this operation, Lorraine called for two more crossings, one by Duke Max to establish a boat bridge between Mannheim and Oppenheim, and the other by to be conducted by Saxony, with Hessian support, at Bingen. The Hessians insisted they had to defend Franconia from French incursions and refused to be assigned anywhere else. The Mannheim crossing should involve 30,000 men and the Bingen one 20,000. The plan called for Saxony to use spare pontoons brought up from Koblenz and for Duke Max to use river traffic on the Neckar to ferry his men across the Rhine. The start date for all three bridging operations was early July. By that time the Brandenburgers should be in the vicinity of Koblenz so that Starhemberg (who was across the Rhine but had no bridges) could detach himself and come south. Simultaneous operations would prevent Duras from countering all of them; if he chose instead to stay near Mainz to defend it, the Coalition could attack with their combined strength. Well, it sounded good on paper.

At this time the Coalition forces were distributed around the theatre as follows. At Bretten, north of the Black Forest and about 30 Km south of Heidelberg, were the Bavarians. The Saxons were between Fulda and Hanau (Hanau is a day's march east of Frankfurt, on the Main). The Hessians were in action opposite Mainz, with additional regiments still at Höchst. The Imperials and *Kreise* troops were at Koblenz and Frankfurt, with a few

regiments in support of the Hessians. The Hanoverians were 'within easy marching distance'.

Sufficient artillery and stores had been stockpiled, so Lorraine ordered preparatory operations to commence. To deal with the problems of a divided command and precedence among the senior officers, it was agreed there would be no council of war during the campaign, but that each commander would liaise as needed. In a combined battle, Lorraine would command, with himself on the right wing, the Bavarians on the left wing and the Saxons in the center. In any siege, the Imperials would operate in one sector and the Bavarians and Saxons would combine to run another. Word was sent to Brandenburg, not for the last time, to refrain from starting a siege of Bonn until Mainz was taken. Lorraine feared Starhemberg's men might be roped in, or worse, that he might have to send aid and spoil his own siege.

On 15 June the Germans threw a proper bridge across the Main to link their two camps. The Franconians came across and marched off to Koblenz, along with the rest of the troops Lorraine committed to that operation. The bulk of the troops left camp about June 13. Numbers for the entire corps are either 14-15,000, or 20,000. The lower number probably omits Starhemberg's 4,000-man advance guard.

General Thüngen went over to Bingen, where he discovered a stockpile of planks the French had left behind. They were already loaded on boats, so Thüngen sent some musketeers on other boats to steal them. They proved very useful.

16 June the Germans detached a regiment of foot to Rhingau, a large island at the bend in the Rhine, which still exists. In those days it sported one of the Archbishop's summer palaces. (Confusingly, the region north of the Rhine in this area is known as *the* Rhinegau.)

17 June the Hessians lobbed 5 bombs into Mars, without effect.

18 June the Hessian cavalry at Mosbach changed camp, moving farther down the Rhine. This was probably to make sure the French did not send raids into the Rhinegau, especially with the commander-in-chief passing through the region. Their Foot, on the bank of the Main, remained in place. It took the cavalry 4 hours to defile from the camp (6-10am). New troops, again cavalry, occupied the camp the same day. Lorraine left Frankfurt for Koblenz, spending one night at Königstein, on the southern slopes of the Taunus.

19 June saw another artillery duel in which 2 Saxons were struck by balls. Up until now, *maréchal* Duras had made no sudden movements. Those of his men not on cordon duty were in the vicinity of Mainz, helping with the fortification work, which included a second line of sunken block ships at the mouth of the Main. Upon learning that Lorraine had packed up his HQ however he drew away

16-17,000 men to a camp between Bad Kreuznach and Bingen, about 2 days march WSW of Mainz. There is a significant river here, partly navigable, known as the Nahe, which flows out of the rough country to the southwest, curves north just east of Kreuznach and strikes the Rhine at Bingen.

There were more troop movements on 20 June. Lorraine halted his own march until he was sure what Duras was up to. His enemy's new camp made the crossing at Bingen too risky and that operation was scrapped. Instead, the Bavarians would cross at Mannheim as before but Saxony could try a crossing at Sankt Goar or Bacharach, about halfway between Bingen and Koblenz, timed so that he would meet Lorraine marching upriver.

There were some movements within the Hessian camp this day as well. The new arrivals at Mosbach followed the Hessian cavalry in the morning, as did the Hessian infantry. Around 10am, they were replaced by yet more regiments coming from Frankfurt. A party of 50 French dragoons, scouting these motions, fell into an ambush but succeeded in their mission and returned safely to camp.

On 21 June a large number of Germans arrived, camping between the Saxons and the village of Grinsheim, along the Rhine south of the Main. (Depending on which Grinsheim is meant, this might be a frontage of 3-4 Km.) There was another exchange of cannon fire on 22 June, while the next day some Saxon and Hessian deserters arrived in the French camp.

Lorraine arrived at Koblenz on 23 June, where the Elector of Trier welcomed him with a cannonade. Here he learned of the surrender of Rheinberg, the successes of the Brandenburgers on the Middle Rhine, and the investiture of Kaiserswerth, which was daily expected to capitulate.

24-26 June: at Mainz there was another German mortar bombardment. At Koblenz the pontoon bridges were not ready, so Lorraine crossed by the flying bridge on 25 June, with some of his troops — pontoon bridges were sturdy enough to take baggage, flying bridges were not. They made their way to Mayen (26 June), 26 Km west of Koblenz, in the center of Starhemberg's picket line, where they stayed for 5 days, just to make the French nervous (and also because the Hanoverian corps, which Lorraine had redirected to his location, was still 3 days away).

On 27 June Lorraine received letters from both Duke Max and Saxony. The Bavarians were camped at Bretten, gathering materials for a bridge and wrecking the roads through the Black Forest. There were enemy raids near Baden and FML Prince Eugene (yes, *that* Prince Eugene) was about to be sent to Stollhofen (by the Rhine, 30 Km northeast of Strasbourg) to deal with them. Duke Max also intended to move north to a spot between Heidelberg and Wimpfen (that is, somewhere on the high road between the former city and the vicinity of Heilbronn), where he could either respond to a crossing by Duras or head north to Mainz. How waiting for a French attack was

supposed to square with a Bavarian crossing of the Rhine — for which he was gathering materials — was not explained in the letter. Duke Max was 'rewriting the playbook', not for the last time. At least Saxony was still a team player. A division's-worth of his troops were now at Fort Gustave and would be left there. The rest, and the Hessians, would remain on the right bank of the Main and when ready march down the Rhine to Bacharach, where they would cross to join Lorraine. However, this would not happen until Duke Max began to form up for his own crossing.

28 June, the French bombarded Saxon work parties at Gustave's Fort. At Koblenz, Lorraine received word of the fall of Kaiserswerth. Lorraine reminded Brandenburg not to tackle Bonn just yet, and also requested some artillerists from the Münster contingent that was assisting the Brandenburgers. 100 cannon and 30 mortars had been assembled for the siege of Mainz, and he was short staffed.

29 June a French cavalry brigade and infantry brigade (Barbezieres' and Lauziere's) plus the Barbezieres Dragoons from the garrison of Mainz were sent off to Mont-Royal on the Moselle; Barbezieres Dragoons were replaced by the Des Landes Dragoons on 4 July. Duras had been deceived by Lorraine's motions and thought there would be an attack on Mont Royal.

30 June 6-7 regiments arrived in the Saxon camp, and on 1 July there was a bombardment of the Mars Fort, which replied in kind.

July 1 Lorraine's army began its march south. A day's march southeast (13 Km) took him to Münstermaisfeld, not far from the Moselle. Presumably, more troops joined from the east or came marching in from their various posts. At Münstermaisfeld the army turned southwest to strike the Moselle at Treis (Treis-Karden) 9 Km away. Lorraine's bridges were moved to Treis by water, along with some transport vessels.

On 2 July the Germans fired on enemy foraging parties operating out of Mars, scattering them. Duras, with his staff, visited the city. He held a council of war. It was clear now that Lorraine was coming south.

The same day Lorraine's army began crossing the Moselle by a flying bridge and at a ford. The proper bridges were still under construction, but he wanted a bridgehead before any Frenchmen showed up. (There is an island just upriver from Treis, which is a likely spot for the ford.)

3 July the bridges over the Moselle were finished and that portion of the army still on the left bank crossed over. Camp was made for the advance guard at Buchholz, 17 Km east of Treis, not far from the Rhine. Buchholz occupies a small plain, with an intervening wooded ridge between it and the river. The army was making for Sankt Goar, another day's march to the southeast. Lorraine had

recently instructed Saxony to cross here rather than at Bacharach. The latter was another day's march, and that much closer to *maréchal* Duras. The Hanoverian corps arrived at Lorraine's camp this day.

4 July La Lande's Dragoons arrived at Mainz. Lorraine continued his march, moving slowly. In fact, the camp may not have changed. He had still to wait for his field train and bridging equipment, which he would need to cross the Nahe, and for Starhemberg, who was bringing up the rear with his own regiment and the Carafa and Auersperg cavalry regiments, and for the Saxons to appear.

5 July the Germans again bombarded Mars. Duras left Mainz. Lorraine made camp at Kisselbach, 18 Km south of Buchholz. Sankt Goar was now well in his rear and there was no sign of the Saxons.

By 6 July all the Saxon troops must have all arrived opposite Mainz, for they were observed being reviewed by their generals. Clearly, they had not gone to Sankt Goar because some of the regiments were still enroute from Saxony. Later, a body of cavalry was seen moving down to the Main — possibly a command party. The Hessians, meanwhile, dug a ditch against Mars within musket range and skirmished with its defenders.

Lorraine's army marched only 7 Km this day, to Rheinböllen and Dichtelbach. These villages lie on the north side of the Hunsrück range. He spent some days here, waiting for his tail to catch up. It would not do for Duras to catch him debouching from the passes, whose defiles were in view of the French camp, and besides, he had sent word for Saxony to try a crossing at Bacharach.

8 July the Hessians again bombarded Mars, from 8pm until midnight. Under cover of this, they floated a fireboat down the Rhine. The French boatmen intercepted it and managed to drag it off course, although they could not extinguish the blaze and only just disentangled themselves before it exploded.

On 9 and 10 July the Saxons began building a bridge of boats at Ginsheim, 3.5 Km south of Fort Gustave. So much for marching to join Lorraine, who was looking for them at Bacharach. A bridge of boats had been constructed for them at Sankt Goar. This was now brought up to Bacharach, but since the Saxons did not show, it was sent on to Bingen.

On 11 July the bombardment of Mars intensified, lasting all night. Skirmishing also took place, running into the next day, and the next. Lorraine broke camp this day, heading for Kreutznach. Saxony had written to say he was not coming. In his judgement it would be too risky to leave only a light guard opposite Mainz.

July 12 Lorraine arrived at Bretzenheim on the Nahe, 4,000 meters downriver from Kreutznach; a march of 21 Km. The French did not oppose him at the passes. They had gone. But not far; Lorraine paused to organise his

troops to force the Nahe. The guns were to lead, Foot and Dragoons immediately behind, followed by the baggage with a mix escort of cavalry and infantry, and more dragoons and cannon in rear. While this was taking place he sent out scouts to locate the enemy.

On 13 July French grenadiers sortied into the Hessian trenches at Kostheim, apparently without much effect. Lorraine's scouts returned, bringing news. They had scoured up and down the Nahe, and toward Mainz and found no French army, but they brought with them a farmer who had somehow picked up a set of dispatches. They were dated July 9 and were addressed to Versailles. It seems that Duras, once he was sure Mont Royal was not threatened, felt no need to remain in the vicinity. His own address was given as Landau, 80 Km to the south, where he was digging in. In Duras' opinion, the only likely siege this summer was that of Mainz, and for Mainz he had no fears. The garrison was strong, well supplied, and the lands around had been stripped bare. He was almost correct in his assessment, but not quite.

News also came from Duke Max, who sent an adjutant to represent him, rather than a letter. This suggests there was need for some advocacy... He had moved back to the Rhine, his men garrisoning Bruchsal and Stolhofen; Count Serényi was observing Strasbourg with a cavalry detachment. The rest of his mobile forces were marching to Heidelberg. Unfortunately, by spreading out he had become too weak to cross the Rhine. Giving no sign of his true feelings, Lorraine mere sent back instructions to build a bridge near Oppenheim, a day's march south of Mainz.

Lorraine wrote also to the Landgrave of Hesse, and especially to Saxony, asking them to quickly collect the rest of their troops as he was planning to build a bridge at Rüdeshheim, 2,000 meters upriver from Bingen. (Bingen being destroyed and lacking forage.) He would shortly be enclosing Mainz from the west and wanted a tight cordon.

On July 14 the Hessians started erecting a battery at Mainz-Kastel to fire against Mars' northern face. D'Uxelles placed this position under an all-day bombardment from the town.

15 July the French commander went on a personal reconnaissance on the right bank of the Rhine and became embroiled in a small skirmish. His investigations led him to conclude that a formal siege, rather than the current blockade situation, was immanent. Feverish preparations ensued as Mainz's works were completed and strengthened, the herds brought in to the city, troops formally assigned defensive sectors and final battery positions chosen. Workshops began manufacturing replacement parts and powder.

[D'Uxelles was in command of the troops, Choisy of the defences. The Artillery Director and Colonel of Bombardiers was named de Vigny; seconded by de Camlin, his men manned the batteries while Camlin made them ready. The Chief Engineer

was de la Cour, seconded by de Boudeville. They were still busy digging more trenches and mines and clearing fields of fire. Siege stores such as palisades were organised by the Petit Intendant. Daily rations as of 8 July were 2 pounds of bread, half a pound of meat, and a pint of wine, plus salt, and 3 sols (sous) for 'extras'.]

The same day, Lorraine's men marched from Gaulsheim (on the banks of the Rhine, 3.5 Km east of Bingen) to Algesheim (4.5 Km farther on), halting for 4-5 hours before continuing. The march was slowed due to the need bring the train over the Nahe without incident. The Saxons apparently had not finished their bridge at Ginsheim. They were observed floating pontoons out of the mouth of the Main and up to a spot opposite Weisenau, 2,800 meters southeast of the city. These were intended for ferrying purposes.

On 16 July the Imperials, the Prince leading with the cavalry, made for Findheim (Finthen), 7 Km west of Mainz and about 12 Km from Algesheim, where there was a bridge over a small river. The French probed them with cavalry from the town but were warded off by some 4,000 (?) 'Croats'. Camp was made at Brutzheim (Bretzenheim) only 4 Km from the city, at about 4pm.

[The Hungarian Military Border was not as well established as it would become in the 18th Century. Particularly since the districts which supplied the men were still in Turkish hands. 4,000 Croats seems like a lot. They may have been Haiduks, or Hussars, or a mix of both. Later, all 2 of the Empire's hussar regiments fought on the Rhine, but they numbered only 1,000 men. Perhaps the number should be 400.]

July 17 Lorraine's Foot dragged in, erecting their tents at 7pm. The circuit of the Lines ran from Weisenau to Heiligkreuz or Ste. Croix (2,000 meters SW), Heiligkreuz to Bretzenheim (2,200 meters NW), Bretzenheim to Zahlbach (800 meters NE — this was a jog in the line, because Zahlbach is on a direct line with the city from Bretzenheim), Zahlbach to Gonsenheim (3,800 meters NW). Gonsenheim to Mombach (2,700 meters NE). Riding this circuit took three and a half hours.

Some of the Saxons began ferrying across between Weisenau and Ginsheim, using 12-15 boats. It took all night. Meanwhile, the Landgrave of Hesse and Duke of Saxony went to confer with Lorraine about the disposition of the Lines. It was decided the Saxons would make camp at Weisenau and the Hessians would join the Imperials on their northern flank. Troops were to be left to man the batteries on the right bank and to conduct patrols.

Within Mainz, d'Uxelles had (hopefully) disarmed any Fifth Column by forbidding public or private assembly; weapons had already been surrendered. The townsfolk were also forced to contribute money & supplies. The Jesuits had to move their schools into the Hospital.

On 18 July, more Imperials arrived at Finthen, while the Hessians on the right bank of the Rhine continued to fire

on Mars and also on the city. A party of 50 grenadiers and 50 fusiliers burned down a mill within musket range of the city's counterscarp. 3,000 peasant labourers worked on the German lines. The French made a sally, which was repulsed 'with extraordinary force'.

Lorraine took a command party on a general reconnaissance, as a result of which it was decided to make the planned three approaches as follows: against the Citadel on the south side, the Electoral Palace on the north (site 'U' on the diagram), and the bastions of St. Boniface and St. Alexander, which faced west. The diagram shows no works approaching the Palace because the Hessians never did dig close to the walls, preferring to bombard at a distance. Possibly due to manpower shortages as the siege went on, they would eventually assist the Imperials in the center.

The 2 battalions of Alt-Starhemberg were posted at Zahlbach, specifically at the Dalheim Monastery. This post gave excellent cover for observation along the length of the counterscarp between the bastions; it was possible to walk, under cover, to within 300 paces of the counterscarp (probably by following the Embach stream). The French launched a sortie against the monastery as soon as the Germans arrived, but were repulsed with musket fire.

A bridge over the Rhine was also finished at Mombach, completing the encirclement. Some Hessian and Saxon regiments gave it a try, the Saxons proceeding on to their camp, while the Hessians remained to guard the bridge.

July 19 the Duke of Saxony and his staff set up HQ at Weisenau. A 'division' of Saxons also ferried across. Lorraine, meanwhile, was expecting Duke Max to appear. It will be remembered he had been asked to cross at Oppenheim. Instead, his 'minder', *feldmarschall* Caprara, arrived to say the Elector did not feel he could abandon Swabia at this critical juncture. Or, words to that effect. This led to a great deal of 'trash talk' among the Staff. Lorraine pretended it was not that important and sent Caprara back with honeyed words, only requesting some of the regiments that had experience in siege work. If this was asking too much, what about a rendezvous tomorrow somewhere 3-4 hours away from Mainz?

More disturbed than he let on, the Prince conferred with Saxony and the Landgrave and assured himself they were still on the same page. It was agreed they would request some of the Münster regiments from Brandenburg's army (not telling the latter that Duke Max was weaselling out).

On 20 July the Saxon boat-bridge was floated down to Weisenau. The Hessians, unmasking a battery at Kostheim at 5pm, fired on the flying bridge connecting Mars to the city with 3 large pieces and 3 mortars, which made it untenable. The next day the cannon fire broke it near the Isle of Mars' end. Meanwhile, the French bombarded the Saxon camp.

At 11am on 21 July Lorraine and Prince Commercy had a meeting with Duke Max. This was all that Caprara had managed to get out of the Elector. They could make no headway. Then, sitting in their carriage as they were about to leave, Lorraine had a brainwave. He suggested Duke Max come along to the siege as an observer. He agreed and went with them. They gave him the Grand Tour and asked his advice about the dispositions. Getting interested, the Elector agreed to bring his army if he could have the approach he liked best. This meant Saxony had to be given the same option, and both men chose the attack on the Citadel. So, the Imperials, supported by Hessians and Hanoverians, were slated to attack the bastions of St. Boniface and St. Alexander while Saxony and Bavaria cooperated to attack the Citadel. The Imperial approach had been the phoney one, but was now the main attack.

The Saxons spent 22 July establishing their boat-bridge while the Staff went on a ride to mark out the trenches. The Landgrave, whose men were still working the gun batteries on the right bank, and who had just opened a mortar battery, asked to remain on that side of the Rhine, offering in compensation some of his regiments to serve under the Imperials. His HQ was in the pleasure palace on Rhingau Island.

The Hessians on the left bank were camped across from him. Next to them were the Imperials, holding the line all the way to Heiligkreuz with the Hanoverians somewhere in the middle. The Saxons were next and the Bavarians were given the old Saxon camp at Weisenau, with a detachment left to guard the bridge on the right bank. Though the lands around Mainz are essentially flat, there are low ridges and hollows. All the camps were in low ground behind a set of 'heights' that ringed the city. The contravallation was to be dug along the high ground in front of the camps. This probably means the line was not a continuous one but a series of strongpoints. There was one spot on the right of the Imperial camp where the crest was too far away, so a small stream at the foot of that particular hill was used for protection. A parapet was dug, and picqueted. It seems also a redoubt with palisade was eventually constructed here. Peasant labour was conscripted for the work. The men were probably quite happy to get any kind of work in the desert the French had left.

Trench routine was the usual thing. 7,000 men would rotate through on a daily basis. 4,000 of these were to work against the bastions — either digging, or, when the time was right, attacking — and 1,000 against the Citadel. For the Imperials, one day it would be 4,000 of them, the next day 2,000 Imperials and 2,000 Hessians, then 2,000 Imperials and 2,000 Hanoverians, then back to 4,000 Imperials. (The 'Imperials' included the various *Reichsarmee* troops.) Each day's contingent was commanded by a FML and a major general. On both the Imperial and Saxon/Bavarian sides there were to be 2

reserve battalions and a body of 500 horse to deal with emergencies. If any attacks were launched they were to be done in coordination.

Once all this was settled, Duke Max rode off to collect his men.

The Imperial trench was opened against the bastions at 400 paces from the covered way on the night of 22/23 July, centered on the Dalheim Monastery. The texts say that by dawn Lorraine's 4,000 had pushed forward to the Monastery and neighbouring Gallows Hill. Over the next two nights next teams in rotation erected a redoubt at the head of each sap and dug a connecting trench. The diagrams shows some similarities but there is no approach to Gallows Hill. Instead, a trench has been pushed out to the left so that batteries could be erected to fire on the hill, which was, according to the texts, a French watch post. Also, the diagram shows the approach starting at the Monastery, not pushing up to it. However, there are indeed two saps, strengthened by redoubts. The erecting of redoubts after each stage of the advance was a feature of this siege; it was not always done and has the 'deliberate' feel of a 'Germanic' project. (Which is odd, because the Brandenburg siege of Bonn was much more 'French' in its execution.)

The French did not respond the first night, they were too busy putting out fires started by the bombs the Hessians were lobbing into the city. One bomb struck the Agnes Convent but the damage was contained. However, the French troops pillaged it until checked by their officers, who made some arrests. (There were a large number of refugee nuns from Worms, who had brought their money and treasures with them.) To restore order the officers were forced to distribute the cash and wine stores — 8 pieces and 3 bottles per day per man was the going rate for a musketeer.

At dawn on 23 July d'Uxelles tested the waters with a quick sortie that fired one volley and then retired. That night he sent out another phoney sortie which resulted in a lengthy exchange of cannon fire. To the south, meanwhile, the Saxons took up a position at the Carthusian Monastery facing the Citadel's two bastions. It was a little too far from the counterscarp; the Duke made plans to erect a redoubt at the end of the first leg of the trench, which was still too far off but would have the effect of interesting the French.

Making his HQ at the bastion of St. Alexander, on the morning of 24 July d'Uxelles observed the enemy digging a retrenchment to the left of a mill at the hamlet of Alheim (probably the building on the knoll beside the Embach shown on the diagram). This he ordered bombarded, which slowed the work. Other labourers could be seen working for the Saxons on the Salsbach height and behind the Carthusian Monastery. The German campaign diary states that the French bombardment was more intense than the experienced officers could remember,

and included musket fire. In the evening several small sorties were made, toward the Mill of Alheim. Nonetheless there were few casualties. One casualty of note, however, was Friedrich Wilhelm von Neuburg. This prince, brother of the Imperial Deutchsmeister and son of the Elector Palatine, had gone by day with his brother (who had commanded the night before and wanted to see the progress his men had made) into the trenches and was struck in the head with a cannonball from a falcon. Several other officers were killed by French snipers occupying a line of rifle-boxes erected on a rise that overlooked the flank of the trench. On the other side of the Rhine, Hessian mortar fire destroyed a flying bridge which connected Mars with Kastel (presumably it was locked up on the French side at the time).

[The Order of the Teutonic Knights had three Chapters, each ruled by a Landmeister. The Landmeister of the Imperial Chapter was also called the Deutchsmeister. By the 17th Century only this chapter was left and all the powers of the Landmeisters and Grand Master (Hochmeister) were concentrated in the Hoch-und-Deutchsmeister, who now resided in Württemberg. The current Deutchsmeister was Ludwig Anton von Neuburg. He was also Bishop of Worms, giving him a variety of stakes in this game. When he died in 1694 his brother Franz Ludwig inherited both positions.]

According to the German chronicler, from the day the trenches opened d'Uxelles never slept in the city but camped out on the various bastions observing the enemy's progress and planning countermeasures.

D'Uxelles ordered his Captain General of Miners, M. de La Motte, to dig a series of countermines at the angles of the threatened bastions; these had multiple branches and extended under the bastions themselves as well the glacis. The glacis was also sown with 'flutter bombs', probably what the French called *fougas*, an early form of landmine. Along the whole of the counterscarp wooden planks were draped, secured at each angle. These had nails driven into them that protruded by one centimetre, and there were 6-8 rows of these planks. The wooden bars were well secured and quite heavy. Individual light cannon were positioned at the angles of the covered way, mounted on racks for portage so they could be moved as needed. Quincy says there were 12 such pieces, of varying calibre. He says they 'discharged 160 balls', while the German account says 'some fired 120 shot'. It is not clear if they mean they were firing grape shot or whether that was the tally for the whole siege, but the former is more likely.

25 July Lorraine visited the trenches looking for likely battery emplacements. He noted that most of the ground was dominated by the enemy's guns, so decided to erect a protected trench line, probably using *épaulements* or berms, perhaps topped with gabions or a palisade, and a large redoubt. It took until the night of 26 July to complete this work. The berm is shown just in front of the Grand Battery (5) on the diagram. A similar *épaulement* is on the flank of the Saxon sector. This day also 1,000 French

cavalry raided Lorraine's forage parties and took 100 prisoners. A little reminder that *maréchal* Duras was still in the field.

On 26 July Duke Max returned, full of how he had not been idle but securing Swabia against all attacks. He brought with him his Lifeguards and the Imperial regiments of Beck, Serényi (part), Stadel, and Kaunitz. And none of his own Bavarian regulars. Prince Eugene and Graf Serényi accompanied him as part of his staff. Lorraine gave him the regiments of Imperial Württemberg, Thüngen, and Auersperg to flesh out his command, took him on a tour of the works and explained why things were just so, then sent him off to see Saxony about his own sector.

The night of 26/27 the Hessians on the right bank of the Rhine completed a trench linking their batteries at Kostheim and Kastel. The Saxons shifted their camp to between Heiligkreuz and Weisenau, to make room for the Bavarians (so-called), who camped on the riverbank south of the city. The new arrivals rested this night, but would start work the next. In the Imperial sector, Graf Souches complete the redoubt and installed 2 guns. According to Quincy, the besiegers unmasked their batteries this night, which fired in a continuously line 'from the mountain to the plain'. The French maintained their own bombardment, and 5-6 men were lost in skirmishes. However, it should be noted that Lorraine's main batteries were not yet erected, so this account may be incorrect. The German account says Lorraine ordered a bombardment starting at dawn on 27 July, mainly intended to suppress enemy fire in the area the trenches were bound for.

On the night of 27/28 the enemy paused their fire, so d'Uxelles ordered a halt to his own bombardment. French casualties remained light, only 3 men this night, while a deserter reported the besiegers had lost 350 men since the trenches opened. D'Uxelles ordered a second palisade put up behind the first in the threatened zone. Meanwhile, the Hanoverians extended a new parallel on either side of the bastions, to envelop them. On the Saxon/Bavarian side, the Bavarian general, von Steinau, oversaw the digging of two parallels, one for the Saxons and one for the Bavarians. The latter extended from the redoubt down to the Rhine; the former in front of the Carthusian Monastery. Soft soil meant the work, plus a redoubt, was completed in one night.

A critical event also occurred. A Lieutenant from the *régiment* Bourgogne deserted and brought with him a detailed plan of the defences. This gave the besiegers a good idea of the location of all the mines and countermines.

The night of 28/29 the Imperials, under the Deutchsmeister (Ludwig Anton von Neuburg, Bishop of Worms), advanced their saps against the bastions, building a redoubt on either side and linking them with a

trench. According to the German source they also made some 'cuts', trenches intended to isolate the bastions from relief from the flanks. A heavy French bombardment continued throughout the night, which discomfited the workers. Quincy says it was d'Uxelles who ordered the two bastions 'cut' — that is, isolated on either side from the rest of the fortress. This is the more likely version, since it was often done. Now that the besiegers had committed themselves they would not probe the adjacent sectors.

On the Saxon/Bavarian side, Graf von Flemming, a Saxon general who later transferred to the service of Brandenburg and became a field marshal, pushed the two saps forward 100 paces, which brought them into the confines of the Cathedral grounds lying outside the walls. Again, the saps were connected and capped with redoubts. Here also the workers were hampered by heavy artillery fire and also French sallies.

The cathedral itself was situated within the city, ESE of the Citadel, but the Archbishop owned extensive properties outside the walls. Position #7 on the diagram shows the Gloriette, also called the Dean's House or the Mechanic's House. A *gloriette* is an elaborate (sometimes very elaborate and large) stone garden house or pavilion. In this case it served as the residence of the Cathedral Dean, who was still living there as the siege began. Associated with the pavilion on the side facing the besiegers were vineyards and a garden called the Stadium. Besides the Dean, the complex was occupied by French troops.

The same night the Hessians abandoned their camp and crossed the Rhine at Rhingau Island to rejoin the Imperial forces.

In the morning of 29 July Lorraine ordered the construction of a second redoubt, to go on the left of his sector as the first one was on the right. He also selected the spot for a grand battery of 35-40 cannon ('S' on the diagram).

Word was also received from local partisans who had intercepted a dispatch from *maréchal* Duras to one of his outposts (Kirn Castle, about 30 Km west of the Nahe) requesting intelligence about the besiegers' lines. Lorraine feared a relief was in the works and called a halt to forward progress until the circumvallation was made secure. This took less time than expected, being completed on the evening of 30 July. The Saxon cavalry and some of the Hessian was brought over from the far bank of the Rhine for extra security.

Work on the trenches did not completely stop. The Imperials spent the night of 29/30 repairing the damage to their advanced works, and the Hessians managed to burn down a barracks with a *carcass* (a bomb of combustible material) at midnight. Small sorties took place near the Carthusian Monastery and Heiligkreuz, but the Bavarians and Saxons, despite losing over 100 men, each

advanced another 100 or more paces, capping the night's work with another pair of redoubts and a traverse.

The Imperials spent the night of 30/31 repairing the damage to their advanced works (no, that is not a typo, the French fire was so heavy the besiegers spent most of their time repairing things instead of moving forward). They did manage to gain 8-10 meters on their lefthand sap, but had to quit work due to the intensity of the fire. The Saxons and Bavarians maintained a continuous bombardment of their own along a line from the Rhine to the main road at Heiligkreuz. They also were advancing works, against the Citadel and the St. Alban bastion, and engaging in skirmishes with French sorties. The works here were not as advanced since the Bavarians arrived late.

On the night of 31 July/1 August the Imperials tried to link their saps with a parallel, which was only partially completed. Work was begun by the Hanoverians (it was their night) on the batteries. This took several days to complete. It started with a trench dug along the crest of the chosen height, with a hollow scooped out on the right to shelter cavalry.

Both sides maintained their constant bombardments. The Bavarians managed to push forward far enough — only 50 paces — to send out a couple of raids into the covered way, which killed a couple of enemy soldiers. But, though these raids were in company strength, the Bavarians quickly withdrew each time. The night's work included a pair of redoubts and a traverse. No less than 7 deserters to the garrison, Bavarian Guardsmen but French by nationality, falsely reported the Elector of Bavaria had been killed by a cannonball. This night the Imperials suffered 40 casualties and the Electors 60.

In the night the French requested a truce to collect their dead. Two trumpeters appeared with letters for 'Prince Karl'. Since this was not Lorraine's official title but an insult implying he was no longer ruler of Lorraine, he returned them unread. From then on d'Uxelles addressed him properly, as Duke of Lorraine.

Early 1 August the Imperials spread out but did not advance — they were enveloping the target bastions. A pair of French brigadiers, Barbesieres and Lauziere, managed to slip into the saps for a look-see while the Hanoverians were taking a break. They were revealed when the bank which hid them collapsed from friendly fire, and they took off for the city at top speed, partly concealed by the plume of dust. Lorraine though they had been sent by Duras and doubled his picquets. He also began spending his nights in the trenches, encouraging the men. This did nothing to help his ill health.

[The German chronicle says the letters arrived 31 August. That must be a typo. According to Quincy the two officers performed their antics on August 1, and both incidents supposedly took place the same day. Therefore it seems likely that the truce was

requested before midnight (July 31) and that the officers went on their walkabout in the predawn.]

Starting about 7pm on 1 August, the Hessians intensified their rain of bombs and carcasses (about 50 fell this night), but the townsfolk extinguished the fires as fast as they started. Heavy rain may have helped. The Landgrave now had his HQ at Hochheim.

[One gets the impression that the Hessians were quite enthusiastic about burning down the Archbishop of Mainz' capital, even though he was an 'ally'.]

About this time Lorraine called a meeting of local partisan commanders. As might be expected, the French devastation spawned numerous bands of desperadoes. There had been a number of incidents where Lorraine's men were taken prisoner and despoiled. His Saphaunce Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Janchamps, was delegated to organise the partisans into formal bodies under the command of responsible men. They were also required to act as scouts and guides.

The night of 1/2 August the Imperials completed their second parallel and the Electors their third. Against the Citadel the saps were pushed forward 30 paces to a spot that was suitable for a large battery. At this point the French could not tell whether they intended to attack the St. Albans Bastion or the Citadel itself. The mutual bombardments continued.

Word came during the day on 2 August that Brandenburg was bombarding Bonn. Well, at least he was only insulting it, not assaulting it.

More heavy rain on the next night lessened the bombardment, but as soon as it stopped, the French ramped theirs up again, seriously slowing the besiegers' advance. On the Imperial side Souches had the grand battery trench and flanking redoubts palisaded. Lorraine wanted the battery ready as soon as possible but it would be a few days yet. The Electors completed a fourth parallel and emplaced some mortars in the third parallel.

Quincy says only 12 French had been seriously wounded since the trenches opened. This night the Electors managed an extension of their parallel, but the French could not understand why it was done. Possibly it was to house a battery? — Yes, it was, for a number of pieces began firing on the Gloriette; d'Uxelles ordered the complex evacuated, including the Dean, who was *still* in residence. 10 men and a sergeant stayed within the pavilion to keep watch. The texts do not say when they were finally withdrawn, but as can be seen in the diagram, the besiegers incorporated the place into their own trench system before their main batteries were erected.


Around 6 (am or pm is not given) on 2 August *brigadier* Vertillac sortied against the Bavarians and Saxons, with the object of capturing what appeared to be a party of senior officers riding on reconnaissance. Fusiliers were

put in ambush, and 10 horsemen of the *grand guard de cavalerie* advanced at a slow walk, but ready to charge. The enemy passed near the fusiliers, who fired a volley and killed 3 of their horses; the party retreated. Perhaps to cover them, the Bavarians began firing bombs against the Citadel. Allied casualties amounted to 64 men this night, including the Deutchsmeister. He was only lightly wounded by a glancing blow, but the concussion from a near miss knocked him down and he actually stopped breathing for some time. Lorraine's steward had his head taken off by a cannonball. In some accounts Vertillac was wounded and Lauziere took over his sector. The small cavalry component of the garrison was also deployed against the Electors.

[The grand guard was not a guards regiment, but a picked detachment used to cover foragers.]

The night of 3/4 August the Imperials strengthened their advanced works, while 3 fires were started in the city by bombs, the Hessians continuing to target the town (firing at least 60 bombs) and the Electors the Citadel. The fires were soon extinguished. After this the rain let up. Prince Eugene, was wounded between head and shoulder by a musket ball.

At the threatened bastions, d'Uxelles ordered wooden lunettes built at the corners of the covered way around the bastions, particularly at St. Alexander, giving protection to parties providing enfilade fire along the counterscarp. They would have looked like low wooden bastions. Already two rows of palisades had been erected along the covered way. A *caponiere* was dug with 10 branches, each about 20 meters long. The purpose of this was to break up an enemy assault by creating positions where enfilade fire could be brought along the main ditch. The name derives from the French for 'chicken coop'. The sample pictured below is roofed and made of stone. This one was simpler, of earth and not revetted.



The night of 4/5 August the Imperials built 2 redoubts on their second parallel, so they could advance their batteries and begin pounding the bastions. The Bavarians dug within 80-100 meters of the Stadium vineyard. Quincy quotes a deserter who reported 300 German casualties since the trenches opened. He is probably referring to the Bavarian sector, since the count was well past that on the Imperial side.

On 5 August 100 Hanoverian foragers were captured by Duras' cavalry patrols. On the other hand, the besiegers

uncovered a spy network within their camp. Two letters were discovered, one hidden inside a button sewn onto a soldier's pants, and the other inside a secret compartment in a log, which was used as a dead letter drop. The first letter was not only in cipher, it was illegible, but the second was from Duras, address to d'Uxelles, informing him he was about to cross the Rhine to do some raiding but would be back in time to relieve him. Just how much of this network was rolled up is not recorded.

The night of 5/6 August the Imperials 'embraced' the angle of the bastion of St. Alexander, extending their parallel by about 60 meters. A French captain of bombardiers was wounded while setting up flaming barrels along the glacis for illumination. Most importantly, the Grand Battery was completed. Now the cannon could be emplaced. This operation alone had so far cost the Imperials 160 men. On the Electors' side, their left was extended another 60-80 meters, topped by a redoubt which they used as a base to send out skirmishers. They also pushed a sap forward about the same distance.

The night of 6/7 August was spent by the Imperials finishing off the siege works in preparation for the first assault. 8 heavy guns were emplaced in the Grand Battery. The Hanoverians kept busy by creating a large redoubt on either side complete with incisions for cannon, but these were mainly for show. The Bavarians pushed forward another 70 meters and established a new redoubt at the tip of the sap.

On 7 August the French sent out a party of 7-8 dragoons into the enemy entrenchments to make prisoners, and another of horse which routed a body of workmen. In the evening the Hessians countered with a raid by 200 foot and 3 troops of cavalry. These were countered in turn by Vivan's cavalry regiment and driven off with losses.

Meanwhile, news came that Duras had broken camp. General Dünwald was sent to Oppenheim with 4,000 horse to observe, while the Electors were ordered to shore up their circumvallation, which they had neglected, and to send some cavalry across the Rhine, where Serényi was operating. Duras' motions will be described later. They affected the siege only in the matter of provisions and creating unease among the Germans. Serényi was drawn off to deal with him but this did not give the garrison an opportunity of any kind.

7/8 August the Imperials dug another 40 meters of their parallel, under heavy fire, and 20 paces of sap on each side. 12 more heavy guns were added to the Grand Battery, as well as 10 lighter pieces and 4 mortars. About 4-5am the Imperials discharged 2 volleys of musketry and a salvo of 24 cannon as the prelude to the general bombardment of the bastions involving all the pieces of the Grand Battery. According to the German chronicler's original source, this morning the Electors heard 2

'beautiful' musket salvos, 3 heavy shots, the repeat of a familiar salvo pattern, and 25 rough shots.

The cannonade lasted all day and by nightfall had silenced the guns of both St. Alexander and St. Boniface. The town was also damaged, with many houses 'perforated'. The Dominican cloisters were particularly hard hit. 2 civilians were killed. Fearing an imminent assault, d'Uxelles ordered his miners to station themselves in their tunnels and also had 12 prominent citizens locked up in the Exchange as hostages.

The Electors pushed their sap against the side of St. Alban, again making a redoubt, from which they fired continually. However, they still lacked their siege train; it would not arrive for another 6 days. In consequence they did little damage.

The night of 8/9 August the Imperials extended a parallel from their right to their left to further secure their guns. This night their 24-gun battery fired 6-700 rounds. The French erected a retrenchment behind the Ghent Gate, garrisoning it with 100 men.

The night of 9/10 August elements of the *régiment* du Maine made a bold sortie against the Imperials, driving off the troops covering the workmen and the workmen themselves, and razing part of the nights' work, for a loss of only 2 men. The German account omits this sortie and says instead that Lorraine completed his work undisturbed. It is possible Quincy has confused the dates.

The Imperials became 'cheeky' as the French were now taking it rather than dishing it out. Though, from the events of later days it seems the French were reserving their fire, not that their cannon had truly been suppressed. Saps were advanced to within 20 paces of the glacis. The usual pair of redoubts and traverse was established. The Electors also advanced their saps, but their bombardment was less effective.

Around 5am, Vertillac, back in command and seeing how far the enemy had advanced, requested a sortie. D'Uxelles only allowed him 100 men with 30 more in support, and told him not to become entangled in a firefight. They went out at 8am. Of course, the enthusiastic Frenchmen advanced too far and were in danger of being cut off. However, after sustaining a counterattack and suffering some losses, Vertillac managed to extract them. It helped that he had covering fire from the cannon in his sector, whose gunners used their own initiative. Quincy reports that the grenadiers of *régiment* d'Orléans did not pause to reload, but drove the enemy off with stones when their grenades ran out.

The account from the German side provides more details. It states the sortie consisted of 400 men and was directed against the Saxons. Regiment Reuss took the brunt but fought well, fighting hand to hand with pikes, poleaxes, and sabres. A Major Schereming led a furious counterattack with the reserves. In the fight he grabbed

the French commander by the collar and they killed each other 'in the face of their troops'. Weight of numbers forced the French back; they were driven at bayonet point to their own palisades. The German account also records the stone throwing. The besiegers suffered 80 casualties, including Reuss' colonel, wounded in the head. The Germans assumed the French took similar losses.

The night of 10/11 August the Imperials dug another 60 meters-worth of parallel, inching around the bastions. D'Uxelles interfered with the work by sending a party of 200 men down to the foot of the glacis. Screened by a low 'curtain' wall only 80 meters from the enemy work parties, they kept up a continual fire until 2am, when a sudden downpour dampened everyone's enthusiasm. The Bavarians made good progress toward the Citadel this night.

The night of 11/12 August the Imperials (it was Hanoverian Night) finished their sap-head communication trench under cover of heavy musket fire, to which the French replied with vigour. The regiments defending here were those of Crussol and Jarzé. Lorraine also began sinking shafts to locate the enemy mines. Two were dug this night.

In the pre-dawn, the French launched a sortie with 80 soldiers and 50 labourers against the completed trench. They chased off the enemy, pushing well past the trench and penning them in the nearest redoubt. This gave their own labourers 2 hours to fill in portions of the trench. They also stole tools and weapons. The French lost only 2 men killed and 4 wounded; the men were liberally rewarded. However, in the evening the Imperials repaired the damage.

The German account says there were 7-800 men in the sally, which pursued the Imperials as far as the Grand Battery. There was also a counterattack, launched at only 50 paces distance that drove the French back before much damage could be done. Casualties were 80 Germans and a body count of 25-30 French. It is very likely a zero should be added to Quincy's number, and that his '50' refers to a distance and not to the number of workmen. The results make more sense with a larger assault force.

Against the Citadel the Electors completed their battery positions and erected palisades.

The night of 12 August the Grand Battery battered the two bastions and also knocked down the palisades in several spots, forcing the French to mount a larger guard. Imperial mortar bombs (there were now 8 tubes) rained down on the covered way, but the French managed to repair the damage. The Imperials under the Deutschmeister began digging parallels on the glacis itself. On the other side, the Bavarians 'made some progress'. The Hessian firebombing continued.

The night of 12/13 August both German corps merely secured their gains. The Duke of Saxony was down with a fever so Duke Max was in charge on his side. The Imperial battery was increased to 34 guns. Quincy lists the units facing the enemy: Bourbonnais and the 2 battalions of Dauphin against the Imperials, and the 2 battalions of Anjou against the Electors. Just like the besiegers, a garrison only put a portion of its strength into the line and rotated units on a regular basis.

Today, word was received that Brandenburg had begun bombarding Bonn in earnest and was preparing for a formal siege. Lorraine and the Electors wrote back for him to stop until Mainz was taken. He should instead send troops to Andernach to cover the communities of Trier's electorate. Apparently this was what Brandenburg had earlier agreed to do.

News was also received regarding Dünwald's campaign against Duras. As briefly mentioned above he had been sent off with the bulk of the cavalry and some infantry supports to locate and block Duras. It appeared he had been successful and that the French were making ready to return over the Rhine into Alsace.

The night of 13/14 August the Imperials slackened their cannon fire, but continued to employ their mortars and musketry. They reinforced their existing positions. 12 French grenadier companies were appointed to the bastion ditch and 2 line battalions were stationed as a reserve to reinforce the bastions. The Imperials were widening and deepening their final parallel and reinforcing it with large redoubts. This is where the assault teams would shelter.

On the other side of the city it was the turn of the Electors to make a bombardment; the French reply was more effective here since their gun emplacements had not been disrupted.

At dawn on 14 August the Imperial mortars, now 14 tubes, fired a salvo and destroyed a new French battery at the Martin Bastion.

The night of 14/15 August the Imperials made a continual fire with their mortars, but the damage was repaired. Their digging was severely hampered by French musketry and cannon fire. As mentioned earlier the glacis was reinforced with wooden beams and the sound of chopping always drew down heavy fire. They suffered over 100 casualties. However, 3 or 4 saps were pushed forward and some palisades were erected.

The Electors in contrast made quick progress, suffered few casualties, and got to within 160 meters of the glacis. They also came under heavy French bombardment, but had the advantage of the ground. The next night they mainly worked at improving their batteries.

[There is a discrepancy in the accounts of the Imperials' progress. The German account says they were up to the glacis.

Quincy says both approaches were still 160 meters away. However, it may be he was only referring to the Electors' men.]

16 August: with the Imperials ensconced in the glacis d'Uxelles ordered a sortie for 10am. This was to be a notable affair, intended to wreck the Grand Battery. The German account says 2,000 soldiers and 400 workmen took part. Quincy gives details: 50 fusiliers each from the regiments of Bretagne, Lyon, Crussol, and Maine, plus 100 workmen, were employed. In support were the rest of Crussol, stationed at St. Alexander, the rest of Maine in St. Boniface, and the regiment of d'Orléans in the demi-lune of La Courtine that lay between St. Boniface and St. Alexander. *Régiment* Dauphin, currently stationed on that sector, would also participate; this may have been a spontaneous event on their part. 10 squadrons of horse and dragoons (pretty much all of the cavalry) under Barbésières escorted the troops to within reach of the trenches, to protect them from enemy cavalry. The German account says the cavalry was placed on the counterscarp at the right of the Imperial camp. 2 cannon were brought along and positioned on the glacis.

The sortie commenced with a 2-hour bombardment by cannon and mortars on the enemy batteries. The assault parties moved out in two columns, in the usual manner, teams of grenadiers supported by 100 fusiliers. The initial rush carried the trenches and even broke into the nearest Imperial redoubt, which was protected by palisades and a moat. According to the German account a raw regiment gave way here but its officers remained fighting and the men soon came back. The German account also says the French attacked in 'Turkish style' with great élan, fanning out to envelop the trench and its redoubts. According to their own side the Germans mostly held their ground, though outnumbered — since this was a daylight raid most of the troops would have been resting in camp.

['Turkish style' meant having the cavalry charging to clear away the enemy cavalry and isolate the infantry formations — in this case the individual redoubts — which were then assaulted one by one by the supporting French infantry. The advance would also be without pausing to fire volleys.]

The French penetrated through a couple of the parallels. The workmen began wrecking the trenches. D'Uxelles and Choisy, observing from the bastions, directed cannon fire against the enemy batteries, which were still in operation and doing some damage to the work parties. The officers of the day at the Grand Battery were generals Souches and Wallis. They had instructed the guns to begin firing a mix of cartridge shot and grenades as soon as they perceived the mass of French, and ordered all the musketeers in the vicinity to mount the 'banquettes' (that is, fire steps) and fire on their own initiative. More men responded as the minutes passed, until there was a wall of fire that stopped the French.

After about half an hour, therefore, the Imperials launched a counterattack with their general reserve, which attacked the flanks of the sortie. Lorraine had been seeing the

Duke of Saxony off — he had to go to Frankfurt to obtain a cure for his fever — and had just returned to his HQ when he heard the firing. He rushed over to Souches accompanied by *Graf Commerci* and organised the counterattack. Commerci was to lead 300 grenadiers on the Imperial right and a division of musketeers was to attack on the left. This would be followed up by a cavalry charge at the trot.

The French withdrew in good order after an hour's hard fighting. Quincy says their casualties were about 125, perhaps a quarter of whom of whom were officers. The German account says they lost over 500 men, carpeting the glacis with their bodies, while the Imperials lost 180 or so, again with a high proportion of officers. A text note in the German account says that the French war diary recorded 500 losses; a low estimate for the Germans was 57. However, it also says that the consensus was that the Germans suffered half the losses of the French which could mean the latter lost 3-400 men.

Quincy says that although the sortie had not lasted as long as desired, it cowed the Imperials, who stayed out of their saps for the rest of the day. The German account notes that Lorraine praised the defenders, promising bonuses and particularly singling out the Hessians. It also states that the work was not interrupted. Considering that the saps would not be occupied during the day anyway, both statements are probably true.

[Lorraine's biographer says this attack was made against the Saxons, who broke and were only saved by the Imperial counterattack, also that total casualties were 1,200.]

The night of 16/17 August the Imperials beat the chamade for an exchange of wounded. This would also give them an excuse to reenter their advanced positions without being fired on, and to investigate the status of the French. But, Choisy said the French would come and collect their men so the Imperials withdrew their offer and recommenced their bombardment. The bodies lay in no mans land and began to swell.

About midnight the French sent out a reconnaissance in force, 50 fusiliers seconded by a similar body from *régiment* d'Anjou. Having frightened away the workmen, they stuck around for two hours, filling in trenches, before returning silently, carrying fascines as token 'booty'. The Imperials stayed away until daybreak. Prisoners were also taken. One of these reported the Germans were losing 20 men a day, that the villages were full of wounded, and that 10 cannon had been dismantled. During the day the besiegers made a pretence of working on their lines in a new direction; the French assumed it was a bluff.

On the morning of 17 August some French deserters made their way out of the town. In statements mirroring that of the German POWs they claimed French morale was low, that Choisy had been heard to say that a few more sorties would 'save His Majesty's wages and bread'.

It is true that no more grand sorties were launched. Ordinary ones continued regularly, however.

General Dünwald came to make a personal report to Lorraine. The French were still on the right bank of the Rhine, camped between Baden and Stolhofen, which Duras probably intended to plunder. Serényi, with whom Dünwald was not pleased, was keeping an eye on things.

The night of 17/18 August the French made sorties against both the Imperials and the Electors, using the regiments of Bourbonnais, Beauvoisis, and the dragoons against the Imperials, and Bretagne and Jarzé against Duke Max. These sorties were repeated, the first repetition being at midnight and the second at daybreak. Lorraine's biographer says they were staggered at two-hour intervals and involved 3,000 men. He writes that each was repulsed with difficulty and that the last pocketed 4-500 Imperials, who sold their lives dearly. The counterattackers only succeeded after their officers 'mocked their cowardice'. 2 Imperial guns were captured.

A good deal of damage was done, so that the enemy spent the next day 'mending their works very gently'. The French were now routinely bringing in gabions and fascines as booty, perhaps judging that the enemy had used so much materiel that they would be hard to replace, or more likely because they had no materials themselves.

The night of 18/19 August: in the Imperial sector, the besiegers constructed 2 new redoubts, some distance away from the glacis; they did not try to reclaim the lost ground. At the conclusion of their last sortie the French stationed cavalry at the head of each sap. In response, the Imperials erected *chevaux-de-frise*. The besiegers did, however, start construction of two new communication trenches on the left of their approach and a new battery of 7 guns was erected to fire on the flank of the St. Alexander, where the Grand Battery could not reach. This was completed on the following night. The battery also enfiladed a *tenaille* on the glacis which the French were using to harass the workmen. (Tenailles were detached works, chevron-shaped, used to channel attacks and as cover.)

The French again sortied, using elements of Dauphin, but this time found themselves matched by a pair of large battalions occupying the redoubts, could make no headway, and lost around 20 men. The German version puts this sortie on the following night. Duke Max only bombarded. His bombs and carcasses struck accurately in the covered way, but did minimal damage. The Hessian batteries across the Rhine supported but most of the bombs exploded before reaching their target, due to the range.

The night of 19/20 August: the Imperial communication trenches and new battery were completed. Both sides put up heavy fire, both of cannon and musket, and both sides

sustained casualties. The Imperials now had a lodgement on the glacis and were in a position to attempt the counterscarp (the glacis was apparently shorter here), but the French stationed a strong blocking force in front of them, including the regiments of Maine and Bretagne. In the German account these conducted the sortie which Quincy puts on the previous night, and cleared the Imperials off the glacis, temporarily. The Saxons completed a sap on the Citadel's glacis.

On the night of 20/21 August the Imperials completed the communication trench for their new saps, while Duke Max did likewise. They also set the Gloriette on fire. This is perhaps when the French observation post withdrew.

On the night of 21/22 August the Imperials refined their trenches, and also sank some wells — looking for French mine shafts. They conserved their artillery ammunition but did some damage with musketry. The Hanoverians completed a sap on the right of the approach and began constructing a second one of the left. The Bavarians likewise strengthened their approaches to the glacis.

On the night of 22/23 August all the signs pointed to an assault from the Citadel approach. The troops there were being very quiet. The Imperial trenches continued to be 'extraordinarily' strengthened and a redoubt was built in the salient angle of the glacis. A new battery of 7 pieces was also erected on the right of the Imperial approach. According to Quincy this was to fire down the covered way and against the Ghent Gate. According to the German account it was to fire against St. Boniface and to drive off a French cavalry post near Gallows Hill. The Allied miners detected 6 mines, 2 of which were complete and 4 more with 500 pounds of powder deposited.

On the night of 23/24 August Duke Max was busy constructing a grand battery. To the French, the Imperials appeared to be doing little, due to the lay of the ground, but he had actually cut halfway up the glacis by the end of the night, finishing their new battery and an associated sap. They too reserved their cannon and used musketry. On the morning of 24 August the Imperials cannonaded with 49 pieces.

On the night of 24/25 August the Imperials dug a communication trench across the angle of the glacis under cover of a heavy mortar bombardment. They had now emplaced 25 tubes (this seems to include the Electors' weapons, but not the Hessians). The bombardment dropped bombs and pitchers full of grenades into the covered way, 'wreaking havoc'. The whole sector was on fire, with secondary explosions going off so that the French musketeers scattered. Apparently a powder keg exploded and set off grenades stored in caskets. Body parts could be seen flying through the air. The French lost 8 hundredweight of powder and 500 grenades. According the German account they were forced to evacuate the area, which was completely wrecked. Ignored by the defenders, Duke Max's men

approached the covered way near the Bastion of Drusus (the southwest bastion of the Citadel).

The Hessians contributed by firing into the city. A burger's child was wounded and the citizens began comparing their 'saviours' unfavourably with the French occupiers.

On the night of 25/26 August Duke Max's trenches were dug up to the covered road in front of the Drusus Bastion. They also dug a large *épaulement*, behind which they could hide bodies of cavalry. On the Imperial side, the fire intensified as they extended saps. For the past few nights the French had begun to take significant casualties. On the Coalition side the death of *prinz* Leopold von Pfalz-Veldenz is recorded, of wounds incurred eleven days earlier.

On the night of 26/27 August the Imperials began a new large parallel at the foot of the glacis. This was a major project, intended to link up the tangle of smaller trenches and provide the base for an assault. Work was slow thanks to the fire from the city. Facing the Citadel, the Saxons continued constructing their own grand battery of 18 guns, unmasking it this same night, to play on the Drusus and St. Alban bastions.

2 more mines were discovered by Lorraine's men. These had connecting tunnels to other mines. Further investigation was needed but every time the batteries fired the concussion put out the miners' lamps. This caused Lorraine to order a ceasefire of several days' duration. (On 28 August the miners requested an extension as they had found a third mine.) The mines were regarded as a significant threat given that they were precisely under the path of the planned assault. Of course, the reduction of fire allowed the French to make repairs. An unintended consequence was the raising of French morale — they believed Lorraine was planning to give up the siege.

Duke Max was doing some mining of his own. The French could hear his men digging and he noticed that a spring, the St. Albans Fountain by the bastion of the same name, had a reduced flow. They debated sinking countermines to 'embarrass' the attackers.

August 27 the Saxon siege guns finally arrived. All this time they had been forced to use field pieces and mortars. It took time to emplace these monsters, so Duke Max concentrated on mine hunting for a few days. He also completed a redoubt on the right of his approach, with cover to conceal a body of cavalry and an egress trench allowing a closer approach to the covered way.

On the night of 27/28 August d'Uxelles was informed that the Imperial banners could be seen at the heads of their saps and ordered a general stand-to. He made an inspection at 2am. The Imperials did not attack, merely completing their trench. However, the besiegers intensified their musketry and bombardment and sustained it. Duke Max's big guns were brought into

position, increasing his grand battery to 30 guns and mortars. Extending the works was costly in men, the most important casualty being Graf Arco of the Bavarians, wounded in the neck.

28/29 August was a night for the miners. The Imperials searched for the French galleries and when they were within a meter or so of one of them the French would set fire to it, collapsing both tunnels. The besiegers' fire slackened but did not quit; they finished emplacing all their pieces. However, the French remained able to repair the damage quickly. On the other side of the city Duke Max's men dug a parallel in front of their battery to protect it. They had here 36 large cannon and 8 medium, plus 7 mortars.

Dawn on 29 August commenced with a Morning Song played on trumpets and pipes. Duke Max, Prince Eugene, the Saxon general Graf Reuss, who was acting as his Duke's substitute, and much of the Staff mounted the redoubt called St. Emanuel. At Duke Max's signal the music commenced, followed immediately by a double salvo of 25 *halbe-Karthaunen* (24-pounders) and other pieces. His mortars joined in. To the west, the Grand Battery answered with 48 (or 46) cannon and mortars. Very quickly a wall came down, as did the *Schilderhäuser* and a guard house in the Citadel complex. Lorraine's guns blasted St. Boniface and St. Alexander. Not all the shots were accurate. A stone ball plowed through the choir of the Jesuit church, wounding many who were sheltering inside. The guns roared all day and late into the night.

[The German, and sometimes the French, texts use the archaic Karthaunen for siege cannon. A halbe-Karthaunen was a 24-pounder and a viertel-Karthaunen was a 12-pounder. It is safer to use the old names, because the specifications were different. A German viertel-Karthaunen had a barrel length of 24 calibre whereas a German field gun of similar weight of shot would have a barrel length of over 30 calibre.]

29/30 August was a repeat of the previous night for the Imperials. The French collapsed two of their mines. Meanwhile, the Imperials tried 3 times to establish a battery at the tip of the glacis, but the French guns foiled them. On the Imperial side their batteries fired about 200 bombs and carcasses, but inaccurately. More effective was their cannon fire, 45 pieces shattering the faces of both bastions. This must have dismounted many French guns, for their counter-fire slackened appreciatively. It ceased completely the following night. The Imperial miners had to vacate the mines due to fumes caused by all the destruction. Their troops did manage to complete their final parallel, leading Lorraine's generals to suggest an immediate assault. The Prince chose to wait until Duke Max was ready. Meanwhile, they could improve the trenches.

Duke Max's men pushed their saps forward, one against the Citadel and one along the foot of the glacis, connecting them as always with a traverse and securing

them with redoubts. They also set up a small battery of 5 guns which drew the attention of the French. General Reuss received a wound to his left arm.

On 30 August Lorraine received three messages. The first was from the Elector of Trier, lamenting that *général* Boufflers had taken Cochem on the Moselle and had threatened Andernach. The second was from Waldeck announcing a 'victory' over the French at Walcourt, just south of the Sambre; over 800 had been killed and they had fled to their camp. This was the culmination of the year's campaigning and it amounted to exactly nothing. Waldeck was compelled to abandon his plans of overrunning the French magazines farther south and withdraw north of the Sambre. The third letter was from the commandant of Heidelberg. It was the most ominous. Duras had recrossed the Rhine, was organising a flotilla, and had called up the Alsatian garrisons. This could only mean he was preparing to relieve Mainz. Deserters later confirmed the news.

The besiegers made the best preparations they could. Lorraine and his staff crossed the Rhine and made a reconnaissance as far as two hour's ride from the river, looking for a fallback position. Batteries were positioned at either end of the Saxons' bridge and 2 chains were strung across the river above the bridge, anchored with small boats; behind these was a third chain incorporating chunks of wood with hooks in them and using larger boats for anchors.

They also hurried preparations for the grand assault. The French mines were the biggest danger, but there were also de la Motte's spiked planks to deal with. They could lay down a carpet of fascines, hurdles, and sandbags, or they could blow a gap with a mine of their own. Although the equipment was ready, it was agreed a mine was the best option. Once the saps were close enough, the men could also pull the planks out by hand.

On the night of 30/31 August the Imperials made the most progress, firing their 36-gun battery and 7 mortars to good effect and digging 3 saps to the end of the glacis. The French blew a mine in front of the righthand Imperial forward redoubt. There are two versions of this event. In one, Lorraine 'teased' the French into firing it to create a pit where he could assemble his men (it turned out to be almost too large), and in the other the Imperials were within 2 feet of a French mine and also pretty close to some other galleries which were not mines in themselves, so d'Uxelles ordered de la Motte to blow it; the Imperials fired off everything they had in response, knocking holes in the palisades and damaging some breastworks, but all were repaired within the hour.

Duke Max's men reached the edge of the glacis. Their mines did not approach the French ones, so could not be interfered with. (Perhaps, thanks to the captured plans, they were deliberately skirting them.) As always, two redoubts and a traverse were dug. The bastions Drusus

and St. Alban were struck by the fire of 36 guns and 8 mortars. The Hessians continued to do their own thing, bombing the city indiscriminately.

On the night of 31 August/1 September, the Imperials reinforced their saps with gabions, and connected two of them with a trench, while continuing a heavy bombardment. They were close enough now for the opposing sides to use grenades. Duke Max's Bavarians built an observation post at the end of the glacis, but the French attacked and killed the first pair of officers who tried to take up station there, and the post was abandoned. The Bavarians responded by increasing their fire.

The night of 1/2 September was spent bombarding the French. The Imperials inched forward but Duke Max's men lodged on the glacis. The French tried to counter the Imperials by firing two mines under their saps. The attempt backfired, blowing chunks of the dreaded 'spiked carpet' everywhere and giving Lorraine two new holes to hide his men in. The saps were undamaged. He invested a few ducats in danger pay and got some of his men to start pulling out the spiked planks, using ropes. His soldiers were eager now that the end was in sight and needed little encouragement. Some started working on their own initiative to lengthen the saps, directed by the junior officers.

2/3 September the Imperials (Hanoverian Night again) at last got up to the palisades, where some bitter fighting took place. The French fired another mine, filled with bombs and grenades at the 'retreating angle' of the counterscarp. This did some damage to the sap in that neighbourhood and caused 20 casualties, but did not stop the work. Lorraine's adjutant, *prinz* Johann Friedrich von Württemberg, was wounded in the face by an exploding grenade which burned him, and also in the foot.

Vertillac ordered a moonlight sortie — the moon was full and the skies clear — against the Saxons and Bavarians, who had just completed their last pair of redoubts and were within grenade range. 40 dragoons from La Lande led by their colonel, Villemort, and a similar number of grenadiers from Beauvoisis under their captain, M. de Barriere, made a two-prolonged attack. The German account claims 300 French took part. The dragons were purposely sent out first, so that the enemy would be engaged and the grenadiers would have time to reach their objectives. 'Unfortunately' the dragoons attacked so vigorously that the Germans were hurled back and they were making preparations to return before the grenadiers appeared. Villemort ordered his men to each grab a gabion, but remained behind to coordinate with Barriere, who had not arrived. Villemort's men thought he had been killed and began shooting, in one version at their own side and in another at the enemy — probably the POWs standing near Villemort's position. Villemort called to them to stop, which they did. In another account he was physically seen — there was bright moonlight. The

grenadiers arrived, collected 7-8 POWs and a gabion each, and made ready to retire. At this juncture Duke Max showed up, leading a counterattack. The French 'scarpered'. The Duke had a hard time persuading his workmen to continue, but by exposing himself to fire managed to animate them. Probably, he stood on the parapet and yelled at them. By all accounts the Germans lost about 1,000 men. Their new small battery was wrecked.

On the night of 3/4 September the Imperials ramped up their fire, with cannons, mortars, musketry, and grenades, inflicting numerous casualties. They also strengthened their saps. A new battery, of 7 pieces, made a small breach in the curtain wall between St. Boniface and St. Alexander, but d'Uxelles had the danger point reinforced. Duke Max's men reached the enemy palisades, tagging St. Alban with their own dedicated 7-gun battery. This despite another French sortie which caused over 100 casualties. This time it was General Steinau who led the reserves in a counterattack. The Duke of Saxony returned to duty.

By the night of 4/5 September the Imperials had advanced so far that they could go no further without making an assault, for which purpose they began stockpiling the fascines and other stores for an attack on the covered way. French counter-fire scored a lucky hit on a forward Imperial magazine holding 18,000 charges, which blew up so violently so that fascines rained down on the French bastions. The Imperials sprang a mine which sent 2 enemy soldiers flying through the air; there is a possibility the explosions are one and the same. The defenders rained down bombs and grenades without let up. The Imperials suffered over 80 casualties.

Quincy says the whole lodgement was destroyed by the French mine. In reality, both approaches continued to be made ready for a general assault. Duke Max's men were virtually ignored by the French, probably because d'Uxelles expected an immediate Imperial assault. The Bavarians and Saxons quietly established 2 lodgements on the glacis, close to the protruding angles of the bastions. All through the next day the besiegers pounded their respective targets.

Early on 5 September Lorraine held a council of war. On any other night Lorraine would have visited the Electors to check on progress. This night they sent word they were ready to go, and then paid Lorraine's HQ a visit, where they found the Landgrave of Hesse, also. It was decided that the general assault should be made the next day. Everything was more or less ready, and there were disturbing reports that *général* Boufflers was marching on Mainz while *maréchal* Duras was manufacturing 'machines' (probably fireships and devices for cutting the booms on the river).

10,000 men would take part, 5,000 on each approach. 5 battalions 'with their colours' — that is, complete — would

stand by as a reserve and the cavalry posts would be doubled. The entirety of the Lines would be under arms. Details were left to the various commanders, who were briefed by the princes. Lorraine's men would halt on top of the bastions and dig in: the Imperials on St. Boniface, the Hanoverians on St. Alexander, and a mixed Hessian-Imperial force along the intervening curtain. The object was not a breakthrough, but merely to gain and hold the covered way all along the line.

The assault would take place in 3 waves: the first, of 1,500 men under Graf Wallis were to attack the palisades, the next 1,500 under FML Thüngen would follow through, and the last wave, of 2,000 under the General of the Day (Souches) would occupy the enemy positions and in concert with the Reserve put up a wall of fire against the inevitable counterattack. The first wave was led by grenadiers followed by fusiliers and men carrying a variety of pole-arms and bridging equipment. The best marksmen in the army were assigned to this wave. All officers of the rank of colonel and above were to participate, to provide a reserve of leadership. As a subsidiary operation, 2 enemy guard posts were to be attacked, one on the left by *Obristleutnant* Vaubon and 300 dragoons and one on the right, by Gallows Hill, by a body of volunteer cavalry.

The Electors would attack using the same pattern. They had a slight advantage as they were already at the counterscarp. Steinau on the right would lead a mixed force of Imperials (the regiments brought to the siege by Duke Max which were serving under him) and Bavarians. Flemming would lead the Saxons on the left.

The assault came at 4pm on 6 September, after a day-long bombardment. Signals were sent up by the Imperials — a bomb set to airburst — to which the Saxons and Bavarians replied with an airburst of their own. Then the coordinated advance began. The bombardment was renewed, 100 cannon and 48 mortars participating. On the Imperial sector 8 battalions advanced, led by a special detachment of grenadiers wearing cuirasses and pot helmets.

Facing the Imperials were a battalion each of Maine, Orléans, and Bretagne, commanded by M. de Lauziere, while facing the Bavarians were the 1. Battalion of Anjou and the regiment of Beauvoisis, under Barbesieres.

The pair of outposts offered only weak resistance, firing a single salvo against the dragoons and then riding away.

The Imperial attack did not go well. The sap heads must still have been still some distance from the covered way, or they jumped off from farther back, because Quincy says they had a lot of ground to cover. Within 15 minutes the glacis was carpeted with dead bodies, including the entire armoured detachment. The covered way was gained and the French pulled back into their forts and *caponieres*. Wallis was mortally wounded while trying to

bring order to the lodgement and his subordinates were left to their own devices for a while.

As might be expected, the narrative becomes confused at this point. For about 2 hours the fighting swung back and forth over the covered way. The Imperials threatened to take parts of it a number of times, but could never quite do so. At the end of the 2 hours the Imperial lines wavered, but Lorraine sent in another 8 battalions and the fight continued, with great slaughter. This followup assault succeed in occupying the covered way, only to be thrown back by a French counterattack.

According to the German account, just as they were securing themselves the French sprang 2 mines, one of either side. The one on the Imperial right killed almost everyone standing on top of it; the hole filled with earth. This was not unexpected, and the Imperials continued to reinforce their positions with hurdles, but the French firing 3 more mines in quick succession, doing tremendous damage. Morale plummeted. There were scenes of men flattening themselves into the earth and of grabbing wounded comrades as an excuse to leave the fighting. The line was too thin to hold. This is probably when the counterattack took place. Lorraine rallied his officers at great risk to himself and they rallied the men. The third wave had yet to be sent up. Lorraine threw them and his entire Reserve into the fight and things stabilised.

After another 30 minutes the assault stalled completely. Quincy says the Imperials attained only one lodgement on the glacis, at one of the bastions. Lorraine's biographer says they took the bastion, which is incorrect. The German account is more positive, saying a lodgement was secured only 3-4 paces from the counterscarp both on left and right. The Hessians in the center, however, were 'stubborn' in a negative sense and failed to gain their objective. Since the Electors' men started at the counterscarp, for the Imperials to merely arrive there seems no great gain.

The battle followed a similar pattern for the Electors, with the attackers only managing to get a grip on a couple of angles in the covered way, which had actually been abandoned earlier, for some reason. Losses were lighter here, however, because d'Uxelles focused on the Imperials, and the men managed to achieve their objectives an hour earlier than the Imperials. Some Saxons and Luneburgers even chased the French to the city gate. The French sprang 4 mines in their sector but none did much damage.

The assault cost the Allies over 5,000 dead, 1,500 of whom were in the Electors' sector. A high proportion were officers, including most of the colonels. Of the nobility, the brother of the Empress, the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order, the Grand Master of the of Prince of Hanover's Household, and Prince Eugene of Savoy were all wounded, along with some of baronial rank. The French

also suffered heavy losses because the enemy batteries never stopped firing.

At nightfall the besiegers attempted to reinforce their positions, still under heavy and incessant fire, and to remove their dead, a task they remained engaged in all the next day as well.

In the dawn of 7 September d'Uxelles launched a fresh sortie. 4 mines were sprung and the men poured out of their tunnels. Failing to dislodge the Imperials they tried again later in the day and fought for a good 3 hours, inflicting 2,000 more casualties, eliminating much of the remaining Imperial leadership. The big names included Souches, Starhemberg, and the Adjutant General, a man named Graf Leopold Markward von Fürstenberg.

The assault was to be renewed. In preparation the besiegers extended their lines along the covered way, and on the night of 7/8 September they moved up their batteries in stages — so that there remained a continuous fire. But, to the surprise of everyone d'Uxelles beat the chamade for surrender at noon on 8 September.

For the French, it was not a surprise. Quincy, who regards this siege as a classic, is of the opinion that the next assault would have gone as badly as the first, and that the effort would have forced Lorraine to lift the siege. But, the defenders were nearly out of ammunition.

2 French officers went out to meet Lorraine and ask him to send a hostage to pick up the articles of surrender. There must still have been fighting because the Electors had not realised what was going on. Lorraine sent word that d'Uxelles should parley with them, too. He then went to confer with them. The discussions went on all day and the articles were not signed until 9 September.

Lorraine was so delighted with this sudden capitulation that he let d'Uxelles dictate his own terms and made no quibbles. The garrison marched out with full honours of war at 9am on 11 September, bound for Landau. They still had 6,000 men, not counting sick and wounded, who were sent to Philippsburg, and brought 6 cannon and 2 mortars with them. D'Uxelles was allowed to keep his war chest, including all the money collected from Mainz. There was to be a full exchange of POWs.

[The German account says they were required to depart at 11am. Full honours of war in this case involved bearing weapons, bullet in mouth, fuses lit, drums beating and flags flying, with all their baggage. The artillery had to be pieces bearing Louis XIV's arms.]

The French lost 845 dead and 1,337 wounded and had to give up a major prize. But, despite d'Uxelles being booed by the rabble of Paris, contemporaries regarded the siege of Mainz as a 'perfect' defense. Very early on Duras had decided not to attempt a relief. Perhaps he should have, but he was badly outnumbered, and if he had succeeded, would either have lost his own army in the process, or caused the Germans to move away and pick an easier

target. Instead, Lorraine had been forced to waste the nearly entire season, to lose an estimated 15,000 men, and expend untold amounts of materiel. The Emperor, on a rare visit to Augsburg, was not particularly happy about the terms of surrender. They dampened the joy of the election of his son as King of the Romans. But Lorraine pointed out that he now had a nearly-intact fortress on the left bank of the Rhine, rather than a pile of rubble.

Just a few days later Lorraine's army broke up. The Elector of Saxony said his men were fatigued and marched for home. Duke Max, concerned about the activities of *maréchal* Duras in the South, headed in that direction to see what damage the French had done. Lorraine had promised to aid the Elector of Brandenburg and marched for Bonn. Mainz was garrisoned by a mix of Imperial and local troops.

The loss of Mainz was regarded as a shameful defeat by the general public in France (or at least by the Parisians, who in their eyes were the only ones who counted). But, it was not a case of cowardice. It was a judgement call on d'Uxelles' part. He continued to be employed on the Rhine in key roles. Probably, he never expected relief, so it was not a question of the garrison losing heart, but he and Duras may have miscalculated the Duke of Lorraine's singleness of purpose. He was prepared to suffer ten times their casualties to achieve success. They ran out of ammunition before he ran out of will.

The Motions of Maréchal Duras

Duras' summer campaign suffers from a dating problem. According to Quincy it took place in June, but this seems to be a typographical error. According to the Mainz siege diary it took place in August. There would be some discrepancy anyway, because the dates reported in the siege journal are when the Duke of Lorraine heard of Duras' various actions. Nevertheless, two months is too long of a time lag. For this account the German version has been followed. Dates taken from Quincy have been amended to 'August' instead of 'June', while retaining the numerals. This may be inaccurate, but it is at least closer to the reality.

Going back to the start of Mainz's blockade... *Maréchal* Duras had decided to cross the Rhine and play havoc with Lorraine's supply lines in Württemberg. He departed Neustadt on 2 August, rendezvousing at 'Little Holland', across from Philippsburg on 5 August, with 11 battalions from Landau, his artillery train, and 76 squadrons, including the Petite Gendermerie and 6 squadrons of dragoons. They crossed the Rhine the next day. At Philippsburg he drew off another 5 battalions. Camping 8 Km from the right bank of the river, he then headed for Heidelberg. One man was killed and another wounded from falcon shots off the walls of that town. A party was sent to take a redoubt nearby. They succeeded but were ambushed and their commander killed.

General Serényi was deployed against such a move as this, but his men were too spread out. He retreated away from the Rhine, to Sinsheim, 23 Km southeast of Heidelberg, while sending 5 battalions and a dragoon regiment to Heidelberg. It was now that Lorraine, receiving word of the situation, dispatched Dünwald with a sizeable force: 2,000 Imperials, 1,000 Saxons, 500 Hanoverians, and 500 Hessians. A Württemberg lieutenant colonel named Thavonat whose own regiment was in the garrison was sent to command at Heidelberg with orders to defend it 'to the last extremity'.

[Quincy says there were 6,000 Allied troops, but this includes Serényi's force; he had 2,000 men.]

Duras had hoped to take Heidelberg, but it now had a substantial garrison, as well as 2,000 local partisans in support. He remained in front of it until Dünwald's advance guard approached from beyond the Neckar, then upped stakes and turned south. Wheeling suddenly, he made an attempt to surprise Dünwald, who had crossed the Neckar and was camped in front of Heidelberg. The latter was warned, burned his camp, and withdrew in good order, *sans* baggage, across the Neckar. Sinsheim was burned by the French, who moved on to Bruchsal, 15 Km southeast of Philippsburg. Enroute, a small castle with garrison of 60 men was stormed and then razed. At Bruchsal the 800-man garrison was compelled to surrender after a few cannon shots into the suburbs.

Dünwald conferred with Lorraine and it was agreed to create a separate corps to cover Swabia. They did not have enough men to form a cordon along the Rhine all the way to Breisach, so it would base at Heilbronn, leaving Serényi's men in a string of posts to act as a tripwire. This plan was repeated in subsequent years, except when a major operation was taking place.

On 11 August Duras detached a couple of columns. One, of 3,000 horse, 4,000 foot, and 2 cannon, went to Stafforth Castle, 6 Km southwest of Bruchsal, before swinging east to Bretten (a day's march southeast of Bruchsal). The other column marched on Gochsheim, a hilltop village a day's march east of Bruchsal. The region was crawling with enemy and the French overran a number of small contingents and took some prisoners.

On 13 August Duras camped at Wergartem (Weingarten), 10 Km SSW of Bruchsal, sending a detachment to secure Durlach, a further 6.5 Km in the same direction. Durlach, just east of Karlsruhe, had a garrison of 450 foot and 50 horse, plus 8 guns and a small magazine. On 14 August the French army camped there, and a detachment was again sent to take Ettlingen, 8.5 Km farther on in the same direction. At this place the garrison decamped and the citizens opened the gates. A raid was also made against Pforzheim, 22 Km east, on the Enz River. Here, both garrison and population abandoned the town; the French burnt it.

Camp was made at Ettlingen on 16 August. Duras now learned for certain that the Germans had abandoned the line of the Rhine as far as Offenburg, 60 Km to the south, opposite Strasbourg. They had even given up a set of extensive entrenchments at Stollhofen (30 Km SSW, on the Rhine west of Baden-Baden). The French had these filled in completely, bringing in 3,000 peasants from Alsace for the work. 2 battalions were kept on the right bank of the Rhine as security, while the rest of the army recrossed the river at Philippsburg with a considerable tail of prisoners.

These evolutions had some effect, but they did not draw that many troops away from Mainz. They were not intended to. Duras was confident Mainz would hold and instead wanted to pick up some new acquisitions while Lorraine was busy. In this he failed, though he did do some damage. As was recounted during the siege narrative, Duras spent the rest of August pretending to prepare for a relief effort.

The Campaign – The Middle Rhine

[Refer to the map on p. 80.]

Fighting on the lower sections of the Rhine took place in isolation. The fact that it was taking place at all had an effect both on Lorraine's actions and those of Generalissimo Waldeck in the Low Countries, but only in that the Elector of Brandenburg never ceased to demand as much aid as possible while sending as little as possible himself. His army was *supposed* to come under Waldeck's authority and guard the flank of the Low Countries, but, typically for the period, the agreement was never notarised, and the Elector consistently chose to define himself as one of the Emperor's lieutenants – except when it was more convenient to claim he was part of Waldeck's command.

The bulk of Brandenburg's army massed early at Wesel, roughly 85 Km downriver from the city of Köln, and waited on events. The army initially numbered around 7,000 men, including garrisons, but this would grow to 20,000 by the time the main campaigning season opened, and then to 30,000. The prince-bishop of Münster already had 800 of his own men at Köln, as part of a prewar mutual defense agreement. Brandenburg, not to be outdone, sent 2,000 dragoons. Münster promised to provide additional assistance (ultimately about 6,000 men in all) to Joseph Clemens, the Imperial Archbishop of Cologne. Most of Cologne's prewar army was still under Fürstenberg's control. Some of the Münster troops were used to garrison Cologne's right-bank possessions at Dorsten and Relinckhausen, miles from the action. Others met up with the Brandenburgers. Other forces in the area included 7-8,000 Dutch in the lands of Jülich and 8 Hanoverian regiments being readied to go to Lorraine's aid.

There had been activity in the lands between the Meuse and the Rhine since the turn of the year. *Lieutenant*

général Boufflers retained the French command here, with a mandate to prepare the ground for an advance down the Moselle which would secure the electorates of both Trier and Cologne, each as yet only partially occupied. The French commander cooperating with Cardinal Fürstenberg, the *marquis* de Sourdis, already had some troops on the Rhine.

Apart from general raiding, as early as February 12 Waldeck and Brandenburg learned that *général* Sourdis' men were advancing both south toward Koblenz and north toward Holland. The *Graf* von Lippe sent 5 companies to garrison Zutphen, while 2,000 Swedish troops hired by the Dutch fortuitously arrived and were sent up the IJssel River. This proved enough to change the mind of *général* Sourdis.


Following this brief pre-season advance of the French down the Rhine, it was the turn of the Elector of Brandenburg to make his play. Heartened by word that the Emperor was sending reinforcements, he decided to clear the French out of the Electorate of Cologne. He would start with 4,000 of his own men reinforced by 5,000 Dutch.

The operation began in March with the ambush of a French convoy travelling from Neuß, 35 Km NW of Cologne, to Bonn, 25 Km SE of Cologne. Shortly after the march began the enemy troops were driven off toward Duisburg, 26 Km north of that place – that is, in the opposite direction to Bonn. The convoy was 'liberated' and led off toward Wesel. Sourdis, at Neuß at the time, regarded this affair as an insult and made plans to pursue. He and his second, *maréchal de camp* Vertillac (the same man who would serve at Mainz), led their entire corps of 24 squadrons and 7 battalions (7,000 men) from the environs of Köln toward Wesel. Expecting this, his German opposite, General von Schöning, and the Dutch second, *luitenant generaal* van Aylva, set up a defensive position with 5,000 men at Herderbosch, near Neuß, to screen the convoy's withdrawal.

[Aylva is sometimes named a major general, but he was one of the four lieutenant generals of infantry in the Dutch Army in 1688. He died in 1691.]

The French attacked this position vigorously but after the initial musketry duel their horse became 'disordered' and withdrew, exposing their foot to a counterattack. Quincy says they were ambushed, probably by a flanking attack. Two companies of French grenadiers held the Germans off for some time before being forced to retire. The French took 2,500 casualties and lost 500 prisoners while the Allies lost 400 men. The *marquis* de Castries was promoted to brigadier for his part in this action.

The Electorate of Cologne was now uncovered. On 14 March Neuß was taken, Siburg on March 16, with the Ruhr towns of Zons and Soest falling soon after. The French and their Cologne allies now controlled only Bonn, Kaiserswerth (11 Km north of Neuß, on the right bank of



Scale & Legend

- Town
- ⬠ Fortification
- ~ River

10 Km

1. French advance from Bonn into Allied blocking position; French lose the battle; Allies free to advance
2. Allies roll up various towns
3. French hold outs
4. Kaiserswerth besieged & taken end of June
5. Bonn besieged & eventually taken October 10
6. Duke of Lorraine crosses the Rhine to envelop Mainz (23 June - 1 July)
7. Duke of Lorraine marches to assist Brandenburg (12-24 Sept)
8. French Raids end of August & early September

1689 Middle Rhine

the Rhine), and Rheinberg, 38 Km north of Neuß. This last caused the Dutch some unease since the town was right on the approaches to Guelderland and the heart of their Republic, but it was an isolated post. It soon surrendered without a fight. The commandant was a German, and though of Fürstenberg's party was also loyal to the Reich.

Counterintuitively, Brandenburg's nominal superior, Waldeck, was unhappy with these results. First, Brandenburg's troops had not shown themselves particularly battle-worthy, despite their successes. The French had lost some garrisons but were not in disarray. Worse, Brandenburg had begun to get Ideas. Instead of securing his gains and marching west, he took the troops from Münster under his command and even requested — and got, against Waldeck's better judgement — 22 squadrons (3,000 men) and 6 battalions from the Dutch Estates.

Nevertheless, this operation was entirely beneficial to the overall Allied cause. The French had been prevented from threatening the Alliance's left flank in the Low Countries. Dutch and Münster troops were pushed forward to Stavelôt (36 Km SE of Liège), where they could prevent French garrisons on the Moselle from coming to support any attack down the Meuse from France. Once reinforced, Brandenburg's offensive continued.


Kaiserswerth was the next target, 42 Km downriver from Köln. It lies on the right bank, and could serve as a bridgehead for the French to invade the Mark. By early

April, Brandenburg's chief commander, General von Schöning, had about 20,000 men, including the 6,000 from Münster and the Dutch, the latter coming from the garrison of Maastricht. Waldeck did not really want to give these troops up, but he considered line of the Meuse safe so long as Namur was held, and that of the Rhine secure while the Germans garrisoned Neuß and Deutz; at the latter they placed a 30-gun battery to prevent the French from sending relief by water.

Kaiserswerth 23 May — 26 June

The siege of Kaiserswerth began on May 23 with a general bombardment. This was not a formal investment, however, just a bombardment. The investment proper began on 21 June. Furstenberg had garrisoned the place with Cologne troops leavened with French, under M. de Marcognet. There were only 100 of them, but they were enough to impose a delay until Brandenburg could assemble more men.

The Brandenburgers established their HQ at the hamlet of Winkdhuisen, opening the trenches on that side in three places on 22 June, under the direction of the Dutch engineer Menno van Coehoorn, the Coalition's answer to Vauban. Coehoorn was not in Vauban's class, but the sieges of Kaiserswerth and Bonn this year made his reputation. Two days later his batteries were unmasked and under their covering fire the trenches were pushed to the counterscarp the same day, with a loss of about 45 men. On 25 June the covered way was seized, at which Marcognet offered to capitulate, which was done on 26 June. The usual honours of war were given, because the



place was held in the name of the King of France, but no token guns were removed because there were no 'royal cannon', and they were required to leave all the ammunition and the war chest. The garrison departed for Luxembourg City by way of Neuß on 28 June.

In Flanders and Brabant, the French put pressure on Waldeck, hoping he would draw off the Brandenburgers, but to no avail. He did not have that much clout. At this point, Waldeck in turn decided to conduct an offensive up the Meuse to strike at the French magazines, many of which were concentrated in the vicinity of Maubeuge and Dinant. He requested the Brandenburgers either send troops — if nothing else, return the Dutch soldiers — or cause a diversion. Brandenburg and Schöning chose the latter course, though without reference to Waldeck's timetable; they were going to attack Bonn anyway.

Bonn is 67 Km upriver from Kaiserswerth. Schöning's forces were now 28,000 strong, but this would not prove strong enough. They were close enough to Lorraine's command now that they had no real excuse not to aid him and were forced to send the Hanoverians to Mainz. More troops were now needed to block the valley of the Moselle. This left only enough for a blockade of Bonn.

The Blockade of Bonn

Operations against Bonn began as early as 16 April, when a body of 2,000 foot and 400 horse, under a commander named Leyden, and supported by 2,000 peasant labourers, left the city of Köln at 1am. Marching up the right bank of the Rhine, they planned to attack a small redoubt, named Biel (Beul), which guarded Bonn's flying bridge. Leyden first attempted to take the redoubt by infiltration, and approached to within 20 paces of the ditch, but a sentry spotted the glow of a match and opened fire, killing a grenadier.

The garrison of the redoubt, 60 troops and 40 workmen under M. Racine, a captain of the *régiment Vendôme*, supported by two detachments of 25 grenadiers from the *régiment Thianges*, took the German column under fire. The grenadiers were stationed in a pair of covered boats anchored at the ends of the redoubt.

The Governor of Bonn, M. de Raouset, observing that the enemy were filling in the ditch in preparation for storming the palisades, ordered and led a counterattack from the city with 300 dragoons. He was given some time to prepare, as the ditch was 'wet' to a depth of 4 feet, but there was a delay at the bridge. Flying bridges were typically hinged, being swung into position with river tugs. Apparently most of the tugs had been swept away by the river, so that the French could not cross in a timely manner. Nevertheless, the Allies withdrew. They had made 3 attempts to storm the redoubt, at a spot where the works were incomplete, and lost 50 dead and over 200 wounded. 21 prisoners were taken. The French dragoons at last appeared and persuaded the enemy not

to return. They did not pursue far, because they had dismounted to pass through the works.

After this, it was decided to extend a 'free fire zone' around Bonn. Quincy justifies these sorts of actions by saying the French lacked the manpower to adequately hold the front and were reduced to the expedient of creating a wasteland that large armies could not survive in. Colonel d'Asfeld, one of the senior officers at Bonn, took a detachment of 8 companies of grenadiers and 100 dragoons of his regiment — 600 men in all — and ravaged the surrounding countryside, burning the villages of Rheindorf, Gueins, Venter, Rinberg, and Honuf, on the right bank of the Rhine. These places appear to have been hamlets located fairly close together, fortified with earthworks, and guarded by local militia and supported by an entrenchment sited between them which contained 200 regulars from Brandenburg and Lüneburg. At Rheindorf there was a deep double-ditch.

[The French regiments which contributed grenadiers were those of Poitou, Grancé, Vendôme, Bourbon, Provence, La Fère, Thianges, and Furstemberg.]

The *marquis* de Thianges led the attack at Rheindorf. The French approached within musket shot of the works before they realised the numbers defending the place and were forced to make an immediate assault. They broke in when Thianges and another officer descended the ditch, climbed the other side, and waved their men forward. The town was taken with a loss of 8-10 men and garrisoned by 50 French. However, the attackers had bypassed the main redoubt which still had to be taken. This was done relatively easily, though it was held by 500 men — the militia having retreated to it. The French then divided their force, sending 200 men to march down the Rhine while Thianges while the rest pushed outward, driving off numerous partisans, who fled down to the river and escaped in small boats. The French burnt the fort, taking the palisades to strengthen Bonn. Orders were given to spare the religious buildings and 'to spare the honour of the women'.

The next significant event in this sector was at the end of May, when Lorraine arrived at Koblenz, on his way to encircle Mainz. There was some talk of dropping forces off to help Brandenburg, or of Brandenburg loaning troops of his own, but just talk.

Action on the Moselle

French activity on the Moselle was lacklustre. This was mainly due to the fact that *maréchal* Humières badly needed help in Flanders, so that *lieutenant général* Boufflers, a very capable commander, was kept running back and forth between the two fronts.

After crossing the Rhine at Koblenz in May, Lorraine's Imperials had taken some useful posts in the Archbishopric of Trier. The most critical of these was Cochem, on the Moselle 38 Km southwest of Koblenz, and about 58 Km northeast of Trier as the crow flies. The

Electorate of Trier, though partly occupied by the French, was loyal to the Empire, and Cochem was garrisoned by 1,600 men, a mix of Imperials and local forces, both regular and militia. These raided the occupied portion of the country and generally made a nuisance of themselves.

[The units were: 5 companies of Gratz, which was a Saxe-Gotthorp regiment probably in service with Trier before the war, 3 companies owned by the Elector of Trier, and 1 company of the Imperial regiment Jung-Lotharingen.]

Due to events in Flanders, Boufflers had only been able to keep a distant eye on the Germans, but in August he set up a flying camp at Monzelfeld on the right bank of the Moselle, just downstream from Mülheim and 8 Km southwest of Mont-Royal. On 24 August, after spending 2 weeks in this position, Boufflers moved against Cochem, the situation in Flanders having eased somewhat. By this time, of course, the bulk of the Imperials had left the Middle Rhine and were besieging Mainz. Boufflers had under him 46 squadrons of horse and dragoons. To these he added 2,400 foot in 12 battalions from the garrison at Mont-Royal.

[Since there were 4 colonels and 4 lieutenant colonels of infantry in his command, it is likely there were 8 regiments, with 4 of them having 2 battalions.]

By land, Cochem is 20 Km downriver from Mont Royal. Boufflers' corps marched halfway to Cochem the first day, halting for a rest between 3pm and 9pm. They then made a night march, arriving at daybreak. The morning was spent in reconnaissance, not only of the best places to attack, but the possible lines of enemy retreat. The cavalry, as was typical, was set to work making fascines, while 4 cannon were deployed in 2 batteries of 3 and 1 gun, respectively.

Cochem was not well situated for defence. Along this part of the Moselle the surrounding countryside is a plateau through which the river cuts a deep valley. The town lies right on the river (in those days, just on the northern bank) at a spot where a tributary, the Endertbach, with its own deeply cut valley enters the Moselle from the northeast. This created a bowl shaped hollow with steep slopes that come very close to the town. Immediately to the west is the Reichsberg, a conical hill on which Cochem Castle still sits. It served as the town's citadel. Although a rather baroque edifice, the castle's aspect is the classic Medieval one, looming over the town below. That said, the Reichsberg is well below the level of the surrounding escarpment. The French could see everything going on below them.

There is a river road, running right along the bank of the Moselle. At the present day there is also a high road that runs along the crest of the escarpment. This may or may not have existed at the time, but its presence directs the eye to the fact that western access to the plateau is by

long, easy slopes, so that the French would have had no difficulty getting guns into a position overlooking both town and citadel. The river road still runs through the original gate, looking like a railway tunnel, which occupies the ground between the Reichsberg and the river, more or less on a line with the castle.

Details of the defences are sketchy but it would seem the Germans dug trenches in the Reichsberg's slopes, with access to the riverside gate and probably to a gate on the northern side of the town. There would have been palisades, and there is mention of *chevaux-de-frise*. Most of the defence seems to have been centered on the castle.

Having erected his mighty batteries within a long musket shot of the defenders, Boufflers summoned the garrison to surrender. His first emissary, a mere drummer, was ignored, so a lieutenant of the Guards was sent. The offer was for the garrison to surrender before a shot was fired, and become prisoners of war (not 'honours of war' probably because the men of Trier were claimed as French vassals). The lieutenant was detained for 2 hours while the Governor 'consulted his staff' — clearly a delaying tactic. Therefore, Boufflers threatened that if he was forced to fire on the town no quarter would be given. The Governor replied that he was prepared to resist to the last man unless allowed to depart with his entire garrison, weapons and all.

Boufflers ordered his cannon to open fire against the castle walls and the northern and riverside gates. After about 4 hours they effected a breach in the walls. Boufflers sent up an assault party consisting of a 50-man advance guard, already crouching behind some *chevaux-de-frise* in front of the castle, supported by 100 more. The most likely spot for this assault is on the Reichsberg's northwestern face. The distance to cover from the surrounding hills to the castle is only about 200 meters, and there are plenty of woods for concealment.

The French found the castle deserted, its guns having run out of ammunition. The garrison had slipped into the town under cover of a palisade which connected the end of their trenches (or of the castle walls) with the town gate (or gates).

The withdrawal proved a mistake. For whatever reason, the entrenchments which covered the town on the northern side were also in the process of evacuation, and the assault party quickly exited the castle and rushed these entrenchments, mingling with the retreating garrison and getting into the town with them. Additional troops followed, including dragoons who rode down the streets slaughtering everyone in sight. At first, the French numbers were small, but more troops arrived as the nearest battalions marched to the sound of musketry. Within 30 minutes there were over 1,500 French in the town and the garrison was forced to shelter in the Church and the Capuchin Monastery. They soon surrendered

enmasse. Quincy says the reason for this remarkable victory was that the garrison had almost no ammunition and considered they had already lost the fight.

[The church is 400 meters east of the castle, in the center of town. There is a complex that may have been the monastery across the road from it, on higher ground jutting out from the plateau to the north. Under better circumstances it would have formed a strong position.]

The town of Cochem was razed, and the loss of this post caused the Imperials to evacuate all their other holdings in Trier west of the Rhine, save for Koblenz. They lost 1,300 men at Cochem, including the Governor; the rest of the garrison, 700 men, were sent to Nancy as prisoners. French losses were moderate, 215 men. The town yielded over 100,000 crowns as booty for Boufflers' men, and 6 flags as war trophies.

On 27 August, Boufflers sent a detachment of 700 horse and dragoons to Kaiser-Leschmein and one of 1,500 horse to Wlm (Ulm?), Heydelshiem, and Kerpen. Thanks to the atrocious spelling of the old chroniclers it is hard to determine where some of these places are, but Kerpen is just west of Köln, a good 90 Km north of Cochem. Heydelshiem may be Heidesheim, a valuable town which lay in an out of the way corner of Trier. In any case, the raids all seem to have been directed northward. Kaiser-Leschmein was burned after disposing of the inhabitants. The other towns had been abandoned and were likewise burned. This was done to deny the enemy winter quarters in the country, and would have assisted the French efforts in Flanders besides protecting Boufflers' flank. Boufflers marched on Andernach but was warded off by General Schöning's cavalry corps.

The taking of Cochem had caught the Elector of Brandenburg's attention, and the threat to Andernach caused him to act rapidly. His main camp lay 8 Km below Bonn. Schöning, by far the stronger party, tried to engage Boufflers' raiders in battle by tempting them with roving detachments of his own, but the French would not take the bait, so he withdrew back to Bonn. Enroute, he invested a local castle called Nuremberg, garrisoned by 100 French of *régiment* Bourgogne. Summoned to surrender the French dared the Germans to try taking them; Schöning raised the blockade and rejoined the Elector.

The Siege of Bonn, to 10 October 1689

[Refer to the diagram on p. 85.]

Although the formal siege lasted only a month, Bonn's travails were of much longer duration. As already recounted, after his initial successes farther downriver the Elector of Brandenburg blockaded the town. The official story is that he lacked the manpower to conduct a formal siege, being forced to send men to help the Duke of Lorraine and Generalissimo Waldeck in the Low Countries. This was partly true, but Brandenburg's problems were mainly political ones. He was under

pressure from Lorraine not to start a siege no matter how strong he was, and he was under pressure from Waldeck to abandon his own projects and help the Cause in Brabant. He was only forced to send troops away for a very short time, and they were soon replaced. It would be more accurate to say he never had enough troops to begin with. The whole thing was an afterthought, done on the fly as a pet project that would bring glory to Brandenburg alone, kill a few thousand Catholics, both French and German, and also score off Cardinal Fürstenberg, who owned Bonn.

The Elector first tried intimidation, but the French governor, *général* d'Asfeld, was unimpressed. He next tried a terror bombardment, to give the French a taste of their own medicine, and that did not work either. By the time his army was fully massed he had burned through his ammunition. He was reluctant to burn through all his men. So, a blockade developed which also featured some spadework. Officially, the siege of Bonn lasted from 16 September to 10 October. Actually, it began in April, and the spadework began in July.

Bonn's garrison was roughly the same size as Mainz's, and d'Asfeld was as active as d'Uxelles. In early July the blockade was still extremely loose, mainly confined to the right bank of the Rhine. On the night of 30 June/1 July d'Asfeld even managed to send a detachment to raid Köln and acquired a good deal of booty.

Brandenburg decided to tighten things up in preparation for conducting his grand bombardment. He entertained a futile hope this would deliver Bonn into his hands without breaking his agreement with Lorraine not to conduct a formal siege. On 1 July *Generalmajor* Barfus stormed the Beuler Schanze, the mound on which the bridge redoubt sat, and which overlooked Bonn. *Generalleutnant* Schwartzent went to Bonn to summon d'Asfeld to surrender and was sent away with a flea in his ear.


The Brandenburgers began emplacing their cannon on the newly captured high ground, arranging them in a straight line with a single entrenchment in front. Brandenburg might not be the premier electorate of the Empire, but she had a first class artillery park: 34 *halbe-Karthaunen*, 14 *viertel-Karthaunen*, 14 eight-pounders, 8 six-pounders, 30 three-pounders, 46 'fire mortars', and 6 howitzers. The latter were a special design capable of firing grenade clusters, bombs, and carcasses.

On 9 July Brandenburg's main army broke camp. In the siege journal its first camp is given as Reil, and its new destination is Kothsirschen. Neither place is shown on modern maps, but they will have been within a day or two's march Bonn. It is not clear which side of the river they were on. However, future journal entries indicate at least part of the army, including the command staff, was on the left bank.

Siege of Bonn

16 September - 10 October 1689
(official dates)

from a plan commissioned by
the Elector of Brandenburg




Circuit of city bastions from Rhine
below city to Rhine above city:

- Half-bastion Rhein
- Camus
- St. Wilhelm
- Keulse Gate
- Heinrich
- Maximilian
- de la Chasse
- Ferdinand
- Stock Gate
- de Peuge

H: Hornwork

Bivouacks



The next day was spent drilling. The siege diary records droves of civilians passing through, expelled from Bonn by d'Asfeld and bemoaning their fate. There were also deserters, who warned the Germans they would have a tough fight.

11 July the Brandenburgers set up a new camp at Ober-Besslingen, about 'an hour's' journey downriver from Bonn. This village is probably Wesseling, on the left bank, 13 Km away, so a day's march for an army. Again, the camp was made in a straight line along the road, putting the cavalry advance guard only about half the distance from Bonn. The Germans patrolled far and wide and today they captured a French engineer on the road between Arlon and Bastogne.

12 July the Elector decided his grand battery on the Beuler Schanze was complete, but a couple of days more were required to stockpile enough ammunition.

On 14 July the Grand Battery opened fire under the direction of Brandenburg himself. Under him were two master artillerymen, his own and one from Münster. The cannonade shook the earth. The concussion could be felt miles away. It went on all day and into the night, and after twenty-four hours most of Bonn lay in ruins, including the citadel and numerous churches. Only the spire of the Cathedral still jutted into the sky, mocking the besiegers.

The bombardment continued all through 15 and 16 July, while the town burned. Brandenburg had brought with him special ovens and technicians to heat the shot. These ovens, invented by a Berlin engineer, were portable and heated rapidly. One was in operation on 14 July and 2 more by the next day.

According to the siege diary the besiegers rejoiced and called it 'a fine revenge'. Whether revenge upon the French or upon the good burghers of Bonn is not explained, but the sense of the text indicates the latter. Bonn belonged to Cardinal Fürstenberg. It was said that the walls of the lower town (by the river) were like Swiss cheese through which the townsfolk could be seen moving about.

The garrison endured the bombardment, avoiding most of the destruction by bivouacking along the perimeter of the defences, in the deep vaults of the bastions or in cellars. D'Asfeld got his own cannon under cover. However, deserters reported that they had lost much of the grain supply, and what was worse, the breweries were all wrecked. This upset the officers more than the men, who preferred wine.

17 July: 5 battalions of foot and some of the cavalry were shifted to a new camp in preparation for a probing attack. Brandenburg went down to the riverbank to observe the effects of the bombardment. There is also a garbled record (the text is old and blotched, and compressed in that annoying 17th Century Gothic script used by cheap German printers) about a citizen of Köln who

was caught with a letter describing conditions in Bonn. From the context it appears the authorities felt such news should be suppressed.

18 July there was a stir in the Allied camp as 500 French cavalry broke out of the town, bound for Mont Royal. Obviously d'Asfeld was reducing the number of useless mouths, but there was also speculation that he was short of water, since people, both civilians and soldiers, could be seen fetching it from the Rhine, despite the bombardment. Others argued they were just putting out fires.

On 19 and 20 July a long council of war was held at Ober-Besslingen to determine if they should start a formal siege despite the Duke of Lorraine's request. No decision was reached. Meanwhile, the bombardment continued. It was not all indiscriminate. Having levelled the town, now the gunners were trying to find the magazines.

21 July Brandenburg, Schöning, and an escort of 1,000 horse and 50 dragoons under *Generalmajor* the Prince von Holstein went on a ride to get an overview of the general situation and decide on the trace of the future Lines. His troops had already taken possession of one of the high points on the left bank, which he used for an observation post. This was probably the Kreuzberg, southwest of the town, which gave the best view of the whole valley. It was possible to see into Bonn from here. The diagram does not show the whole of the Kreuzberg, and the labelling on the original makes it look as if the name refers only to the knoll with the large building on it. However, from modern maps it is clear the Kreuzberg is the whole hill. On top was a large monastic complex. The large walled building shown on the diagram was only its Cloister, or chapel. This eventually became Brandenburg's HQ, when he was not over on the other bank of the river.

The diagram does not exactly match the topography found on modern maps. Upriver of the city two hills covered in vineyards are shown. Modern topography reduces this to only one hill, wooded today, roughly where the westernmost of the pair is drawn. In the journal, also, only one such hill is mentioned. Possibly, one of the hill's ravines has been overemphasized in the artwork.

Immediately front and right of the Cloister was the hamlet of Poppelsdorf. Streams coming down off the high ground made it a marshy spot. Between it and the city was a low ridge and then a morass. Today, Poppelsdorf boasts a fine palace, built between 1715 and 1746; at the time there was already a formal garden but only a few buildings, probably a mix of workmen's huts and guest houses.

Brandenburg and his party were coming from the west along the Heymertsen Road. They passed through the village of Enderich, just off the edge of the diagram. The action described below started on this road, then drifted

southeast toward Poppelsdorf across the lower open slopes of the Kreuzberg.

The troops that were keeping watch from the observation post, 150 horse and 50 dragoons commanded by a lieutenant from Münster, warned that there might be a sortie from the city. Civilian refugees had been exiting the place along the various roads, but so had formed bodies of cavalry. Prince Heinrich of Saxony, who was in Brandenburg's service, rode over to confer with the picquets. About the same time, 2 enemy squadrons were observed on a course that would take them near the post. It appeared also there was enemy infantry or dismounted cavalry in Poppelsdorf. Either the Germans laid a quick ambush, using the picquets and Heinrich's men, who numbered 200 horse and 50 *Leibdragoners*, or they took up an open blocking position. Either way, as they passed the observation post the French were attacked and 'obliged to retire'. The French made for Poppelsdorf — sliding to one side — rather than Bonn.

This cleared the field for the moment and some scouts were sent to examine the vineyards and the 'fountain' (or springs — probably the lake shown on the diagram just outside Bonn's defensive works).

The German cavalry were then reformed and an attempt was made to take the Poppelsdorf using dragoons and infantry. As can be seen in the diagram, the village and formal garden was surrounded by streams. These had been tended so that they formed a proper moat. The garden was surrounded by a 'high and standing hedge'. The Germans advanced into the village on horseback slowly from the west and southwest, coming under enemy fire. They responded without much affect. Although Poppelsdorf was in general terms lower than the surrounding terrain, the immediate site was on raised ground, so that at close range it was the German fire that went high, rather than the defenders'. The Germans then tried flanking the position with 2 companies, and a stiff fight developed. Their cavalry could not sustain it and rode quickly out of the village, but were replaced by the dragoons of the Leib Regiment. However, the French were also feeding more men into Poppelsdorf. There was a wild melee, with both sides trying to clear the village. Ultimately, the Germans withdrew, but the French did not pursue because of a large mass of enemy cavalry waiting on the open ground beyond.

Once the Germans reformed again, Schöning stationed a skirmish line about 150 paces from the village. The journal text is confusing, but it appears that under cover of this the German command party and its escort broke contact and headed back to Enderich. At the same time, however, the text says the French were pressed back against the city. The most likely explanation is that Schöning pinned the French with his skirmishers, threatened to envelop them with his cavalry, and they chose to withdraw to the city, at which the Germans could

withdraw unmolested. There is mention of a rearguard action, which probably refers to the French rearguard.

23 July is the next entry in the siege diary. The bombardment continued, driving the French underground. A fire was observed behind the German camp and scouts later reported the French had set fire to Poppelsdorf and plundered the monastery. This suggests the permanent camp on the left bank was close to the river, below the city.

On 25 July there was a pause in the bombardment and the French made a vigorous sortie against which the German cavalry fought for about 15 minutes before the French withdrew. Their workmen were roughly handled but the French also took casualties. After, representatives came out of the city to discuss prisoner cartels — that is, the terms under which prisoners would be exchanged. This affair, fought on the left bank of the river, indicates that Brandenburg had closed in his blockade and was preparing fighting positions, but that conditions were still fairly open. A ring of redoubts is shown in the diagram. From what the journal says, these seem to be German redoubts, not preexisting ones, built during the blockade.

[Bonn was besieged again in 1703. At that time there was only 1 detached redoubt of significance, in front of the place where the Brandenburgers breached the walls in 1689.]

26 July the bombardment recommenced, throwing up clouds of ash from the remains of the city. The besiegers assumed the French had moved all the treasure and their most important magazines into the cathedral, which was still standing.

For a change of pace, on 27 July some officers visiting the German camp fought a duel, or possibly several duels. These rowdies belonged to the Duke of Schomberg's party. Schomberg, a Huguenot and ex-French general, was at this time C-in-C of Brandenburg's army, but he was not involved in this campaign. (He was also the chief patron of the Huguenot exiles in that realm.) William of Orange had requested his services for the Irish campaign; he would be killed at the Battle of the Boyne next year. Some of his suite were required to remain in Brandenburg's service and the duelling was a variation on the straw-drawing theme. No one left behind wanted to be accused of cowardice.

28 July some French deputies crossed the Rhine to Fort Beuel to finish the cartel discussions. An agreement was reached and the documents were sent Versailles for ratification.

29 July was the day news of *général* Boufflers' advance from Mont Royal was received. As recounted earlier there was no real danger, but at the time it started a small panic. The Brandenburger cordon was spread pretty thin. 3 battalions and the cavalry were sent off to investigate. In the evening 1,000 men were dispatched. It is not clear, but this seems to be a reinforcement. In all, 7-8,000 men patrolled the western approaches to Bonn.

(As an interesting aside on the politics of the war, the Brandenburgers were, naturally, kept supplied by the countryside, which was more or less friendly. All the same, the city of Köln chose to send aid of their own accord, not so much from love of the Elector, who was a bad neighbour, or to help the Cause, which they cared little for, but because the Bonn garrison had raided them.)

This day also the minster of the cathedral was brought down. Deserters reported the destruction of all the pharmacies and painted a bleak picture of conditions inside Bonn, with the officers hoarding food, disease rampant, soldiers refusing to obey commands, and general looting. Probably a wild exaggeration by malcontents wanting to curry favour. Not until the end of the summer did d'Asfeld's men begin to feel the twin pinches of hunger and disease. Despite the blockade, they were able to roam the countryside and glean whatever lay forgotten in the fields. If the siege had been conducted in isolation, Brandenburg would have been forced to lift it, but of course, Mainz fell at last, and Lorraine marched north.

(Later in its narrative the siege journal pretends that all is well in the besiegers' camp yet is forced to mention the fact that some officers, of too high a rank to gloss over, died of an epidemic.)

In the evening the French sortied against Poppelsdorf but returned to the city when they saw the place securely guarded. (So, at some point between 23 and 29 July the Germans placed a garrison there.) Retiring, they were attacked from the vineyards by 100 men, losing 7 dead and 30 POWs.

30 July Schomberg's party obtained permission to leave for England. Meanwhile, Brandenburg tightened the blockade. Too many enemy expeditions were roving around. Schöning was given 8 battalions and some covering cavalry to make a start on entrenching. At dawn they defiled through a large vineyard belonging to Cardinal Fürstenberg and dug in only 2-300 paces from the counterscarp. The French launched two sorties against this position, supported by musket fire and artillery, to no avail. The Germans surrounded themselves with a wide trench. Although the mention of a vineyard suggests a position on the slopes upriver from Bonn, other indications suggest the entrenchment was made at Poppelsdorf. Both locations became the base for approaches against the city, so it is hard to be sure, but the latter location is more likely.

31 July: as the Elector's Trabant Guards (bodyguards) were executing a routine relief operation a three-pound ball from the city landed among them. It passed between one man and his horse, knocking both down and destroying saddle and blanket without wounding either of them, struck another guardsman in the face, smashed the carbine of a third, and went on to cause further unspecified mayhem.

The blockade now took on the aspect of a formal siege. Brandenburg's grand bombardment used up much of his ammunition without cowering the town, which was virtually empty of pesky civilians. D'Asfeld cared as much about the damage as Brandenburg — it was not his home being wrecked. So, the Germans tried a half-baked siege in an attempt to get the job over with. It only lasted a few days but it never really stopped, either, it just petered out into the usual make-work projects of an idle army.

The journal begins recording real siege work on the night of 31 July/1 August. A battery was started in the vineyard, where there was good cover from the folds in the ground and a nearby house. 'Commanded' cavalry was stationed in reserve and a communications trench was begun. Schöning directed this work personally.

[The house may have been on the site now occupied by the St. Marien Hospital. Like the Cloister on the Kreuzberg it would have given a good view of Bonn.]

1/2 August the work continued during the night. Incredibly, for such an early stage in a siege, a mine was located and 6 tons of powder extracted.

2/3 August: about 10pm there was a major French sortie involving 2,000 men against a small hill near the counterscarp. The French led with their dragoons, followed by their horse and then the foot. In the attack the horse peeled off to act as a reserve while the dragoons and infantry closed. The German post was a small one, only 30 men and a lieutenant. French grenadiers crept through the underbrush and rushed the post, overwhelming it; the officer was struck twice by musket balls. Some workers were captured. However, Markgraf Philip Wilhelm was in the vicinity, probably as Duty Officer, and led a counterattack using men drawn from neighbouring posts. German grenadiers drove out the French, who were pursued back to the city, losing 40 men and 10 of their own workmen.

During the day Schöning's cavalry returned to report on Boufflers' corps. The French seemed to be bluffing. Though acting as if they were about to break camp, their baggage was still at Trier and Boufflers only had about 1,500 cavalry. At worst he might make a raid.

The siege diary now has a gap of 11 days. This does not mark the complete termination of the 'hasty siege'. Probably, nothing happened because Brandenburg had too few men. He could only ring Bonn with a loosely connected string of posts and dig battery positions for the future.

The next entry is for 14 August. The manpower problem has been alleviated. So many men are now in the camp on the right bank of the river that a sizeable force can come over to the left bank. The Kreuzberg is made the focus of the main camp, well back from the trench lines.

On 15 August an important mortar pit in the Poppelsdorf gardens, started the night before, was finished.

Representatives from the Duke of Lorraine and Generalissimo Waldeck arrived to see Brandenburg. Both had similar messages — do not siege Bonn, send us men. Brandenburg stalled as long as he could but would eventually be compelled to return some regiments to Waldeck and give Lorraine some of the Münster troops.

16 August is the date chosen in the siege diary to describe the layout of the besiegers' positions, roughly as shown in the diagram. Brandenburg's HQ and personal quarters were at the Cloister atop the Kreuzberg, with his Grand Musketeers on the right and his Trabant Guards on the left. The line troops were arranged in a semicircle around the city. On the right bank was a small contingent to protect the batteries. The trenches were not as advanced as shown, and the Imperials' Lines upriver of the city did not exist, although their camps were occupied by Brandenburg regiments.

On 17 August there was a heavy rainfall which curtailed operations, though the odd cannonball ploughed into the Poppelsdorf Gardens. Here, the Germans erected a redoubt in the space of about 3 hours.

18 August the existing works were improved and the mortar pit given its full quota of 7 large tubes. Actual trench work — the digging of saps and parallels, and the erecting of protective redoubts — resumed.

19 August the Poppelsdorf mortar battery was unmasked. Its fires were supported from the other side of the river. Trenches were advanced and by evening a new battery had been laid out overlooking the road leading from Poppelsdorf to the city which skirted the morass.

20 August: digging was slowed by the hardness of the ground, so that the work had to continue in daylight under a heavy French bombardment. Some reinforcements arrived from Köln.

On 21 August the second battery was erected. Teams of men fabricated fascines, hurdles, and sandbags. More reinforcements arrived from Köln. The number of French deserters was increasing. They spread the word about massive shortages of meat and beer; the garrison was down to bread and water.

From 22 through 24 August the besiegers brought up more guns on either side of the river, while continuing the bombardment. Compared to what had gone before, this must have been more harassment than anything else.

25 August troops from Neuburg arrived. These would have been *kreistruppen* from the region east of Bonn. This night also d'Asfeld celebrated the Feast of St. Ludovic (St. Louis) with a cannonade against the Münster troops, who had not yet left for Mainz. About 30 deserters left the city but gave mixed reports. Some said everyone was starving and others said that there was plenty to go around (and not just toasted rat).

[The siege diary says this took place on Sunday 28 August, but the feast day is always 25 August. It is possible the celebrations were delayed until the Sunday. Bouffler's taking of Cochem may also have been timed as a bit of good news for King Louis.]

26 August: great frustration in the camp. The princes of the Lower Saxon Circle were under contract to help the Dutch and detached 3,000 men of their own accord. These are usually called 'Dutch' troops, because they were in Dutch pay; 5 battalions of real Dutch remained, or were sent as a replacement, and they participated in the final assault.

On top of this, 3 express riders came from Trier. Boufflers had just taken Cochem and sacked it. Brandenburg had to send off Schöning with all his cavalry to see if he could be engaged in a battle — another 8-10,000 men gone. Things reverted to a very thin blockade. And yet, work never entirely ceased. Officially there had never been a siege; unofficially, Brandenburg wanted to take Bonn without any help from the Emperor's flunkies.

27 August Schöning broke camp this night and rode away.

28 August the circumvallation work continued, along with the construction of redoubts. If they could not prosecute the siege, they could at least protect themselves.

On 29 August the Dutch major general Flodoff joined Schöning with 7 Dutch cavalry regiments. These would have been troops covering Jülich and the approaches to Maastricht and were not supposed to be a permanent loan.

According to the siege journal nothing of any note occurred on 30 and 31 August.

On the night of 1/2 September there was some activity. To begin with, very early on 1 September Brandenburg made a 7 hour journey to a castle to meet with the Elector of Trier. The latter had come from Koblenz. They talked for 4 hours and Brandenburg arrived back about 11pm. About 1am on 2 September the French sortied with about 2,500 men. 250 of them attacked a redoubt in the Münster sector, by the river below the city, and drove its garrison out. Counterattacked, they were driven out in turn. Three more assaults were made, the whole sortie lasting about 3 hours. The German attack was commanded by General Barfus. The attackers lost a captain and some soldiers and workmen; the French lost 100-150 men, many during their return to the town when they were forced to run a gauntlet of German musketry.

2 September: the French did not fire their cannon today. The besiegers captured a spy caught tossing a blue bag into a vineyard. The bag was found to contain two letters, one from War Minister Louvois and one from *général* de Montal, commandant of Mont Royal. Later the same day some dragoons brought in another spy with more letters (probably copies of the others). He almost made it into the city.

On 3 September that a request for 6,000 men came from Lorraine. Brandenburg claimed he had none to spare. Lorraine had received word that *maréchal* Humières was marching with a corps from Flanders to receive Mainz. Ultimately, Brandenburg would send the men, though the siege diary does not give the day; they were the bulk of the Münster contingent.

On the night of 4/5 September a letter came from Schöning saying he had located Boufflers at Mont Royal.

6 September: the siege diary reports there is nothing to report.

7 September Brandenburg received an express from Waldeck explaining that the reason Lorraine requested 6,000 men was because *maréchal* Humières, commander of the French forces on the Northeast Frontier, had dispatched 6,000 men of his own toward Mainz. (This was one reason Lorraine pushed the siege regardless of casualties, but of course the French never got anywhere near Mainz.)

8 September the bulk of the cavalry, including the 7 Dutch regiments, remained up the Moselle, but the Foot returned to camp. Circumvallation work continued; the French were very quiet. Brandenburg was supposed to visit Cleves in regard to a civil matter — receiving homage or some other tiresome ceremony — but decided not to go.

9 September an express arrived from Mainz. The city had fallen! Barfus would return with his 6,000 immediately and Lorraine would follow in a few days.

One item of news the siege journal completely omits is the famous duel which took place on 9 September between *Generalmajor* Barfus and his superior, *Generalleutnant* Schöning. Most sources give the date as 30 August, but this is another case of OS/NS dates; the 9th will be cited here so that the chronology is preserved.

Schöning was apparently more arrogant, haughty (and greedy) than was typical for a man of his class and station, and considered his subordinates to be *untermenschen*. There was already friction between the two but Schöning had some particular beef with his junior, possibly relating to the attack of 1 September, possibly due to jealousy over Barfus receiving independent command of the 6,000 men sent to Mainz, or possibly because the men had gone off without Barfus, had accomplished nothing, and were now on their way back. This last is the sort of technicality that would get up a martinet's nose.

The troops were dispatched 'soon after' 3 September — Waldeck's express hints not until 7 September — but as of 9 September Barfus had not joined them. This was not unusual practice for general officers, but perhaps Schöning chose to interpret it as dereliction of duty, or even cowardice. The duel took place right after Barfus took his leave of Schöning to ride off and join his corps.

The two men were about 100 paces outside the camp. Barfus was just turning to mount, after having said goodbye to a third officer, when his superior, who had already verbally abused him, challenged him to swordplay. Barfus refused to draw his sword — he says 'ten times' — upon which Schöning struck at his sheathed sword contemptuously and violently with his stick. At this, the two began poking at each other with their sticks until the bystanders separated them.

Since the fight had taken place about 100 paces outside the camp, Schöning probably thought he could get away with it, since duelling had been forbidden *inside* the camp. But, both men were arrested and deprived of their commands, temporarily. Ultimately, an investigation found Schöning to bear most of the blame and he was dismissed from Brandenburg's service. Barfus went on to hold an important command in Brabant the following year, and then led the Brandenburg contingent in Hungary, fighting at Slankamen in 1691. He became a field marshal and even briefly served as prime minister. Schöning will appear again, as a Saxon field marshal.

On 10 September a victory salvo was ordered for the taking of Mainz. About 8 or 9pm a rocket case was fired on the Kreuzberg and the guns ringing Bonn opened fire simultaneously, accompanied by a musket volley.

11 September a *Te Deum Laudamus* and day of thanksgiving was ordered for Mainz. A trumpeter was sent to Bonn with the news, plus a demand that Bonn be handed over. D'Asfeld's reply was to the effect that the Sun King's governors were not in the habit of yielding fortifications and if Brandenburg wanted Bonn, he could come and take it. But, he did agree to talks. The *marquis* de Castro was sent out a number of times to meet with *generalmajor* Schomberg and *Graf* Dohna of the Grand Musketeers (both of whom had been left behind by Marshal Schomberg). They agreed to give Castro a decision on the morrow. But, the French also held side talks with the Dutch, unofficially. This led to the main negotiations being broken off and the French in the Dutch camp being taken prisoner.

Separately, deserters from Bonn were reporting the flour mills had all been ruined so that corn was being ground by hand. The bread ration had been reduced to 3 pounds over 4 days. Men were eating old horses, unsalted, drinking only water, and disease was rampant. The death toll was rising daily.

Meanwhile, the Duke of Lorraine was wrapping up affairs at Mainz. As noted earlier, his army was broken up, the Saxons claiming they had done enough. The absent General of Artillery *Graf* Souches was made Governor of Mainz, with *Graf* Thüngen as interim commander. Mainz was strongly garrisoned and the men put to work building it up as a base of operations for the following year. Lorraine then began marching on Bonn with his own corps.

12 September saw the completion of a communication trench to the main battery. *Generaal Liutnant* Delwig, commanding the Dutch contingent, brought his HQ about half an hour closer to Bonn. This may have brought it within range of the city's guns because several of his own regiment were injured by a ball from a falconet, one being struck on the chin, another having the glove ripped off his hand, and two more losing their legs.

On 13 September d'Asfeld gave his formal reply to the besiegers' demand for surrender, the one intended for publication. It was courteous but negative. He claimed he had no authority to surrender. Besides, he believed he could hold out. A party of 20 French was observed outside the walls digging for roots.

14 September d'Asfeld sent 2 donkeys to Schomberg and Dohna laden with either eggs or ice (the text of the diary is blotched). In either case the message was clear, and they were not particularly amused.

15 September was the day preparations were made for the first assault, but Brandenburg canceled the order after receiving word that Lorraine was on his way with 10,000 men. More is better.

16 September was the first 'night attack' against Bonn, which is why this date is sometimes given as the start of the siege. It was not an assault, merely the start of making formal approaches against the city. The Brandenburgers gained 100 paces on a line heading straight up the road from Poppelsdorf, while the Dutch and Münster troops gained 150 paces starting from their own redoubt. Feldmarschall Dünwald arrived to mark out the Imperial camp.

17 September the Brandenburgers gained another 250 paces, the inundation (as the morass to the south of the city was called) coming up on their right. The Allied troops mainly consolidated but did gain another 100 paces.

18 September was a Sunday, with an early morning sermon followed by a *Te Deum* for an Imperial victory over the Turks. Bonn was given a triple discharge of cannon and mortars. Brandenburg spent the day attending the wedding of a Spanish princess at Sieberg.

[This victory was the Battle of Nish. Louis of Baden (who was to command the Imperial army on the Rhine during the second half of the war) was said to have slain 86,000 Turks in this campaign. Hyperbole is permitted when talking of Eastern armies. Serbia was conquered by the Imperials. However, a year later the Turks retook Nish. Any given history book will say Turkenlouis' victory was on either 23 or 24 September. But, the Te Deum recorded here as well as a letter in the Stuart Papers collection indicate the battle had to have been fought before 18 September. The letter in question is dated 6/16 OS/NS. Ignoring the fact that historians are lazy and copy each other, two factors are at play here. First, the subsequent Turkish victory at Nish took place on 23 September and the year of that victory is sometimes erroneously given as 1689 instead of 1690. Second, there is the old OS/NS dating issue. This author is satisfied that the date of the Te Deum was a Sunday. The Sundays in

September 1689 were on the 4th, 11th, 18th, and 25th. Since the time difference for OS/NS is 10 days that means 8/18 September, depending on whether OS or NS is used. The other Sundays are out of the question due to the sequence of events in the journal. The letter is dated 6/16 September, close to the 8/18 date. This means the battle had to be at least a day earlier than 6/16. This author suspects 4/14 September. To derive 24 September one would then take the 14 September date and add 10 to it — in other words, erroneously apply the 10 day adjustment twice so that 4/14 becomes 4/24. Now, the Te Deum might have been on the following Sunday, which was 25 September, but if that were the case the siege of Bonn would have ended on 20 October, which raises the same problem all over again, since everyone agrees it ended on 30 September OS and 10 October NS.]

19 September a communication trench was started to connect both approaches. (It should be noted that not all these works appear on the diagram, which only shows the most significant features.)

Unlike Lorraine, Brandenburg was prepared to take risks. On 21 September a quick attack by some grenadiers netted 100 prisoners, many of them wounded, and secured a spot on the glacis, where a redoubt was quickly built.

22 September the French targeted the new batteries, having spotted the construction of a 13-tube mortar pit. There were several minor sallies and the French tried something novel. The wind picked up and blew against the Germans, so the defenders started firing 'steam balls', stinkpots, grenade bundles, and other 'noisome' objects. The Germans persisted, working in the smoke, which they used to conceal their efforts. 8 *halbe-Karthaunen* arrived from Köln.

23 September was a quiet day. Word was received that the Imperials would soon arrive.

On 24 September the Imperials did indeed arrive. The siege journal names Hanoverians, Hessians, Saxons (Franconian mercenary regiments), and 'some' Imperials. Lorraine, Commercy, and other high Imperial officers were present. The corps was supported by 16 ships on the river. They were allocated the 'old cavalry camp' above Bonn. There is a vague reference to their being greeted by a French sortie, which is likely enough, for Lorraine and his staff visited Brandenburg on the Kreuzberg. That night he toured the approaches and came under a heavy cannonade, almost as if the French knew he was there...

25 September: a formal luncheon for the Duke and his staff. The day was spent erecting batteries.

26 September the Imperial cavalry arrived in camp on the right bank of the Rhine; the Foot appears to have camped on the left bank, as would be natural. This day's entry in the journal states that *Generalmajor* Hollstein died of the fever; the camp was rife with it.

On 27 September the Imperials set up a camp on the right bank of the river. The troops remaining on the left bank prepared to tackle the hornwork on front of them (as shown on the diagram). The numbers involved were low and 500 Brandenburgers were sent over each night to assist the work. The French appeared unusually active. 6 men were wounded; the siege journal implies they were French so perhaps there was a sally, or more than one. The Imperial cavalry was augmented to 4,000 men by the arrival of some Hessians and Franconians.

28 September the Imperials gained 150 paces at a cost of 100 casualties. They began erecting a 12-piece battery. On the other side of the city the Dutch and Münster troops were erecting a 13-piece battery each.

29 September the Brandenburgers advanced 100 paces, as did the Allies, who forced the French out of some forward posts and gained a lodgement at a cost of 17 casualties. Their batteries and the new Brandenburg battery fired on the city, 34 cannon in all. The French response was feeble. They fired twice and stopped. It was assumed most of their guns had been dismantled. Another Brandenburg battery of 10 guns was also completed.

30 September: at a cost of 50 casualties the Allies enlarged their lodgement.

On 1 October 4 cannon were ready at the newest Brandenburg battery. The Imperials began extending their trench along the length of the hornwork. A Dutch engineer was killed by a musket ball. It was seen that the French had pulled back everywhere to the counterscarp. They were now under a heavy mortar bombardment.

2 October the Allies made a quick assault, securing a position within 50 paces of the counterscarp on their left, at a cost of 2 dead and 2 wounded. The French counterattacked fiercely in an attempt to ruin the forward trenches. On the far side of the city the Imperials extended their trenches along the face of the hornwork.

3 October the Imperials connected their system to the Brandenburgers; the latter made improvements to their existing positions. The Imperial communication trench does not show on the diagram.

4 October: this was the Duke of Hanover's day to be in charge of the works. The Brandenburgers added 10 more cannon to their latest battery. The siege journal now reveals this was at the foot of the glacis, about 45 paces from the counterscarp, which means these were not new pieces but that guns were being shifted to a new position, preparatory to creating a breach. Deserters reported that the counterscarp and hornwork were heavily mined at all points, but especially in front of the saps.

A French drummer appeared on the battlements and began to play. Thinking this was for a parley, the Germans signalled for him to advance, but he only started playing again, until someone shot him. Then a trumpeter

appeared. They shot at him and he ran away. No one could make out what the French intentions were (and there is no information from the French side to explain it).

5 October six new saps were advanced around the city and the Brandenburgers erected a new 10-piece battery on their right. The Landgrave of Hesse arrived in camp. *Feldzugmeister* von Spaen, one of Brandenburg's generals, received word that his wife had died of the fever at Köln and was given permission to go there.

By 6 October the various besieging contingents were all on the glacis. The Imperials unmasked a 10-piece battery against the hornwork.

7 October saw preparations for the general assault and the collection of materials such as wool sacks for sandbags and devices for breaking down the palisades.

8 October the Brandenburgers and the Allies drove their saps up the glacis at a cost of 40 casualties; the Imperials stood pat, but opened a second battery against the hornwork. One of their mortar bombs did great execution within it. Their sappers worked feverishly to extend the lines as far as possible, hoping to isolate the hornwork. As can be seen in the diagram, it was a detached edifice, separated from the city by the wet ditch.

9 October: at a council of war it was decided additional digging would be a waste of time. Von Spaen was back on duty as Officer of the Day. Under his direction a massive stockpile of hurdles, sandbags, and the like, was made behind the main battery. Bridges over streams and ditches were repaired. The troops were issued a ration of wine, brandy, and beer (according to their regional tastes). The Catholics were then shriven by the priests. Brandenburg and his staff went to the Poppelsdorf Gardens.

At 5pm 3 *halbe-Karthaunen* fired the signal and the men left the trenches. Only the Brandenburg sector is described in detail by the siege journal. There were six waves in all. At each of three points of attack 3 lieutenants, 3 sergeants, and 3 corporals led a body of 60 grenadiers up the glacis and into the counterscarp. The second wave consisted of 3 captains and 180 grenadiers. The third wave consisted almost entirely of Huguenot exiles in Brandenburg's service: the French Company of Grenadiers under Major du Puis, supported by 14 French senior officers spread out as controllers, followed by 3 companies of French Cadets and 20 grenadiers. The fourth wave had on the right Lieutenant Colonel Dohna and 80 men of the Grand Musketeers, probably dismantled, and on the left 20 spare officers leading another 80 men of the Grand Musketeers. The fifth wave was led by Colonel Schöning of the Guard, with 600 musketeers and what appears to be (the text is blurred) 9 pieces of equipment, probably light artillery, though they might be portable bridges; the men were grouped left, center, and right in bands of 200. They were supported by *Graf* Dohna and 500 workmen, with another 6 of those

'pieces'. The last wave consisted of 900 workmen and a number of engineers, bearing fascines, under command of the Chief Engineer, *Generalleutnant* du Puis. The engineer officers were given the job of breaking down the barricades.

The first wave reached the palisades under heavy fire, the Allies doing so first. The French fired a volley at pointblank rank but the Germans kept advancing. Close-quarter fighting broke out all along the line and raged for a long time. Eventually the Germans broke down the palisades or managed to clamber over them, at which the French ran back along the ravelins into the city, abandoning the counterscarp.

The Brandenburgers occupied the covered way, plus the works between the bastions of St. Maximillian and De La Chane. These consisted of a ravelin and 2 *tenailles*, plus minor posts. Many French were slaughtered in the retreat. The impetus of the assault was so great that the Germans reached the Wall itself and began to pile up at the bottom, milling around. A lieutenant colonel named Courneau (Corneaud?) wanted to take 200 men up but this was vetoed due to the general confusion. The French recovered themselves and lined the bastions, pouring musket fire into the Brandenburgers below. The Germans endured continuous salvos but would not give up their gains, flattening themselves on the wall or hunkering down behind the captured strongpoints.

In the Allied and Imperial sectors the assault followed a similar routine but was not as successful. A ravelin was taken and the counterscarp cleared fairly quickly, making for a ranged firefight. The French sprung their mine too soon in the Imperial sector and the Germans reached the hornwork and part of the counterscarp. Here the French counterattacked but were driven back. Fighting continued within the hornwork as the men endured an 'apocalyptic fire' from 5-7pm. The French officers among the prisoners stated they had never experienced anything like it and praised their attackers' bravery.

(Both the French and Germans must have sprung mines all over the place, but only that one is described.)

At 4am on 10 October Brandenburg, still at the Poppelsdorf Gardens, gave orders to renew the assault. This will have been for his own men, as the other contingents were not directly under his orders — Lorraine outranked him as the Emperor's stand-in but tactfully did not assumed full control. This meant the three groups fought their own battles.

If the siege journal is correct there was as yet no formal breach. It was decided to blast one at 7am. For this purpose new batteries were being erected and new mines dug. However, d'Asfeld beat the chamade. The journal does not explain why, but other sources explain that the reason was because a breach had indeed been created,



smaller than the textbooks required, but still wide enough for 20 men to walk abreast.

The journal now leaves some information out for political reasons. There is simply a statement that Brandenburg sent off a dispatch describing the situation and giving the glory of the day to God, and another saying he ordered his positions reinforced with 1,000 more men, drawn from all the battalions.

According to the journal, negotiations with the garrison commenced but preparations for a renewed assault continued. D'Asfeld's initial terms to Brandenburg were 'impertinent' and rejected after consultation with the Allies and the Imperials. The counter offer was Surrender at Discretion (essentially unconditional surrender). If the French wanted a deal they should have quit long ago. A second round of talks was held in the evening after an exchange of hostages. These terms were also initially rejected, but the besiegers changed their mind.

What the siege journal does *not* mention is the solo assault made by Brandenburg and his own men, which failed dismally at a cost of over 2,000 men. This persuaded him to soften his demands. Lorraine had wanted to grant d'Asfeld terms similar to those he gave d'Uxelles, in recognition of his stout defence, but the Elector, exasperated by this repetition of leniency for men who had given him such a hard time and forced him to share the glory with Lorraine, absolutely rejected the idea. To break the impasse, Lorraine told Brandenburg he could make an assault, but only using his own troops. The Elector led the attack himself and fought bravely, but got nowhere. D'Asfeld was severely wounded in the leg during this assault.

The final accord was dated 15 October. The garrison was to receive honours of war: marching out with drums beating and flags unfurled, with bullets in their mouths (but no mention of being armed or having lighted matches), and with all their baggage. All guns and ammunition were to remain in place. They would be convoyed by *Graf* Schilppenbach, a Dutch officer, to Thionville. This was a march of about 170 Km, intended to take them out of the fight until next year. The wounded would be shipped by boat to Mont Royal. 3,000 men and women remained from the original garrison (some sources say only 8-900 men). Witnesses said they were more like ragged walking skeletons. They had been living on rat meat for some time. 120 horses managed to avoid being eaten. The administrative Intendant had to remain as hostage against a huge indemnity of gold and silver.

D'Asfeld was allowed to go to Aachen for a cure, receiving compliments and words of sympathy from the Duke of Lorraine, but died there soon after. On the Coalition side the dead included major generals Heiden, Belling, and the Dutchman, Delwig; *Generalleutnant* Schwarz, of the Münster contingent, was wounded.

End of the Campaign

Unlike Mainz, Bonn had been the focus of a serious relief effort by *maréchal* de Lorges, but he ran out of time. News of the capitulation greeted him on his arrival at Mont Royal. To guard against any end-of-season play, he formed a corps of 20 battalions and 60 squadrons, roughly half from Flanders and half from the Saar, with subordinate generals Tessé and Tallard. He was allowed to draw on Mont Royal and a few other places if needed.

Maréchal de Lorges was Duras' replacement. So, King Louis was not *that* phlegmatic about the loss of Mainz. But Lorges was Duras' brother; the family was not in disgrace. His replacement may have been intended to sooth ruffled feathers.

While the French relief force was still assembling, the Germans went into winter quarters. Lorraine distributed his men in a cordon along the frontiers. Reserves were allocated as follows. At Heidelberg, 3,000 men. At Heilbronn, 1,000 cavalry. At Heppinghen, 1,500 foot and 1,500 horse. At Veheingen, 1,000 foot and 300 horse. At Pforzheim, 300 foot and 1,000 horse. At Beltingheim, 1,000 foot and 500 horse. The remaining cavalry was distributed thus: Rottweil 200, Velingheim 500, Soposem 500, Hohlemgrabem 500, Alshat 2,500, Kingsgertal 500, Zell 600.

Upon word of Bonn's surrender, the French made similar deployments to cover the Rhine on their side, with reserves deployed in Alsace and Lorraine. A large concentration was placed at Neustadt, which was being developed as major base of operations.

On balance, things had worked out reasonably well for the French. Though the Electorate of Cologne was lost, they still held the left bank of the Upper Rhine, and the Germans had wasted an entire season at Bonn and Mainz without it costing the French that many men.

In December, King Louis ordered the raising of many new regiments, including 6 of dragoons, which were proving a very useful hybrid unit. Cavalry regiments had their complements raised from 35 men per company to 40 (which is a bit unusual; normally, wars force regiments to be cut down in size and split up). More naval officers were also appointed.

For the coming year, *maréchal* de Lorges commanded on the Rhine. His subordinates were *baron* de Montclar and *marquis* de Sourdis as *lieutenans généraux*, the *comte* de Tallard as *maréchal de camp*, and brigadiers de Pinsonnelles, Lanion, Vertilly, Harleu, and La Fare. Mont Royal was governed by de Melac, whom Boufflers had installed, and Vertillac as his brigadier. The Saar sector was commanded by M. d'Husson and M. Romainville. M. de Varenne commanded in Franche-Comté, and M. de S. Fremont in Champagne. There is significance in this list, it is not just a roster of forgettable names. These men, and others on the remaining fronts, were to be permanently

stationed on the frontiers, which was a new policy. General officers were also assigned to the interior districts to monitor subversive activity. The Coalition made much use of Huguenots, sending volunteers from the exile communities across the frontier to make mischief.

[Louis also promoted 65 of his leading officers to be Knights and 4 more to be Commanders of the various French Orders, as a bump to their loyalty.]

Guy Aldonce de Durfort de Lorges

Born 1630, died 1702. Guy Aldonce II de Durfort de Lorges, *duc de Quintin-Lorges* (1691+) bore the same name as his father; his mother was a sister of *maréchal Turenne*. He was also the father-in-law of the *duc de Saint-Simon*, the aristocrat chronicler of Louis XIV's Court (*Saint-Simon also served as a soldier in this war*). Lorges was the younger brother of *maréchal Duras*, who was five years his senior but outlived him by two years. Like his brother he served under Turenne, and in the action where Turenne was killed, Lorges and the *marquis de Vaubrun* commanded the retreat; when Vaubrun was killed in a subsequent battle, command devolved on Lorges until the Great Condé took over.

Replacing his brother in 1690, he commanded the Rhine Army until 1695, when a fever contracted while on campaign forced him to relinquish command. It is also said his wife forbade him to take the field! She, incidentally, was of a lower social status, but the marriage was an unusually happy one. Saint-Simon said he was both good-natured and the 'most truthful man alive'.

From 1693 to 1695 he commanded against the great *Türkenlouis*, hero of Vienna, the result being a stalemate (except that the French lived off the Germans and not vice versa).

[Opposite: *Maréchal de Lorges*, by Merry-Joseph Blondel, painted two generations after his death.]

1690 – Equilibrium

"In the field... horses must be fed as occasion offers: it is better to feed them often with small quantities at a time, as their stomachs are very small; work on an empty or very full stomach is bad for them. Bran is excellent as a change, and when possible a mash may advantageously be given twice a week, instead of corn at evening stables. Green food, especially in summer and for young animals, is very good when they are not working hard..."

Quoted from Marshal Wolseley's Soldier's Pocket Book for Field Service (1869), in War for the Every Day, by Lund, Erik A., Greenwood Press, London, 1999.

Grand Strategy

Grand strategy on the Rhine once again remained defensive in outlook. The French, stymied here and facing the opening of a fourth front in Italy at the end of May, decided to push hard against the Dutch while William of Orange was still bogged down in Ireland. They



had no firm longterm goals. King Louis and his cabinet were still trying to come to grips with the failure of his 'blitzkrieg' and spent most of 1690 reacting to events. This was particularly true in Italy, where the French tried vainly to bully Savoy into joining them, but would also be the case in the Low Countries.

Given that this was supposed to be a short war, peace feelers had already been put out by the French, and responded to by the Alliance, but they did not bring an end to hostilities. Instead, all the players began hardening their political agendas. Both sides sought to avoid damaging their war machines but both needed to acquire bargaining chips. The Low Countries were the best place to pick these up, not Germany. In Germany, the concern for France was to protect Alsace, and for the Germans, to avoid being incommoded by French raids. A tit-for-tat war of words also passed between Louis and the Emperor, each claiming the other had started the war; the Sun King invited neutral plenipotentiaries to investigate his Perfectly Legal Rights which the Emperor had Unlawfully Infringed.

William of Orange, the driving force of the Alliance, shared some of his war aims for public consumption. These were a return to the status quo of the Treaty of Nijmegen of 1678 and recognition for himself as King of England, Scotland, and Ireland. Eventually, France would be content to accept peace on the basis of 1678, but for now they insisted on the settlement of 1684, which primarily sought guarantees against Imperial 'aggression' (i.e., reclaiming the frontier territories the French had managed to grab before 1684). But, acknowledging William as King would be harder to agree to, given France's unwavering support for James II.

Over the winter William opened a 'standing conference' at The Hague, to which Holland, England, Spain, and the Empire could send permanent representatives. Such a committee might have been a useful counter to France's ceaseless diplomatic offensive, but William actually intended it as a strategic planning committee.

That was also a good idea, but due to a number of factors, such as the delegates' lack of military training and the fact that the Imperial envoy was a mere mouthpiece for Vienna, the Hague Conference never did much strategic planning. As it was William's brainchild, so it only functioned properly when he was in town. For the remainder of the year the commanders worked out bilateral deals in the field. The Conference did serve to iron out some problems before they became serious, and it was better than not having a committee. In the end, most of the serious political and strategic coordination that took place during the war, particularly in Germany and Italy, was done by a rival Congress of Vienna, established by the Emperor. Established, one suspects, to counter William's royal pretensions. The Congress declared that the French should be rooted out of Germany and anyone caught aiding them, of whatever rank, should be considered a traitor.

The Conference bore some fruit. By mid March of 1690, the Spanish, Dutch, and Brandenburgers had agreed to fully cooperate. Well... at least they were trying. In Flanders, the plan of campaign called for the Spanish to strike at and penetrate the Lines of the Scheldt, while the Elector of Brandenburg agreed to march from his cantonments in Cleve, Jülich, and Cologne, into that section of Luxembourg known as the German Quarter, the western end of the Eifel between the Meuse and Moselle. That ought to draw off some French troops.

Whether this was to be a diversion for the Dutch or whether the Dutch effort was to be a diversion for this advance, which would use the Moselle as its primary route, was never settled, and became a bone of contention — but that is a minor factor. The offensive was supposed to be carried out by the army of the Middle Rhine, consisting of troops from Münster, Jülich, and Brandenburg. However, the Brandenburgers did not take the field until July. Münster and Jülich, both very minor powers, saw no reason to do all the heavy lifting and the

offensive never got very far. It is not clear how many troops Jülich even had. The idea was reactivated a number of times during the year with equal effect.

This putative Moselle offensive affected both sides. King Louis worried overmuch about it, and hamstrung his forces in the Spanish Netherlands with restrictive orders, while the Dutch and German commanders each took offence at the lack of support their ally was giving.

On the Upper Rhine, two German armies formed, one above the Neckar under the Duke of Lorraine, and after his death, the Elector of Bavaria, and the other on the below the Neckar under General Dünnewald. Primary goals were to clear the French from the Rhineland and prevent deep enemy raiding; later in the season they would attempt to cross the Rhine, partly to ease the pressure on the Allied armies in the Low Countries, where things by that point were going badly.

The Wider War

The high point of the fighting in the Low Countries was the Battle of Fleurus on 1 July, a double envelopment by *maréchal* Luxembourg which destroyed Waldeck's offensive capabilities for the whole year, though it was not decisive enough to force a permanent conclusion. Both sides spent the rest of the season manoeuvring against each other and extending their field fortifications, which were already beginning to resemble the trench systems of the Great War — ultimately, the French would establish a continuous belt of fortifications from the sea to the Meuse.

The Flanders campaign progressed badly for the Allies. The Brandenburgers lack of effort has already been mentioned. They abandoned the grand plan a mere ten days after agreeing to it. The Elector suggested what Waldeck needed to do was have three armies: two under the Elector's command and the other on the Meuse to protect the Elector's rear. Worse, Waldeck was now facing France's greatest marshal, the *duc* de Luxembourg, who swiftly took the initiative and ran rings around him all summer. Supporting Luxembourg was *lieutenant général* Boufflers, commanding a significant 'flying camp' of 7,000 men between the Sambre and Meuse, keeping the communications open between the armies in Flanders and the Rhineland. His instructions were to support *maréchal* Luxembourg, but also to remain ready to repel German troops penetrating France by the valley of the Moselle. Therefore, he sometimes shifted his center of gravity eastward. A strong post was retained at Mont Royal, from whence annoying cavalry raids continued to be dispatched.

All the same, many of the troops mustered in northwest Germany marched off to aid Waldeck (the Dutch paid well) leaving the Elector of Brandenburg with an army too small to assist the Imperial forces operating farther up the Rhine. Late in the campaign the Brandenburgers would decide to go to help Waldeck — when it was too late.

[Mitigating his 'selfish' acts it should be noted that Brandenburg pawned his private domains to raise money to help the princes of the Upper Rhine.]

In Italy, *général* Catinat was very active, holding a central position with his main army while raiding with his cavalry. But he also had to deal with an insurrection by the Vaudois, tough Protestant mountaineers who lived very near the key French fortress of Pinerolo. Catinat's vigorous manoeuvring would eventually lure his enemy, the young Duke Victor Amadeus of Savoy, into losing a battle at Staffarda, giving the French a free hand for the rest of the season. This allowed them to establish an additional staging post on the East side of the Alps at Susa, but ultimately Catinat lacked the manpower to winter on the plains of Piedmont. As would be the case every year, he had to pull back over the Maritime Alps before snowfall cut the passes.

In Catalonia, *général* Noailles fought a defensive war against the local viceroy, Villahermosa. Neither side had enough manpower to do more than besiege border fortlets and conduct minor raids.

At sea, the French scored points. Needing to open the sea lanes to send aid to the Jacobite forces in Ireland — including an expeditionary brigade — they not only managed to land the brigade without being intercepted, but defeated a combined Anglo-Dutch fleet off Beachy Head on July 9. Strategically, though, the battle was of little use. The French sank few ships and failed to take advantage of their dominance in the Channel. They burnt the seaside village of Teignmouth, for no particular reason. A month later the Allies were once again in command of the seas around France. As Childs' puts it (p. 133) 'The armies and navies of the later seventeenth century were relatively blunt weapons.'

On the Rhine

Unfortunately there are no readily available German sources to counterbalance Quincy for the years 1690 through 1692. Brandenburg, having accomplished his personal goals, barely participated, or was serving in Brabant. Duke Max was made the Imperial generalissimo after the death of Lorraine in April of this year, and the next year it was Saxony's turn (and he also died). Neither commander's administrators kept good records. Since the campaigns were strictly routine, there was nothing to write home about and the Bavarians were notoriously lax about keeping accounts anyway. Duke Max preferred organising hunting parties. The *Geschichte de Sächsischen Armee* has a few paragraphs covering the Saxon side.

Foiled in his attempt to secure Cologne as a vassal state, King Louis ordered the electorate placed under *contribution* during the winter. Other states in the Rhineland also had visitations by French raiders — yes, even though the French had been 'driven out', no one could stop their cavalry coursing at will in the lands along

both banks of the Rhine. Most German forces wintered well east of the river. Upward of 50 villages were milked and burned.

As part of this program, in March, M. de Melac, currently Governor of Mont Royal, led a coursing to Andernach, a day's march down the left bank of the Rhine from Koblenz. His column was not large, only 600 horse and 400 foot. Andernach was told to raze its own walls; instead, the town summoned reinforcements from beyond the Rhine.

Melac led another 1,000-man raid in May, advancing as far as the high ground immediately outside Mainz's walls without being challenged. Passing by the small town of Algsheim (8 Km east of Bingen on the right bank of the Rhine), his troops were fired upon and he resolved to storm the place. Algsheim was well fortified for its size, with 5 towers and a double ditch. Melac ordered the surrounding villages to supply scaling ladders, and, dismounting his cavalry, had them wade the first ditch and cross the second before climbing the walls. The town's defence was stout at first, but the French broke in, suffering about 30 killed but killing 100 of the defenders, and came away with much booty.


The Grand Dauphin, now 29 years old, was given charge of the Rhine theatre for the second time. The actual commander was *Maréchal* de Lorges, brother of Duras, who had retired at the end of the year. The primary concentration of French troops, consisting at the start of 36 battalions and 97 squadrons (18 of dragoons), formed in late May not far from Mainz, probably at Landau. Melac appears to have joined it with a column from Mont Royal. This army roughly matched the one in Flanders for size.

The French kept no sort of mobile army in the Palatinate, only garrisons. Farther upriver the French likewise kept garrisons guarding the crossing points, and relied heavily on local militia who could be summoned in the event of any serious threat.

The Dauphin left Versailles in mid-May, stopping at Nancy on 22 May, Strasbourg 24 May, and Haguenau 30 May. He spent a couple of days at each place inspecting fortifications. On 31 May he checked out the newly completed Fort-Louis before stopping at Wissembourg. On 1 June he was at Landau. On 2 June he made a day trip to Philippsburg before returning to Landau. The Dauphin needed to assure himself Alsace was safe. He had plenty of time; the Germans would be late to the field as usual.

By the time the Dauphin arrived at Landau, Lorges and his army had apparently already taken the field and were some distance away. A few days after his return to the town after his tour of inspection, the Dauphin met one of Lorges' couriers at a village called Vintebnick. Quincy's text seems to indicate this was a chance meeting; possibly he was out hunting. Lorges and his army had been at Hoderheim (16 Km from Mainz). In a minor action

Upper Rhine Theatre of War 1690



1. March-May: (off map) Melac makes cavalry raids out of Mont Royal, from Andernach to Mainz
2. Late May: Dauphin concentrates at Landau; posts along Rhine
3. Late May: Dünwald covers between Main & Neckar & at Mainz; Duke Max covers south of Neckar; Souches opposite Huningue; militia hold Black Forest
4. June-Oct: French movements
5. June Oct: German movements (off map to Mainz & back)
6. Early September: the armies face off - no battle

near there the Barbesieres Dragoons had taken Bechtolsheim Castle (23 Km SSW of Mainz), but German activity led him to march south again. This was on 8 June.

On the Allied side, Duke Max's army was the largest of the Rhine concentrations, including troops from his own possessions and the other South German states, plus regiments from Saxony and Celle-Lüneburg. In all there were 55,000 men. The gentle Lorraine died of his longstanding illness on 18 April, 1690, the immediate cause being 'a suffocating catarrh'. He was only 48. Command should have defaulted to Saxony, but the Emperor was having one of his periodic tiffs with the Duke and yielded to Duke Max's petition.

[Quincy says the German forces also had some Swedish battalions — he has a fixation about the Swedes — but most of this contingent served in Flanders and the rest on the Baltic. Only one Swedish battalion ever served on the Upper Rhine, and it was in the service of Holstein.]

General Dünwald commanded the official 'Imperial' army, a mix of Habsburg units and troops from Hesse-Kassel and Franconia. His area of operations was between Mainz and Heidelberg but he was to hold himself ready support either Brandenburg or Duke Max. In early June he was assembling his army at Sinsheim (?), where Duke Max and the senior Imperial general, Caprara, joined him at the end of the month.

[Quincy puts the camp at 'Sailzheim', saying this place is between Philippsburg and Heidelberg. No such place exists in that location, even on detailed period maps. His spelling is atrocious. The best guess is Sinsheim, one of the usual places for armies to camp because it was on the direct road to Heidelberg from Heilbronn and had access to the Neckar and water transport.]

Dünwald's forces initially faced off against the French at Mainz, while Duke Max remained ready to march to his aid or to try a crossing of the river if circumstances permitted, but both commanders were decidedly on the defensive. Both got into motion around 1 June.

Meanwhile, *général* Choiseul came to the Dauphin with an escort of 1,200 horse, after which they proceeded to Lorges' camp together, arriving there on 4 June. The camp was then at Lambsheim (13 Km west of Mannheim), where the Dauphin held a four-days' review of 30 battalions. The rest of the army was presumably on security duties. They broke camp on 8 June, and moved to Wachenheim, a day's march southwest, up against the Vosges, where they remained for 2 weeks. Wachenheim is about 61 Km south of Mainz, well back from the Rhine, more or less west of Mannheim and not far from Neustadt. It was an excellent central position. Lorges could respond rapidly to any river crossing, and if the Germans marched toward the Moselle from Mainz, he could attack them in flank while Boufflers blocked them in front.

Lorges then engaged in two large coursings along the river, each employing about 2,000 horse covering a substantial number of infantry, who did the actual gleaning. The second of these coursings, getting started around 18 June, operated between a place Quincy calls 'Andernheim' and Worms. The former town is probably Abenheim, about 7 Km northeast of Worms. It was not an idyllic trip. The *marquis* de Souvré was shot in the arm by Germans firing from boats on the Rhine.

These operations ended on 22 June, by which point Dünwald and Duke Max were combining forces. On 1 July, Duke Max sent his men to Bruchsal.

Meanwhile, on the upper reaches of the Rhine, *Graf* Souches was forming a small corps about 6 Km from the French post at Huningue, 3 Km north of Basel. D'Uxelles, now in charge of Alsace, monitored him with a flying camp and requested reinforcements from the Dauphin, which were sent. This gave d'Uxelles a mobile force of 12 squadrons of horse, 6 of dragoons, and 8 battalions.

Mainz remained strongly garrisoned, under General Thüngen, who held 'dual citizenship' as a general officer in both the service of Mainz and the Habsburgs. On 23 July, after shutting the gates in pretended fear of Lorges' approach — the French were operating in the sector at the time — at midnight he released 600 of the Kollonitsch Hussars, who overran a scouting party of 300 French horse, taking 50 horses, killing 60 men, and capturing several prisoners, including a lieutenant colonel. They then rode off to join Duke Max, who desperately needed light troops.

(These hussars, and their sister regiment, Pálffy's, were the only regular hussar formations in Imperial service. They were outrageously successful and exceedingly annoying.)

Around the end of July, the *duc* de Villeroi, who was maintaining a flying camp at Fort-Louis, crossed the Rhine with 1,000 horse and 500 foot and got revenge on the hussars, encountering a large body of them and inflicting a great slaughter. He took 25 prisoners, about double what the French had lost on 23 July.

[Quincy does not say if it was the same regiment, but there were only two, and in the early years they functioned more like first and second 'battalions'.]

Duke Max had not moved from Bruchsal. He was waiting for a promised contingent of Saxons who seemed in no hurry to reach the front. At the end of the month these troops crossed the Neckar, 10,000 strong. A council of war was held at Heilbronn, where the Elector of Saxony had set up his quarters. Present were the Elector, Duke Max, Caprara, and another Imperial general, Serényi. The upshot of this conference was that Duke Max withdrew his army from Bruchsal and marched it first south to Durlach, and then north to the vicinity of Mainz. Dünwald was dropped off, establishing a flying camp at a spot opposite Fort-Louis, and the Saxons positioned

themselves near Philippsburg. Souches at Huningue also registered local activity. Quincy says that the Germans began circulating rumours that they planned to invade Alsace. This was correctly taken as a bluff by the French; the Germans had made no preparations for such an enterprise.

On 1 August the Dauphin was camped between Landau and Offenbach an der Queich, occupying a frontage of 6 Km on an east-west line. Upon the rumour of an enemy crossing, he decided to cross the Rhine himself, so that any fighting would be done on enemy soil and at the enemy's expense. The army moved in 3 columns, the Dauphin and Lorges in the center, the *Maison du Roi* under Choiseul on the right, and the *comte d'Auvergne* on the left. The crossing was made at Fort-Louis, 45 Km to the south. The advance to the crossing was made on a wide front, the right column along the mountains and the left along the Rhine. Partly this was for added security, and partly because of the large belts of woodland spread across the plain; in those days there were also extensive marshes. The army had 40,000 men. Feeling a little weak and not worried about Souches, the Dauphin ordered d'Uxelles to join him, adding about 2,700 cavalry and 4,000 infantry to his army.

Once on the other side of the river, the Dauphin gave orders not to wantonly ruin the country, but informed the locals that partisan activity would be severely punished; the village of Steinbach, a day's march southeast of the crossing point, was duly razed.

The country east of the Rhine was becoming harder to occupy. *Snapphausen* abounded and there were entrenchments everywhere. On 18 August the *prince de Conty* led a detachment of fusiliers and some cavalry to forage at a 'fortified hamlet' which was defended by cannon. A two-pronged assault forced the militia to flee, though the commander of the right-hand thrust was mortally wounded. The Germans were pursued into the Black Forest, where they tried to hold a mountain redoubt also equipped with cannon. However, the French took this place too, and foraged freely throughout the neighbourhood.

In mid to late August the Dauphin was in the vicinity of Offenbourg, on the right bank of the Rhine opposite Strasbourg. 20 August at Urloffen (9 Km north of Offenbourg); 27 August close by Offenbourg; 28 August at Schuttern (12 Km south of Offenbourg); 1 September at Ettenheim (26 Km south of Offenbourg).

25 August was the Feast of St. Louis. Duke Max sent the Dauphin a bouquet.

Both armies drew in their detached corps in the last few days of August. According to Quincy, the Dauphin wanted to bring on a battle, but instead of marching north to seek one he withdrew south. Likely, he was in search of forage, and, he probably wanted to take contributions from the towns on the plain. But, it may also be the Dauphin was

hoping to lure Duke Max into the Breisgau, where he would have a strong position supported by the fortresses of Breisach and Freiburg. If so, it was some time before Duke Max took the bait, as he was (according to Quincy) attempting a similar ploy by threatening to invade Alsace. When he did follow, he remained at a distance, just to limit the amount of mischief the French could get into.

On 3 September, the French were at Kenzingen, 42 Km south of Strasbourg. On 4 September, when the Dauphin was camped at Endingen am Kaiserstuhl (another 7.5 Km southwest), Duke Max began to follow, marching out from his camps around Bruchsal.

The French position at Endingen was a good one. It lay on the Plain of Weil, with the Rhine over on the left, wooded hills on the right, and the small River Elts in front, passable by 3 fords. The river, which runs by Kenzingen, is about 7 Km north of Endingen. The French were not lined up on the river itself, but positioned to strike at an approaching army that tried to use the fords. Their army was drawn up in the usual 2 lines, facing northeast on a 6-7,000 metre frontage. The Dauphin's quarters were at Endingen itself. Three quarters of the army's front was screened by a belt of light woods. The Left was covered by the marshes of the Rhine, the Right and Rear by the Kaiserstuhl, a rectangular massif detached from the hills of the Black Forest. On the south side of this massif lies Breisach. An army in retreat had access to a pass near the Rhine, while an attacking army would have to march around the massif.

No sooner had he set up camp than the Dauphin received word that the Landgrave of Hesse had taken his corps to Koblenz with the intention of attacking Mont Royal. German offensives up the Moselle were King Louis' *bête-noir*. This was probably the third such attempt this year. As mentioned previously, Brandenburg was supposed to have marched up the Moselle at the start of the season. Then, shortly before the Battle of Fleurus Versailles put pressure on *maréchal* Luxembourg to obtain a decision on the battlefield so that forces could be diverted to the Moselle, where an immanent attack by the Brandenburgers was feared. The *maréchal* himself had a shrewd idea that his opponent's job was to pin him in Brabant while the Moselle was opened up. But, it turned out that the Brandenburgers were *still* only mustering, and after winning Fleurus, the pressure on the French eased considerably.

Ironically, Luxembourg could not capitalize on his success because King Louis was also worried that the Dauphin was about to be attacked and warned him he might need to send reinforcements. But, as has been recounted, the Dauphin took the initiative instead. Now, it was the latter who was required to send troops to Save the Situation on the Moselle. He detached 12,000 men under Choiseul, replacing them with troops drawn from Alsace, including militia. The necessary shuffling rendered his army inert for a few days.

In the French camp, 6 September was an inspection day. 7 and 8 September were given over to foraging, to deny fodder to the approaching enemy, who was now in the vicinity of Offenburg, by the castle of Molbeck, and telling everyone they had come to fight the French. The latter sent their train 15 Km southwest to Breisach and broke the bridges on the Elts, except for the one in Kenzingen. This seems to have been in preparation for a withdrawal, not a fight. However, Duke Max left the bulk of his army in a camp a good 2-3 day's march away, arranged in 2 lines with their left on the Rhine-side town of Altenheim (10 Km west of Offenburg) and their right on the castle of Molbeck, giving them a similar frontage to the French. A strong detachment was sent up to the Elts about 3 Km from Kenzingen, and 4 Km from the French camp, to tempt the Dauphin. Thus, on 10 September the Dauphin ordered the return of his artillery and infantry guard. The French deployed for battle, waiting on their train. Observation of the enemy seemed to show that Duke Max expected an attack the next day.

On 12 September, when the Germans made no move to advance, the Dauphin ordered his own forces to do so, to prevent the enemy from foraging. This brought the opposing sides very close and some skirmishing ensued. But as it turned out neither side was willing to risk a battle with the flower of their armies, and as the day progressed the forces gradually drifted away from each other, until at 5pm the Dauphin pulled back completely.

That night, a fire broke out in the hamlet where the *duc de Vendôme* had his quarters, which destroyed 10-12 houses and some wagons. This appears to have been an accident because the Dauphin paid the locals for the damage.

At 7am on 13 September the French broke camp and marched for Breisach (15 Km southwest) in 3 columns, with the foot in the center and the *Maison du Roi* acting as rearguard under the Dauphin himself. The move took 2 days; the first day a halt was made at the midway point, a place called Ackaren. The next day the Dauphin visited the city while the army marched to a place Quincy calls 'Minguienne'. This is probably Munzigen, about 10 Km southeast of Breisach, where there was a plain suitable for a large encampment. The French were not going to cross the Rhine while the Germans were threatening the Breisgau, but they seem to have given up on the idea of a battle. Duke Max followed cautiously, camping at the 'Abbey of Schustren' which may have been in the vicinity of the Elts.

16 September the Dauphin visited Freiburg, which had been held by a French garrison since before the war, with a small escort, a 40 Km round trip. On 18 September he reviewed his Cavalry. The enemy was not pressing the French, instead marching with a view to protecting the town of Rheinfels on the Middle Rhine, about halfway between Koblenz and Bingen. Duke Max was mostly

concerned to prevent the French from doing too much damage.

On 19 September the Dauphin reviewed the Foot. After this his army remained at Munzigen until 22 September. They then marched onto the plain of Neuenburg, another 20 Km farther up the Rhine and crossed the river at the end of the month. The Dauphin was said to be bitterly disappointed at having failed to bring Duke Max to battle. Given that he had in no way been aggressive in his manoeuvring, it is hard to see how could have expected to bring on a fight. On 30 September he left the army for Fontainebleau, leaving Lorges in command. The latter put his troops into winter quarters in early October. 15,000 men were spread out between Philippsburg, Landau, Fort-Louis, and (surprisingly) Offenburg — but this last location was within reach of Strasbourg if it ran into difficulties. 15,000 more augmented the permanent garrisons of the Breisgau and Upper Alsace.

[The Dauphin arrived at Court on 7 October.]

The Germans followed suit, quartering in the Bergstat — that is, between the Main and the Neckar — and the Black Forest; some Imperial regiments were sent to Hungary, where the Emperor was planning a renewed offensive. Brandenburg's forces quartered along the lower Moselle in Trier, and at Koblenz.

Summary

Despite the Dauphin's failure to defeat the Germans in battle, 1690 was a very bad year for the Allies. On the Northeast Frontier alone they had lost a major battle, and general wear and tear had reduced the size of every contingent. Elsewhere, Anglo-Dutch naval forces lost the Battle of Beachy Head, though that was more a moment of shame than a strategic blow, and the Duke of Savoy was hammered at the Battle of Staffarda.

On a positive note, William of Orange would be free to command in the Low Countries next year, and hopefully the monetary and manpower resources of England could at last be poured into the war (William still had little experience of the English Parliament's whims).

French arms were everywhere victorious. Their troops were better than the Allies (mostly), their generals were better (mostly), their logistics were better, their diplomats and spies were better. And yet the war showed no sign of ending.

1691 Saxony's Turn

'Marshal de Lorges found the means to feed the army of the king on the enemies' country during the entire campaign, to take from them large contributions and to subsist at their expense.'

Quincy, quoted in Lynn, p.219.

Strategy

Coalition strategy was being made both at The Hague and at Vienna, without much coordination between the

two sites. The Hague Conference was sponsored by William of Orange, now King William III, and catered primarily to his interests and those of the Dutch. Vienna's Congress naturally served Leopold's interests as well as those of Italy and the Pope. In simplistic terms the Hague Conference was the Protestant team and the Vienna Congress the Catholic team. German strategy, in and of itself, rather fell between two stools, as various German princes attended one conference or the other depending on personal agendas.

Before the new season opened the two camps did at least agree on troop numbers. The Grand Alliance would field 220,000 men: 35,000 from Holland; 20,000 each from the Empire, Spain, Brandenburg, and England (remembering that most of the Emperor's troops were fighting the Ottomans); 18,000 each from Savoy and Bavaria; 16,000 from Hanover; 12,000 from Saxony; 8,000 from Hesse-Cassel; 7,000 from Münster; 6,000 each from Liège and Württemberg; 4,000 from the Palatinate. These numbers were hypothetical, but it was the thought that counted. The German forces mentioned came from the respective states' armies; many also had to contribute troops to the War of the Holy League.

On the political side, the Coalition boisterously declared no one would make peace until France's frontiers had been reset to those of 1648, her citizens' 'ancient privileges' restored — implying tolerance for the Huguenots and a significant weakening of France's central authority — and reparations were made for the shabby treatment the Sun King had accorded the Pope.

Unsurprisingly, the French, not having to consult with anyone, were far better prepared for their campaigns. The grand plan concocted by Louvois and King Louis, finalised in a cabinet session on February 26, was to take the frontier town of Mons in a surprise move before the campaigning season opened, and then to redistribute their forces to other fronts. Flanders would still host the largest army over the summer, but its role would be a defensive one.

After Mons, *général* Boufflers would be given command of a larger number of troops for his Army of the Moselle, allowing him to truly form a link between the Rhine and Flanders, while blocking any enemy advance up the river.

Germany was given the highest priority. Given what actually happened this year — which was 'nothing' — this surely cannot be true? Yet it was: a decision was not to be achieved through a major battle or siege, instead, it would be a campaign 'of detachments', of attrition, intended to shake the bonds of the Alliance.

The Wider War

On the Northeast Frontier, winter raiding continued, in preparation for the great siege of Mons. After Mons, the rest of the season was spent in manoeuvres and entrenching. Liège and Brussels were threatened in

hopes of extorting money, and the Allies countered by crossing the Sambre — and barely escaping with their lives. The last act would be a rearguard action at Leuze, on 19 September, where Waldeck's forces were badly handled by the French but managed to retreat in good order.

In Italy, Catinat would be reinforced after Mons and fight a vigorous war against Duke Victor of Savoy, taking Nice and a number of other towns, notably Montmélian in central Savoy, but failing against the key fortress of Cuneo; ultimately the French would clear the west side of the Maritime Alps of all enemy presence but not gain a foothold on the plains of Piedmont.

In Catalonia, both sides still had small armies. It was enough if they could besiege and take a fort or two over the course of the year. Noailles would remain in command and have the better of the Spanish for the whole season.

The French Navy's mission was coastal protection, though it continued to halfheartedly support the Irish in their flagging bid to restore King James II. King Louis was always afraid, with good reason, that William of Orange would foment rebellion among his Protestant subjects, or among people such as the Bretons, who held only a marginal allegiance to Versailles, and then land an expedition of his own. At the same time, Louis' wanted his ships to assist his land forces; such efforts took place in the Mediterranean, away from the Royal Navy, and had some success.

[Jean-Baptiste Colbert, marquis de Seignelay had been Naval Minister, but he died in 1690. This loosened the hold the Colbert family had on government offices (he was the eldest son of THE Colbert). His job went to the Comptroller of Finance, Louis Phélypeaux, comte de Pontchartrain (after whom Lake Ponchartrain in Louisiana is named). Pontchartrain retained his old job and chose to focus on it. In consequence, though his reputation has been rehabilitated of late, it is true the French Navy did not do so well after 1690.]

The Most Expensive Hat in History

Ernst August, of the House of Brunswick-Lüneburg, had ambitions. He was only the youngest son of the Duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg, yet his offspring were destined to become Kings of Great Britain. But that was in the future. His ambitions when war broke out were merely to obtain the status of Elector of the Empire.

Without going into the convoluted details, by 1689 he was actively and secretly negotiating with Leopold, not only promising troops for the Turkish war but agreeing that he would always vote in line with the Emperor's wishes. Leopold was interested. This would secure the votes needed for him to revive the Bohemian Vote, which had lapsed earlier in the century. That would give the Habsburgs two automatic electoral votes out of eight (make that nine if Hanover were elevated), with Hanover being a guaranteed third.

Ernst's program was not all 'carrot'. On 27 November 1690 he signed a subsidy treaty with the hated enemy, France, then pulled his troops out of the war for the whole of 1691. This was not merely to emphasise how much the Emperor needed his services. Buying an electoral hat was expensive. He needed that subsidy, and he needed have his army on hand to suppress possible revolts as he squeezed his subjects for every penny in taxes.

Probably the most damaging thing Ernst did with regard to the war effort was to draw the Northern princes into a new iteration of the anti-Imperial Third Party with a decidedly neutralist bent. They were less keen when the news broke that Hanover was the new Ninth Electorate and that Ernst had played them for saps, but they had been pulled farther from Leopold's orbit, nonetheless.

The elevation was made public on 17 May 1692. It still had to be voted on, which took some hard lobbying by the Emperor. To assuage bruised feelings, the elevation would only formally come into effect after the war. Even then it took 16 years for Hanover's place on the Electoral Council to be fully secured.

For now, Hanover was on the bench and the other Northern princes were more reluctant than ever to help their southern neighbours.

The Campaign

From a historian's perspective, the war on the Rhine in 1691 was a very dull affair. Once again, Quincy is the main 'semi-primary' source. Things were so quiet that Boufflers' Army of the Moselle was diverted to bombard Liège (1 June).

The French were always much quicker into the field. They gambled that they could take Mons and transfer enough troops to Germany to take the offensive there, and won the trick. Shortly after the bombardment of Liège, *maréchal* Lorges assembled his immediate forces, reinforced by troops from Luxembourg's command, near Neustadt. He was in motion before the Germans began to muster at all. Quincy says their own concentration, at least for the Upper Rhine sector, took place at 'Winlzheim', possibly Welzheim, east of Stuttgart. The troops on the Middle Rhine tended to quarter in Trier and Cologne east of the river, and the four counties of Jülich, Cleves, Mark, and Berg.

After fully mustering, Lorges took his army north toward Mainz, resting his infantry under d'Uxelles at "Herviler" — probably Herrnsheim (3 Km north of Worms). He and his cavalry continued another 30 Km north to Nieder-Olm, a village a day's march SSW of Mainz, where there was an abundance of forage. At 'the end of the month' (May?) Lorges sent out a large foraging party under *lieutenant général* de la Feuillée. They were to strip the country bare around Mainz. As with all such operations the force consisted of an escort of cavalry and foot soldiers to do the work, accompanied by a baggage train to put the stuff

in. 4 Km north of Nieder-Olm was the matching village of Ober-Olm. Here, the French encountered 50 enemy hussars. Up until now, the Mainz garrison had been in hibernation, but they were beginning to stretch themselves.

The hussars had either been policing the district or making a raid, and were themselves escorting 70 prisoners to Mainz. The main body, about 2 squadrons, concealed itself in a wood, while the band of 50 — a company's worth — exposed themselves and made a play of challenging the foragers' covering force, or 'grand guard'. When the grand guard pursued, they were ambushed by the remainder of the hussars, and possibly other troops, to the number of 4-500. However, the French put up such a stout resistance that reinforcements had time to arrive — some dragoons and also 3 cannon charged with canister. These routed the hussars and recovered 25 of the prisoners. The pursuit went to the gates of Mainz, at which the garrison responded by sending out 8 squadrons and some infantry, along with cannon. A brief skirmish was fought and the French withdrew.

On 20 June Lorges sent a detachment consisting of 2 battalions, the horse regiments of Villepion, Forcat, and Bercourt, and the dragoon regiments of Saint-Frémont and Boufflers, plus 2 guns, to *lieutenant général* Boufflers, who was still on the Meuse.

Not until 2 July was another significant detachment made from Lorges' army. This consisted of Pagnac's dragoons, 300 grenadiers, and a few cannon. M. de Rochefort commanded. This force was tasked with taking a castle near Mainz. The original text is slightly marred but the place appears to be Algesheim, a day's march west of the city. This makes sense because Algesheim sits just to the west of the Seltz River which flows into the Rhine downriver from the city, dominates the left bank of the Rhine between the Seltz and the Nahe, and could be used to anchor a cordon around the city, just as Neider-Ulm could. But, the chief value of the castle was political; it belonged to the Elector of Mainz.

(Other places which crop up in the sources as part of such a cordon are Sauer-Schwabenheim and Stackeden, both on the Seltz. East of Stackeden there is no significant river line, but a number of nicely spaced villages stretching to the Rhine above Mainz.)

Algesheim castle held 100 men, and was already under siege by *général* Melac and an unspecified number of troops. The garrison surrendered after a 12 hour bombardment. French casualties numbered 50, including Melac's brother. Lorges ordered the castle blown up on 8 July, along with a castle at Nieder-Ulm (presumably also one of the Elector's properties).

Upper Rhine Theatre of War

1691

Scale & Legend

●	Town
◆	Fortification
—	Shore/River
@10 Km	

1. May/June: Lorges forages around Mainz
2. Early July: d'Uxelles contests Rhine crossing
3. Saxony tries to cut off Lorges from Neustadt
4. Lorges' detour & d'Auvergne's 'push through'
5. August+: Lorges on the right bank of the Rhine; raid on Pforzheim
6. Saxony covers Lorges to protect Mannheim crossing



The Germans did not get into motion on the Upper Rhine until July, when the Saxons arrived. Command here, over 40,000 soldiers, was given to the Duke of Saxony (J.G. III) and the Imperial general, Caprara. What had happened to Duke Max? He had been shunted over to the Italian front to serve as the Emperor's *Generalleutnant* there. Leopold had reinforced that front and needed a *bona fide* Imperial officer who also held sufficient political rank, this being the rank of Elector of the Empire — the reader must remember northern Italy was still considered part of the Holy Roman Empire, but it had no native electors; Duke Max was the most Italianate Elector Leopold could find. A man such as General Caprara had the Imperial but not the social credentials, while Prince Eugene, who was also serving there, had the military and social credentials but was not an Elector.

In the Black Forest sector, the troops, mostly local forces, dug in, while on the Middle Rhine, Brandenburg committed the best part of his army to the fighting in the Low Countries. A few regiments remained in garrison while the rest were loaned to the Upper Rhine army. They would be commanded by General Schöning, even though he was no longer in Brandenburg's army (!) — it will be remembered that in 1689 Schöning fought a duel with General Barfus and was dismissed from Brandenburg's service. A good general, despite his obnoxious personality, he readily found work in Saxony.

Saxony's army was to bridge the Rhine at Mannheim. Or, at least, he told Caprara to do so. When the Duke arrived with the main body he discovered the Imperial general had been unable to find a suitable site above the town. D'Uxelles had brought his infantry up from Herrnsheim and disputed the passage at every point, constantly harassing the engineering parties.

Around this time (no specific date is given) Lorges moved south, taking up a position along the Pfrimm River, which flows from west to east to the Rhine at Worms. The district was lush with forage and well watered. He had camps at Flörsheim and Kreisheim (these are guesses based on Quincy), roughly 10.5 Km and 6 Km west of Worms, respectively.

On 8 July Lorges moved north from the Pfrimm, seeking higher ground, making camp at 'Gentvinghen', another example of Quincy's vile spelling. No village of this name exists on modern maps, nor on the more detailed period maps. By a stretch of the imagination it might be Hangenweisheim, 6 Km from Flörsheim. At the end of June the Rhine had overflowed its banks.

Saxony crossed to the right bank of the Neckar on 6/7 July and found a place to cross the Rhine below Mannheim. Quincy says about 800 meters from the town, but it was actually at Sandhoven, about 4 Km away. There was a partially demolished bridge there, connected with an island called the Isle of Sandhoven. Saxony used small boats to seize the island in the dark. This allowed

them to make the crossing to the island secure. There was a French redoubt about 2 Km farther on but it was abandoned next evening. Other French posts along the Rhine in this sector fell back upriver toward the Philippsburg crossing. The continued high water prevented French troops from reaching the Saxons' bridge in time to hinder the crossing.

[The Isle of Sandhoven used to be at a loop in the Rhine, now bypassed by a straight canal cut. The passages between the islands have silted up but the loop is still visible.]

The Electoral Prince of Saxony (the future J.G. IV) was in the van. The Germans paused to form a bridgehead on the island and built a bridge to connect it with the left bank of the Rhine. This took until 13 July, after which the army marched to Frankenthal, about 6 Km west of the crossing. They began repairing the fortifications there, on the assumption they would be able to maintain themselves on the left bank over the winter.

Lorges acted swiftly, breaking camp at midnight on 12 July. His fear was that the Germans intended to push farther west. If they did they would cut him off from his magazines at Neustadt. Their immediate objective would be the defile at Türrckheim (Bad Dürkheim), only a day's march southwest of Frankenthal. On a modern map the whole plain may appear open, but Türrckheim is on the Turkeimerbach, which flows to the Rhine past Frankenthal and in those days it was very swampy. The current flood conditions did not help. Neustadt sat in a very narrow gap between the Vosges range and the very extensive Forest of Speyer which ran all the way to the Rhine. From his current position Lorges could either go to Frankenthal to get round the morass and march southwest across the plain to Neustadt — in which case he would be following in Saxony's footsteps — or he could strike due south for Türrckheim, or he could leave the field for a space.

The Germans acted as expected. Saxony's HQ was Oggersheim, 4,800 metres south of Frankenthal and his army was spread out between Frankenthal and Leistadt, the latter place being at the foot of the Vosges, 4 Km north of Türrckheim. This meant Lorges was cut off — technically. The Germans held a front of almost 15 Km. The Duke had nowhere near enough men to cover every square foot, especially since he had work parties repairing Mannheim. Probably the bulk of his army was within 5-6 Km of Frankenthal. The rest of the line will have been a series of cavalry posts, and probably more interested in covering foraging parties than blocking the enemy.

Lorges decided to combine his second and third options. The *comte* d'Auvergne was sent ahead of the French army 'with all the grenadiers and dragoons' to secure the defile at Türrckheim, while Lorges made a 24-hour march with the main body on a wide circuit west, toward Kaiserslautern, at some point turning south until he struck the Speyerbach, following it through the Vosges to

Neustadt. Quincy records no action between d'Auvergne and the Germans, so presumably he just barrelled past whatever opposition there was. If he secured Türckheim as seems to be the case, d'Auvergne probably remained there, reorienting himself to become a forward post for the army at Neustadt.

[Thanks to Quincy's unique ability to spell place names phonetically, there is a possibility Lorges might really have followed behind d'Auvergne. However, Quincy is clear the main body marched for 24 hours, which it would not have done on the direct route.]

No battle ensued subsequent to these manoeuvres. Lorges called up troops from all the major garrisons in Alsace and even from the garrisons on the right bank of the Rhine, such as Freiburg. Some augmented the garrison at Neustadt and the others rendezvoused with him at Offenbach an der Queich, where he camped at the end of July. (Offenbach again is 6 Km east of Landau, and 18 Km south of Neustadt.)

Reinforced, the French army marched again on 2 August. According to Quincy, Lorges was acting on false intelligence, believing Saxony was marching on Little Holland by way of Speyer in order to isolate Philippsburg. The French set out to meet them. Finding no Germans, they decided to cross the Rhine themselves.

Saxony does not seem to have any strategic aim beyond pushing the French away from Mainz. He was content to consolidate the crossing at Mannheim. Lorges again beefed up the garrisons at Landau, Fort-Louis, and Philippsburg, and brought his army, including d'Auvergne's 'fire-brigade', which was still operating independently, to Graben-Neudorf, 8 Km south of Philippsburg. Here he camped and foraged until 8 August.

Saxony, now back at Mannheim, had received word of Lorges' movements and about 4 August called a council of war, after first allocating 6 battalions to reinforce 2,000 men already working to repair Mannheim and sending a pair of hussar regiments under Pálffy to observe the French.

The council of war was a stormy one. Some called for a reprisal invasion of Alsace, while others demanded they seek battle. Ultimately, the latter course was adopted and the Duke pulled most of his army to the right bank of the Rhine. The cavalry departed south the same day while Saxony made a further detachment of 600 men to cover the bridge still under construction at Sandhoven. The Foot crossed on 5 August. All elements joined up at Sectenheim (about 6 Km southeast of Mannheim) by the end of the day. Still operating on the left bank was an observation detachment currently about 35 Km from Neustadt.

Lorges was alerted to these motions by Melac. Leading a scouting party of 200 men, the *général* acquired some prisoners and arrived at the French camp on 7 August. Lorges deployed to meet the threat by marching to

Durlach, 18 Km south of Graben-Neudorf — that is, farther away from the enemy — and finding a defensible position at Kretzingen (Grötzingen), about 1,600 metres northeast of the town. The terrain here was very constricted. Karlsruhe was a non-place, its site occupied by the Forest of Durlach, lying between the Rhine and the marshy Pfinz River, which flows south and in those days bent west at Durlach before entering the Rhine. East of the Pfinz was a narrow plain 1,000-1,500 metres wide, blocked on the south by Durlach and on the north by swamps and woods. Backing onto this plain were wooded slopes facing west and cut with ravines; Kretzingen blocked the entrance to the largest of these. The French army was arranged on the slopes.

Remchingen Castle, the local peasant refuge 8 Km southeast of this position and the only threat to the French rear, was taken after its defenders abandoned it, and a good store of vittles and fodder was found, plus 3 'falcons'.

Lorges was not merely seeking the best spot to defend. Indeed, he was more concerned with collecting contributions. Villeroi was sent out with a body of horse, and a few dragoons, plus 2,000 fort and 6 guns, to canvass the neighbourhood. The locals 'owed' the French 80,000 livres. Well, the Duke of Württemberg *had* agreed to pay it. But, some of his subjects disputed the legality. At Pforzheim, 20 Km southeast, Villeroi had an encounter with 500 locals defending the town. He summoned them to surrender. They refused, so Villeroi erected a battery in the faubourg and began a bombardment. The townsfolk resisted stoutly, returning the fire. The commandant was about to surrender anyway, but *Graf* Fürstenberg (*not* the Cardinal but a relation fighting on the other side who owned lands in the vicinity) arrived in the nick of time with 2,000 foot and large body of horse and hussars. Nonetheless, when a breach was made wide enough for 30 men the *chamade* was beaten. The commandant wished to march his men away but this was refused. During the negotiations, the townsfolk took up arms again, which infuriated the French, who launched an assault. Villeroi led the attack, and encountered Fürstenberg in the breach. This was fortunate. Villeroi had been on the point of ordering 'no quarter' but the Count managed to convince him the betrayal of the truce was not made by the soldiers. Instead, the German troops were made prisoners of war. Pforzheim's towers were demolished and its mills burned. Soon after, Villeroi returned to the main camp loaded with contributions.

Meanwhile, on 12 August, Saxony's army reached Bretten, 16 Km north of Pforzheim and only 12 Km from Lorges' camp. Here they met reinforcements. The Duke sent a column to Weingarten, a day's march west, on the rumour that the French were paying it a visit. The next day he sent another one, under a *Generalmajor* Gronsfeld, to Bruchsal, a similar distance northwest, for the same reason. On 14 August, he moved a short

distance from Bretten and made ready for battle, with his vanguard on the left. There was (and is) a large wood between Bretten and Kretzingen (the Ölbrunnerwald). On 15 August, Caprara ordered a portion of it cut down to prevent a possible surprise attack.

There had been a French ambush shortly before. A band of 65 horsemen had ambushed a convoy and taken 64 prisoners and 62 horses. This seems to have been a surprise night attack while the convoy was resting, because the raid had to be terminated when one of the defenders opened fire, suggesting the rest were taken silently.

Meanwhile, M. de Baliviere of the French army was scouting the Germans with a body of 300 horse. He departed the French camp at midnight and came to the enemy camp at daybreak. 40 of his men made a sudden assault on the picquets, killing 6, taking prisoners, and routing the others, who alerted their camp. Baliviere suffered no losses and returned to his own camp.

Lorges had no desire to fight a pitched battle now he was weighed down with booty. On 16 August he decamped. This was a day, not a night march, and it was away from the enemy, to Ettlingen, about 8 Km southwest. The French expected the Germans to chase them and had a strong rearguard under d'Auvergne, but the enemy appeared not to have noticed the move. Saxony was not informed of the French march until the next day. The French camped in line of battle, with Ettlingen on their right and Weyer on their left, along the line of the Albe River, a frontage of about 7 Km. In those days a loop of the Rhine approached almost to Weyer. Here Lorges was joined by a detachment he had left to cover Landau, which must have crossed the Rhine at Fort-Louis.

Saxony tried to guess Lorges' next move, and sent *Graf Pálffy* and 1,000 horse (probably his hussars) by devious routes to cover Gernsbach, 21 Km south of the French. This was a logical next place for Lorges to visit, if he intended to continue extorting money from Württemberg and Baden; though Gernsbach was in the Black Forest, the French had a couple of good roads to choose from if they made it there. On 19 August Saxony followed this up by sending the Landgrave of Baden-Durlach to the Kinzigthal with 7 regiments (a mix of horse and foot) to block that route. It will be remembered the Kinzigthal, about 50 Km farther south than Gernsbach, was a primary route through the Black Forest, which an army could use to reach the upper reaches of the Neckar River or the Danube. It was also 'target rich' in its own right.

The Germans shifted their base to Weingarten, a day's march west of Bretten. On 19 August Baliviere conducted a reconnaissance of their camp with 100 carabiners and 100 dragoons, plus 50 workmen. As before, he drove in the picquets and took a number of prisoners.

It seemed that Saxony's predictions were correct. On 25 August the French broke camp and headed for

Ebersteinburg, a march of 20 Km southwest. Ebersteinburg lies in a small valley among wooded hills, only 3.5 Km northeast of Baden-Baden. 5.5 Km north was the edge of the Black Forest at Kuppenheim on the Murg; 8 Km southeast was Gernsbach, in the valley of the Murg. Lorges wanted to deal severely with this place because its garrison had made a number of attacks on French foragers operating out of Fort-Louis. The *prince de Conti* was sent to invest it with 2,000 foot and 1,000 horse.

The detachment left in the night and arrived near Gernsbach at dawn. First, they stormed a detached redoubt about 800 meters from the town. A sergeant and 10 men were captured. At the town, however, Conti waited for instructions. Gernsbach had a good wall, a ditch, and a palisade; artillery was required. Furthermore, Baden-Durlach was camped on the nearby heights with 4,000 men. Lorges reinforced Conti with infantry and guns under the *marquis de la Freselliere*, his artillery general. A parley drummer was sent to the town, but to his surprise the place was almost empty. The 900-man garrison had been evacuated the day before. They very kindly left all their stores behind. Unfortunately, a fire broke out soon after which burned down the whole town.

Facing the whole of Lorges' army, Baden-Durlach was reinforced on 28 August by another 2 regiments, and on 30 August by a regiment from Saxe-Gotha. Again, no battle took place. Quincy now reveals both armies were in the grip of dysentery. Both Saxony and Caprara fell ill, and on 31 August the Duke ordered a retreat to what Quincy calls 'Valkinghen'. He probably means Vaihingen-an-der-Enz, but may mean a place with a similar-sounding name on the Neckar. In either case, this was a withdrawal of 20-30 Km to the east. Saxony was carried to Tübingen in extreme distress and Caprara to Ettlingen. General Schöning assumed command.

Around the end of August Lorges abandoned the Murg, marched south past Baden-Baden, and camped at a place Quincy calls 'Bersleim' (which does not appear even on period maps). On 1 September he moved south, to Bihel (Bühl), 10 Km southwest of Baden-Baden. The Foot was stationed 1,000 metres south of Bühl and the cavalry, in 2 lines, faced toward Baden on the north side of Bühl. The Carabiners covered the left side; the dragoons were stationed at the foot of the mountains on the right.

Meanwhile the enemy received 2,000 replacements, 9 guns, and 2 more regiments from Saxe-Gotha. On 7 September the young Electoral Prince of Saxony rejoined the army. According to his report the Duke was recovering, but was too weak to resume command. A Württemberg Regiment reinforced Baden-Durlach in the Kinzigthal.

The French continued moving south along the skirts of the Black Forest: from Bühl to Renchen (15 Km) on 8 September, to Urloffen (4 Km) on 9 September, where

they suffered from lack of water. The peasants had diverted the local river and it took a deal of work to un-divert it and sink some wells. Forage was also dwindling. The French only managed to locate a few small caches in the Black Forest. They eked out an existence until 3 October, when they went southwest again, camping just south of Offenburg. On 14 October they marched to Lahr, a day's march south of their last camp, then broke up for winter quarters. 6 regiments were sent direct to Italy.

The Germans had already gone into quarters, the orders being given on 13 September. The Imperials, Swabians, and Franconians headed for the Kinzigthal. Troops were also dispersed at other locations in the Black Forest. At that time the French were moving along its face, so they were 'in quarters' but not *In Quarters*. The Saxons quartered in Franconia (where they had some 'business' to discuss with communities which were refusing to pay for Saxon upkeep). A large detachment was left at Heilbronn until it was known the French had crossed the Rhine; they then quartered on the Main. A corps was sent to Mannheim, other forces to Weiterstadt, by Darmstadt.

[Quincy still talks about the Swedes as if they are a significant contingent. They can only have been the regiment in Holstein's pay. They were sent to Weiterstadt but later marched to North Germany. They returned periodically throughout the war.]

The Duke of Saxony, after a partial recovery, died at Tübingen on 22 September. He was a significant loss, the only one of the Saxon Electors who had real military skill and an interest in prosecuting the war.

[This author's great-grandfather died of dysentery during the Boer War (he was war correspondent for the Cape Times); it is an unpleasant way to die.]

Taken as a whole the campaign was a French success. They spent most of the season living at the enemy's expense. They also avoided the same fate. In a war of attrition, that is as good as it gets.

1692 – Divided Command

An unexpected event, which occurred in the summer of 1692, had significantly increased the irritable mood of the elector against the imperial court. It was namely that the Saxon Fmschl. v. Schönning was, by imperial order on the 18th June 1692, suddenly arrested in his quarters at night and escorted by a detachment of imperial troops as a prisoner of state to Prague, but then to the Spielberg fortress near Brno. The alleged reason for this measure, which caused a sensation everywhere, was the accusation, which was based on nothing, that he corresponded with French generals and that he was in agreement with them.

Geschichte de Sächsischen Armees, p. 123

The Wider War

Dealing with a war on four fronts, King Louis chose to relegate two of them to a defensive posture; the other two would feature vigorous campaigning. Spain, and not

Holland, would be the main target, but both Brabant and Catalonia would feature an offensive.

In Catalonia, despite the insistence that he attack, Noailles would have many of his forces taken away from him. Nevertheless, the Spanish would squander their advantage and no gains would be made by either side, which is to say, the French would come out ahead.

In the Low Countries, the Great Event this year would be the taking of the Fortress of Namur, at the confluence of the Meuse and Sambre (25 May through 1 July). The rest of the campaign would see the *duc* de Luxembourg foiling King William's every attempt to mitigate the disaster. His best chance to make any sort of political capital would be taken at the Battle of Steenkerque, on 3 August; it was a dismal failure. Late in the season, the Allies would try to break the French Lines in Flanders, only to be attacked on the other end of the front, at Charleroi.

In Italy, Catinat would be outnumbered three to one and the Allies would invade the Dauphiné, on the west side of the Maritime Alps. When the Prince of Orange learned that King Louis was stripping this front, he pressed the Emperor to appoint the brilliant Eugene of Savoy to lead the Italian armies. This was done, and the results were remarkable. Only some fancy footwork by the French and the untimely sickness of Duke Victor of Savoy would prevent the Allies from doing serious damage. Yet, campaigning the far side of the Alps was almost beyond their logistical capacity. For the French to strip this front to fight elsewhere would prove worth the risk.

The High Seas was one theatre where the French hoped to do well. The previous year, Ireland had been conquered by the forces of William of Orange. Ironically, this had given the French a force of some 12,000 men to play with, as many of the Irish 'renegades' were persuaded to swear allegiance to the king of France and be evacuated to the Continent. Louis planned to send these men home, but he would invade England enroute and break the back of the Grand Alliance.

8,000 French and 14,000 Irish emigres would be assembled at La Hogue on Cotentin Peninsula, under *maréchal* Bellefonds, with ex-king James as titular head of the expedition. Unfortunately, the two fleets of the French Navy which were to combine to sweep the Channel would be unable to coordinate their efforts. Plagued by dockyard shortages, contrary weather, and conflicting orders, the French would encounter the Royal Navy off La Hogue and be worsted. Fortunately, the counter-operation planned by the English would likewise flop. The soldiers involved in these amphibious operations were all destined to fight in Flanders.

(Ex-king James was relieved by the outcome. He had just about had enough of being the Sun King's pawn. The French were most bemused to witness him cheering on the Royal Navy when the high nobility went to watch the sea fight.)

On the Rhine, the French would also be heavily outnumbered, but though the German princes fielded as many as 80,000 men (including those guarding the Middle Rhine) they were mentally unprepared to take the offensive. They had leagued to keep the French out, not to conquer new territory. To make sure they never changed their minds, the French would make a number of bold river crossings throughout the season, ravaging the lands on the right bank of the Rhine for much of its length and expanding a zone of devastation that would be difficult to cross.

High Politics

While the armies were fighting, significant changes took place in the political landscape. In France, the effective but brutal hardliner, War Minister Louvois, died, on 16 July. His replacement on the High Council, though not at the Ministry itself, was a veteran diplomat, Simon Arnaud, *marquis de Pomponne*. A very old man (he was born in 1618 and would die in 1699), Pomponne had been dispensed with in the 1670s because his soft approach did not suit the King, but Louis always regarded him with favour.

In keeping with the way ministries were run as 'family businesses' in France, the War Ministry was placed under the control of Louvois' son, the *marquis de Barbezieux*. Barbezieux's performance during the war was only 'fair'. In the vernacular of the military performance review, 'nice guy, tries hard, kinda dumb'; swap the phrases as applicable. This may have been due to a lack of talent but probably owed more to the Sun King's desire to weaken the power of the War Ministry when he was beginning to seek a diplomatic solution. Pomponne had enough trouble in the person of the Foreign Minister, Colbert de Croissy, another hardliner, and did not need the War Minister breathing down his neck.

On the other side, William of Orange augmented his influence as well as his purse by formally becoming King of England, Scotland, and Ireland. This gave him diplomatic precedence over lesser princes in the Coalition and the ability to treat with other kings as an equal. Only the Emperor actually outranked him. The money was also nice, but it came with a string called Parliament. The rank of king was also of little value when dealing with people who did not recognise his right to it, such as Louis and the Emperor. However, it gave *them* leverage — they could offer to recognise him in return for concessions.

Peace feelers still traced their way across Europe. Both in 1690 and in 1691 Sweden offered mediation, but at the time the offer did not go anywhere. In August of 1691, France asked Rome to see if a separate peace with the opposing Catholic powers might be achieved. This was done at the cardinal level, but the current Pope disliked King Louis and refused to lend his support.

With Pomponne now at the helm, greater diplomatic efforts were made. It was known that 'King' William was

interested in peace, but King Louis insisted James II was the real King of England and would not budge. So, efforts were made to detach William's allies. Rome was approached a second time, again without immediate result, though a seed was planted. More strikingly, both the Emperor and his mortal enemy, the Turk, were approached.

France had a long and flagrant history of making deals with the Ottoman Empire. It was a little more unusual to genuinely seek a separate peace with the Austrian Habsburgs. However, the reader may remember that Spain, not Austria, was regarded as France's own mortal foe. It was also known at Versailles that Leopold disapproved of James II's overthrow. Both these approaches, though not decisive, yielded positive results over the course of the next few years.

The Emperor was between a rock and a hard place. Pledged, along with the rest of the Empire, not to make a separate peace with France, he would have been content to see France merely passive on the Rhine while he fought the Turks and dealt with rumblings of mutiny in Transylvania. Unfortunately, the more powerful of the German princes were taking matters into their own hands. This time it was Saxony's turn. According to Leopold, the new Duke, Johann Georg IV, was still required to contribute 12,000 men to the defense of the Upper Rhine. The Duke was, like his father, not prepared to bankrupt himself in the process. He could argue that these numbers exceeded his legal quota by a large margin. He could also use this fact to extort some juicy concessions from Leopold, as Hanover had just done.

Alternatively, since he had an oversized army but was not legally bound to use all of it in Imperial service, he could cut a deal of his own with the Franconian-Swabian association and ignore Leopold. Since some of the Franconian states were suffering from Saxon extortion — the Saxons billeted their troops on their own soil to reduce costs but continued to demand upkeep from the states where they would have otherwise wintered — such a deal was unlikely, but would have extended the anti-Habsburg bloc from the North into the South.

As it happened, the new Duke was more inclined to cut a deal with France. Using the war as a pretext, Johann Georg IV was extending a reign of extortion within his own realm and that of his clients to fund an extravagant building program, aping the Sun King. The extortion had begun under his father and was clothed in terms of collecting the Imperial contributions destined to pay for the Saxon Army (so really, he was doing them a favour by eliminating the middle man...). When said clients petitioned Leopold for aid during the previous reign, the Emperor was not able to help them.

The new Duke, who lacked any sense of purpose beyond gratifying his own whims, was also leaning heavily on the advice of his new commander-in-chief, General Schöning.

It will be remembered that Schöning was an ex-Brandenburg officer. He had served primarily during the Francophile reign of the present Elector's father and had many French contacts.

Saxony was keenly involved in the discussions of the Third Party which began in 1690 and led to the elevation of Hanover as the Ninth Electorate in 1691 — an Imperial bribe to break up this northern bloc. Leopold felt incapable of sacrificing the southern states, who were really pulling more than their weight in the war, to Saxon ambition, so a fresh bribe was out of the question. The Duke walked off the job in 1692 (after collecting his annual protection money from the southern states), spending the year reorganising his army into a more effective machine for intimidating his neighbours.

The Emperor resorted to unconventional measures. He had Schöning kidnapped and imprisoned on 4 July. Having nipped off the French clinging vine, a regimen of tough Imperial diplomacy eventually brought Saxony back into the fold with a formal treaty (Treaty of Dresden, 20 February 1693) which granted the Duke a hefty subsidy — paid for in large part by the Maritime Powers.

[Schöning was eventually exonerated and released in 1694, returning to Saxony's service; he died in 1696]

Brandenburg, too, followed a shifting path, anti-French sentiment notwithstanding, and joined in the search for a Third Party. The new Elector of Hanover was his father-in-law, and he saw that it was relatively easy to wring concessions from the Emperor by playing hard to get. The Brandenburgers henceforth played only a minimal part in the Rhine campaigns, though they fulfilled their Imperial obligations by sending troops to Hungary, and to Italy. William of Orange also secured their services on a semi-permanent basis through a mixture of self-interest (suggesting it would not be good for business if the French gained influence on the Middle Rhine) and subsidies, which Brandenburg could stockpile to help his bid for a kingdom at the end of the decade.

1692 was also the year in which the Franconian-Swabian association became a formidable force. The Emperor was comfortable with this because there was no danger of the component members becoming a unified principality — the inertia of centuries, not to mention Bavarian interference, would see to that. In 1692 the Regent of Württemberg began manipulating affairs so as to raise the duchy to the sort of position held by Bavaria, Saxony, and Brandenburg, but the Regent was captured by the French, who were as reluctant as Leopold to see such a state emerge. Instead, working on the traditional *kreise* model, the Association was, with English and Dutch money, able to field 16 regiments at a minimum, allowing the Emperor to shift Imperial troops to Hungary and enabling the Association to refuse all further payments to Saxony after 1692. The Association, formed in 1691, had

only been intended to run for a year. Now it was extended for the duration of the war.

Because of the defection of Saxony the crucial problem for the Empire in 1692 was the lack of a unified command. The problem did not extend to the Middle Rhine, where Brandenburg and King William could coerce or cajole the smaller states and where the French presence was limited to the odd cavalry raid. On the Upper Rhine it was a different matter. Duke Max, now returned from Italy with a blot on his resumé, was a problematic leader; he was given the job of Viceroy of the Spanish Netherlands, where he would be under the watchful eye of King William, but unfortunately his regiments either went with him or continued to serve in Italy.

The Württemberg Regent, Friedrich Karl, was unsuitable, as was the Elector Palatine and the other Rhineland electors. The Landgrave of Hesse was committed to the fighting in Brabant and usually took his best regiments to that country every year now (though this year the bulk of them did serve on the Rhine). There was a Franconian general, Christian Ernst Margrave von Brandenburg-Bayreuth, whom Leopold raised to the rank of field marshal in August of 1691, explicitly to act as his loyal representative. But he had not the gravitas of a Lorraine and the Swabians refused to take orders from him. All of the local princes, in fact, were either not competent to lead troops in the field or were not trusted to do so, for fear they would begin to act like Saxony and Brandenburg. Fortunately, the French had no ambitions for the Rhine theatre in 1692.

The Most Expensive Hat in History — Part 2

It will be recalled that Hanover's bid for an electoral hat was made public in 1692, resulting a great deal of bad feeling, to put it mildly. The vote came on 17 October of this year. It passed, barely. Brandenburg, Bavaria, Saxony, and Mainz — the followers of the Third Party — were in favour, despite their secret jealousy. It set a useful precedence. Trier, Cologne, Pfalz, and many of the smaller states, including Hesse, were opposed. This was the root of much pro-French sentiment in the early decades of the 18th Century. Ernst August's cousins in Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel were the most enraged. They were the elder branch.

In 1693 cousin Anton Ulrich began talking of an open alliance with France in concert with Denmark (the latter having issues with Sweden at the time and finding little sympathy among the Coalition members). War almost broke out between Hanover and Wolfenbüttel but England vetoed the idea. The deal with Denmark fell through. France helped diffuse the situation by withdrawing her subsidy to Wolfenbüttel. By this point the French were looking to deescalate the war, not start new fires.

The Rhine Campaign

Not only had *maréchal* de Lorges been instructed to remain on the defensive, he was significantly outnumbered as the campaign opened. Most of the Brandenburgers would wind up fighting in Brabant, but the Franconian-Swabian association and the lesser lights supporting it still overmatched the French.

Nonetheless, the Rhine was hardly a solid wall of enemy troops. Sometime in January, *maréchal de camp* Tallard crossed the Rhine at Philippsburg with a large body of horse and dragoons, penetrating as far east as Heilbronn, 56 Km away. In February, *maréchal de camp* Melac led a similar coursing around Mannheim, burning villages which refused to pay contributions.

(Apart from these two *maréchaux de camp*, Lorges had for subordinates *lieutenans généraux* Choiseil, de la Feuilles, Chamilly, and d'Uxelles. The other *maréchaux de camp* were Bartillac, the ubiquitous Feuquières, and Breteche.)

Once the primary season opened, Lorges ravaged the countryside on the left bank of the Rhine to within 12 Km of Mainz. The Germans were seriously alarmed by Lorges' energy. Though his army was much smaller, it always spent the winter quartered in a concentrated manner, relatively near to the Rhine. Therefore, in mid December the Rhine princes had asked for aid from the Flanders Army. This was refused, with the suggestion that perhaps the new Elector of Saxony should start pulling his own weight.

The Emperor, in contrast, talked of besieging Philippsburg, or even Landau. Unable to supply many troops himself thanks to his Hungarian offensives, he authorised the Rhineland Circles to levy a large number of men: 3,000 Bavarians, 3,000 Saxons, 3,000 Swedes, 6,000 Luxembourgers, 4,000 Württembergers, 1,000 Hessians, 8,000 Franconians, 8,000 Swabians, 2,000 Imperial Hussars.

These were paper totals, but, surprisingly, the numbers were reached, one way or another. The Elector of Saxony did fulfill his quota, but hired troops from Celle and Hanover to do so, men badly needed in Flanders. The Bavarian total, 5 battalions, was in excess of the men who followed Duke Max to Brussels or served in Italy. The only questionable figures are for the Swedes and Luxembourgers. Swedish numbers refer to troops paid for by Sweden, namely those of Holstein Gothorp. What troops Luxembourg paid for is unclear. Luxembourg had no indigenous army; it was a Spanish province. Therefore the Spanish must have paid for 6,000 men from somewhere, and since they had no money, the troops were really funded by the Maritime Powers, meaning they may have served in Flanders. However, the ecclesiastical electorates and the Elector Palatine are not included in the list so perhaps their troops were paid for by 'Luxembourg'. Also, the Hessians contributed most of

their army. South of the main area of operations, local militia continued to hold the Black Forest and extend their entrenchments.

Overall command of the main army went to the Imperial field marshal the Margrave von Brandenburg-Bayreuth, seconded by General Thüngen, Governor of Mainz. As already explained, Bayreuth, though a competent commander, and holding Imperial authority, was unable to impose his will on the princes under his command. This seems, counterintuitively, to be the chief reason why the Hessians remained on the Rhine instead of going off to Brabant. Bayreuth could not command the loyalty of the Swabians outside their own territory and needed an alternative source of troops. Bayreuth held a council of war with the Landgrave of Hesse and the counts Styrum and Lippe, his chief subordinates, at Dieburg, east of Darmstadt. They decided to split the army in two, one corps at Heidelberg under Bayreuth, and the other at Mainz, under the Landgrave.

[Below: Brandenburg-Bayreuth. He was affiliated with the Brandenburg House of Hohenzollern but not in the direct line. His branch of the family had remained in the South.]




Upper Rhine Theatre of War 1692

Scale & Legend

- Town
- ◆ Fortification
- Shore/River

@10 Km

1. Early July: Hessians move against Lorges who retreats from Worms to Neustadt; Landgrave falls back; Lorges returns to Worms
2. 29-31 August: combined German crossing at Mannheim; Lorges retreats to Neustadt
3. 1 Sept: fight at Speyer; Germans withdraw
4. 21/22 Sept: Lorges crosses the Rhine
5. Landgrave & Bayreuth split up; Bayreuth crosses Rhine
6. 27 Sept: action at Heidelshiem
7. Landgrave besieges Ebernberg; Lorges responds 6 Oct; Bayreuth intercepts
8. 9 Oct: German flight & French pursuit





[Johann Karl "Hans" von Thüngen c.1700. Notice the eye-patch which appears to have been added to the portrait. Thüngen lost that eye during the siege of Bonn, when a grenade showered him with splinters of stone. He began his career in the service of Lorraine. Late in the Dutch War he transferred to the service of Würzburg. Fighting in Hungary as commander of the Franconian contingent he entered Imperial service in 1684, but was regularly seconded to serve particular princes, notably the archbishop of Mainz. He served with distinction both in the Nine Years' War and War of the Spanish Succession, dying in 1709.]

The latter crossed the Rhine on 6 July and marched against Lorges, who was then near Worms. By evening the two armies were camped close to one another, resulting in some minor skirmishes.

An action had already occurred at Worms on 2 July. Lorges had garrisoned the faubourg (the town was still ruinous) with of 300 men. These were attacked by 5 regiments of dragoons from Hesse's army. The Germans summoned the French to surrender, but their commander did not realise the Landgrave was nearby and thought he could be rescued, so he refused. In consequence there was a fierce fight. The French holed up in the Church of Notre Dame and withstood an assault of 1,000 dragoons for 24 hours before the enemy fired the gate to the compound and fought their way into the sacristy, where the surviving French surrendered. 200 of them were cut

down when the dragoons burst in, but they left an estimated 300 dead dragoons in the square outside.

Lorges was seriously outnumbered by the Landgrave's army, so he retreated west over the plain of Pfeddersheim, north of the town of the same name. Here, the plain is cut by two tributaries of the Rhine, the Pfrim to the north and the Eisen to the south, which secured his flanks as he moved to Heppenheim on the Eisen, 7 Km southwest of Worms.

The Landgrave pursued, but failed to observe Lorges detach the *marquis de Villars* (the future French marshal) and 2,000 horse, who concealed themselves along the Eisen. When the Allies tried to cross, Villars attacked their vanguard, forcing them to flee into the river and swim to safety. 300 Germans became casualties and some prisoners were taken.

This action should not have been enough to halt the pursuit, but it tipped the scales. Friction of war was quickly wearing down the Landgrave's offensive. First, there was flooding on the Rhine, and concerns that the bridge built the year before would not stand the strain. Then, thanks to Villars, Lorges had broken contact and seemed to be making for the Rhine and a crossing into Baden's lands. This led the various notables in the army who held lands in that region to agitate for its defence. Also, by this point in the war Alsace was quite heavily defended by local forces holding strong entrenchments, so while it *could* be conquered, the process would take a long time, too long to then turn back and succour Baden. So, Bayreuth undertook to cover Baden while the Landgrave recrossed the Rhine to hold a line from Heidelberg to Koblenz.

Lorges did not in fact cross the Rhine after all. He returned to Worms and camped there for quite some time, until he had received major reinforcements from the Northeast Frontier.

The Germans resolved to try again. Elements of the 2 Imperial hussar regiments, numbering 300 men, assembled at Mainz, and 2 regiments of Württemberg dragoons mustered in the Black Forest. Bayreuth then marched to Weisloch, 15 Km east of the Rhine at about the latitude of Speyer. This was on 27 August. The next day he marched to Schwetzingen, 10 Km WSW of Heidelberg, and on 29 August he reached Mannheim with his foot and artillery, where he rendezvoused with a train of 6 cannon and ammunition sent from Heidelberg. The Landgrave of Hesse linked up with him there, giving Bayreuth 30,000 men.

From 29 to 31 August the two corps crossed the Rhine at the island of Sandhoven, at separate points. In the months since the Germans erected their bridge in the previous year the French had garrisoned the island, building a redoubt to contest the crossing. Feuquières commanded, with 2 brigades of foot, a regiment of

dragoons, and 500 horse. He held out for some time but was eventually forced off the island.

Only a few small skirmishes followed on the left bank. In a repeat of 1691, Lorges rushed to occupy the Türckheim defile, reformed his army at Neustadt, which he strongly garrisoned, then headed for Philippsburg, by way of Petite Holland, hoping to draw the enemy after him. The ploy worked. Not chasing the French last year had proved counterproductive.

From the enemy's motions, Lorges thought they might either challenge his rearguard or occupy Speyer, which would threaten his crossing operation. He led his army down the Speyerbach, using it to cover his flank. An officer named Gobert screened him along the river with 100 horse. Meanwhile, the advance guard, under Breteche, kept pace with the army but camped ahead of it, while 4 dragoon regiments escorted the heavy baggage to the key defile near Speyer called 'the Capuchin', which led into Petite Holland.

The enemy were indeed making for Speyer, but the French advance guard arrived there first and established a blocking position, allowing Lorges and the main body to come up in safety. (Though Speyer was in ruins and thus could not be truly garrisoned, the gap between the Forest and the Rhine was extremely narrow and easily defended.)

The Germans tried to seize the Tower of the Thorn (Tour de l'Épine) which guarded the bridge over the Speyerbach. It was held by only a small party and the commander was beginning to negotiate his surrender when Melac (who was ill but nevertheless at his post) arrived and had his men fire on the Germans, driving them back. 400 German dragoons then tried another crossing upstream but were repulsed by 20 French dragoons who were again reinforced just in time. Feuquières, meanwhile, entered Petite Holland and secured it against the enemy by firing the cannon he had with him. He took up a position in the ruins of Speyer.

The Germans responded by erecting a battery by the Tower of Speyer. This was a feint. Under cover of its fire, work parties cut paths through the forest west of the town, and occupied the village of Dudenhofen (Römerberg-Dudenhofen). 4 battalions of 'Swedes' (Holsteiners) and a battery of 3 cannon were deployed in the bridgehead. The Speyerbach is split into at least two channels at this point, and there was still the southern arm of the river to cross. This was impassable except at a bridge guarded by a tower within musket range of the village. Breteche prevented them seizing the crossing by bringing up an Irish battalion.

The French then deployed their whole army along the Speyerbach from the Rhine to Dudenhofen, putting their infantry behind the rising ground and establishing a number of batteries which played on the Germans. The 'musketry was also very lively', lasting well into the night.

The enemy probed Feuquières' position about half an hour before dark (roughly 8:30pm). The fire became so heavy there that Lorges and his staff rode over, fearing a breakthrough. Villars was sent to watch the Left, where, using some Irish battalions which had just arrived, during the night he pushed the enemy out of Dudenhofen, taking the church and the castle. The Irish attack was so vehement that 2 of the 'Swedish' battalions fled, abandoning their equipment, including numerous bridging pontoons. The Germans pulled back all along the line, out of artillery range and behind a ravine.

This action took place on 1 September. The next day, the Germans withdrew. The French pursued and attacked their rearguard, losing 100 men but inflicting over 500 casualties and taking a quantity of horses. Lorges did not pursue far, turning aside to Bestheim (yet another village known only to Quincy), still intent on crossing the Rhine.

On 4 September *maréchal de camp* Masel was sent across the Rhine with 300 horse, including some carabiniers and the Cuirassiers du Roi. These fought a skirmish with a party of German horse.

Another encounter took place on the night of 7/8 September. The bulk of the German army was now camped at 'Munnengeim' — probably Mundenheim, about 3 Km southwest of Mannheim. In those days this position was within a loop of the Rhine which would have secured both their flanks. It would be isolated from the bridge at Sandhoven, which was below Mannheim, but it is entirely possible new bridges were being constructed here (there are modern bridges, so the site is suitable).

The French cavalry regiment Royal Étranger was tasked with conducting a reconnaissance. At 2am they came on the enemy camp and bumped into a picquet of 8 hussars. The French split up, the bulk of the party chasing the picquet and 40 horsemen going off in a different direction. It is unclear why, unless they were hunting for another picquet to chase. These 40 were suddenly attacked by 300 more hussars who emerged from a wood. They sustained the combat for some time, hoping for relief, but were in danger of being enveloped. At last a small group of French dragoons showed up. These were ordered to dismount and occupy a ditch on the left of the French horse to cover the latter's withdrawal. The French suffered heavy losses, though the dragoons killed 12 of the hussars as they rode by and caused the remainder of that group of enemy to swerve aside. A French brigadier was killed.

Because of the closeness of the opposing armies, Lorges only sent Masel's column across the Rhine. The rest of his army camped for two weeks on the Height of Landau, about a day's march south of Neustadt, observing the Germans from a distance. At last he decided they were only trying to pin him in place and lacked the means of undertaking any serious offensive action. So, leaving 2,000 horse to observe and guard the defiles, he again

marched for the Rhine, crossing on either 21 or 22 September, using a bridge he erected at Hagenbach, 37 Km south of Neustadt. Pausing for a day or so he marched to Berghausen, 2.5 Km east of Baden-Durlach, on 24 September.

Bayreuth was meanwhile probing Lorges' old position. On 18 September the turtle stuck its neck out and moved to the unidentifiable site of 'Bernstengre', then on 21 September used 1,500 men and 4 cannon to obtain the surrender of a redoubt called Fort Slauf, garrisoned by 50 men. Since Bernstengre cannot be identified it is not possible to determine whether the fort was an outwork of Neustadt, or Speyer, or one of the fortlets along the Rhine. A spot near Speyer seems likely; the *Geschichte de Sächsischen Armee* speaks of the Germans foiling a by the French against that town. It seems certain all these movements took place north of the Speyer Forest.

Only now did Bayreuth receive word that Lorges had crossed the river. Swabia was not defenceless, there was a corps at Eppingen, 22 Km west of Heilbronn, but it lacked cavalry. The Regent of Württemberg (the current duke was a minor) was dispatched with 5 regiments of horse to augment it. (Eppingen was a central position, roughly equidistant from the Neckar, Rhine, and Black Forest.) The Landgrave of Hesse was also detached to maintain a watch over the left bank of the Rhine while Bayreuth and the main body marched by way of Frankenthal to pass the Rhine at Mannheim and come south.

The season was advanced but there were yet four significant incidents to take place. On 25 September Lorges was camped at Wilferdingen, 10 Km northwest of Pforzheim. His immediate goal was simply to inflict pain on the latter. *Lieutenant général* Chamilly was detached with *maréchal de camp* Breteche, 1,000 horse, 1,000 dragoons, and 1,200 foot. Since this was to be a siege, 4 four-pounder and 5 light cannon were also sent. Leaving camp at daybreak on 26 September, Chamilly arrived at the town around 8 or 9am.

After ordering a reconnaissance, Breteche led a group of between 50 and 100 dragoons against a similar number of enemy troops whom he had noticed outside the fortifications. These were making for the gate, so he crossed the moat under fire from the town and came up the other bank to intercept them, forcing them to retreat into the nearby woods. Chamilly arrived and reinforced Breteche's position close to the town with an additional 300 foot and a few dragoons.

A small party of French was ambushed by 300 hussars; only 25 French made it back, around midday or early afternoon. These hussars came from the camp of the Regent of Württemberg, which was not at Pforzheim, but at the village of Heidelberg, 13 Km northeast, down the Enz River. Quincy is unclear what the French were up to, but does say they were envoys. The assumption is they

were summoning Pforzheim to surrender, but it could also be that they had been sent to talk to the Regent, regarding monies still owed the French, per an agreement made the previous year. In any case, they were somewhere on the road to the camp at Heidelberg, and the survivors reported on the state of that place.

Lorges accurately estimated the enemy camp at 5-6,000 men. He resolved to advance himself with a large portion of his army: the whole (both lines) of his right wing cavalry and the infantry brigade of Picardie. D'Uxelles remained in command of the rest, with orders to send the artillery by night as soon as possible and to follow on with the infantry and left wing cavalry the next day, to rendezvous by 2am on 27 September.

[French infantry brigades had from 4-6 battalions. The larger ones were usually Swiss or German so there were probably 4, or 5 if a militia battalion was tacked on. Régiment Picardie had 4 battalions on the books but there is no confirmation that all were present. The brigade would have contained at least 1 battalion from that regiment; since it was a senior regiment the brigade took its name, also since it was a senior regiment there is a higher probability all battalions were present.]

Lorges arrived at Pforzheim about 6pm. He formed for battle and remained under arms all night. The enemy did not stir from their camp. Meanwhile, the siege continued. Chamilly erected a battery on the edge of the ditch by the faubourg and soon made a breach. Fearing a night assault, the garrison, 500 men and 12 officers, plus the Commandant, surrendered at discretion on 26 September. French losses were 12 infantry and 8 dragoons.

The Combat of Heidelberg (27 September)

This led to the second incident, the Combat of Heidelberg. Lorges was unsure where the enemy were and what they were doing. Why had they not tried to raise the siege? *Maréchal de camp* Masel was sent out see, taking only a small force. The dragoon regiments of *Mestre de Camp-Général*, Gobert, Ganges-Cadet, and St. Hermine were sent after him in case support was needed. The reconnaissance was conducted with such skill that the Germans never even noticed. They were still in their camp, enjoying the day. Lorges sent word that Masel should hide in a nearby wood on the right of the enemy position and continue to observe, while the dragoons concealed themselves in ambush behind the wood.

Lorges received word that Graf von Styrum was bringing 5,000 horse to join the enemy camp. He therefore decided to move up his whole army as one body, hoping to attack the camp before Styrum arrived. If that was not possible he would at least continue to enjoy superior strength. The march was made in 4 columns using the same wood for cover during the approach, the infantry under *lieutenant général* Joyeuse on the right, artillery in the center, and the cavalry under Chamilly on the left.

D'Uxelles had command of the infantry and Breteche led the line. To confuse the enemy, the French garrison at Pforzheim, 800 horse and 1,200 foot, was ordered to fire cannon to simulate an ongoing siege.

The Regent of Württemberg, whose HQ was in Heidelberg, had 6,000 cavalry with him, a mix of 6 regiments of horse and dragoons, plus 4-500 Imperial hussars, but only 2 cannon. Heidelberg had a palisaded wet ditch and a covered way, constructed by the soldiers. The camp itself was on high ground, in some places inaccessible, with a brook running along the foot of the slope. There was also a marsh. Behind the camp was a dense wood.

Alerted by peasants that the French had 4 regiments of dragoons, roughly 2,000 men, hidden behind the wood, the Regent decided to chase them away, assuming that they would not contest his 6,000. He only sent out 2 large squadrons, with 150 hussars in support. The latter scouted for defiles and hovered on the wings of Masel's position.

Lorges arrived just as the enemy squadrons were approaching Masel's position. Masel was ordered to deal with the hussars, who were a kilometre away. These made as if to stand, then retreated to warn the Regent of the approach of Lorges' whole army. This gave the Germans time to form for battle, but it was a hasty deployment. They were drawn up facing upriver, with their Right on Heidelberg and their Left on a hamlet called Mühlacker. Outnumbered, their squadrons had very large gaps between them, to simulate greater numbers.

When the enemy hussars had retreated, Lorges sent his cavalry ahead so rapidly that it surprised the German main body, and, coming on the right flank of the enemy line, caused that wing to retreat in disorder into Heidelberg. A few dragoons disputed the passing of the brook which had to be crossed at Mühlacker, but they were overcome, and the brigades of Florensac and Montgomery rode straight for the camp. There was some difficulty getting up the hill but by taking whatever defiles they could the crest was reached. Attacking in this manner worked to the advantage of the French. The Germans were already shaken, and though they tried to rally at the camp, when they saw enemy horsemen approaching from every direction, they fled enmasse.

Masel and the 4 regiments of dragoons who had supported him were ordered to pursue, dividing into 4 columns to chase the scattered enemy through the woods beyond the battlefield. The leaders of these columns were men of current or future renown: Feuquières, Villars, Cogny, and Tallard. Lorges, leading the *régiment* Duras, came after with Bartillac, and sent the regiments of Colonel Général and Florence to join the dragoons. The pursuit ran through copses and vineyards, over broken ground, down the far slope right to the banks of the Enz River. No time was taken to find the fords, the French

swam the river and continued the chase. Cogny's column captured the Regent himself and a number of other ransom-able prisoners were taken, including Baron Sohier, the Bavarian sub-commander. The French also scored one of the Regent's carriages containing money, and his baggage mules with his plate and other possessions.

On the left of the German line, some of the men fled as far as Vaihingen an der Enz, 8 Km away. This place was walled and had a garrison of 200 regulars plus 3,000 armed peasants. There was also a citadel, containing the French prisoners taken earlier. The garrison caught the panic fever and routed, abandoning not only the prisoners but all the stores which had been gathered to keep them from the French, *and* over 100,000 livres of silver intended to pay the troops.

Apart from the high ranking prisoners and the baggage, this action cost the Germans 900 casualties and 400 prisoners. The 2 cannon were also taken, with their caissons, and 2,000 horses, plus 9 standards. News of the defeat caused the garrison of Knittlingen (11 Km northwest of Mühlacker), 600-strong, to abandon the place; a French detachment occupied it and found 6 cannon. 3 more guns were picked up in Neuenburg, 3 miles from Pforzheim.

The First Siege of Ebernburg (22 Sept — 8 Oct)

[For a picture of Ebernburg see the second siege, described in the last pages of this Commentary.]

The penultimate incident of note was the German siege of Ebernburg Castle. Owned by the Lord of Sickingen but taken by the French in 1688, Ebernburg, 4.6 Km southwest of Bad Kreuznach, was a French post which routinely raided the Palatinate on the left bank of the Rhine. It was becoming a nuisance, a nest of land-pirates. With nothing else to do but keep watch on Alsace, the Landgrave of Hesse decided to deal with it. This required some preparation as it was a strong post, secure on a high rock outcrop. Even after Lorges was informed of its siege he was not too concerned and first took contributions from Württemberg before making the long march back to succour it.

Hesse invested the castle on 22 September. His camp was at 'Henelsheim', yet another 'Quincy-village' that cannot be identified. Probably it was at no great distance and would have been to the southeast, for the Nahe River covers the north and east of Ebernburg.

After a short time, the Landgrave had 3 batteries in operation, one of 24-pounders, one of 12-pounders, and one of 4-pounders, totalling 20 pieces. He also had 3 mortars firing 100-pound shells. Trenches were opened on 28 September. The guns fired 500 rounds per day and did a great deal of damage but by 7 October had still failed to make a breach in the bastions which covered the gate. The steep angle of attack may have had something

to do with this. By that date the trenches had advanced to the palisades and all was ready for an assault, if only the breach could be made. The Governor was a M. du Bois, who took all precautions. His magazines were buried deep, and his men organised to put out fires as quickly as they broke out and to make repairs to the key structures, particularly the cisterns.

Lorges, now concerned for the fortress, arrived at Philippsburg at 3pm on 6 October. He had with him a large advance guard consisting of all the cavalry, all his grenadiers, and 6,000 fusiliers, 120 from each battalion. The rest of his army was making the best speed it could.

Quincy gives a garbled account of Bayreuth's movements to intercept which would make an interesting connect-the-dots drawing. Bayreuth was clearly not involved in the action at Heidelberg. That involved the Swabian corps and its augmentation of Württemberg cavalry. He was probably hovering around the environs of Mannheim — in other words, forming a link between the Swabians and the Hessians and creating a 'front' along a northwest-southeast axis.

When Lorges began crossing the Rhine, Bayreuth was either on the left bank already, a little north of Speyer, or marched north into the Bergstat and crossed the Rhine at Mainz. (It is also possible his army was divided and different corps did different things). The first clear bit of information is that he occupied a blocking position at Flonheim, 15 Km ESE of the Landgrave's camp, on 8 October and was a day's march ahead of the French. Lorges detached *Général* Breteche and 1,000 horse to shadow Bayreuth, but this does not confirm the Germans were already on the left bank, since Breteche could have followed them down the Rhine. (And, if on the left bank, why did Bayreuth not contest the French crossing?)

While on the final leg of their own march, the men in Lorges' army heard a great cannonade and the fire of musketry, and assumed the final assault was in progress. The French could not hope to get there until the following morning. This was when Breteche sent word that the Landgrave had raised the siege. Though Quincy does not give details, most likely Bayreuth and the Landgrave decided they could not both prosecute the siege and face Lorges. It is quite possible Bayreuth only had a flying column with him. Quincy does say they misjudged it was possible for the French to reach them that very day.

So, the sound the French heard was actually the besiegers firing off as much ammunition as they could before abandoning the rest. The French captured 3,000 grenades and over 1,000 bits of siege equipment and other ammunition. Du Bois lost exactly 1 sergeant and 13 men during the whole siege, despite the terrific bombardment.

The Germans must also have decided they could not face Lorges at all; they retreated so quickly that Breteche could not catch them. They crossed the Rhine at Bingen

over a 2-day period, except for 3,000 men under General Thüngen, who went to Mainz. The Landgrave's baggage and artillery went last, screened by a rearguard of 2 regiments. The rapidity of the crossing adds weight to the idea that Bayreuth only had a small mobile corps with him and that most of the men who made the crossing were the Landgrave's.

Lorges received word of the crossing at 2am. Immediately he led his cavalry at top speed for Bingen, forming for battle on the Heights of Ketsinghen an hour before dawn. But, the crossing was well executed. Daylight revealed the usual detritus of an army's wake and only 50 or so stragglers were taken. The most remarkable thing about the Germans' march was that the Artillery was made to keep pace.

In Quincy's words, the Allies were mortified. Not only had they abandoned Württemberg to its fate in order to take the fight to the enemy, but their offensive had been feeble in the extreme. The Court of Württemberg began to show less zeal for the Cause.

Lorges made his final camp of the campaign at 'Henelsheim', on the ruin of the Landgrave's schemes, then sent his men into quarters for the winter. The Germans did likewise.

Winter in Rheinfels (16 December — 2 January 1693)

This was not quite the end of operations on the Rhine. A favourable frost led to Versailles ordering a siege of Rheinfels, a castle on the left bank of the Rhine just north of Sankt Goar. The object of the siege is not stated in the sources. It might be thought the castle was valuable because it controlled the crossing at Sankt Goar, There were few suitable crossing points along the Rhine Gorge. It also dominated the river traffic, especially if the same power controlled the smaller castle on the opposite bank, Katz Castle. It was also the largest fortress on the river between Koblenz and Mainz — the place is huge. But the deciding factor may have been that the place was owned by Hesse. The County of Katzenelnbogen was obtained by the Hessians during the Renaissance, and the Landgraves liked to tack 'Count of Katzenelnbogen' onto their list of titles. Strictly speaking, the owners were the Hessen-Rheinfels branch of the family, but they were closely related to the main dynasty. Most of the county was on the right bank, but there were two enclaves on the left bank, one here at Sankt Goar, and a smaller one 9 Km south of Koblenz. Attacking Rheinfels would distract the Hessians, who were hypersensitive about protecting his property.

[Confusingly, the key feature of the other enclave was a small town called Rinsfeld (modern Rhens). This town had political and cultural significance as the site of the Königsstuhl, a pavilion where diplomatic negotiations and coronations were held in the Middle Ages. Even more confusingly, there is a Rinsfeld on the Upper Rhine (mentioned in the 1690 section). It seems to have had a much higher strategic value, being a

backdoor into Upper Alsace and the site of conflict in other wars, but not in this one.]

Maréchal de camp Tallard had charge of the operation. He took 12,000 men from Lorraine and the French garrisons in the Electorate of Trier, a mix of cavalry and infantry, plus detachments from farther afield which arrived a day late, and invested the place on 13 December. His approach was probably made by the route used by Lorraine in 1690, leaving the Moselle in the vicinity of Münstermaifeld, where the land is flat and open, and marching by Buchholz and Leiningen, on the western side of the ridges which line the Rhine in this sector.

[It is said Tallard wanted revenge for the destruction of one of his castles in the Dauphiné which the Duke of Savoy had destroyed. Tallard had already paid back Duke Victor, but apparently he was also angry with the Hessians.]

Sankt Goar is aligned along a river road wedged between the Rhine and a high plateau immediately to the west, known as the Patersberg, which rises sharply 600 metres above the river. The town was walled but not to any great strength, and of course could be completely dominated by fire from the plateau above.

About 600 metres northwest of the town center is Rheinfels Castle, now a ruin, perched on an outcrop extending from a corner of the plateau. The north face of the plateau is cut here by a deep valley with a small river at the bottom; the slope is again almost 600 metres high. Relatively easy access was only to be had from the southwest, for the castle is not at the top of the plateau but slightly below it, but a generous estimate of the approach from this direction is a width of 2-300 metres. The castle itself was built on a series of raised terraces and had been given a modern 'star' trace, including a ravelin halfway up the valley slope as well as flanking works. Whatever defenses lay across the neck of land connecting it to the plateau have been obliterated by a car park.

On 15 December Tallard received a chest wound from a musket ball while making a close reconnaissance and had to be evacuated. The Governor of Mont Royal, *marquis* d'Harcourt was given the command but he remained at Mont Royal, while the Governor of Saarlouis, M. de Choisi, was sent to oversee the work, arriving on 16 December (he must have traveled by boat). Choisi was a master engineer.

Trenches were opened on the night of 16/17 December. Unfortunately, the heavy guns were slow to arrive, thanks to the commencement of a thaw, so that when the first battery was unmasked on 21 December there were only 4 pieces in operation. Over the next few days 7 other cannon were emplaced. They concentrated on a tower which dominated the French trenches to such an extent that the besiegers were kept constantly in motion repositioning their cannon and abandoning and occupying

forward posts. The Governor, a Baron Gartz, seems to have been an energetic person.

Meanwhile, the Landgrave of Hesse was assembling an army on the far bank of the Rhine. On 24 December he unmasked a battery of 18 cannon which drove the French to abandon their works on the Patersberg, where they had been attempting to isolate the castle. This was unfortunate, because the French guns had just managed to ruin the bastions on that side, named Meysenkarne and Teverspeyers. Now they had to begin again by erecting a new battery at a safer distance.

Hesse also sent both supplies and reinforcements across the river. 7 regiments (a mix of cavalry and infantry) also escorted an overland convoy which resupplied both town and castle on more than one occasion.

27 December the French received 4 more guns but lost 100 men to an enemy sortie.

28 December the French bombarded the town with 2 cannon and launched 3 consecutive assaults, their trenches having reached the covered way. Quincy says the attacks came from three different directions, which may indicate the town was attacked as well. It is possible attempts were made to sneak up the slopes on the northwest angle of the castle. One attack lasted 5 hours and cost 200 men. The covered way was gained, but not for long, being retaken at all points by a furious sortie.

That day also, the Landgrave of Hesse crossed the Rhine at Koblenz with his entire corps, the cavalry first and the foot on the next day. They were augmented by local forces (probably garrison troops from Koblenz belonging to the Elector of Trier).


Threatened with encirclement, Choisi maintained the pressure until 30 December, then raised the siege and made a hasty withdrawal. The siege train was sent off the night of 31 December and the rest of the train on the night of 1 January, leaving only 2 cannon and a mortar to maintain the pretence of a bombardment. This was effective enough to lead the Governor to fear an immanent assault. On 2 January the French rearguard, composed of cavalry and the last of the artillery, evacuated the camp.

There was no pursuit. The thaw continued, making the roads useless. Furthermore, the *marquis* d'Harcourt brought a considerable force down the Moselle. Learning the siege had been abandoned he covered the retreat.

Siege of Rheinfels

16 December 1692 - 2 January 1693

from a 1705 map by Nicholas de Fer



Notes:

- 1) On the original, the covered way (C), as well as a detached redoubt sited on the main French approach, are only pencilled in, suggesting they may have been improvements made after the siege; similarly, it shows some very lightly sketched works on the far side of the ravine. Because Quincy's text mentions the covered way, and because the French trenches seem to approach it, it has been included in this diagram. It may have been constructed during the siege.
- 2) An optical illusion may suggest the fortress is higher than the plateau to the south. This is not the case. The fortress does overlook the plateau, but its foundations are below the crest. Likewise the covered way runs below the crest and not along a raised embankment. The plateau is about 600 metres above the level of the Rhine. Today, the slopes are heavily wooded.

1693 — Return of the Dauphin

Meanwhile, the army which had been sent to Germany under the command of Monseigneur and of the Marechal de Lorges, did little or nothing. The Marechal wished to attack Heilbronn, but Monseigneur was opposed to it; and, to the great regret of the principal generals and of the troops, the attack was not made. Monseigneur returned early to Versailles.

Saint-Simon. Memoirs of Louis XIV, Book I, p.69.

1693 was France's big blow-out. A four-front offensive. Shake the house until the foundations crack. At the end of this campaign one could say, well yes, the French made a few gains, but no one sued for peace and the war went on, and France was just that much more exhausted. 1693 was also to be the year of the Great Famine, and the previous two years had not exactly been stellar ones for the farmers. The prolonging of the war also meant increased taxation. The French Army already exceeded a quarter of a million men, and the Allies fielded a similar amount. The numbers would continue to grow. Though the Army had priority in everything, and though the Allies were being made to foot the bill in many regions, by the spring of 1693 even French troops were going unpaid, and sometimes unfed.

Nevertheless, in the long term the four-front offensive paid dividends. The military offensive was accompanied by a peace offensive which offered a number of juicy concessions to various interested parties. Duke Victor of Savoy, who had never stopped talking quietly to the French, now began very, very secret negotiations with the local enemy commanders on the Italian front. He stayed in the war for another three years, because he wanted more concessions both from France and from his allies, but as soon as he got what he wanted, he stepped aside and the Grand Alliance fell apart.

[The Famine's main culprit appears to have been the Icelandic volcano Hekla. The eruption started very violently, ejecting 60,000 cubic metres of material per second, and lasted for over 7 months. The ash plume extended as far as Norway. (This was not Hekla's largest eruption in modern times. That took place in 1766 and lasted two years.)]

Negotiations

At the beginning of the year 1693, it seemed the war was just going to go on and on. France was invincible, at least on land, yet the Coalition could not seek peace while the enemy was ahead on points. They knew Louis XIV. Anything they gave now would be pocketed and the hand would come out for more. The Sun King felt the same. As Lynn puts it (pp.232-233), 'Louis learned the hard but eternal lesson that it is far easier to start a war than to end one. By 1693 he fervently wished for peace, but not at any price, a formula that paradoxically always seems to lead to paying a very high price in the long run.'

William of Orange, the prime mover of the Grand Alliance, was similarly desirous of peace. As the French ran out of money to maintain their navy, it became clear they could

not threaten England, however much damage they might inflict through privateering. Eventually, Louis IV was going to have to recognise William as a fellow monarch.

[Interestingly, the French tried to hire ships from Sweden.]

Could the Coalition survive long enough for that to happen? The Germans were already falling out amongst themselves. The Emperor had had to buy Hanover's manpower pool (for use in Hungary) at the price of making its duke an Elector of the Empire. Now Saxony was forming a political league of interested princelings to oppose this concession, including some key contributors to the war in the Low Countries, such as Denmark, Münster, Hesse-Cassel, and Wolfenbüttel.

[Ironically, Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel belonged to the Hanoverian House.]

This gave France an 'angle'. That formidable diplomat, the *comte d'Avaux*, was sent to Sweden. The Swedes, feeling neglected, had already offered to mediate in 1690 and 1691, and d'Avaux brought the happy news that their help would be welcome. A deal was concluded whereby Sweden would explore bilateral peace talks with the German princes, and even with the Emperor, going behind King William's back — drawing on the tendency of the lesser princes to treat William and Leopold as leveraging tools. (Incidentally, Spain, England, and Sweden all acclaimed Hanover's elevation to an electorate before it was made official, which seriously embarrassed Leopold; this cannot have been accidental.) The Swedes also agreed to pull their troops out of the war, although in reality they merely put the regiments, already being subsidised by Holland, under Dutch colours.

[This would have been an advantage for the Dutch, who not longer had to worry about Sweden's interests when using their troops.]

Before he could be completely shut out, therefore, King William also had to open negotiations with France. Over the course of this year's summer he allowed some informal talks between a French merchant called Daguerre and the Dutch diplomat Everard Dijkveldt. These progressed far enough for Daguerre to be replaced by the Abbé Morel. As they always did, the French opened a second channel through a Pole living in Amsterdam who had his pulse on public opinion. Word that the Dutch burghers were growing sick of war allowed the French to adjust the 'volume' and direction of their demands.

From 1693 these negotiations became continuous, though they often stuttered. Two of the difficulties have already been mentioned: William and Louis distrusted each other, and Louis, having given his word to James II, would not recognise William as king. Even Emperor Leopold had trouble stomaching that. The third roadblock to an early end to the war was France's desire to either retain the Spanish Duchy of Luxembourg, which they

occupied, or to trade it for an 'equivalent' number of fortresses and towns in Belgium. The diplomats could not agree on a definition of 'equivalent'.

The Wider War

In September of 1692 King Louis abandoned his last hope of a negotiated settlement, at least in the short term, and ordered the raising of 12 new infantry regiments: Blésois, Gatinos, Tierache, Albegeois, Laonnois, Auxerrois, Agenois, Charolois, Le Bours or Labourd, Bugey, Santerre. These regiments were rather small, only 3 companies each. A new Bressé regiment was created out of dismounted hussars. Free companies of local people on the frontiers were also raised, besides a number of militia battalions in Alsace. The Swiss were approached for more mercenaries. On 27 March, 1693, King Louis created 7 new marshals. Those familiar from the Rhine theatre were Joyeuse, Catinat, Villeroi, Choiseul, and Boufflers. The *duc de Noailles*, commanding in Spain, and the naval commander the *comte de Tourville* were the others.

[On 10 May the Sun King also instituted the Military Order of Saint Louis to incentivize his generals.]

In Flanders, the French continued to win limited successes. No decisive blow, just a grinding attrition that kept them ahead of the curve. It was the intention of Versailles to assail the fortress of Liège, but King Louis fell ill enroute and the campaign on the Northeast Frontier devolved into a lacklustre war of manoeuvre, capped on 29 July by the Battle of Landen (or Neerwinden), a crushing defeat for the Allies which regained the initiative for the French.

The *duc de Saint-Simon* attributes the failure of the Liège campaign in the following manner, worth quoting at length for atmosphere, even though it is not the direct subject of this Commentary:

"After having paid the last duties to my father [who had just passed away] I betook myself to Mons to join the Royal Roussillon cavalry regiment, in which I was captain. The King, after stopping eight or ten days with the ladies at Quesnoy, sent them to Namur, and put himself at the head of the army of M. de Boufflers, and camped at Gembloux, so that his left was only half a league distant from the right of M. de Luxembourg. The Prince of Orange was encamped at the Abbey of Pure, was unable to receive supplies, and could not leave his position without having the two armies of the King to grapple with: he entrenched himself in haste, and bitterly repented having allowed himself to be thus driven into a corner. We knew afterwards that he wrote several times to his intimate friend the Prince de Vaudemont, saying that he was lost, and that nothing short of a miracle could save him.

*We were in this position, with an army in every way infinitely superior to that of the Prince of Orange, and with four whole months before us to profit by our strength, when the King declared on the 8th of June that he should return to Versailles, and sent off a large detachment of the army into Germany. The surprise of the *Maréchal de Luxembourg* was without bounds.*

He represented the facility with which the Prince of Orange might now be beaten with one army and pursued by another; and how important it was to draw off detachments of the Imperial forces from Germany into Flanders, and how, by sending an army into Flanders instead of Germany, the whole of the Low Countries would be in our power. But the King would not change his plans, although M. de Luxembourg went down on his knees and begged him not to allow such a glorious opportunity to escape. Madame de Maintenon, by her tears when she parted from his Majesty, and by her letters since, had brought about this resolution.

The news had not spread on the morrow, June 9th. I chanced to go alone to the quarters of M. de Luxembourg, and was surprised to find not a soul there; every one had gone to the King's army. Pensively bringing my horse to a stand, I was ruminating on a fact so strange, and debating whether I should return to my tent or push on to the royal camp, when up came M. le Prince de Conti with a single page and a groom leading a horse. "What are you doing there?" cried he, laughing at my surprise. Thereupon he told me he was going to say adieu to the King, and advised me to do likewise. "What do you mean by saying Adieu?" answered I. He sent his servants to a little distance, and begged me to do the same, and with shouts of laughter told me about the King's retreat, making tremendous fun of him, despite my youth, for he had confidence in me. I was astonished. We soon after met the whole company coming back; and the great people went aside to talk and sneer. I then proceeded to pay my respects to the King, by whom I was honourably received. Surprise, however, was expressed by all faces, and indignation by some.

The effect of the King's retreat, indeed, was incredible, even amongst the soldiers and the people. The general officers could not keep silent upon it, and the inferior officers spoke loudly, with a license that could not be restrained. All through the army, in the towns, and even at Court, it was talked about openly. The courtiers, generally so glad to find themselves again at Versailles, now declared that they were ashamed to be there; as for the enemy, they could not contain their surprise and joy. The Prince of Orange said that the retreat was a miracle he could not have hoped for; that he could scarcely believe in it, but that it had saved his army, and the whole of the Low Countries. In the midst of all this excitement the King arrived with the ladies, on the 25th of June, at Versailles."

[Saint-Simon. Memoirs of Louis XIV, Book I, pp.66-68.]

To be fair, Louis really had been ill prior to the start of the campaign, and he was not relishing spending weeks stewing in a camp on some Brabantine heath. Nonetheless, allowing one's mood to dictate events is bad strategy.

France's efforts in Catalonia, still directed by Noailles — who was made a marshal this year along with a number of other senior commanders — would be proportionally much more successful, given the small size of the opposing armies, but the *maréchal* would be required (again) to send a part of his army away, meaning he had to pull back to the frontier. However, the Spanish counteroffensive would be ineffective in the extreme and he would not have to concede any of the forts he had acquired.

Italy would prove the most successful theatre for France, with *maréchal* Catinat fending off a siege of Pinerolo, France's gateway to Piedmont, and then winning a crushing battle against Duke Victor at Orbassano (Marsaglia). The Italians were not so mauled that they could not reconstitute their army, but from this point Duke Victor was in serious negotiations with France. The Sun King had found the chink in the Coalition's armour.

At sea, the French would sortie with nearly all their ships. Several things were to be accomplished by this operation. First, the Allies would be unable to blockade the squadrons in their separate ports. Second, a sea battle might ensue, particularly as the fleet would be attacking the Smyrna Convoy, a cloud of 400 merchantmen, mostly English and Dutch, sailing from the Levant. Third, Noailles' and Catinat's efforts along the Mediterranean coast would receive naval support. Fourth, the Allied fleets would be prevented from assisting their own ground forces.

All these things would be accomplished, but only in part. 1693 was the last year that the French Navy functioned as a battle fleet. Decommissioning their expensive battleships, from now on they would wage *guerre de course* — commerce raiding. Some historians see the attack on the Smyrna Convoy as the first such action. In it, the juicy convoy was engaged and lost a quarter of its strength, but no more; its escort was driven off but suffered minimal damage. The Allies would be able to give some support in the Mediterranean, though not to attack Toulon as had been hoped. They would also be able to attack St. Malo, as notorious a privateer base as Dunkirk.

Winter on the Rhine

The affair of Rheinfels has already been described. Apart from that the Rhine front was, as usual, quiet over the winter.

The Emperor held a conference at Cologne in mid December to discuss the growing threat to the Middle Rhine fortresses, Rheinfels being a case in point.

Summer on the Rhine

At long last there is a consistent German account to compare with Quincy. This is the campaign diary (or biography) of *Türkenlouis* — Louis of Baden — who was appointed the Emperor's *Generalleutnant* and remained so for the rest of the war.

Maréchal de Lorges retained command of French forces on the Rhine. This year, however, he would be joined by the Grand Dauphin. After the cancellation of the siege of Liège, news of the rapid fall of Heidelberg, described below, inspired King Louis to send *Monseigneur* and a sizeable corps to the Upper Rhine, there to either engage the Germans in battle or to lay siege to Heilbronn, or both.

Lorges' staff this year were the new *maréchal* Choiseul as his second, plus *lieutenans généraux* Feuillée, d'Uxelles, Villars, Breteche, Melac, the *marquis* de Revel, and the Irish exile Milord Montcashel. *Maréchaux de camp* were the duc de la Ferté, the *marquis* de Barbesieres, the *comte* du Bourg, the *marquis* d'Alegre, Vaubecourt, and Saint Frémont. As usual, Lorges' forces would muster at Neustadt. The Dauphin's corps would show up in July.

After a spectacular siege against Heidelberg, the campaign on the Rhine became mere manoeuvre, the armies first massing as reinforcements arrived, then gradually dwindling to their normal size as detachments were sent away on other tasks. Unfortunately for the simultaneous 'peace offensive', Lorges was still following the harsh rules of war laid down by Louvois and made yet more enemies among the Germans. The armies sparred for some time but neither felt strong enough to commit to a battle, even after the Dauphin showed up.

Türkenlouis

Louis William, Margrave of Baden-Baden, was born at Paris, in 1655, making him 38 when he was appointed to command the armies in Southern Germany. He was called *Türkenlouis* for his victories against the Ottomans, most recently at Slankamen in 1691. The Turks called him the Red King, due to his red uniform. In this commentary he will usually be styled 'Baden'.

Prince Louis was extremely well-connected. His uncle was the father of Eugene of Savoy, with whom he had a friendly rivalry. It was the Savoy connection that caused him to be born in Paris, but his parents were estranged, and his father kidnapped him; he was raised by his paternal step-grandmother.

He saw extensive service during the 17th Century, fighting under the elder Montecuccoli against *maréchal* Turenne and then serving under Charles of Lorraine. It was he who succoured Vienna in 1683, joining forces with the Poles to rout the Turks, and he was the victor of Nish in 1689. Baden had been considered for the top slot on the Rhine that year but the Emperor felt he could not do without him. He later served with distinction in the War of the Spanish Succession, dying in 1707.


Though his credentials were impeccable, *Türkenlouis*' appointment was opposed in some quarters. The Franconian-Swabian Association disliked him for his highhanded methods in obtaining troops for the Turkish war. The new Elector of Hanover was jealous of him. There was some nebulous personal animosity there, but Hanover had also hoped Leopold would pick him for the role of supreme commander in the West. Baden would continue to experience difficulties with his peers, his subordinates, and his boss, throughout the war, but nevertheless retained his position and obtained a certain measure of success against the French, as will be seen.

Upper Rhine Theatre of War 1693

Scale & Legend

●	Town
◆	Fortification
—	Shore/River
@10 Km	

1. Siege of Heidelberg 19-22 May
2. Extent of Baden's movements pre-Heilbronn standoff
3. Saxony marches to Frankfurt
4. Action at Zwingenberg 9 July
5. Saxony retreats, then marches to join Baden
6. Dauphin's march
7. Dauphin & Lorges advance
8. French raids into Württemberg throughout the campaign; Carlin's flying camp opposes them
9. Standoff at Heilbronn @1-6 August
10. French withdrawal; Baden follows at leisure
11. Dauphin leaves; focus shifts to Black Forest





[Türkenlouis in 1705.]

The Siege of Heidelberg (19-22 May)

[Refer to the diagram on p. 125.]

Lorges opened the campaign immediately after he and his staff arrived in theatre, laying siege to Heidelberg. This was not a scratch operation. When it crossed the Rhine the French siege train included enough cannon and stores to fill 200 boats, each crewed by 2 men, plus 1,000 wagons. These preparations were needed. Heidelberg, though it did not occupy the best possible position, was strongly fortified. Furthermore, the southern approach was between two wooded hill complexes, and only about 5,000 metres wide. Also, the town had a garrison of 3,000 men, as befitted an Imperial magazine. The Commandant was FML von Haitersdorf (alternatively spelled Heddersdorf or Heitersdorf). According to the German record Baden sent a pair of foot regiments to

Heidelberg sometime in May and it appears they arrived before the siege. One, a Pfalz unit, was Schrautenbach's, a 4-battalion regiment, contributing 2 battalions. The other is likely to have been Haitersdorf's, also of 2 battalions.

Crossing the river at Philippsburg on 16/17 May and camping near Rauenberg (15 Km northeast) the next day, Lorges split his command, sending, on 19 May, one large corps under *maréchal* Choiseul to observe Louis of Baden, whose army was mustering at Heilbronn, and a smaller corps, commanded by Chamilly, against Heidelberg itself. Choiseul took a direct route east, over the hills. Chamilly reached the vicinity of Heidelberg on 19 May and established a cordon from Rohrbach, lying against the hills south of the town, to Wieblingen on the Neckar, just below the town; a line about 4,000 metres long.

Lorges himself showed up at Heidelberg on 20 May, by which time Chamilly had thrown troops across the Neckar and built a communication bridge at Wieblingen. *Lieutenant général* Melac, with 12 battalions and 500 dragoons, had secured the eastern heights above the castle, and cleared out an enemy post which proved to be a perfect spot for firing into the rear of the defences.

The approaches were opened on 20 May, with batteries being erected 'at the high mountain behind the Star against the Castle'. The Star was a redoubt on the right bank of the Neckar, intended to prevent an enemy from establishing a position overlooking the town. Of course, if captured it would serve as such a position.

In late afternoon or early evening a 4-gun battery was unmasked above the Star while the French directed fire from another battery against the Speyer (west) gate, where the Germans were trying desperately to improve the defences, damaging it enough to allow a view of the interior of the town.

On 21 May Chamilly erected a battery of 6 cannon in front of the faubourg (that is, on the west), protecting it with the brigade of Picardie. Meanwhile, Vaubecourt dug forward on the far side of the Neckar, and though under heavy fire his men pushed to within 35 paces of the ditch by the end of the day. The Germans had a 400-man local relief force in the eastern hills by the Neckar, but it was not strong enough to accomplish anything, though they did direct mortar fire against the French on the hill. But, by this point the French bombardment had ruined the defences — even some of the mines had been exposed.

On 22 May the surrender of the town was achieved, in the following manner. The garrison still occupied the faubourg but decided to evacuate it in broad daylight. The *régiment* Picardie, led by their colonel, the *prince* d'Epinoy, immediately moved in. Fearing that the enemy would mingle with the retreating troops and get inside the town, the main gate was shut against all of them. The French captured or killed 500 men. Then, they crossed the



Königstuhl
566

Heiligen Berg
447

Star Fort
location unidentified
but roughly in this area

- 1) French sieze Heiligen Berg 20 May; Germans hold Star Fort on lower slopes
- 2) Batteries erected on the hill
- 3) 6-gun battery fires on Star Fort; 4-gun battery fires on Speyer Gate
- 4) on 21 May 6-gun battery erected to west of the Faubourg
- 5) French on right bank dig toward main defences
- 6) on 22 May Star Fort overrun; pursuit to the Fabourg bridge; Town abandoned; Governor surrenders

- A. Castle
- B. Citadel
- C. German Tower
- D. Stairway
- E. Town
- F. Faubourg
- G. The Horseshoe
- H. French Tower
- J. French Gate
- K. Frankenthal (or Speyer) Gate
- L. Frankfurt Gate
- M. Castle Gate

Siege of Heidelberg

19-22 May 1693

from a 1693 map by Jan Luyken

100 fathoms
(183 metres)

drawbridge, which had not been raised because of the press of men on it, and began chopping into the gate with axes. The rest of the garrison fled the town and bolted for the citadel, save for some stragglers who were cut down.

On the other bank Vaubecourt's men noticed what was going on. 60 men of the *régiment* Güinne rushed the Star, which was in the process of being abandoned. Haitersdorf, whose men had held an open breach in the Star since 20 May, had just decided he could hold no longer and was pulling back to the Castle on the left bank of the Neckar, by way of the town bridge. The Star was taken, along with 2 standards. Most of the garrison appear to have escaped.

This accounted for the town. There was still the Citadel to deal with.

The French had a considerable number of prisoners, whom they decided to lock up in the Cathedral. This proved to be a mistake. While the French began collecting the massive quantity of stores in the town the prisoners set fire to the Cathedral's two steeples. Rather than have a major fire break out, Chamilly agreed to leave the most vital stores, a magazine of flour and another of gunpowder, alone. The prisoners extinguished the fire.

Haitersdorf now offered to surrender the Citadel. At first he insisted on obtaining permission from Türkenlouis. Lorges refused this so Haitersdorf agreed to capitulate as soon as the French brought up cannon and mortars to bombard him. All of which, plus the signing of the surrender documents, took place on the same day. The garrison, 1,800 men, marched out the next morning with their baggage under French escort to Heilbronn.

[Below: view of Heidelberg from the north, 1620 AD.]

Though the two magazines previously mentioned remained untouched, other magazines were looted. The haul included 5,000 grenades, 17,000 pounds of lead, 12 cast iron cannon, 10 cannon of ordinary iron, stores of tools, and other food magazines containing flour and oats. The French razed the fortifications and partially demolished the castle.

Haitersdorf's courtmartial was the trial of the century. Well, it dragged on for a month, anyway. Heidelberg was an Imperial City. Though sacked at the beginning of the war it had been empty of troops then. Now it had Formally Surrendered. The Emperor was highly displeased.

Baden, thoroughly embarrassed, excused his failure to relieve the town by saying he had nothing to work with but a handful of enthusiastic local militia and some Bavarians. He really did not need to make excuses. He had only taken command at Heilbronn on 18 May, and held his first, pitifully small muster on 19 May. The next day, hearing of the siege, he broke camp and marched to the town's relief.

On Thursday 21 May Baden was at Eppingen, 22 Km due west of Heilbronn. He had with him 80 squadrons and 24 battalions. If he could not raise the siege — and at this point he had some confidence he could — he could at least conduct a reconnaissance in force.

Blithely unaware Heidelberg had just surrendered, on 23 May Baden assembled his army and read out the Imperial Articles of War.

The next day 1,300 men were dispatched to Heilbronn, 300 of them to act as 'gate guards'. 200 hussars and 50 dragoons were sent to Neckargemünd, 30 Km to the north. In the evening, Prinz Georg von Darmstadt followed them with 300 horse, 100 dragoons, and 100 hussars. He had orders to cross the Neckar and



penetrate the Odenwald. They would conduct reconnaissance and bridge the gap between Baden and the forces of Saxony and Hesse on the Main River. 40 horse were sent to Sinsheim, a day's march north, and 100 more were sent back to Heilbronn to garrison Gros-Gardach (Leingarten, 6.5 Km west of Heilbronn), a defensible village on the main road to the town. At that distance from the city there was a semicircle of defensible villages; Gros-Gardach is the one on the main road from Heilbronn to Eppingen. News now came that Heidelberg had surrendered and its garrison was marching to Heilbronn with a French escort.

25 May the Wartsleben Cuirassiers arrived along with 700 of Schönbeck's Foot. They had been sent to reinforce Heidelberg but had arrived too late. A French deserter was brought in who claimed the French had 20,000 men at Heidelberg but were now bound for Mainz with 40,000. This information, whether true or not, influenced Allied thinking, for even King William of England, from his own intelligence services, later came to believe the French intended to besiege Mainz. Why else would the Dauphin be sent to the Rhine?

26 May Baden spent foraging. 150 men were detailed as a grand guard and 150 more went to Sinsheim to watch for the French. Haitersdorf and his column of 60 dragoons and 1,000 foot arrived at Neckargartach, 3 Km downriver from Heilbronn. This seems to indicate the column marched up the Neckar, because they avoided an encounter with Baden. Orders were waiting for Haitersdorf to repair to Sinsheim and 30 horse were waiting to see that he obeyed. The French escorts came along. At Sinsheim GWM Fürstenberg formally arrested Haitersdorf in the presence of the French. From the enemy, Fürstenberg learned they would be abandoning Heidelberg after razing it.

[Fürstenberg and his men appear to have previously sent their baggage to Heidelberg. If so, they would have been highly annoyed with Haitersdorf.]

27 May 400 German horse were sent to burn down Ladenburg. Ladenburg is about 10 Km downriver from Heidelberg, on the right bank of the Neckar. While there the cavalry took 11 prisoners who reported their army was at Weisloch, on the main road 12 Km south of Heidelberg. They were on the same mission as the 400, and were part of 2,000 French cavalry under Melac who had orders to destroy all the small castles and manor houses in the vicinity. They repeated the tale that Mainz was the primary goal of the campaign. In the evening Melac was seen at Eppingen.

28 May 400 horse and 200 hussars from Baden's dwindling supply were sent up the Elsbach River in the Odenwald to patrol the area. The cavalry regiments Carlin and Stauffenberg were mustered and were posted between Marbach and Cannstatt. Marbach is on the Neckar 24 Km south of Heilbronn, and Cannstatt is by Stuttgart, so these were deep reserves. Prinz Georg

returned with some POWs but reported no significant enemy encounters.

29 May Baden approved plans for a pontoon bridge on the Neckar below Heilbronn. It could be used for rapid movement around the city or be floated down toward the Rhine for use in operations there. He also assigned 1,000 men to work on Heilbronn's fortifications; the work was to be inspected daily by a major general.

Saturday 30 May was the day Haitersdorf's court martial opened. The Kurmainz Dragoons arrived in camp. Reports came in that the French were foraging all the lands between the Main and the Neckar out on the Rhine's flood plain. They had not penetrated the Odenwald. Or had they? A recce party inflicted 21 casualties on 30 Irish grenadiers at Hirschhorn, a village on the right bank of the Neckar 9.5 Km northeast of Neckargemünd, not far from where the river bends to the west. This place straddled a back road that ran north to the Main.

31 May the Württemberg and Carlin Dragoons, and the Stauffenberg Horse arrived from their original posts in the South. From the northeast came a battalion from Würzburg. This small bishopric provided a large regiment's-worth of troops to the Franconian cause during the war. Additional reinforcements included a battalion of the Imperial regiment Wallenfels, 2 squadrons of the Schrautenbach Dragoons from Darmstadt, and enough men to give all the Franconian foot regiments 3 new battalions each. More generals arrived as well: k.GdK Friedrich Karl von Württemberg, k.FML *Graf* von Castel, k.GWM the *Prinz* von Hohenzollern, and fr.GWM Bibra. During the day a French trumpeter brought in 400 German POWs from Heidelberg. Apparently there were more POWs but they had all volunteered to fight for the French in Catalonia. Baden also heard that Lorges had broken camp the previous night.

Standoff at Heilbronn

On 30 May Lorges broke camp and marched 12 Km south to Weisloch, camping on the Gänsberg. As an aside to the reader, in these later campaigns the armies were always 'camping on the Gänsberg'. This is a bit of high ground (142m), a wide raised expanse which commands a good view all around, and with easy access to water. It is located a kilometre or two southwest of Weisloch.

Was Lorges bound for Mainz? This was a question raised in both armies. His subsequent movements demonstrate he had no intention of marching there, and in particular, he had his siege train brought across the Rhine — if it was to be used at Mainz, why was this done? However, Mainz does appear to have been the target selected during pre-campaign planning. There is a suggestion that the Dauphin was still expecting to lay siege to it when he arrived.

But, Lorges very soon came to the conclusion he could not support an army in the Palatinate, at least on the left bank of the Rhine. The fall of Heidelberg gave him the option of crossing the Neckar and laying siege to Mainz while subsisting on the right bank — even though it had not been undertaken with that in mind but rather as a political statement made at the express order of King Louis.

With the Neckar crossing in French hands, it was now possible to consider occupying the Bergstat, moving to the Main, and besieging Mainz from that side, but it would be dangerous for Lorges to march north to Mainz with Baden in his rear and Saxony and the Landgrave in front of him. Therefore, Baden had to be defeated in battle. But, defeating Baden in battle would be of value no matter what fortress were besieged, and in fact would have a propaganda value in its own right.

All of which is to say that Lorges seems to have gradually changed his mind about the target. Probably, he made no decision until after speaking with the Dauphin. At that point, however, it was decided to attack Heilbronn instead. If they had succeeded, the French would probably have razed and abandoned it as they did with Heidelberg. Heilbronn was also an Imperial city, so taking it would be a slap in the Emperor's face, and it was the primary magazine for the Germans on the Upper Rhine. Taking it would force Baden to rebase farther east, at least for the rest of the season, opening up all of Swabia and Württemberg to the French.

And, this raises another point. When the Dauphin arrived he made it clear Versailles wanted the squeeze put on Württemberg. This would have been hard to pull off if the army was sent north to Mainz. (Württemberg's Regent was a prisoner but the realm had an oligarchic style of government and the oligarchs had not been paying the dues agreed to by the Regent.)

Baden, meanwhile, continued to worry about Mainz. In his opinion the French were too weak to engage him directly. Thus, while he saw to his defences, he was still planning to march north and pick up the Saxons and Hessians. He waited for Lorges to cross the Neckar (though he may also have expected the French to recross the Rhine to avoid being squeezed between the two German armies). But Lorges did not retreat or move north. He advanced.

[Quincy does not say what became of Choiseul; clearly the two corps rejoined each other once the siege of Heidelberg was over.]

On 1 June he was at Sinsheim (15 Km ESE of Weisloch), while Baden held a general review. The Germans sent out 4 reconnaissance parties who all reported the French were drawn up with the Castle of Steinsberg on their right and along the line of the Elsbach. The castle still stands (a classic motte and bailey) 4,500 meters south of Sinsheim; the French line was probably that long, and would have faced due east.

On 2 June the French were between Reithen and Ittlingen (6 Km SE of Sinsheim). Here Lorges camped for 2 days, waiting on intelligence. Baden was camped by Gros-Gardach.

Baden was having difficulty coordinating a defence. Letters written at the end of May express his fear Mainz would be attacked and ask the princes of Hesse, Trier, and Pfalz to cooperate in its defence. He also wrote to King William for aid, receiving a polite refusal. His cousin, Prince Eugene, wrote from Vienna to say that the Court was only interested in the latest fashion trends and who was sleeping with whom. Ah, Vienna.

[Interestingly, Baden's wife was on campaign with him, though she was lodged at a safe distance. Many generals followed this practice, or brought mistresses instead.]

Baden sent a man named von Junkheim, colonel of the Kurpfalz Dragoons, to Eberbach, the next chief crossing point below Heilbronn, about 40 Km NNW, with orders to prevent any French crossing. Meanwhile, Baden himself went on a staff ride around Heilbronn, particularly to the defile of Lauffen. Lauffen is on the left bank, about 9 Km above Heilbronn. It was the next notable crossing point, but using it involved crossing a second, small, river. Lauffen Castle had a garrison of 200 men which Baden stiffened with 2 cannon, 50 more men, and orders to hold to the last man.

Meanwhile the hussars reported Melac had overrun a post Baden left at Eppingen with 2,000 cavalry. *Graf* Forgatsch of the hussars was sent back there with 250 men to observe. At this point Baden decided the French were too close for comfort and ordered the army across the Neckar. Some troops remained on the left bank. Apart from the garrison at Lauffen, 2 battalions of the Saxe-Gotha regiment Prinz Wilhelm (about 1,000 men) were picked to defend a new redoubt at the crossing (150 of their ranks were at Lauffen). However, 300 men who had been holding the Gros-Gardach graveyard were withdrawn. Heilbronn itself was defended by 3 battalions under GWM Erffa. The army's main camp, holding 4-5,000 men, was laid out about 3,000 metres upriver, along a stream called the Schozachbach; it is usually called the Sontheim Camp after the hamlet at its northern end which lay on the bank of the Neckar. Refer to page 144 for a diagram of the camp as it looked when the French were preparing to attack it.

On 3 June Baden sent 100 of Carlin's Dragoons up the Neckar with orders to break every bridge between Heilbronn and Canstatt, above Stuttgart. He sent his wife to Schwäbisch Hall, 40 Km to the east, behind a tract of wooded hill country. Spies were arrested in Heilbronn.

According to the B.H.K., Forgatsch reported the bulk of the French were still at Eppingen as of 4 June, so the enemy troops who could be seen on the heights opposite the city were only the advance guard and some of the artillery. These were men under Masel's command, sent

out to investigate Baden's doings. This day Baden ordered the construction of bridges at Heilbronn and Lauffen. he also swapped out 150 men of the garrison in the latter place, leaving 100 behind.

[There is a slight discrepancy in the dates between Quincy and the B.H.K.. Quincy says the French established a position on the Klingenberg (see below) on 7 June. the B.H.K. says French guns were already in action here on 5 June. Since the B.H.K. is a proper campaign journal, his dates will be used.]

On 5 June Lorges advanced to Gros-Gardach, arriving about 10am. The day being young, after a look around he sent 30 guns up onto the Klingenberg Heights. (The village of the same name is 5 Km southwest of Heilbronn at the spot where the river starts an S-bend.) On this section of the Neckar the left bank is dominated by a fairly high slope very close to the river, which runs from a point well above the camp at Sontheim to a point well below Heilbronn.

Later, the whole of the French army appeared on the heights along the river. Their Right was by Gros-Gartach, their Reserve between there and Franckenbach (a line of about 2 Km back along the main road in a southwesterly direction), and their Left started on the left bank of the Leynbach, a small river which runs into the Neckar near Neckargartach.

Around 3pm the French 30-piece battery on the Klingenberg Heights began firing. Some mortars were also present. The fire began to strike into the camp at Sontheim, just across the river. This brought on a sharp skirmish.

The details are a little unclear. Essentially, 5 battalions of Germans repelled 5 battalions of French. It is a question of who was attacking whom. 1,600 meters west of Sontheim was the hamlet of Horkheim. Here, there were fords. Moreover, the summer was hot and the river was exceptionally low. According to the B.H.K. the Germans crossed the river (probably hoping to deal with the guns) and the French charged down the slope to repel them. This was done 'in assault mode', which probably means they employed the common French tactic of advancing with the bayonet and not stopping to shoot. The fight was prolonged. There was a parley to recover the wounded and prisoners, including 160 French. Quincy says Lorges intended to make a crossing here, and the Germans soon came to that opinion themselves, but whether this was merely a preparatory probe or a proper attack, or whether the whole thing was just a feint, is not made clear.

The Germans made some more petty deployments. The Aufsess Dragoons, a Swabian outfit, had been supporting Lauffen Castle. They were now sent onto the 'heights' to patrol. They were to dig in at 'Bauren' and man the trenches with 100 men each night and 30 each day. The reader's guess is as good as the author's where 'Bauren' was located. Hausen, a hamlet just west of Lauffen is the most likely choice. From here, patrols could monitor the

French Right. 1,100 cavalry were also sent to Neckarsulm, 6 Km downriver, to observe the enemy's Left.

On 6 June the French were seen to have stopped their patrols and pulled back, leaving a garrison in Klingenberg Castle and a few battalions in support. 2 groups of 60 hussars were dispatched from Baden's camp to rove the countryside behind the French and cause trouble. Baden also pulled out the battered battalions from yesterday's skirmish and replaced them with 2 cavalry units supported by a battalions of Herzog Heinrich, supported in turn by a battalion each from Durlach, Schönbeck, and Horn. Adding cavalry to the mix gave the Germans an edge, but there were only about 600 men in all. Baden thought about abandoning the post but French deserters told him their army intended to cross there, so he wound up reinforcing Horkheim with 2 more battalions, plus the ones he pulled out earlier.

[The German battalions involved in the skirmish were from the regiments of Schwanefeld, Durlach, Haitersdorf, Furstenberg, and Erffa.]

Otherwise, both sides were out foraging. At Brackenheim, 12 Km southwest from Heilbronn and well behind the French lines, a German party of dismounted volunteers killed 30 French and took 30 prisoners.

From the Black Forest came a dispatch from k.FML Graf von Öttingen, the district commander, that he had visited Alsace with 2,000 of his men (peasant militia for the most part) and plundered at will.

On 7 June, the French sent 5 squadrons of dragoons, 8 of horse, and 10 battalions to Klingenberg, where 2 bridges were to be erected at Horkheim. According to Quincy, Baden sent 4 regiments to interfere with this operation. According to the B.H.K. Baden sent 500 men and 2 battalions, presumably reinforcing the original garrison. The Germans caused the French to abandon the attempt for now. the B.H.K. also says that prisoners reported the French bridging train had been sent for but was still at Philippsburg. In this case the probe against Horkheim may have been to locate suitable spots for the bridges, not actually build them.

The prisoners also gave numbers: their army had 35,000 line troops and 15,000 militia and peasants; the train was of 60 pieces, 7 of 24-pound and the rest 16- 12- 8- and 4-pound, intended for a terror bombardment of Heilbronn.

In other news the duelling between foragers continued. A party of 40 German horse brought in 80 horses, having killed their riders. Another skirmish killed 8 and captured 22 French. 15 deserters also arrived. All armies in proximity to each other received a steady stream of deserters looking for a better deal. On the Upper Rhine many of these would be Irish who had been given the chance to go into exile with James II as part of his private army. But the French quickly broke that force up and sent the men to fight on the Rhine or in Spain. Irish who

deserted to Louis of Baden were sent off to die in the Hungarian marshes, yet they continued to cross the lines. Some even volunteered for Hungary, though Protestants asked to go to Italy or England.

8 June 500 of the Kollonitsch Hussars were sent to Besigheim on a rumour the French bridging train was in the vicinity. The Horkheim detachment was detailed to provide support. Besigheim is 13 Km upriver from the camp at Sontheim, at the confluence of the Enz. A French crossing here would be a smarter move than trying to force the Neckar at Klingenberg, but there were two rivers to contend with. It would make more sense if Lorges intended to move deeper into Württemberg, toward the Danube...

[The Kollonits de Kollograd Hussars were one of 2 Imperial hussar regiments employed on the Rhine. They were the only 2 regular hussar units in the army. Both derived from the oversized Czobor regiment which split when its original colonel proprietor died in 1690. The other regiment in the split was Pálffy's. Each regiment had 10 squadrons. They were true workhorses, having an effect all out of proportion to their size and their names appear frequently in the records.]

Also on 8 June some Hessian cavalry arrived: 5 horse regiments and the Garde du Corps. The French remained in camp. German raids inflicted 70 casualties and a large number of horses were stolen. 40 of the French are said to have been killed by 15 hussars.

On 9 June Lorges tried to cross the river again, this time using the permanent bridges at Heilbronn itself, but Baden's cavalry foiled him. The *Maréchal* made a third attempt 10 Km downstream at Wimpfen. This time the French pushed hard and a real combat developed, but it was still no go. Both sides lost 4-500 men.

These actions must have been feints, because the same day Lorges broke camp and marched back the way he came. His advance guard was at Eppingen this very day. Without access to source documents it is difficult to decide what Lorges was up to. It is very unlikely he seriously contemplated crossing the Neckar in the face of Baden's army. Quite possibly he was merely pinning Baden while his cavalry patrols milked Swabia. Having done so, he naturally withdrew to a safer position. On the other hand, intelligence gathered by the Germans over the next few days suggested Lorges really had intended to force the ford at Horkheim with 14 regiments. If successful he could then have laid siege to Heilbronn, though this would probably have amounted to nothing more than the 'terror' bombardment. The Germans were simply stronger than expected. Possibly their raid into Alsace made him nervous. It is curious that the 'terror' bombardment was not conducted from the left bank.

On the German side, this day a Colonel Schönebeck was placed under arrest. He had been the commandant of Heidelberg's citadel. The investigations were proceeding apace. On the military side GWM Bibra took a party of

cavalry to confirm a report of 600 French cavalry moving toward Besigheim. 61 deserters appeared at the German camp.

The Saxon Army, meanwhile, was at Kitzingen and Ochsenfurt, towns on the Main River about 100 Km to the northeast, not far from Würzburg. Rather than march cross country to Heilbronn, they would head down the Main to Frankfurt.

10 June Baden sent out 4 new parties of hussars, 200 men each, to harass the French withdrawal. Bibra's group was at Stammheim, just outside Stuttgart. More Hessian troops were arriving; they had reached Neckarsulm; a regiment from Darmstadt was expected. Large numbers of deserters were picked up (75 volunteered for Hungary). The intelligence gleaned was mixed. The French were bound for Fort-Louis. The French were bound for Stuttgart. Choiseul had been detached with 13 regiments to Alsace. There was general agreement that Lorges was at Bretten, 40 Km to the west, and now had 150 squadrons and 47 battalions. Melac, whose numbers may or may not be included, had 4,000 men at Vaihingen an der Enz. He was taking contributions in the valley, and it was probably his column that Bibra had been sent to investigate, the Germans moving up the Neckar and then up the Enz. Baden, worried about Stuttgart, diverted Bibra there.

Lorges did make camp at Bretten, on June 11. During the rest of June Melac and 6,000 cavalry were sent out on a series of raids to milk Württemberg. They ranged as close as 3 miles from Stuttgart. What they could not take with them, they destroyed, ruining the country.

Baden appears not to have taken vigorous measures to stop Melac. He did have his hussars and other bodies of cavalry out, but the French had overwhelming numbers. Their patrols toward Stuttgart concerned him unduly and he spent more effort in securing that sector. On 11 June Colonel Leiningen was sent with 1,000 cavalry to Marbach, at the confluence of the Murr and Neckar; 200 dragoons were detached to secure the bridge at Canstatt. More men were sent to Stuttgart itself to aid the small garrison of 500 local men.

On a personal note, Baden took the opportunity to investigate the abandoned French camp. It stretched 'from Neckargartach and Frankenbach to Gros-Gartach and Leynbach, over the Walthurn toward Northheim'. This covers a square of about 4 Km by 4 Km, the whole of the ground between the bend of the Neckar and the Frankenbach. According to the B.H.K. it could have contained 500,000 men. It was found that there had only been about 30 cannon, all emplaced to cover the Klingenberg-Horkheim ford. The deserters taken in this day were mostly 'wild Irish', speaking the Gaelic and bits of broken French.

12 June Lorges still at Bretten. Melac was reported at Enzweihingen, across the Enz from Vaihingen. Probably

he was in both locations simultaneously; there was a permanent bridge. Baden left 3 battalions in Heilbronn and stationed 50 horse at the Horkheim ford. Otherwise he let his men rest. Schrautenbach's regiment of 1,300 was a welcome addition. There was a steady stream of deserters and hussar parties with prisoners and booty. No doubt the same was true in the French camp.

13 June the Heilbronn garrison was added to Baden's camp. Yesterday and today work parties had constructed a redoubt at Horkheim which could hold 60 men and 4 cannon (2 large and 2 small). Baden also ordered a bridge constructed above the one at Lauffen.

On 14 June the redoubt at Horkheim was improved and the French returned 53 POWs. Possibly from them it was learned the enemy had a work party of 300 men demolishing Heidelberg's citadel and walls, and caving in the mine galleries. 60 of Baden's men were sent to Besigheim, 200 to Canstatt and Neckarrems (Remseck am Neckar) not far from there. The Hessian cavalry was billeted at Lauffen. 2 battalions under GWM Erffa were rotated into the Heilbronn garrison. GWM the Prinz von Hohenzollern arrived in camp. Though only a major general, he was an important political figure. Speaking of politics, at Haitersdorf's court martial it was decided he be stripped of his Cross of the Teutonic Order; all members of the Order were required to attend the ceremony.

On 15 June Baden made preparations for breaking camp. The army was to march to Murr, 21 Km to the south. Baden's primary concern remained the protection of Württemberg. Quite probably he was pressured into defending Stuttgart rather than taking the offensive against Lorges, thanks to Melac's impudent raiding. The march was made in at least 2 columns. The Van (presumably the cavalry) went to Talheim and over the Schozachbach to Württemberg-Zollthurm, Itzingerhof, and Ziegelhütte, then to Bronnen Falls by Höpfigheim to Murr. The rest (including some cavalry) went by Flein straight to Ilfeld and Winzerhausen, taking the main road to Murr. Upon reaching Murr it was found to be unsuitable for a campsite — too far from the Neckar.

Elsewhere, the garrison of Lauffen sent 300 foot and 60 of Leiningen's Dragoons to Besigheim. This created a warning post for Baden about 8.5 Km away on his right flank. 300 more of Leiningen's were sent to Canstatt. the B.H.K. says this was to observe the French, so presumably Melac was operating unmolested all around Stuttgart at this time. Bibra and his men were detailed to go to the Hagenschiesser Forest, while Erffa was sent up to the Main to hustle the Saxons. Word was received that Lorges was about to move to Bruchsal, 46 Km due west of Heilbronn and 13 Km northwest of Bretten. Bretten is on the plateau, Bruchsal is on the flood plain.

16 June Baden moved his camp to a line between Gemrigheim and Ottmarshiem. This position, only 13 Km from Heilbronn, was halfway between Murr and Lauffen

and a third of the way back to his old camp at Sontheim. But, it was close to the Neckar, with Lauffen on the right and Besigheim on the left. The line faced southwest, toward Stuttgart and was about 3,700 meters long. Hohenzollern was given command of the Right Wing.

This day also it was rumoured the French had sent their baggage over the Rhine, leaving a number of intact magazines on the German side of the river. More immediately a ceremony was held in which Haitersdorf was expelled from the Order.

17 June spies in Philippsburg reported the French had constructed a number of special boats with high sides and firing ports, suitable for infantry or very light cannon. From deserters there was a report that Melac had gone to Sinsheim with 300 horse and 100 foot, presumably to establish a forward post. And, from Holland it was learned that King Louis had given up his plan to lay siege to Liège and detached the Dauphin to the Rhine with a significant force, estimated at 75 battalions and 75 squadrons. The letter containing this information, from King William, was dated 14 June. Though a link up with Lorges was the most likely destination, the Dauphin might still head for Mainz, or even Koblenz. William said he was deploying the Brandenburgers to cover Jülich and Cologne.

This was followed by a letter confirming the Dauphin's route. The letter is interesting because it gives the standard march route between the theatres used by couriers and armies alike: from the Meuse through Luxembourg to Bastogne and Luxembourg City (this was the Grand Route of Luxembourg), to the Moselle at Trier, then either down the Moselle or up the Saar. The Dauphin had taken the Moselle. That suggested he was bound for Koblenz or Mainz. If so, Lorges ought to be moving to join him soon. Taken together with Melac's shift away from Stuttgart, the movement of the French baggage, and the appearance of naval craft on the Rhine, it was almost certain Mainz was the intended target.

As a footnote, k.FMLdC *Graf* von Castell arrived from Hungary. Castell, like Hohenzollern, Bibra, Pálffy, and Erffa, crops up often in the chronicles. He was given command of the Right Wing cavalry, under Hohenzollern.

18 June was fairly quiet. German hussars killed 6 and took 1 POW and 8 horses. Baden approved a bridge over the Neckar, probably for his immediate use, but spent most of the day in negotiations with the representatives from the Swabian and Franconian Circles. He needed more men, and a place to store them.

Friday 19 June Baden broke camp. Scouting parties (1 German and 1 hussar) were sent to Eppingen, Bretten, and Bruchsal. Baden had been relying on the reports of deserters to monitor the French since the enemy was not in contact. Now he needed better information. One of the groups (probably the hussars) actually rode into the French camp, killed 12 men and stole 12 horses. They returned to Baden's camp with 6 Frenchmen in hot

pursuit. The same group reported that a farmer told them the Dauphin was bound for Mainz with 20,000 men and that Lorges was either going to join him or return to Heilbronn, take it, then march north around the Odenwald to the Main and cut Mainz off from relief. This sounds a trifle extravagant.

It was later learned the French, who had abandoned Heidelberg as promised, returned this day to do some more burning. The Germans had been erecting some new structures there, which was *verboten*.

20 June was a big day in the German camp. Haitersdorf was found guilty of his crimes and condemned to be Cashiered with Infamy. This involved a ride from Heilbronn to the camp in a tumbril, hogtied, and escorted by 200 horse and 1,000 foot. He was then paraded across the army to his old regiment and dumped out of the cart. The charges were read aloud and a sentence of beheading announced. The executioner stepped forward, whispered 'it's your lucky day, mate' or words to that effect, took the prisoner's sword and broke it over his knees, and struck him three times in the face. Haitersdorf was also publicly stripped of his patrimony and formally banished from Swabia, Franconia, and the Imperial Rhinelands. He was then retied, tossed back on the cart, taken to the bridge over the Neckar and tossed out (presumably in the ditch, not in the water). His regiment was renamed.

The more mundane events of the day included the dispatch of 400 of Pálffy's hussars and 60 dragoons to scout the French camp (essentially maintaining a rotating watch) and the assigning of 50 men to the bridge at Kirchheim, 1,800 meters downriver from Baden's camp. This is probably the new bridge he ordered a day or two ago. The Hessians were marching to Höpfigheim; they had been left behind at Heilbronn and were only now arriving. Bibra had moved west of Stuttgart to Vaihingen.

21 June Baden concluded his recruitment negotiations. Franconia and Swabia each pledged to supply 2 new regiments of infantry and 2 of cavalry, to be ready for service in 3 months, to receive 1,200 Reichs-Thalers for a foot soldier, 1,500 for a dragoon, and 1,850 for a 'reiter' or horseman, per month of service. The Saxons were now at Miltenberg, 60 Km north of Heilbronn, on the Main. They could still join Baden but it was becoming clear they had no intention of doing so.

New intel put Lorges army at 40,000 and the Dauphin's at 20,000. They were expected to combine to besiege Mainz. Lorges was still between Bruchsal and Ubstadt. That would make his camp about 5 Km long.

22 June more intelligence was received. 5 spies based out of Fort-Louis reported the French had sent a total of 240 ambulances to Landau so far and were supposed to have suffered 5,000 casualties, plus another 2,000 sick and wounded in local hospitals. The hussars reported

Lorges intended to break camp and march for Mainz on 23 June.

Lorges did not break camp on 23 June. Word came to Baden that the people of Heidelberg were evacuating their town. Bibra, operating 'at his own discretion', went to Bretten to interfere with the French cavalry who were harassing German foraging parties. The Hessians inched forward to Murr and Steinheim. No word from the Saxons.

24 June a patrol of 20 hussars visited the French camp. The Saxons and Hessian Foot were in the Odenwald. There seem to be three groups of Hessians in the chronicles. The cavalry and guard were with Baden. Some of the Foot had arrived at Heilbronn separately and was now camped near him. The Hessians mentioned here will be the bulk of the infantry, under Saxon command. The Germans made preparations to blow up Heidelberg's castle. 50 miners were sent there and the inhabitants were evacuated. 200 French partisans plundered Eppingen. These men will have come from Alsace. Whether they were exacting revenge or working directly for Lorges is unclear.

25 June: apparently Lorges had intended to leave on 23 June but a pair of Irish deserters claimed he was immobilized by a sudden flood.

26 June Baden had a bridge floated down the Neckar from Besigheim to Kirchheim, a distance of about 4 Km. Baden also received a letter from Mainz. The commandant was prepared for a 6-months siege and was improving his defences; 2 engineers were dispatched to assist him. There is also a reference to the French hussar regiment. This was a small unit made up of Imperial deserters and assorted riffraff, an experiment based on the success of the Imperial hussars. A pair of two-time deserters from Carlin's Dragoons told how they were made to serve in the French unit, which only had 60 men. The regiment saw service for the rest of the war in Flanders, well away from Germany.

On 27 June Lorges broke camp and began moving north. Word was, he was bound for Mannheim.

Graf Lippe, one of Baden's chief collaborators on the Saxon staff who was helping him coordinate the Middle Rhine defences, wrote to tell him about the Brandenburger deployments promised earlier in King William's letters. Some Palatine troops were with them. Others, probably a mix of Hessians and Pfalz troops, were covering the Bergstat immediately north of Baden's sector, with concentrations at Dilsberg, 10 Km up the Neckar from Heideisberg, on the left bank, and at Weinheim, 15 Km north of Heidelberg on the Bergstrasse itself. Lippe complained that the Darmstadters, whom he had hoped would fill a void left by the dispatch of some of the Palatine troops to the Moselle, were reluctant to serve outside their own country.

The Bergstat was the country between the Neckar and the Main, primarily on the Rhine's floodplain but also into the Odenwald, a section of hilly, wooded country that spanned most of the distance between the two rivers and extended east as far as the Main on that river's south-north course between Aschaffenburg and Miltenberg. The land was fertile and the towns prosperous, and apart from the initial ravages of 1688 had not been milked by the French. The northern half belonged to Darmstadt while the southern half was divided among Worms, Mainz, and the Palatinate. The Bergstrasse ran from Heidelberg to Frankfurt and the city of Darmstadt through a wide, flat valley between the Odenwald and a range of low wooded hills. The valley was nominally above the floodplain but much of the road was still raised on an embankment. It was a vital trade artery and much unsung effort would go into defending it over the years to come.

Baden now had a new mission: protect Mainz. On 28 June the Hessians were sent back to Heilbronn. Detachments of other troops were posted at Dilsberg (30 men), Zwingenberg (30 men), Horneck Castle (30 men), Lauffen (100 men), and Besigheim (300 men). The last two places were of course to the left and right of Baden's camp, the others were on or near the Neckar below Heilbronn. The posts secured the army's supply route down the Neckar; at intervals of a day's march.

Lorges was at Weisloch but had an advanced guard throwing bridges over the Neckar. It was reported this was for their cavalry; the infantry was supposedly going to Mainz by boat. From Mainz Baden received a letter that the Dauphin had 2 bridges over the Moselle. Baden sent out his hussars to bother Lorges.

North of the Neckar

Neither Quincy nor the B.H.K. records any activity for 29-30 June. Presumably both armies were busy making ready for important movements.

On the German side all that happened on 1 July was the appearance of 106 Savoyard deserters, who were sent back to Italy. As a 'loyal vassal' Victor Amadeus had been required to supply 3 battalions of troops to King Louis. He joined the Coalition in 1690 and the men, who were never happy in French service, deserted in droves. Enough returned home to form a complete battalion. Those remaining in French service were stuck in the Flanders mud as far away from Italy as possible.

Lorges was more active. His troops crossed the Neckar at Mannheim, Heidelberg, and Ladenburg. Masel was detached to take contributions from the country of Darmstadt. Near Heppenheim Castle (Heppenheim an der Bergstrasse, 19 Km north of Ladenburg) the garrison fired signal cannon to summon the local defenders, so that somewhere between Heppenheim and Bensheim (5 Km farther north) the French encountered about 6-700 enemy cavalry, not locals but Saxon cuirassiers, defending the passage of a hollow way. They were part of

a detachment under General Bron, who was on his way to scout Lorges' army.

By now, the Saxons and their Hessian detachment, including the Landgrave, had reversed course and were making their way down the Main toward Frankfurt. About this time their cavalry crossed the Main at Kelsterbach and Rüsselsheim, between Frankfurt and Mannheim and began patrolling. They established a base at the old Saxon camp of Fort Gustav, but their troops were strung out on the road at least as far upriver as Aschaffenburg. Their vanguard soon discovered the country south of the Main was a wasteland, and a decision was made not to make any great effort to head south.

This was going to lead to great contention between the Saxons and Baden. Very briefly, Baden made repeated pleas for the Duke of Saxony to march south so they could squeeze the French between them. Saxony refused to do so. Baden would go on to accuse Saxony of ignoring his orders, of going behind his back to seek an independent command (though 'independent' as commander of his own army, he was supposed to obey the Imperial *Generalleutnant*), and of generally hurting the Cause.

Not forgetting Saxony was one of the Third Party anti-Imperial clique who at this time in the war were adopting a neutralist stance, and that he had a personal animosity toward Baden, having opposed his appointment, it is also true there really was no grass for the horses in the Bergstat, and a shortage of good water. But, instead of making this his justification, Saxony tried to take the high moral ground, saying he was protecting Mainz, as Baden had ordered (earlier). He also loaded the Landgrave with blame, whom he said (correctly) was only interested in protecting his own lands and was doing as little as possible to help the Saxons, never mind the Greater German Cause. It was true enough that the pair had separate camps. The Landgrave, for his part, claimed, as did most of his neighbours, that the Saxons were highhanded and requisitioned whatever they wanted, when they wanted. This was also true. And, Baden was not guiltless. As the events of the next couple of weeks unfolded he showed little sign of meeting Saxony halfway, saying he needed to remain where he was to protect Swabia. Now, since the Franconian-Swabian association was the only group giving him solid support, it make sense he would favour them. But Saxony could argue it was Baden who was not pulling his weight.

If the French had felt able to lay siege to Mainz it would have been relatively easy for them to defeat Saxony and Baden in detail and then do so, and this is perhaps what was intended. Baden was less of a threat now that they had ravaged the Swabian lands since he could not bring forward his magazines very far. But, the raiders of the early war had done their job too well. The lands on this section of the Rhine were indeed a wasteland.

Just for the moment, though, there was a skirmish to be won at Heppenheim. Masel organised his small cavalry corps into 13 troops and arranged them in echelon. The first wave consisted of a troop from Colonel Général, a troop of Carabiniers, and a dragoon troop. The Saxons, who were holding the hollow way enroute to Bensheim, employed the tactic of awaiting the enemy charge and discharging their pistols before countercharging. Unfortunately they fired too soon. The French made their discharge pointblank and charged home, routing the Saxons.

The rearguard, 200 infantry concealed beside the road in a series of *hayes*, or peasant cottages ringed with hedges, made off to Bensheim without helping the cavalry, who also retired to that place. The retreat was rather slow, because the road was lined with *chevaux-de-frise* so that the Saxons could only enter the area in front of the gate four abreast. Those at the back suffered losses and some prisoners were taken. Behind the town were 1,200 more cavalry in support. These had no time to deploy. So, they also retreated into the town. Masel withdrew. Losses were about 200 Germans and 12 French, killed, wounded, or prisoners.

On 2 July Baden broke camp. His Foot marched through Heilbronn and across the Neckar, camping on that side. The Cavalry remained upriver, on the right bank, protecting the train. Lorges' camp was at Neuenheim, right across the Neckar from Heidelberg, now also garrisoned by the French.

3 July Baden's cavalry and baggage laagered at Neckargartach. Next stop, Wimpfen, 7 Km down the Neckar. But there was a slight delay because the road needed repair. 2 parties were sent north into the Odenwald, partly to observe the French and partly to get hold of the Saxons.

4 July Baden broke camp at 3am, reaching Wimpfen by 9am. Here he dug some entrenchments and sent out more picquets, because 2,000 French cavalry were reported operating in the Odenwald. They had just raided Michelstadt and Hirschhorn. The latter place is on the Neckar, 17 KM ENE from Heidelberg but the former is 28 Km due east of Bensheim and right in the middle of the Odenwald. Local defenders counterattacked but they escaped with their booty. A redoubt holding 30 men was set up on the Sinsheim road. A bridge was started above Jagstfeld, a couple of kilometres behind the army; this was to grant passage over the Kocher River, a right bank tributary. Each hussar regiment was to send 100 men, plus 53 dismounted men, plus 20 gentlemen volunteers, into the Odenwald.

Lorges' camp was now between Feudenheim and Ladenburg, a frontage of 5,600 meters with its back to the Neckar. The camp at Heilbronn had probably been to oversee more destructive work and may only have belonged to a work party.

It was said the French were planning to ruin the whole of the country between the Main and the Neckar. If this is so, then Saxony's excuse that there was already no forage becomes suspect. But, what is most likely is that the Germans had already eaten up whatever the French left around Darmstadt during the original siege of Mainz and the land had never recovered. The French were preparing to do the same to the Bergstat farther south.

Confirmation came to Baden's camp that the Dauphin had crossed the Moselle. The observer's report called his cavalry 'beautiful'.

On 5 July Baden held a secondary court martial for Schönbeck and the rest of the Heidelberg Crew. Their fates are not recorded. Some changes were made to the order of battle: GWM Erffa was given command of the Left Wing first line, Fürstenberg the Right Wing, and Bibra the entire second line. Castell and Hohenzollern of course retained their wing commands. A missing Franconian regiment finally showed up and 70 more riders were sent to the Odenwald.

6 July the French scoured the country round their camp. Baden sent 30 horse to Schweigern. There are two such places in this part of Germany. The most likely one is 11 Km due west of Heilbronn; it will have been a flank guard and a connecting post to the troops in the Black Forest. The alternative is on the other side of the Neckar toward Würzburg, which seems pointless unless there was a magazine there. An adjutant, probably belonging to Graf Lippe, arrived from the Saxon army, talked with Baden, then left — no details.

7 July the French moved back to their first camp at Ladenburg. This was only a slight shifting of position, a move to the east of a few hundred metres. Their raiders pestered Hirschhorn several times. The town was at the end of a road through the Odenwald and probably saw a lot of commerce. Deserters arrived at Baden's camp telling of a mutiny among three of the Irish regiments; 43 Irish escaped. More would follow in the next few days. FML Wartensleben was sent to the Saxon camp. He would be Baden's representative there.

8 July 49 more Irish deserted and were sent on to Hungary to fight with the Prinz George von Darmstadt regiment. Graf Lippe's adjutant returned with bad news. 300 Saxon horse had been ambushed at Zwingenberg, losing 30 killed and 60 wounded. This probably took place about 5 July, though it may refer to the action on 1 July. A much more severe action took place on 9 July.

The Affray at Zwingenberg — 9 July

There are multiple version of this even, all different. To begin with Quincy, after the previous encounter, Lorges ordered his men to be ready for battle and kept them under arms all night. Today, the army marched north, probing for the enemy. The baggage and a reserve was to be left behind. 700 dismounted dragoons led the way 'by

the right', under Bourg and his brigadier, Estrades, supported by the Colonel Général regiment. After them came the artillery and the rest of the cavalry and the infantry, on the left. They passed by the château of Heppenheim, then Bensheim, then Zwingenberg. All these places were garrisoned by the enemy, and though the latter two only had 50 men each, the Saxon cavalry was nearby to support them.

By Zwingenberg they deployed for battle, at 9pm, aiming to take that town in a night assault. For this, two detachments were made: the grenadiers of the Normandie brigade, including men from Royal Vaisseaux, Royal, and Conty, plus the dismounted dragoons, and of the Picardie brigade, the latter including men from Picardie, Auvergen, and Moncassel. Normandie was on the right, under Chamilly. Their job was to climb a hill, while Picardie, under *prince* Epinoy, was to move down the main road. There were marshes on the left which restricted the advance.

In the dark the Picardie grenadiers rushed down the road and into the faubourg. They were repulsed twice but broke in on the third attempt. About 10:30pm the grenadiers of Normandie came down the hill 'pell-mell' and broke into the town. In the confusion, there was friendly fire which caused some casualties. The town was in French hands by 12:30am.

The French lost about 150 killed and as many wounded, including Vaubecourt and Epinoy. They estimated the Germans lost a similar number and the remainder used the darkness to cover their escape. The town was pillaged and burned, as were Heppenheim, Weinheim, and some other locations in the vicinity.

The facts as reported to Baden on 12 July were these: a 'major attack' had taken place, with fighting lasting from 9am to 5pm. Both the Saxons and Hessians participated. The French withdrew. The Germans suffered minimal losses.

In a subsequent letter to the Emperor, Baden says the action at Zwingenberg was a repulse of 900-1,000 French cavalry by the Saxons, supported by the Hessians in the later stages; a small skirmish with 3-400 other enemy troops also took place (this may be the attack on the town). However, he does write that the Germans were the ones to withdraw, or that they also withdrew. Baden hints this timidity is due to personal animosity on the part of Saxony toward himself.

The most glaring difference in the accounts is the time. A day battle or a night assault? Well, why not both? The French would have begin their advance in the early morning. If they encountered the Germans about 9am there could have been a series of cavalry 'duels' resulting in the French advancing as far as Zwingenberg by 5 pm. The Saxon camp was not far from Zwingenberg (had been since at least 4 July) and the infantry probably remained there. The Hessians — exclusively infantry

since their cavalry was with Baden — would have been guarding their own camp, which was farther north. Clearly the Saxons were forced back, allowing the French to storm Zwingenberg in the evening. However, the French probably also pulled back, if only to establish a secure base for the night.

But, the German version also omits the aftermath. The Landgrave and Duke of Saxony withdrew north, rapidly, sending the baggage away by night and the troops the next morning (10 July). They also sent to Baden asking for reinforcements. The Saxons took station at Langen and the Hessians and the combined HQ were at Sprenlingen. Langen is about 27 Km north of Zwingenberg, on the road to Frankfurt-am-Main and about half that distance from the capital, Darmstadt. Sprenlingen was even closer to Frankfurt along the same road. As the French approached, the Germans fell back again, until they reached the line of the Main at Frankfurt. Abandoned by its defenders, Darmstadt opened its gates. Lorges took contributions but did not pillage the city. So much for a stunning German victory.

Baden's representative, FML Wartsleben, was with Saxony all this time and had several talks with the commanders, trying to persuade them to push forward again, but to no avail. On 10 July, he reported from Frankfurt. The Landgrave's motives were clear, he feared for his lands, while this latest iteration of the Duke of Saxony seemed to be an indecisive ninny.

Saxony had his reasons, not all of them political. Before the encounter a French deserter reported the French were coming up the Bergstrasse, but that half their army was cutting eastward through the Odenwald toward Miltenberg on the Main. This was false, as Baden knew, because the Leiningen, Junkheim, and Pálffy cavalry regiments had been guarding that sector for the past 3 days. Moreover, the woods were full of German partisans. It was disinformation but Saxony and the Landgrave chose to accept it as fact.

According to a letter of Graf Lippe's, dated 4 August, the Germans held Zwingenberg for 3 hours with only 100 men from Hesse-Darmstadt. In his version of events the main body was unable to intervene at all, for a variety of reasons: lack of forage, lack of water, Hessian reluctance, the size of the enemy force. Against the town the French (according to Lippe) deployed 18 cavalry regiments and a brigade of grenadiers. This seems closer to the French account; it may be that the cavalry skirmish reported taking place around 5 July was conflated with the assault of Zwingenberg, so that there was no open fight on 9 July, only the assault.

And, finally, the Landgrave had his own tale to tell. It was Saxony who was dragging his feet. His men had done all the fighting at Zwingenberg (see Lippe) and he was not going to stick his neck out again without Saxony taking the lead. Actually, what the Landgrave wanted most was

'equal billing' with Saxony. Baden either refused to recognise this fact or decided it was a social impossibility.

the B.H.K. records some other items for 9 July. Yet another general arrived at Baden's camp: k.GWM Baron de Zant. A party of hussars at Bensheim attacked 60 French on a mountain road and killed 15, taking 3 prisoners. These men said the French camp was at Bensheim. Pálffy's Hussars were dispatched into the Odenwald. Graf von Leiningen went with them, tasked with organising a proper system of posts and patrols. These facts suggest the rumour of a French advance through the Odenwald was not entirely made up, but it was vastly exaggerated. The action will have taken place 2-3 days before the encounter at Zwingenberg.

10 July the new German bridge over the Neckar was completed and a guard of 60 men placed on it. An escaped German POW reported the French had broken camp, but this was old news, for he also said they were digging mines at Heidelberg to blow it up. That was on 2-3 July. Fresher news came from the Odenwald. The French appeared to be seriously hampered by the activities of the hussars and local partisans.

11 July: at 4am Baden went on reconnaissance to Sinsheim, 21 Km west of Wimpfen, returning that evening. The French were bombarding the castle of Starkenburg, which overlooked Heppenheim an der Bergstrasse. The Dauphin's movements were updated: he had crossed the Nahe 6 days ago, but only had 12,000 men (so the reports said). 65 Irish recruits who deserted from the French staged a revolt when told they were going to Hungary. At Mainz, enemy correspondence was found and one of the garrison's officers was suspected (nothing ever came of this).

Baden received a letter from King William stating that it was now believed Mainz was the object of the Dauphin's advance (old news). He was sending up *Feldmarschall* Flemming with the Brandenburgers and Palatine troops, along with some Hessian cavalry serving with them. Interestingly, the Landgrave of Hesse had to be asked for permission for the troops to cross his lands (though the bulk of his property was further up the Main, there were pockets near the confluence with the Rhine).

12 July Baden sent advance guards to Sinsheim and Bruchsal. It appears the river road from Wimpfen was not suitable so he would be forced to cut across country. This was the day that the news of Zwingenberg arrived. Baden probably did not yet know the Saxons had retreated to Frankfurt, since Wartensleben only wrote to him on 10 July and news seems to have taken 2-3 days to arrive. Pálffy's Hussars engaged 80 French, capturing 63 and killing the rest. On Baden's southern flank, Bibra's mix of garrisons and screening forces concentrated at Vaihingen.

The situation was a tricky one. The Saxons and Hessians were up by Frankfurt. Lorges army was operating along

the Bergstrasse with a reserve at Feudenheim, meaning Baden would have to force the Neckar if he wanted a battle. If Baden made a misstep, the French could redirect their efforts up the Neckar and perhaps take Heilbronn while their reserve held him in check. The strength of the French cavalry, an estimated 200 squadrons, was a source of constant worry, as was a chronic lack of money. Baden had nowhere near that number of mounted troops. He was also in ill health. In consequence, he marked time, waiting to see what the French would do.

Despite his forceful arguments for a link up near Mainz, Baden was reluctant to strip the Neckar line. There were many important towns in the region or behind it, such as Stuttgart and Ulm, not to mention Heilbronn itself. Also, the Swabians, until now fairly cooperative, might sour if abandoned. If Franconia and Swabia were both ruined they might quit the war. Baden's divided command attempted to protect both regions but he needed somehow to combine if he was to face the Dauphin.

Baden sent more hopeful messages to Saxony, via Wartsleben, saying the situation south of the Neckar was stable (he was expecting 4-5 Bavarian regiments and units from Würzburg) and that he would try to rendezvous at Hülff, from whence they could march together on Mainz. His letters are full of complaints (presumably for Wartsleben's eyes only, though maybe he expected Saxony to read them — and which he repeats in letters to the Emperor) about the Duke of Saxony, saying the man is out to ruin his reputation. Saxony and the Landgrave wanted to hold the line between Frankfurt and Aschaffenburg, close to their own bases, but this allowed the French to operate unchecked on the Bergstrasse. Baden argued that the Main would better defended from Mainz. A second letter reported the French had pulled back to Weinheim, so a link up is possible. Baden offered some concessions on the question of command if only Saxony would cooperate.

As an earnest of Baden's intentions, Bayreuth, who was his second in command, was given a small corps and sent to join the Saxons after the action at Zwingenberg, serving under Baden. Couriers were dispatched to put a rocket up the Bavarians, who had not yet arrived, and to summon forces from the Black Forest. As Baden crossed the Neckar in the vicinity of Heidelberg, he dispatched a small corps back to Heilbronn to strengthen it.

Enter the Dauphin

Quincy says that King Louis concentrated in Flanders to weaken the Allies along the Rhine, then dispatched the Dauphin by design to bolster Lorges. It is quite clear, however, that the King fully intended to besiege Liège (before his mistress summoned him), which would have occupied him for the entire season. Rather, it was the rapid fall of Heidelberg (which Louis had also called for)

that inspired him to send the Dauphin to the Rhine as a means of saving face.

As noted previously, the Dauphin was apparently planning to lay siege to Mainz. Likewise, Lorges' had been preparing the army to do just that. But at some point the *Maréchal* decided such a siege was insupportable. This has already been discussed at some length. Whether the lands around Mainz could not support an army, or whether Saxony was in actual fact quite strong, (at least in appearance) so that Mainz could not be isolated, or whether Lorges felt Baden had not been sufficiently cowed and might come after him, is not clear. What is clear is that once the Dauphin and his lieutenant met face to face, if not before, a new plan was devised. *Monseigneur* was not a man to argue.

Departing Namur on June 12, the Dauphin's corps consisted of 27 battalions and 45 squadrons, including elements of the Guard and the *Maison du Roi*. With the Dauphin were *maréchal* Boufflers, *lieutenans généraux* the *duc* du Maine (bastard son of the King, and a pitiful commander), the *marquis* de Gasse, the *marquis* de Mont-Revel, M. de Bertillac, and the *comte* de Tallard, newly recovered from his Rheinfels wound. The *maréchals de camp* were the *comte* de Mailly, *comte* de Lanion, and *comte* de la Motte.

The corps entered the Ardennes by way of Houfalisse (14-17 June) and after a rough march reached Mont Royal on 26 June. They did not set out again until June 30, crossing the Moselle and marching 33 Km southeast to Kirn (4 July). Turning south, on 5 July they were at Sobernheim (14 Km), and on 9 July at Bad Kreuznach (17 Km). As Baden learned on 11 July, they crossed the Nahe the day they arrived. Here the various elements merged — some troops had gone by a different road, probably closer to the Rhine. The Dauphin held a review. The army was a little worn, but passable.

The grenadiers and carabineers, with 300 dragoons, were made the Advance Guard and sent southeast to Alzey (20 Km; 12 July), 'Eppenheim' (20 Km 13 July), and Ogersheim (14 Km; 14 July). ('Eppenheim' is probably Wiesoppenheim); Frankenthal, which they passed through, was still in ruins. Ogersheim is 7 Km west of Mannheim.

On 13 July Lorges was camped at Lorsch. Imagining Heppenheim, Bensheim, and Lorsch as the points of a triangle, Lorsch is the western apex, 5 Km from either of the other two towns. He also had a palisaded redoubt at Ladenburg garrisoned by 400 foot and 70 horse, to protect his bridges. The countryside had been pretty well ravaged, and it was time to leave. Lorges had already come to the conclusion that he could not march to Mainz on this side of the Rhine — there was no forage except what was loaded on his wagons, and he was between two fires. If there had been forage he might have tried

chasing off the timid Saxony, leaving Baden behind, but things were just too dicey.

The Saxons and Hessians were still south of the Main, just barely, at least according to the latest information Baden had. He knew their train was at Frankfurt along with the HQ. A corps of Brandenburgers had arrived at Frankfurt: 6,000 Brandenburgers, 4,000 from Münster, and 3,000 Pfalz troops. Baden was still trying to get Saxony to come south so he could return some of his own men, not wanting to leave Württemberg and Swabia exposed. Because, if Mainz was off the table the Dauphin would probably come farther south and join Lorges for an attack on Heilbronn. Saxony did agree to march, but only after the Brandenburg corps arrived.

The entry for this day also reports the arrival at Baden's camp, still by the Neckar near Wimpfen, of 2 cannon and 4 battalions of Würzburg troops from the Kinzigthal.

On 14 July Baden ordered Bibra to Sinsheim with a detachment, to secure his march route. The same day a lieutenant colonel named Mortani deserted to the French. the B.H.K. provides some interesting details. Mortani was under a cloud. Just before the confrontation at Mühlacker on the Enz last year, where the French had routed the Germans covering Pforzheim, Mortani had been scouting near Ötisheim. His scouts had misled him so that he missed the French advance guard and many considered it was his fault the engagement had been lost. He had been given other commands since, but he took this opportunity to desert. The French appointed him to command their experimental hussar unit.

Probably on this day Lorges crossed the Rhine with a small escort to rendezvous with the Dauphin. His army, under Choiseul's command, moved 13.5 Km southeast to camp at Weinheim on the Bergstrasse. Neither Quincy nor the B.H.K. gives the exact date of the rendezvous with the Dauphin, but Quincy says Lorges 'returned' on 17 July. the B.H.K. mentions an intelligence report that the Dauphin was to command both French armies on the Upper Rhine, with Lorges being given a new one to operate in Trier. This was false information.

On 15 July the French army gave up trying to take Castle Starkenburg, broke camp, and withdrew to Ladenburg. German scouts counted 100 wagons of dead and wounded. Baden, meanwhile, ordered 2 bridges of his own constructed, at Kochendorf. They were on the Kocher River which enters the Neckar just above Wimpfen.

16 July the French crossed the Neckar on 8 bridges, headed for Weisloch, where they camped that evening. Baden seems to have abandoned his original plan to march down the Neckar and ordered a concentration of his and Saxony's armies at Heilbronn. He must have come to the conclusion that Mainz was off the table, either by observing Lorges' movements, or possibly through information received from spies in the Dauphin's

entourage. If the French were no longer bound for Mainz, they probably intended to attack him, or to besiege Heilbronn or possibly Stuttgart.

He pulled most of his forces over the Neckar, leaving a bridgehead at Wimpfen. His HQ was at Kochendorf. This camp was protected on three sides by rivers, the Neckar on the west, the Jar on the north, and the Kocher on the south. The bridge over the Neckar sported a redoubt at either end. A total of 500 men were entrenched at Schwaigern on the road between Eppingen and Heilbronn, Neckargartach, and Gros-Gardach. Pálffy's Hussars returned to the Odenwald, possibly to round up French stragglers, possibly to ensure the way was clear for Saxony to come south.

Meanwhile, Wartsleben returned from the Saxon camp with news that a deal had finally been brokered and the Duke and the Landgrave would come south, bringing the Brandenburger corps with them. And, at long last, the Bavarian Foot showed up.

On 17 July the Dauphin crossed the Rhine at Philippsburg. There is some question whether Lorges was with him (the B.H.K.) or had returned to his own army (Quincy). That army was between Langenbrücken and Ubstadt, about 7 Km north of Bruchsal. The Germans had reports of 3,000 provision carts coming from Alsace and Lorraine. Baden did not move, but sent 300 men to garrison Lauffen.

18 July the Dauphin went to Kretzin, near Durlach, a day's march from Lorges' army. This may have been a personal visit since the B.H.K. says the French armies did not move today, but it is more likely his army made a short advance, since Quincy says they were lining up to move simultaneously on an even front. Lorges (or Choiseul) halted his army for a day to allow the Dauphin to catch up. They were headed for the Neckar above Heilbronn, but whether to attack that place or Stuttgart remained unclear to the Germans.

Baden remained where he was, but ordered the bridge below his position on the Neckar dismantled. It had only been intended for the march north. He ordered 2,000 Bavarians mustered east of Augsburg to stand by to protect Ulm. That was how far he feared the French might advance.

Sunday 19 July Leiningen and his flying column returned from the Odenwald. The dismantled bridge was floated up to Heilbronn. 3 parties of hussars inflicted 50 casualties on the enemy and took 22 prisoners; 8 French deserters reached Baden's camp. They reported the French had started marching against Pforzheim. This was the Dauphin's army, estimated at 27 battalions, 50 squadrons of horse, and 12 squadrons of dragoons.

The Saxons, Hessians, and the Brandenburger corps were on their way. Their corps was augmented by 2,000 more Saxons, 4,000 Hanoverians, and 300 Swedes. It

was estimated they would reach the camp in a week; currently their van was at Amorbach, 6.5 Km south of the Main at Miltenberg. This means they had pulled up stakes at Frankfurt a few days before and taken the long way around, following the Main behind the Odenwald. They had another 40-50 Km to go.

They should be in time. The French were not moving rapidly. This day Lorges ordered a general forage south of the Neckar, his men going as far as Eppingen, where they laid an ambush for the local garrison. Sending out a few foragers they lured the Germans into attacking and nearly wiped them out. The garrison fired their cannon at the ambushers, in violation of some previous agreement, and in consequence the town was burned. Something similar had occurred at Weinheim on the Bergstrasse, so this agreement may have been a general one.

Quincy's next entry for the French is 23 July. the B.H.K. says 20 July was a 'rest day' for them. This from a report by Bibra, stationed at Vaihingen. Baden sent him *Graf Pálffy* and 200 hussars. A new assessment was made of French numbers and intentions. The Dauphin had apparently assumed command of the whole, but did not intend to join the armies. Instead, 60,000 men would march against Baden to pin him while a corps of 13,000 marched to Stuttgart. The Dauphin would lead the smaller force, which seems unusual. The French were said to be waiting for a large convoy of ammunition.

21 July the Germans located the larger French army between Münzesheim and Gochsheim, with the advance guard, probably under d'Uxelles, on the road between Illingen and Vaihingen. The main body had a 30 Km march ahead of them. The Dauphin's corps was marching from Grötzingen (by Durlach) directly to Pforzheim. It appears the van of the larger army was covering the Dauphin's approach.

22 July the German regiment Carlin's Dragoons was sent to Neckarrems (Remseck am Neckar) with minimal baggage. Otherwise, Baden did not move.

On 23 July the Dauphin marched to Oberriexingen on the Enz, 4,500 meters downriver from Vaihingen. D'Uxelles crossed the Enz and seized a hilltop castle at Asperg, 9 Km ESE from Oberriexingen, which he garrisoned with 400 men. So far, the French line of advance was straight for Neckarrems. Probably, they would isolate Stuttgart from the north and then sack it. But, to do so would involve crossing a couple of small rivers.

Bibra had been brushed aside, but was still at Enzweihingen, across the Enz from Vaihingen. He reported the French, consisting of the Dauphin's army and d'Uxelles' vanguard, were moving on a broad front in small groups, all headed for Stuttgart. These will have been cavalry detachments, possibly supported by grenadiers. the B.H.K. quotes some deserters who said the French remained 8 days at Vaihingen. If this is not a typo it probably means the Dauphin planned to base out

of Vaihingen for a week while his raiders visited Stuttgart. But later events do not bear this out.

Lorges' main army was marching against Baden's forces, 8 squadrons tearing through GÜglingen, halfway between Bretten and Heilbronn. They were headed for Lauffen, where they hoped to bounce the German garrison.

The Duke of Saxony and his cavalry were at Neudenau, only 3 hours from Baden's camp. The Landgrave was 7 Km behind at Möckmühl.

On 24 July, with his allies nearby, Baden began issuing a string of orders. The quartermasters were to marshal their foragers between Talheim and Heilbronn (that is, in the area of the old camp at Sontheim). Graf Styrum arrived in the afternoon with the Left Wing cavalry (of Saxony's army) and 4 battalions. Baden visited the Duke. Pálffy engaged a French patrol, killing 30 and capturing 17; he reported enemy forces marching for Vaihingen and Horrheim (6 Km north of Vaihingen). Another group fought a French patrol in a churchyard, killing 13 and taking 27, out of 40. Bibra's men, at Markgröningen (4 Km west of Asperg Castle), inflicted 20 French casualties and took 10 POWs but he reported there were 15 squadrons in front of him and more coming. The French were expected at Bietigheim soon. Bietigheim is halfway between Markgröningen, Oberrixingen, and Besigheim — in other words only 6-7 Km from the confluence of the Enz and Neckar.

Lorges was reported to be sending 4 brigades to reinforce the Dauphin at Vaihingen. The latter's cavalry were sighted near Stuttgart, Canstatt, and Rothenburg. If this last is Rottenburg, that particular band was on the Neckar above Tübingen, 50 Km south of Vaihingen and twice as far away as the other groups.

With the French moving to pin him as his Intelligence had forecasted, Baden decided to shift his position farther south. If the French crossed the Neckar at Lauffen, they could potentially blockade Heilbronn before he arrived there himself. On 25 July he had his bridges dismantled and the pontoons sent up to Heilbronn. Work on a redoubt covering the crossing of the Neckar at Lauffen was hastened. Styrum, now above Heilbronn with his cavalry, reported seen 20 French squadrons on the heights by Besigheim and sent 150 men to hold that place. They immediately had to fend off a sudden French assault. News of this caused Baden to immediately send up his Right Wing cavalry and all his Foot to Heilbronn. The Saxon advance guard was a little behind, only at Neckarsulm by the time Baden reach his old camp at Sontheim. Hesse was a day behind (it is unclear whether Baden still had any Hessian troops under his command or whether they had gone off some time earlier to rejoin the Landgrave; probably they were still with him). The Brandenburg corps was at Kochertürn, 14 Km northeast of Heilbronn (marching on a separate road from the Saxons).

The dragoon regiments Aufsess and Wartesleben were dispatched to Besigheim with 3 light cannon. The place might have fallen but the Germans employed a ruse, rounding up bands of peasants (probably hired to do the foraging) to make their numbers look larger and having a drum corps make a lot of noise; the French pulled back.

According to Quincy, 5,000 French and 8 guns, part of d'Uxelles' corps, had been detached under the Irish general, Montcashell, to take Besigheim. Also according to Quincy, the German garrison, 500 men under a Colonel Horn, withdrew in the night. He does not mention the repulse of the French. However, the town was actually abandoned either in the night or at dawn the next day, though Pálffy, coming from Baden's camp at Kochendorf, took a patrol past it before retiring downriver to Lauffen.

Lorges and the Dauphin had joined forces and marched for Besigheim earlier in the day. They were making camp while d'Uxelles amused himself. Lorges, or rather the Dauphin, now had 45,000 men: 70 battalions and 205 squadrons.

At Neckarweilhing there was an incident when a German supply ship capsized and 60-70 French drove off the peasants who were trying the salvage it. Neckarweilhing is 12 Km southeast of Besigheim, and much farther by water, since the river flows through a number of loops. 50 of Carlin's Dragoons at Remseck am Neckar, 5 Km farther south, rode down to help, chasing the enemy into the river where all but 5 drowned or were cut down.

Very early on 26 July Horn's men at Besigheim pulled out, along with the general population. 12-15 people drowned when the last 2 boats overturned (overloaded, one expects). In the morning the French bridged the Neckar at Besigheim. An detachment of German grenadiers was dug in on the far bank and tried to interfere but were driven off by cannon fire. 80 of Carlin's Dragoons at Neckarweihingen tried to harass the French flank guards.

At Heilbronn, Baden was organising the defence. Apparently the Duchess of Württemberg (this will have been the Duke's mother) was in the town, because the Dauphin sent word promising her safety so long as there was no resistance. However, she and her court swiftly withdrew from the area. Baden sent emissaries all over Württemberg to arouse the locals (who were beginning to be fed up with the war).

Baden had occupied his old camp at Sontheim. For details refer to the diagram on p. 144 and the description on p. 142. It was a very strong camp, but at the moment only contained 8 regiments of his own and 26 squadrons under the Duke of Saxony, who held his right flank. The rest of his army assembled in the old camp below Heilbronn, ready to move. The Sontheim detachment dug in, mounting artillery at every possible approach.

On paper Baden's army was organised as follows: the Duke of Saxony commanded the Right, with General

Chavet as his second-in-command and infantry commander, and Count Styrum his General of Cavalry. The Landgrave commanded the Left, with General Flemming, Duke Frederick-Charles of Württemberg, and Count Lippe in matching roles. Baden commanded the center, with General Steinau and the Margrave of Baden-Durlach. Bayreuth commanded the Reserve. The precedence squabble between Saxony and Hesse continued to give Baden headaches, which is why he made the Landgrave commander of the Left. At least that would put the two men on opposite sides of the battlefield.

[Quincy mentions there were 34 additional generals.]

The French crossed the Neckar in force on 27 July by 2 pontoon bridges. These were made of copper, the latest thing in bridging material, but it was found they could not support the weight of the heaviest of the guns. In addition, the Neckar's flow was too great and both bridges snapped more than once. However, the army, including the heavy cannon, did eventually get across, camping at Pleidelsheim (6 Km southeast of Besigheim). It took until 31 July for the crossing to be completed. The French had 120 cannon and 13,000 provision wagons with supplies for 3 months. Choiseul commanded the bridgehead and Boufflers supported him.

The French estimated they faced no more than 25,000 men (this according to prisoners taken by the Germans), which suggests they were unaware of the Saxon corps. The Germans thought they faced 50,000.

The B.H.K. recounts a line-of-communications skirmish which took place at VeiHINGEN. 2,000 French infantry were building a bridge to NeckarweiHINGEN. They had a redoubt on their own side, with 4 cannon. A band of *French* hussars (if this designation is correct they cannot have been more than 60 in number) crossed the new bridge and were immediately attacked by Pálffy — Pálffy had a roving commission — with 200 men. 2 were captured and 3 killed. After this, Bibra's command and Carlin's Dragoons were ordered to Liebenstein, 20 Km northeast, across the Neckar. Since Liebenstein is a few kilometres beyond Besigheim they would give advance warning of French movements behind the latter's lines.

At Heilbronn, cannon were being erected. The Landgrave and his cavalry were approaching the town; his infantry were expected the next day.

On 28 July the lead French elements dug in, a day's march south of Baden's camp. 3,000 men worked on the defences. This camp was between Höpfigheim and Ottmarsheim, 5 Km east of their bridges over the Neckar. The French occupied Marbach, Gantz, Murr and 2 other villages. There is some indication they also built a bridge on the Neckar south of Besigheim, near Talhof, for the use of forces operating around Stuttgart. 100 Germans were sent to Schorndorf, 25 Km east of Stuttgart in the

valley of the Rems; they wiped out a French raiding force there.

The Hessian and Brandenburg cavalry arrived at Sontheim. Baden's scoutmasters, Pálffy, Carlin, and Bibra, were headquartered at Kaltenwesten (Neckarwestheim), less than 4 Km north of the French.

In a letter dated 29 July Baden reported that the French had done little more than a bit of digging. It seemed they might withdraw. He had heard rumours of a 20,000-wagon convoy that the enemy feared would come under partisan attack. If the French were attacked by him while the countryside rose in revolt, it would be a dire situation for them. Of course, Baden was not strong enough for that, but it seemed to show the French were not that strong, either. (In a letter dated 14 August he estimated their numbers at only 15,000, but that was after two weeks of wastage.)

In contrast, the Germans dug in vigorously, extending their trenches toward Flein, 2,000 meters southeast from Sontheim, and a ridge called the Kreuzberg, on which the main section of their entrenchments would eventually be secured. Flein is on the northern side of that ridge. The terrain featured wooded hilltops with vineyards on the lower slopes (as it still does today). Baden ordered a flying bridge constructed behind his lines at Sontheim. Baden also erected 4 bridges over the Neckar at Lauffen, so that he could outflank any French advance. A few small detachments were sent east to Schwäbische Hall, to cover the main supply route which ran from there to Heilbronn — this was one weakness of the German position, that the chief supply line jutted out at right angles from Heilbronn, rather than feeding their camp from its rear.

The French advanced some forces late in the day pushing Pálffy and company out of Neckarwestheim.

The Germans spent 30 July erecting batteries. Baden sent an express to the Elector of Brandenburg asking for more troops. Carlin's Dragoons were sent to reinforce Schorndorf. The French held a general muster.

At 4am on 31 July the French were seen marching through Ilfeld. A detachment was also seen passing through Neckarwestheim. This put them only 7 Km from Sontheim. What lay between was the village of Thalheim and the wooded Kreuzberg, whose western and northern slopes were covered by vineyards. Since last night the German Left had manned their trenches. The rest of the army was pulled back from the line in case of a sudden bombardment. The cavalry remained saddled all night. The guns were to unmask simultaneously when ordered.

Baden made a personal reconnaissance around the eastern end of the Kreuzberg, to Unter-Gruppenbach, a village 6.5 Km southeast from his camp and very close to the French line of advance. He placed a garrison of 50

men in the local castle, named Stettenfels. This was essentially a 'forlorn hope' position.

At 10am the French at Neckarwestheim began moving again, but did not go far. The whole mass of the army came to rest along the line Neckarwestheim-Illfeld-Gruppenbach. The Dauphin summoned Lauffen to surrender. Meanwhile, deserters from his camp reported an assault was to commence tomorrow. Baden's 3,000 extended their lines along the Kreuzberg. Disturbingly, enemy parties were spotted at Weinsberg, 5.5 Km due east of Heilbronn, and at Löwenstein, 13 Km ESE from the city. These places had German garrisons (200 and 50, respectively) and no doubt there were more unnamed posts ringing the town. Apparently there were at least 12 French squadrons operating on the German supply lines. In skirmishes Carlin attacked a party of 30 French taking 6 POWs; elsewhere, 6 other French were killed and 2 POWs taken.

On the night of 1 August the German Night Watch was attacked by mounted men. The attackers recoiled so precipitately that 6 broke their necks in a ditch. This led the Germans to work even harder. 4,000 men dug trenches and 10,000 improved the main camp. Peasants collected wood for palisades and revetments. 2 more bridges were built between Sontheim and Heilbronn. Pálffy's Hussars were sent to the Heights of Heilbronn (toward the east) to discourage raiders; there were some skirmishes. Later in the day GWM Sohier and 12 squadrons were sent to the Weinsberg Valley to secure the road.

[The Night Watch was presumably the Left Wing, at 'stand to' in the trenches. Either they had that duty permanently, or they rotated with the Right Wing, but either way it would have been their turn. According to Quincy, 12-15,000 peasants had been employed digging the German entrenchments.]

Early in the day, deserters came into Sontheim saying the Dauphin was about to attack. Baden ordered his troops to their posts and had the guns manned. More guns were brought up onto Heilbronn's walls. Meanwhile, the French were erecting 2 batteries against the Lauffen bridgehead.

Baden was well prepared. He had the whole of his Left Wing along the circuit of the trenches with his Right as a reserve. The cavalry was dismounted and ready to either enter the trenches or mount and sally. Bombs, grenades, and powder were stockpiled along the lines.

No attack came, but Baden ordered the trenches fully manned all night. According to Quincy, the Dauphin fully intended to bring on a battle, but he found Baden's position very strong. He hesitated. The situation very nearly required a formal siege and he had little siege equipment on hand.

The Non-Battle of Heilbronn

Refer to the diagram on p. 144. This map is the best that can be attempted with the sketchy details available. Most histories ignore the fact that anything ever took place here. Fortunately full OOBs are available for both sides, dated to within a week or so of this encounter. Three period sketches of the Camp were used, each one significantly different, though agreeing in broad outline. A modern topographical map was taken for a foundation, and an Imperial German army map from 1693 (which uses the older place names) was also referenced.

Two of the period maps include the positions of all the German regiments, though they are not exactly the same. Since all the units in the diagram are to scale, it became evident that most if not all the cavalry was deployed in 'column'. It was assumed that each regiment had its squadrons arranged one behind the other. This must be so, not only from the evidence of the period sketches but simply because of the amount of ground the regiments would otherwise take up. The position of the German cavalry is not exact, but roughly as shown in the various sketches. The Hussars and one of the horse regiments each have 2 locations, one of which is faded; the faded locations show where they were deployed in the line, and the darker locations are where they appear to have been during the encounter. Similarly, 3 other cavalry regiments are faded. These are the 12 squadrons of Sohier's brigade, sent to patrol the Weinberger Valley, which is just off the north and northeast edges of the diagram.

The German Foot are more accurately shown, deployed in a horseshoe shape around the trace of the entrenchments. It should be remembered that only a company or so from each battalion would be on watch in the trenches at any given time. When the French approached, the musketeers and grenadiers would man the trenches but the pikemen, or similar reserve bodies, would be in the immediate rear to conduct counterattacks. Only 2 battalions from the OOB are missing, those of Mollendorff's Regiment. It has been assumed they are guarding Lauffen. There were also some troops at Unter-Gruppenbach but these were probably company detachments. Carlin's Dragoons are also missing — they were at Schorndorf.

The line of the trenches and the position of the redoubts are somewhat subjective. The period sketches do not exaggerate the eastward thrust of the line as much as this diagram, but the length of the lines is based on the location of Thalheimer Farm, which still exists. Close examination of the ground shows that the battery at the end of the 'nose' was capable of conducting 'grazing fire'. The trenches at Lauffen are conjectural. There seems to have been no attempt to fortify it along the lines of the Horkheim Redoubt which was built to guard the fords at Kilingenberg, and the period sketches show no preexisting fortifications. However, it is likely some defences were thrown up.

The French are shown as a linear mass, without detail. The arrangement of their units is based upon their OOB. It should be remembered that some units may have been absent, but all are shown 'at full strength'. As with the Germans, it has been assumed the regiments, including the infantry, were deployed in column, for several reasons. First, if the army was deployed in line its length would be ridiculously long, about twice that shown. The length depicted is quite close to that given on the period sketches. Second, the army was camped on that spot, so deploying it in a contracted form seems sensible (although armies often did camp in line, the troops sometimes advancing only a short distance in front of the tents before forming for battle). The main reason, however, is that Quincy specifically says the assault was to be made in column — 7 columns, to be precise. Columnar attacks were more common than the reader might expect. Even as this encounter was shaping up, the *duc de Luxembourg* was fighting the Battle of Landen/Neerwinden (and a superficially similar situation) using assault columns. As can be seen from the map, the ground was too constricted for a linear approach; also, they would be attacking a fortified line, which called for the tactics of a siege assault. It does raise the question, however, of whether the formations were arranged as shown on the OOB, or in the form of 'assault groups', as would happen in a siege.

During the encounter the mass of the French cavalry on the right either remained in place, was sent into the Weinberger Valley, or hooked around to skirmish with the Germans in front of Heilbronn. The French would have stayed away from the town, which was armed with heavy guns. There is no mention of the *Maison du Roi* doing anything heroic. Similarly, the French Left seems to have done no more than observe Lauffen and the gap between the Neckar and the Schozachbach. As will be described, some squadrons, probably on the Right, made a probe and suffered losses. This was probably at the 'nose' of the German trenches, though it may have been against the section between the 'nose' and Flein. The main 'attack' was made by columns of grenadiers, totalling about 5,000, which will have been most of the grenadiers in the army; possibly, dragoons also participated in the assault. Some of the cavalry is reported bringing up fascines.

The position of each side's cannon is based on the period sketches and the locations of the Thalheimer and Schellenhof farms. The location of Thalheimer Farm cannot be disputed, but there is no sign of Schellenhof on modern maps, or even the 1893 staff map. The period sketches place it just to the east of the Flein-Ilsfeld Road. However, there is a substantial farm called Hohrain at the location marked as 'Schellenhof' on the diagram; the author conjectures this is its true location, partly because a siege battery was started near there in a position that overlooked Lauffen (as shown). The other French batteries are in roughly the correct location anyway.

1 August was a day of preparation. Fascines were made for use in the marshy brook that runs at the foot of the Kreuzberg. At dawn on 2 August the drums of the French battalions began to beat and the trumpets of 200 squadrons brayed out the challenge. Musical displays in the presence of a Royal were impressive affairs. It is not surprising the Germans heard it in their camp.


Dawn was at 4:53am. As soon as the 'royal standard' ceased the French marshalled and began the advance. Their Right Wing Cavalry anchored itself on Unter-Gruppenbach, sent some squadrons over the rise into the open ground in front of Flein, and others to overwatch the Weinsberg Valley. The German picket line, 60 horse with 100 foot in support, stationed south of the ravine, repelled a probe by 6 squadrons of French.

From Ilsfeld to the German entrenchments was about 4,000 metres. When the French were perhaps 2,000 metres from the enemy, with their Right still anchored on Unter-Gruppenbach, the Dauphin, Lorges, and Choiseul went to investigate the enemy's Right. As can be seen from the diagram, the enemy trenches extended all along this flank and made a dogleg, behind which was a mass of cavalry. Farther east the woods were too thick for cavalry to fight in. On the other hand, immediately in front of the French was an 'impassible' ravine, enemy positions dug in along the wood line, and cannon in embrasures above the infantry.

The Dauphin ordered up his own cannon and his Right Wing (infantry) to join the Center and Left. The Foot were organised into 3 lines. Behind them, the cavalry stockpiled the fascines. 2 batteries, amounting to 50 cannon, were erected. Quincy says they were to fire on the corner battery (the 'nose' of the trench system) but the period sketches show them emplaced farther west, opposite the main German battery.

A cavalry detachment was sent to Schellenhof and a siege battery was soon started which appeared to face Lauffen, though it may have been intended to bombard the western corner redoubt. The Germans could see the Dauphin there, too, looking for a weak spot in their lines.

The French infantry went forward and cleared out the few remaining enemy posts in front of the entrenchments. The Germans made no attempt to hold them. However, once within general musket range the attackers began to suffer from the German fire. There was a some 'free-style' sharpshooting. On the other flank, in front of Heilbronn, there was some inconclusive cavalry skirmishing. While this was going on both sides began a bombardment. The Germans had 44 guns facing the French. Even the Dauphin's personal troop was fired on and lost some men. Interestingly, instead of riding out of range, he rode



1000 meters

Heilbronn

3 July - 6 August 1693

- Swabia
 - Franconia
 - Mainz
 - Pfalz
 - Bavaria
 - Wolfenbüttel
 - Hesse
 - Electoral Saxony
 - Brandenburg
 - Imperial
 - French Brigades
 - Dragoons
 - Stream
 - Road
 - Trenches
 - Redoubt
- Units to Scale
- 4 sqn Cavalry Regt in column of sqns
 - Foot bn in line
 - Foot bn in column
 - Cannon
 - Piquets & Outposts

forward so he could be identified and Baden ordered his gunners to avoid that troop. The French guns, still being brought into position, were unable to suppress the fire.

Probing continued all day — the B.H.K. says that no more than the 5,000 French grenadiers were ever involved — but by the evening it was concluded the German position was too strong and the French withdrew back to their camp, retiring the same order they had advanced. Opinion at the time held that the French infantry could have stormed the position at a high cost, but their cavalry would have been useless, while the Germans had room on the plain behind their trenches to form cavalry for a counterattack. It was said that the Dauphin miscounted his own army, thinking he had 90,000 when he only had 40,000 or, alternatively that he was prepared to attack if the Germans had no more than 40,000, but that he had not expected the Saxons. These sound like excuses made after the fact. The *duc de Luxembourg* would have risked it, but he was in Flanders — where he did risk exactly such an attack at Neerwinden/Landen. But, King Billy was not Louis of Baden, either. After fighting the Turks for a decade or more *Türkenlouis* was a master of the art of the fortified camp. The Dauphin could see no reason why he should incur heavy losses, though it frustrated him to be thwarted in this manner.

In the evening 20 grenadiers from Durlach's regiment were sent to investigate the site of the Schellenhof battery. Presumably no guns were ever emplaced here, but the fact of its existence suggested the Dauphin might be considering a formal siege.

To keep the enemy agitated, 60 drummers from the German dragoons rendezvoused with the hussars and advanced against the French in the dark, making a great noise. Apart from this, skirmishing was forbidden. (Armies in close proximity frequently indulged in target practise on each other for amusement.) The German cavalry remained at 'boots and saddles' all night; The Kurpfalz and Grebendorf Dragoons were sent to man a redoubt on the Kreuzberg.

3 August saw the French remaining in camp. The Dauphin had not yet abandoned his enterprise but may have been waiting on events, hoping for some turn of fortune. Or, nerving himself for a bloodbath.

Most of Baden's army remained on watch. The lines were held by 60 men from each regiment of foot. 2 parties of Saxons (30 men each) crossed Neckar on reconnaissance. There was a small castle on the road from Unter-Gruppenbach to Weinsberg and this was garrisoned by 50 men. 1,200 more men were sent to Besigheim, probably to interfere with the French bridges. At the confusingly-named Bietigheim, 6 Km south of Besigheim, the French cavalry made a probe, but they did nothing else.

4 August was much the same. The Saxon raiders returned with 2 prisoners, claiming they inflicted 25

French casualties. Carlin at Schorndorf reported he had fought a party of French, taken 55 prisoners and inflicted 27 casualties. About noon, the French tried setting up some cannon (the B.H.K. says only 2 guns) to fire on Lauffen. Return fire from Lauffen scared them away. The French were raiding east of Heilbronn, riding through Löwenstein and nearby Lichtenstern. French deserters reported their army would break camp tomorrow and probably recross the Neckar. leisure

According to Quincy, on 5 August the Dauphin ordered a withdrawal, but Baden swiftly sent out a detachment to attack the rearguard, so he cancelled the move. According to the B.H.K. the French only sent their baggage over the Neckar, by way of Besigheim. There was some skirmishing, though. At Unter-Gruppenbach 4 French squadrons fought 50 German dragoons. 100 Germans were dispatched from their camp to further secure the hamlet.

Overnight the German trenches were manned by 80 men from each regiment. Baden sent Bibra across the Neckar on the Eppingen Road to face Gros-Gartach with 12 battalions and some artillery.

The same evening the French made a triple *feu de joie* of both muskets and cannon (104 pieces), for the victory at Landen in Brabant. Interestingly, Landen was a superficially similar situation, an Allied army nestled between a major and minor stream, with entrenchments in front. However, William of Orange's army was in actuality severely cramped and his entrenchments were pathetic. Still, it took the French three assaults to break his lines.

It was likely the Dauphin had planned to retreat today, but either the threat of a German attack caused him to rethink his situation and how to extricate himself, or the news of Landen inspired him. The inspiration was short lived and nothing came of it.

On 6 August the French managed to decamp unmolested, vacating their premises in the morning but leaving their tents erected until 1pm. They did not move far, just back to the camp between Höpfigheim and Ottmarsheim. Their HQ was at Mundelsheim on the Neckar, in the middle of the west side of the camp. To cover their retreat the French placed all their dragoons, grenadiers, and best battalions in the rearguard. They had bridges at Pleidelsheim on the Neckar, 4 Km southwest. It was rumoured they were bound for Stuttgart, possibly to force Baden to abandon his camp. Stuttgart was where all the peasants had fled to. The French sent a *salvaguardie* there. This may sound like a patrol of some kind, but a *salvaguardie* was an extortion document — pay us X and we will not burn your town. Once signed, the town was immune. Sometimes the town did not pay the extorting army directly but agreed to send money to the nation's treasury. Therefore the term *salvaguardie* also embraces the army officials overseeing

the transaction, who would remain at the town to oversee payment. Many places in Württemberg were sending money to France, as arranged by the Regent during his captivity. In Stuttgart's case the *salvagerie* seems to have been a renewal notice. It does suggest the French did not intend to attack Stuttgart after all, unless the city refused to pay.

The same day (6 August) another notable incident took place. The Germans had intercepted a courier. Perhaps the letters included personal correspondence, for the Dauphin sent a trumpeter to Baden asking that they be returned, which was done, the *Generalleutnant* apologizing for being unable to pay his respects in person and for having accidentally fired on the Dauphin the other day.

7 August 66 deserters arrived in Baden's camp. They said the French had put most of their baggage over the Neckar. Baden reduced the number of men manning his trenches. Bayreuth made a reconnaissance of Liebenstein, southeast of Heilbronn, without seeing anything. The hussars wiped out a party of 25 French cavalry; this probably happened west of the Neckar. On the French side nothing is reported for today.

8 August Pálffy returned from a lengthy patrol to report there were still French at Pforzheim (probably harbingers and a small garrison securing the line of march). His men inflicted 30 casualties and took 6 prisoners. Sohier brought his 12 squadrons back from the Weinberger Valley, since the French had gone.

9 August: on the French side M. du Rosel was detached with 1,500 horse and some foot to take Selingen, an enemy post on the Neckar above Stuttgart. Its 500-man garrison evacuated the place. Baden had been under the weather for some days, though this did not seem to affect his operations much; he felt much better today.

On 10 August a violent storm arose. It only lasted 45 minutes but witnesses claimed they had never seen anything like it. Most of the tents in the French camp were blown down and several fires started, including in the Dauphin's quarters. Many of the horses broke out of their lines, causing great confusion — those that could be captured were hastily mounted and used to screen the camp from potential hostile action. The storm also affected the Germans, though not so severely.

This storm was the official reason for the French retreat which followed, which was not conducted hastily, but scheduled for 12 August. Probably a damage assessment took place on 11 August, after which it was decided not to remain. Quincy says the Dauphin had planned further operations, perhaps even a renewed attack on the German camp, but the storm ruined the cavalry. the B.H.K.'s entries, particularly the reports from deserters, suggest the French already intended to retreat. But, perhaps they would have marched south instead of for the Rhine if the cavalry had remained fit for service.

Certainly, it was rumoured in the German camp that the French were bound for Schorndorf. Colonel Carlin was still there and now received 500 horse and 300 foot as reinforcements. They were replaced by 4 Brandenburg battalions who had been on line of communication duties in the Odenwald. 2 raiding parties, 1 under a Baron Zont (Zandt?) and 1 under a man named Friesen were sent out; 22 French casualties were inflicted and 12 prisoners taken.

For 11 August nothing is reported for the French except that a POW cartel was signed between them and Baden at Ottmarsheim. Pálffy was still out patrolling, this day reporting 8 enemy casualties and the capture of 45 artillery horses. Deserters reported the occupation of Stuttgart by the French. They were also said to be at Canstatt, Esslingen, and other places around Stuttgart.

12 August: both Quincy and the B.H.K. say the French baggage crossed the Neckar today. Since the B.H.K. also says the baggage crossed between 4-7 August it is unclear what he means. Probably, carts from the huge provision train, possibly loaded with sick and wounded, and perhaps the heavy baggage, were sent away on the earlier dates, by way of Besigheim. This time, it would be the integral baggage and the artillery, crossing by way of the bridges at Pleidelsheim-Ingersheim. Some of the troops also crossed, both cavalry and infantry. These troops pushed up the Enz to secure the various villages; some were seen at Brackenheim, 6 Km east of Lauffen.

Baden sent Bibra to Schwabische Hall with 200 horse. Apparently there were French marauders there. Each of the Neckar bridges was given 6 cannon for protection. Which means the artillery park was being broken up as the threat of a battle receded. Perhaps the guns emplaced on the trench line remained.

On 13 August the French main body crossed the Neckar. The Dauphin commanded the rearguard with the *Gendermerie* and the *Colonel Général* cavalry brigade (probably of 2 regiments). A new camp was established at Ingersheim, just over the Neckar. The army faced north. The HQ was at Ingersheim itself but the army probably occupied the whole tract of land between there and Bietigheim on the Enz. The Neckar and Enz form a pocket here, three sides of a rectangle as they merge by Besigheim on the north. This protected the camp on all sides except the south, and to the south were only French troops.

Baden urged (not ordered) the Duke of Saxony to 'brave the enemy with parties'. 200 (Imperial) hussars and 59 'reiters' were sent out.

In Baden's letter of 14 August he states the French had recrossed the Neckar — their last bridgehead of 3 brigades was drawn in today — and seemed in a bad way. He expected they would recross the Rhine, despite what the rumours said about an occupation of Stuttgart.

In fact, the French would remain in their present location until the forage ran out.

The Dauphin visited Stuttgart, returning at 10pm. He had had an escort of 20 men from each regiment, amounting to 1,300. According to deserters (and not recorded in Quincy) the city was garrisoned with 700 French. The visit was connected with the very large *contribution* owed by the state. If it were not for the fact that the Dauphin was obviously hoping for some signal achievement, like besieging Mainz or beating the great Türkenlouis in battle, one might assume his whole campaign had been made solely in order to collect back rent.

As for the Germans, Pálffy paid another visit to Vaihingen with 200 hussars. Carlin at Schorndorf sent Baden 100 POWs, presumably so they could be sent on to the French camp, per the current cartel. 20 German POWs were repatriated. 4 new reinforced raiding parties were sent out.

16 August: the B.H.K. says the French were at Beitigheim. This probably means the Dauphin moved his HQ to the Enz. Their army was large enough to occupy the whole pocket. The Germans returned their artillery to its park at Sontheim. There was a shortage of artillery horses so the hussars were told to go find some. Baden continued to man his trenches, but only with a light guard.

On 17 August a single German hussar sergeant reputedly inflicted 14 French casualties and stole 18 horses; this surely cannot have been a solo enterprise, but it sounds good. Another party reported a body count of 25 and captured 12 horses. Horse captures begin to appear frequently in the campaign journal. Irish deserters diminish. Priorities change.

The Dauphin was resupplied by 2,000 wagons from Strasbourg. He also had his men out foraging. Baden's intelligence arm could not decide if the French would make for Philippsburg or the Hohlengraben. This last is a district in the Black Forest east of Freiburg. Though it had been fortified by local labour the area was more open and fertile than other parts of the Black Forest, and not protected from the east. The eastern end opens out onto the upper reaches of the Danube.

18 August Baden received reports the Dauphin was planning to break up his army, sending a corps to the Low Countries and another to Italy and leaving Lorges with the remainder.

Aug 19: Carlin raided from Schorndorf taking 15 prisoners and 80 horses. Pálffy cut down 30 French and collected 16 horses. The German garrisons of Weinsberg, Gruppenbach, Neckarsulm were reduced. On the French side nothing of note occurred. It can be assumed they were conducting similar activities.

On 20 August Baden ordered the marking out of a new camp, on the other side of Lauffen, by its chief monastery.

21 August a captain and 70 men were sent by Baden to Stuttgart. There were reports that the French have sent all their heavy baggage and artillery train to Philippsburg with '100,000 men'. This has to be a typo for a 10,000-man escort. There must have been spies in the Dauphin's HQ. This is the problem when one has an entire corps-worth of servants. Baden learned he was planning to leave for Versailles on 25 August. The army was being organised into 2 corps, one bound for Tübingen and the other for the Hohlengraben. Tübingen was 50 Km south of the site of the current French camp. The town is on the Neckar, for the river runs northeast at that point. Baden also discovered the campsite he had chosen for his own army was too small.

On 22 August the patrol sent to Stuttgart must have returned, for Baden learned that the shocking 'occupation' of the city by the French amounted to no more than the Dauphin's visit and a demand for 500,000 Thalers. If not paid, Stuttgart, Tübingen, and the rest of Württemberg would suffer the same fate as the Palatinate.

Cavalry patrols also reported that French supply wagons were headed in the direction of Leonburg, 20 Km southwest of the French camp and in the same latitude as Stuttgart. This meant they intended to carry out their threat. It also suggested that if Württemberg paid up they might be granted permission by the duchy to circle back to the Rhine through the Black Forest.

A German *Oberleutnant* Mortani (who cannot have been the noted deserter but may have been a relative) was sent in the direction of Reutlingen (east of Tübingen but on the far side of the Neckar) with 300 horse to check on this situation; he confirmed the reports. Pálffy and Sohier were sent to Marbach (7 Km east of the French camp) with 200 hussars and 200 dragoons to beat up any enemy cavalry they found on the right bank of the Neckar; the river was very low and it was assumed the enemy would cross it to raid.

23 August the French camp was backlit by a great fire. The Germans assumed Stuttgart was burning. Quincy does not report such an event but instead talks of an accidental fire at Vaihingen-Mitte which took place either next day or on 25 August. Vaihingen-Mitte is not on the Enz, it is 9 Km southeast of Leonberg. If it were not for the fact that Quincy names the town one would assume this was the same fire.

German reports said 3-4,000 French (32 squadrons) under Tallard had gone to Göppingen, on the Fils River, 44 Km southeast of their camp. This would put them 14 Km southeast of Carlin's force at Schorndorf. The Bavarian regiments of La Tour and Sohier were sent to reinforce Carlin, who was ordered to patrol in the direction of Göppingen. In the other direction, 300 French horse were reported at Bönningheim, 5 Km southwest of Lauffen. Despite these wide ranging reports Pálffy found no enemy hussars east of the Neckar but did acquire 1,000

oxen. The French pursued the herd for 2 hours, crossing the Neckar in the process; they recovered 400 of the oxen.

The French Move West

On 24 August the French broke camp. Quincy and the B.H.K. differ in their accounts of the march. The B.H.K. says (according to German reports) that the French divided with part going to Stuttgart and part to Pforzheim. Quincy says they all (or most of them) marched to Leonberg, 20 Km southwest of the Ingersheim camp. There, the Dauphin met the Duke of Württemberg's representative, Öostin. He handed over 1,200,000 livres (400,000 crowns), and agreed to pay a further 300,000 livres (100,000 crowns) annually. Württemberg also agreed to give hostages, including two of the Duke's councillors, 2 senior clergymen, and 2 burgomasters.

Quincy then recounts that a fire broke out at Vaihingen-Mitte (see above). This was where the French had their bread ovens. All the flour stocks were destroyed. There is no hint of sabotage in Quincy's account. If improperly stored the flour could spontaneously combust in the summer heat. This is the second reason advanced for the Dauphin's complete withdrawal from the right bank of the Rhine.

It seems that he was only rambling about Württemberg until they paid their dues, but further action might have been taken if this disaster had not occurred, possibly the advance into the Hohlengraben everyone was talking about. Quincy says the Dauphin retired to Pforzheim the next day.

The forces the B.H.K. says went to Pforzheim today might have been a flank guard dispatched to cover the line of retreat or just to cover the lines of communication. If the fire is the same as the one reported in the B.H.K. (in which case the bread ovens may have actually been behind the Ingersheim camp), then the Dauphin will have already intended to retreat. Otherwise, he will have been protecting his lines of communication. In either case the move to Leonberg may simply have been a threat that was swiftly responded to by the Württemberg Court.

The German account also says the French had many sick, suggesting a retreat was already being carried out, and in which case the party seen at Pforzheim may have been an ambulance convoy, while the group 'going to Stuttgart' was actually bound for Leonberg. Remember also that Baden learned as early as 20 August that the Dauphin planned to leave for Versailles on 25 August.

On the other hand, Tallard's men were now taking contributions around Plochingen, at the confluence of the Fils and Neckar (where the Neckar makes a sharp bend to the north). They were slowly moving west, but they had also garrisoned all the villages in the area, suggesting that far from retreating, the French intended to remain in

darkest Württemberg. Carlin does not seem to have had much effect on Tallard's presence.

The Kollonitsch Hussars were ordered to shadow the French (which group of them is not clear) while the Pálffy Hussars were ordered to Pforzheim.

This day Baden received a letter from his cousin Prince Eugene at Vienna. Everyone there believed a sanguinary battle had been fought and wanted to know who had won!

25 August the French advance guard was at Pforzheim; 300 wagons had already passed through the town according to Pálffy's scouts. A French trumpeter came to Baden's camp asking for POWs. Apparently the French had been slow to release their prisoners and may even have been killing soldiers instead of capturing them. Baden told the trumpeter, if the French wanted to play war 'Turkish style' then he would tear up the cartel and do the same to them.

26 August the reinforcements sent to Carlin at Schorndorf finally arrived. Their commander was a Bavarian named Steinau, who would become a man of note in Italy. Tallard was still at Plochingen. Esslingen, 8 Km downriver to the northwest, was still French-occupied, with 1,000 men in the suburb of Altenheim. The Germans reoccupied Besigheim with 200 men. Baden was still looking for a decent camp and was contemplating a spot between Bönningheim and Brackenheim.

27 August Baden made a reconnaissance of the Bönningheim-Brackenheim site. He also made a rotation of Heilbronn's garrison. Carlin sent Steinau with 300 horse and 100 foot up the Neckar to Tübingen (a march of 47 Km southwest). Tübingen was still occupied by the enemy and Steinau was to clear them out.

28 August Carlin reported an engagement with Tallard's men where he inflicted 70 casualties; he also sent down 64 POWs. After riding all around Besigheim, Bönningheim, Brackenheim, Lauffen, etc. Baden finally decided to camp by the old French site at Ottmarsheim.

The main French camp was still at Leonberg.

On 29 August Baden moved camp. His Left was anchored on Murr and his Right on Ottmarsheim, a frontage of 7,000 meters, facing southwest, with the Neckar in front. Not that there was any chance the French would attack. At least one pontoon bridge was brought up to serve the camp.

The French retreat properly began today. The Dauphin's forces marched 25 Km northwest to Pforzheim, the Gendarmerie proceeding as far as Ettligen, another 22 Km west. This was to be the army's line of retreat.

French garrisons were still reported at Kirchheim (150), Teck (150), Plochingen (100), and Altenstadt (50). These places are all within 7 Km of Plochingen. The remainder of Tallard's force must have been concentrated somewhere nearby. Some were downriver by Canstatt.

He had 1,000 men at Geislingen an der Steige, over 30 Km southeast of Plochingen, where the Steige River joins the Fils River. The place is about the same distance north of Ulm — a day's ride.

But, on 30 August Baden received news that all these forces, totally 6,000 men, had suddenly vanished. They had been reassigned to Lorges' army — it was his army again, the Dauphin had gone. Tallard camped at Lomersheim, 13 Km east of Pforzheim, a ride of over 80 Km in one day for the men nearest Ulm.

the B.H.K. reports there was another fire, this time at Vaihingen an der Enz. Either a couple of mines were set off, or high wind blew sparks from the bread ovens into the buildings. The French claimed the latter and the Germans assumed the French did it deliberately. The whole town burned down.

Carlin's command, meanwhile, cleaned up after Tallard. 100 men from La Tour planted the flag at Canstatt and left, and both hussar regiments rode around the countryside to no particular effect.

On 31 August the Dauphin arrived on the Rhine with the Advance Guard and crossed at Fort-Louis. Lorges' army broke camp and marched west. Some of his troops may have left yesterday. The order of march was baggage, then foot, then cavalry; the Rearguard was formed of the massed dragoons. Their garrison at Bretten (16 Km to the north) was recalled, since they would be headed due west to Ettlingen and Louis of Baden was miles away.

In the German camp, now over 40 Km from the receding enemy, a footbridge was ordered laid down for the infantry at Neckarweihingen. This implies Baden intended to march toward Stuttgart and not even pretend to pursue. In his letter to Vienna dated 14 August he explained to the Emperor that Württemberg was ruined, Swabia not much better off, and there was no money for provisions (he asked for a large sum on account).

[In the letter Baden also asked for 2,000 Haiduks — irregulars from the Hungarian border zone to operate alongside the hussars. With them he could start raiding the French lands over the winter. He also complained about certain princes going behind his back and seeking independent commands — the man's name began with an 'S'...]

1 September Lorges camped at Durlach (Quincy says between Grötzingen and Berghausen, just northeast of the town). The Germans thought he had abandoned his sick and wounded but this is not confirmed. Their Intelligence revealed the French planned to send troops to Flanders and Italy as had been hinted earlier in the month.

Boufflers was sent back to Flanders with 15,000 men (according to Quincy — the Germans first estimated 25,000 and later 22,000), going by way of Philippsburg. He was supposed to help with the siege of Charleroi, but when he arrived King Louis told him he was not needed.

The Gendarmerie and some line regiments (about 12,000 in all) marched for Piedmont, where they arrived in time for the Battle of Orbassano. This would leave Lorges with about 30,000 men.

By the Neckar, Steinau rejoined Carlin and was immediately sent west again, into the Black Forest. The hussars rounded up 50 horses and 12 mules. No one asked too closely where they got them. The Hanoverians (technically, Wolfenbüttel) battalions left for home. Too many hills in South Germany.

2 September: after crossing the Neckar at Neckarweihingen, Baden camped at Bietigheim with his Left on Markgröningen, a frontage of about 6,000 meters. The march was about 24 Km for the rear elements near Murr. The infantry used the foot bridge but the cavalry forded the river.

The Dauphin quit his army on 3 September, departing for Versailles from Strasburg. According to German spies, the French cavalry appeared exhausted. A German detachment sent to Heidelberg under a colonel Jungheim discovered it had had a small French garrison all this time, but they failed in their attempts to completely raze the town. The walls still stood, proving too thick to demolish. *Feldmarschall* Bayreuth went home this day; the German army was slowly starting to break up for the winter.

September 4: 182 French POWs at Heilbronn were sent home. The German entry notes the French had stripped the Pforzheim region of forage so thoroughly that it was hardly worth while for Baden to move.

September 5: 4 more battalions of Bavarians arrived at Baden's camp.

On September 6 Lorges took what was left of his army to Kuppenheim, in the plains east of the Rhine 23 Km southwest of Karlsruhe, camping between Kuppenheim and Rastatt — a frontage of about 5,000 meters on a line NW-SE. The HQ was in the middle, at Förch. Baden in his camp was 65 Km away, still technically close enough for a cavalry raid (in fact, his scouts were observing the French) but much too far to interfere. The scouts were told the Dauphin was still at Fort-Louis. Lorges brought in his 200-man garrison from Ettlingen, a day's march northeast of his camp. These may have been left behind in ambush, or have been guarding a depôt which the French no longer needed.

7 September the French abandoned Heidelberg. Baden moved his camp 18 Km northwest, to Güglingen, about halfway to Eppingen. Apparently the valley of the Enz was unliveable.

There are no records for 8-9 September other than the close watch of the French by German scouts. The French do not appear to have done the same, possibly because this was hostile territory and they could not risk sending out small groups.

On 10 September Baden was at Eppingen. Specifically his Right lay on Ittlingen, Center at Stebbach, and Left on Eppingen, a triangular camp with a frontage of 6-8,000 metres. Here his army split up, the Landgrave of Hesse and Elector of Saxony taking their troops north in preparation for winter quarters. Baden retained his own forces: the Imperials, the troops of Franconia and Swabia, and a few Bavarian and Pfalz regiments. The pontoon train (presumably still on the Neckar) was sent to Dilsberg so the Hessians could use it.

11 September Baden sent the remaining French POWs, 203 men, to Philippsburg. At French post of 400 men was located by German scouts at Gernsbach, about 10 Km southeast of their main camp, in the Forbacher Valley. This valley is a large one running north-south to the east of Baden-Baden; it ultimately leads to the upper reaches of the Neckar. Baden surmised the French were planning to loot the valley since supplies elsewhere were scarce and their cavalry looked all-in. They might then head south to the Hohlengraben.

On 12 September Baden lost the services of the Hessians and all the North German troops except the Saxons. They marched for Dilsberg, where extra ammunition was stockpiled for them. Two dragoon regiments, Aufsess' and Prinz Johann Friedrich von Württemberg's, were dispatched to the Kinzigthal to reinforce GWM Würtz, the local commander. An Imperial Envoy, Graf Hohenlohe, arrived to discuss manpower issues with the Duke of Saxony. This was a sure sign the campaign was ending.

13 September Jungheim occupied Heidelberg and his men began picking up after the French. He reported that things were better than expected.

On 14 September the Saxons began to head home. 4,000 foot and 2,000 horse were sent to cover Heilbronn and the surrounding area. The Palatine troops were stationed at Mosbach on the Neckar, about 30 Km northeast of Baden's camp. The other allied forces and the rest of the Saxons were to remain in the Odenwald and Bergstat until the end of the month. Most of Baden's baggage was now sent to all the way back to Schwäbische Hall, simply because the cavalry were becoming exhausted in the constant search for forage.

Both Quincy and the B.H.K. note the utter devastation plaguing both armies by September but neither mentions that this was not the typical regional stress caused by two armies campaigning but by a Europe-wide famine. The war made things worse, but they were bad enough already. The vast corps of peasant labourers the two sides could enlist were desperate for work and the chance of a meal.

Baden's remaining forces, Imperial, Bavarian, Franconian, and Swabian troops, made ready to move out the next day. They would march in the direction of Herrenberg. This is 60 Km south, on the east side of the

Black Forest, in the same latitude as Strasbourg. Their route was Sulzfeld/Zaisenhausen (15 September; 10 Km SW), Ötisheim (16 September; 16 Km S), Lower Mönshheim (17 September; 12 Km S. This involved a crossing of the Enz, so Friday 18 September was a rest day. No further marches were made until 22 September.

The only other information supplied for the German side over these days is the following: on 15 September the Pfaltzers occupied Heidelberg, their capital, and some Saxons garrisoned Vaihingen, while 100 hussars watched Philippsburg. Between 16 and 19 September Baden visited Esslingen, southeast of Stuttgart. The campaign journal does not say why, but perhaps he was visiting his wife. When he returned he was put out that the army did not give him a drum salute. On 18 September there was a report that Lorges had moved 13 Km south to Steinbach; he recalled all his bakeries, suggesting he was planning to cross the Rhine. Also that day a report came in that the Gendarmerie passed through Basel on their way to Italy. The reinforcements sent to GWM Würtz were ready to enter the Kinzigthal. And, on 21 September the Commissariat at Herrenberg sent the first instructions about food and hay.

About 22 September Lorges was at Bihel (Bühl), another day's march closer to Switzerland. Baden set up his final camp at Altingen this day. Altingen is 5 Km southeast of Herrenberg, so the camp was probably drawn up between the two. The Neckar was not far away, so communications were good.

Baden's men were penetrating the Hagenschiesser Forest on the outskirts of Pforzheim, searching for French stragglers. 100 hussars and 30 horse went by one route and 150 horsemen by another. There may have been quite a camp of marauders skulking in the woods, and it sounds as if this was a coordinated operation to round them up, but there is no further information.

23 September Lorges camped at Urloffen, 16 Km due east of Strasbourg. He sent his baggage to that city for safety, while his men raided the Kappelerthal, a stubby valley a few kilometres to the northeast. This section of the Black Forest was well fortified and the local peasants held them off for some time, but after heavy losses the French broke in and led off 200 captive peasants as well as generally plundering. Baden's spies reported Lorges had 25,000 sick and far more horses than men; since he had at most 30,000 men, this seems unlikely, but it is not impossible, given the conditions. On 24 August Baden issued an order for his own men not to billet in villages but to camp outside them, probably to avoid contagion, but perhaps to ease the burden on the populace.

25 September Melac rejoined Lorges. When Baden's army broke up the French believed a contingent was being sent to Mannheim to reformatory it. Melac was thus sent with 1,000 men to interfere, but he found no evidence of such an effort. Baden's spies also reported

the French were planning to break up into small groups and raid the Kinzigthal on 29 September before calling it quits for the winter.

On 26 September, because of this latest intelligence, Baden sent more men to the Kinzigthal — the infantry regiments Fürstenberg and Würz. These were both large regiments with 3-4 battalions each (depending on the year). The generals Fürstenberg and Durlach accompanied them, with the latter given overall command. Entrenching tools and 6 cannon were sent after them.

27-28 September: no news from either army on the first day; on the second, Baden distributed men into a number of encampments — Gültstein, Hailfingen, Jettingen, Gültlingen, Altingen, Aschelbronn, Bondorf, Entringen. All these villages are within a day's march or so of his camp. This may have been done to prevent an epidemic breaking out, or because of a lack of forage.

29 September the Germans harassed the French camp mercilessly, so that it was impossible to forage. Lorges countered by occupying Oberkirch and Kappelrodeck, villages a few kilometres east of his camp at the entrances to the two nearest valleys in the Black Forest. Baden sent 30 more hussars into the Black Forest.

Quincy does not record the French raid on the Kinzigthal, and it seems clear Lorges' army was still intact. However, on the German side there is a report dated 30 September from Fürstenberg, who gives a body count of 50 killed, 58 prisoners, and 36 horses from a fight in the Kinzigthal.

Winter quarters were now on everyone's mind. On 30 September Baden told his Franconian and Swabian commanders to send their deputies out to pick wintering locations and arrange subsistence.

Between 1-2 October nothing is recorded for either side. The French were still at Urloffen. On 3 October Baden's scouts reported the French had sent 6,000 cavalry over the Rhine at Fort-Louis. The fort was about 30 Km north of the camp so the riders could have made it in one day, but probably took two. Lorges also placed 2 regiments in Strasbourg. Baden was now fully engrossed in arranging winter quarters, and there was no more activity until 5 October.

On 5 October Lorges moved his camp from Urloffen to Offenburg, 10 Km farther up the Rhine. He was reported to have 20,000 men with him. Fürstenberg brought in 30 more POWs that day. The next entry is for 7 October, when the French marched to Lahr, 16 Km farther up the Rhine. Lorges was sending out small parties to raid each valley in turn, gleaning the last of the harvest, but he kept the bulk of his army intact. He was now 80 Km away from the German army. Baden had essentially quit for the year and decided the troops he had in the Black Forest were enough for security over the winter.

However, his forces there were not idle. Durlach, with his two large foot regiments and the various elements that had been under GWM Würz's command, and the hussars and other cavalry elements, were still harassing the French. On 10 October Durlach was at [Hohen]Geroldseck Castle, 2 hours from the French camp, on the southern flank of the Kinzigthal. Durlach's forces had so far inflicted 130 casualties and taken 3 POWs. On 11 October he strongly reinforced Geroldseck Castle, so it would require a formal siege to take it. (This stretch of the Black Forest was the most heavily fortified, some of the work having started as early as the Thirty Years War.)

Also on 11 October the Germans learned the 6,000 French cavalry detached by Lorges had appeared at Landau. Their commander was Tallard. Baden, meanwhile, sent an express to Bavaria for more men. To do so at this late date make it appear his army was being ravaged just as much as Lorges' by disease.

The next few days were busy but quiet as both commanders made arrangements for winter quarters. On 13 October Lorges broke camp. Details are sketchy. Quincy says his last camp was at Altenheim, 10 Km to the west, where he bridged the Rhine and ultimately crossed into Alsace for a well earned rest. But his troops also entered the Kinzigthal in force over the next few days. It seems likely Lorges spent a day or two picking a crossing site and erecting the bridge or bridges while having his men push east to keep the enemy occupied and round up the last bit of plunder.

the B.H.K. states that the French were in the Kinzigthal on 15 October, fighting with Durlach's men, but also that some regiments had crossed the Rhine. The next day the Germans heard a triple *feu de joie* from the French camp. This was for the French victory at Orbassano in Piedmont. On 17 October the French attacked Durlach's picquets with 6 squadrons; Baden ordered 2 more regiments (Durlach's and Horn's) to the valley. The next day, sensing the French were going to make a supreme effort, he ordered Geroldseck Castle held to the last man, but was told in reply the French were gone.

On 20 October Baden dispatched 500 Bavarians to Italy. More troops would follow over the winter as the Coalition tried to keep Victor Amadeus on their side.

21 October Lorges either began or continued crossing the Rhine. He still had troops on the right bank as late as 25 October. It sounds as if his army was 'limping' a bit. The Germans assessed his losses in that period as 1,000 men *plus* those lost to enemy action. Durlach left 6 battalions in the Kinzigthal and moved the rest to St. Georgen, now a suburb of Freiburg. The next day he punished the local German commander in the Kinzigthal; the reason is unclear but it was probably for negligence, though it might have been for running away in the last fight.

Neither source records any more activity; the armies dispersed into winter quarters. However, Baden had left the Black Forest and the line of the Neckar strongly guarded for the first time in the war.

Quincy assesses this campaign as a stalemate. The French score big points for spending the entire season living off the enemy, but neither the Dauphin's hoped-for siege nor hoped-for battle materialized. Moreover, the French suffered heavier losses from general wear and tear. Apparently the troops from Flanders, and more especially the horses, were unused to the conditions and had a hard time making long marches over rough ground. This was not good, because the aim of the high command was to push hard in Germany to a) make the Emperor treat for a separate peace, and b) encourage the Turks so that *they* would not make peace with the Emperor.

Contemporaries considered the campaign a failure, for which the Dauphin usually receives the blame. He certainly was a lacklustre commander, but it is questionable whether Lorges would have done anything differently if he had not been there.

Louis of Baden's reputation has taken a beating over the centuries, for his not living up to the aggressive reputation he obtained in Hungary. Especially in this campaign, where he can be faulted for not going after the French aggressively. Baden heaped all the blame on Saxony. There was *some* justification, but he hardly acted in an offensive manner himself. Instead of trapping Lorges in the Bergstat he fiddled about at Wimpfen while insisting Saxony push the French toward him. On the other hand, his refusal to abandon the line of the Neckar prevented the French from penetrating farther into Germany. Instead, the French troops, though superior to the Germans this year, were badly damaged by the campaign; the Great Famine meant the damage would be hard to fix.

1694 The Alliance Attacks

To this the prince of Ligne remarks (p.144 "Study this, my young readers, and pay close attention to the five requirements that Prince Ludwig of Baden possessed, if you wished otherwise to grow up by the knowledge of a great man himself. 1) His admirable boldness. 2) His resources. 3) His dispositions to the battle. 4) His skill in striking camps, and finally 5) his way of marching in the face of the enemy. This general seems to me to be the only one of his time who saw and executed everything by himself."

B.H.K., p.77

In 1693 more than 10% of France's population died. Some may have emigrated, but most died. This did not stop the war, but the collapse of the economy that followed the massive crop failure of 1693 put definite limits on what the Sun King and his advisors could hope to achieve in 1694. France went over to the defensive on all fronts.

The Wider War

On the Northeast Frontier, the French, though fielding their largest army yet, would remain strictly on the defensive. Any further territorial gains would simply mean more garrisons, and a smaller field army. Both sides would enter the field late, due to a lack of forage, and spend the summer marching and countermarching, again, mainly seeking forage. Although Luxembourg would make a brilliant flank march and spoil William of Orange's attempt to break through the French Lines, he would be unable to repeat the manoeuvre, and the Allies would, after making a feint in coastal Flanders, recapture the fort of Huy, between Namur and Liège.

In Italy, Duke Victor would play at being soldiers with *maréchal* Catinat, deceiving his allies into thinking he was still committed to the Cause but 'unfortunately' too weak to drive the French out of his lands. Catinat, with only 50 battalions and a handful of cavalry, would not be capable of offensive action anyway.

Catalonia would be the most bloody of the four theatres. *Maréchal* Noailles would fight and win the Battle of the Ter River, with 26,000 men against 20,000 Spanish. This success would allow him to capture two important fortresses: Palamos, a small port needed to shorten his supply lines, and Girona, a regional capital which called itself 'The Virgin', because of its former inviolability. The French would very nearly reach Barcelona, capital of Catalonia, but an Allied fleet would put in an appearance, forcing them to rely on the wretched road net for supply.

At sea, the French would commit themselves to '*guerre de course*' — commerce raiding — which produced results, but slowly, and would drain their battle fleets of manpower. The only fleet activities of note would take place in the Mediterranean, where the English, for the first time, would station significant naval forces, affecting French operations in the region, though their main aim would be to hearten the Spanish and Italian members of the Coalition.

The English would meet with disaster at Brest, however. The operation was planned in tandem with the sortie to the Mediterranean, but 'planned' is too precise a term. It bears all the hallmarks of an afterthought. Vauban would lead the defence, using all his ingenuity to inflict maximum pain. The worst loss to the English was probably the landing commander, General Talmash. In reprisal, Dieppe, Dunkirk, and Calais would all be bombarded, with more or less effect depending on the state of the defences. For the Coalition, the only positive effect of the Brest fiasco would be to heighten the Sun King's fears of invasion from the sea.

Diplomacy

The naval threat may have made King Louis a little more pliable on the diplomatic front, but here the French still held the initiative.

One curious development — which has nothing to do with Germany — was the signing of a treaty of neutrality specific to the western Pyrenees. No fighting had taken place here, because of the terrain, and also because there were preexisting agreements in place, arranged long ago. However, the treaty provided extra security in the event of an enemy naval landing around Bordeaux.

More insidious was the attempt to subvert the Patrician Party in Holland. The Patricians were the hereditary opponents to the Orangists. They were the secular republican ruling class, pitted against the monarchical-leaning and Calvinist House of Orange whom they thought were dragging the Dutch down the road to absolute monarchy. However, the Patrician leader, Heinsius, chose to continue supporting William's war effort, probably because William was only a potential absolute monarch, while Louis was an actualized one.

The official, or overt, diplomatic offensive was conducted during the winter of 93/94, while the generals discussed strategy with their respective monarchs. Neither the French, represented by Callières, nor the Dutch, represented by Dijkveldt, could find a middle ground. Aside from the usual differences of opinion, the Dutch were mentally still at the stage of 'secret talks' while the French wanted them to openly sign a final agreement.

Later in 1694, as the campaigning season wound down, the two envoys would meet secretly at Maastricht, but this time it was the French who did not appear serious, their envoy lacking full authority. When the Dutch published a summary of the meeting in an attempt to blackmail them, the French denied it had taken place. The main sticking point was, as always, King Louis' refusal to recognise William of Orange as an equal.

This French diplomatic 'flip' had nothing to do with the march of armies. They were not on the ropes, but neither were they making gains. Partly, it was a case of the Holy Roman Emperor moderating his language and suggesting he might even consider sponsoring James II's cause, but more importantly, Duke Victor of Savoy showed real signs of yielding. Though ignorant of the root causes, King William was seriously alarmed by the change in the diplomatic tempo, and began fearing the Coalition might suddenly split along religious lines.

Interestingly, he corresponded frequently with Louis of Baden, but also with the Landgrave of Hesse, whose troops were doing double duty on the Rhine and in Brabant. The Landgrave (or rather, his representative, Baron Görtz) was a conduit to those German princes antagonistic to the Emperor, while Baden championed Leopold's side.

The German States were flagging. The Swabia-Franconia association remained committed, as did the Palatinate, but their lands were devastated. One reason the Swabians and Franconians remained leagued was the greater leverage they thus obtained when dealing with the

Emperor; if he was unwilling or able to support them the bloc had enough clout to seek other sources of income, particularly the Maritime Powers. But, they were competing in a crowded market. Holland was nearing the end of her tether and Savoy had to be bribed to stay in the fight.

The correspondence in the B.H.K. also highlights the absolute necessity of the Jews in the matter of provisioning; their trade networks, even more than the cash they could raise, were the only way large armies could find maintenance. Not that it helped their status within the wider community.

The states on the Middle Rhine and North German Plain had almost lost interest in supporting the South Germans. All save Brandenburg, who, after King William took him aside and had a little talk, agreed to contribute most of his army to the Upper Rhine as part of Baden's strategic plan for this year. The other northern states did send large contingents to Brabant — all except Münster, who was sulking.

Electoral Saxony only agreed to participate after receiving huge subsidies. This was the last year they put a western army into the field. Saxony and Hanover were still at loggerheads over the Ninth Electorate issue, though they put on their best faces in public, and the House of Brunswick was still divided against itself. Saxony and Hesse were not on speaking terms after the last campaign. There was even a flare up between the Dutch and the Danes over tolls in the Sound (the straits between Sweden and Denmark).

Preparations

The Allies, though tired of war, felt a reprieve coming. They were also exasperated at French intransigence. So, for this year, the Coalition decided to field a massive number of troops in hopes of breaking the French military economy. In this they would not succeed, partly because their own propaganda inflated the misery France was in, and partly because the member states each thought they could contribute less than agreed and that the other members would take up the slack.

Despite this, the Coalition did field an enormous number of men across all fronts. The English Parliament alone voted an increase in funds for the war, agreeing to pay for 93,635 men, of whom 68,725 would be 'British'. In the end, however, this strategy of attrition would backfire. By 1696 France, having rested for a couple of years and making some sacrifices, would be strong enough for a final push while the Coalition war economy — primarily the English economy — slid into chaos.

The Empire was in a catch-22 situation. If she wanted to conduct an offensive against the French she needed a large army. But, a large army would take a long time to muster. Not only would it cost a lot to operate, it would bleed money from the time the numbers were agreed

upon until the time it took the field. Most of the princes would not muster until they were paid.

It was true that they continued to send regiments to fight in Hungary — and that was another issue, the increasing demands of Leopold for more men to fight the Turks — but the Emperor was willing to pay up front for such troops. Leopold was not that concerned with the West. Perhaps he was right to ignore the danger. The French were not an existential threat. A dangerous situation might arise if a group of German princes united into a rival power bloc as a result of fighting the French, but thanks to the Ninth Electorate that was unlikely now.

Leopold may have concerned the Rhine a secondary front, but letters between himself and Louis of Baden indicate a more aggressive strategy was planned for this theatre. Baden asked for 2 armies to be formed, one to operate on each bank. Each would be of 40,000 men. On the left bank, 12,000 Saxons, 12,000 Brandenburgers, 12,000 Hanoverians, and 4,000 Pfalzers. On the right bank, at least 25,000 Swabians and Franconians, 4,000 Imperials, 6-7,000 Bavarians, and 6,000 Hessians. Artillery would be proportional. But, this plan soon fell through.

The Saxon and Hanoverian numbers reveal the underlying tensions. The fact that they match is not a coincidence. Hanover now considered itself the equal of Saxony. The numbers were also only a proportion of the total available, since each power wanted to leave matching numbers at home to protect themselves against the other.

At one point, too, it was questioned whether the Bavarians would continue to fight, but this was settled at the Brussels Conference in December. A new dynamic was emerging as the King of Spain edged closer to death. Duke Max of Bavaria was a prime candidate for the throne of Spain. In practical terms this led him not to quit the war, but to ignore the Emperor's needs in favour of King William's; William could provide crucial political support at the right time, while the Austrian Habsburgs had their own candidate.

Politics aside, provisioning was Baden's biggest headache. There were no magazines closer to the Rhine than Heilbronn and Frankfurt, and even those were small ones. Esslingen, Canstatt, Rotenburg am Neckar, and Villingen would also need depôts, but these places were likewise well away from the Rhine. The disruption of trade along the Bergstrasse last year did not help. Most supplies would have to come from the Danube.

Baden complains bitterly in his letters of a lack of support from both his subordinates and the Imperial bureaucracy. He even risked writing that the Emperor should call a general Empire-wide muster and do the job properly, or not at all. The only mitigating fact was the condition of France, which everyone took to be far worse than their own.

The Campaign

Lorges had 45 battalions and 133 squadrons. In a pinch he could call on Boufflers, who was stationed on the Meuse with 20,000 men, ready to support either him or *maréchal* Luxembourg. Versailles had decreed a defensive posture, so Lorges's campaign was to be of the *chevausée* variety. Crossing the Rhine at Philippsburg on 10 June he would find the land so wasted that he would have to recross the river. After some bloodless manoeuvring all summer, the Germans under Baden would threaten an invasion of Alsace but be forced back across the Rhine without a battle.

The *Maréchal* assembled two corps, one at Kaiserlauten on 18 May, of 20,000 men, and one at Neustadt, drawing on the troops based in Alsace. The two corps united at Neustadt, where a review was held.

The combined army reached Philippsburg on 8 June and began crossing at 2pm on 10 June, using 2 bridges. Included in the train were 10 large siege guns, which were brought to Philippsburg by boat. Set in battery, these fired a triple volley for the victory of *maréchal* Noailles at the Battle of the Ter in Catalonia. The army was across by 11 June, camping at Bruchsal. The train joined it on 12 June.

The Germans on the Upper Rhine meanwhile assembled their infantry at Heilbronn and their cavalry 30 Km southwest at Vaihingen an der Enz. This became the routine in later years. Their commander was still Louis of Baden, who was headquartered at Stuttgart. Energetic as always, he had actually managed to bring his troops into the field by 4 May. That is, the Bavarians, Swabians, and Franconians. He even had a few extra (and very raw) Imperial regiments under his command. Farther down the Rhine everyone was still in cantonments and would remain so for weeks. They had the Dutch and Spanish between them and the French. (That is perhaps unfair; the climate on the Middle and Lower Rhine was colder and wetter than the southern highlands of the Palatinate and Swabia.)

The full muster (ignoring unreliable types like the Saxons) was begun on 25 May but it took a couple of weeks before Baden had a viable field force. On 30 May the Palatinate troops arrived, under FML *Graf* Velen: the Velen Dragoons, part of the Von Sandrasky Dragoons, the Nagel Horse, and Saxe-Meiningen infantry regiment. Additional forces, probably Bavarians, were on the Fils River to the southeast (6 June), under a *Generalleutnant* von Günzburg.

On 7 June Günzburg's troops reached Vaihingen and they and the Cavalry (under General Recke) marched to the concentration at Heilbronn.


Upper Rhine Theatre of War

1694

Scale & Legend

●	Town
◆	Fortification
—	Shore/River
@10 Km	

1. Early June: Lorges crosses Rhine
2. Baden moves into the Eppingen Camp; end of June advances against French
3. French raid on Darmstadt
4. French hastily break camp when Baden approaches
5. Major cavalry skirmish by Wiesloch/Hockenheim
6. Lorges recrosses Rhine at end of June
7. French establish a cordon on the Rhine & forage in Palatinate for the rest of the season
8. Germans try refortifying Mannheim but fail
9. Baden drifts south looking for forage & to counter French raids (R)
10. September: Lorges in the Hunsrück; returns in haste when Germans cross Rhine at Hagenbach
11. Germans occupy Hagenbach 14-24 September, raid into Alsace & into Vosges; campaign ends after German withdrawal



Baden decided to occupy last year's camp at Sontheim. He arrived there at 1am on 10 June. A general review was held in the morning. Sometime during the day reports of the French crossing reached him. At this time he only had 41 battalions and 70 squadrons. He wrote immediately to Saxony, asking him to hurry up, for once.

The French camped at Graben (Graben-Neudorf, 9 Km southeast of Philippsburg) overnight. German intelligence reported Lorges had 32 cannon. On 11 June they marched to Unter-Öwisheim by way of Bruchsal and Ubstatt, a 15 Km zig-zag march to the east. Unter-Öwisheim sits on the edge of the higher rolling country above the flood plain.

Baden responded on 12 June, marching for Eppingen at 8am. In his opinion the French would move on Württemberg again, probably making a base at Vaihingen. They might attack Heilbronn, but he did not want to camp there any more, because the region was played out. Better to move aggressively. Heilbronn was garrisoned with a small force and 400 men were sent to Sinsheim. 3 roads were made to allow for this post's rapid relief in the event of an attack. On the Neckar, 2 bridges were ordered for Wimpfen, for use by the Saxons. Just in case they deigned to make an appearance. The

Generalleutnant did receive word from them. Apparently they had no specific orders to help him, but were willing to do so if the French made any threatening moves.

[The original text says the 400 garrisoned 'Lintsheim' but there is no such place in the vicinity. Sinsheim guarded the northern flank of Baden's position and is the most likely location.]

At Eppingen Baden dug earthworks, particularly on his left flank. Eppingen was flanked on the southeast and south by an extensive belt of forest. Baden expected the French, only 3 hours away, would approach from the open country to the southwest, from the direction of Bretten, which was on the road to Vaihingen.

The hussars fanned out to locate and harass the French. General Aufsess was ordered to break down all the bridges on the Elsenz, the river flowing north through Eppingen, as far as Sinsheim, 12 Km away, and to form a cavalry cordon along the length of that river. The Feldwatch (picquet screen) was doubled in front of the camp. Ammunition was issued and the regiments assigned their artillery. Commanders were ordered to report their status on a regular basis.

(Baden made an interesting tactical change. German cavalry squadrons were typically divided into 3 companies. Baden ordered they be divided in half, with each element marching in parallel.)

The ball was now in Lorges' court. From POWs Baden learned that the rank and file thought the German army had gone to the Bergstat and that Lorges would therefore march straight to Heilbronn. But, nothing happened for a few days.

The German campaign diary for 13 June reports only that GWM Würtz, commanding in the Kinzigthal, had reinforced Weil der Stadt with 200 men from the Zollern-Sigmaringen Dragoons, and that Baden sent a courier to the Emperor and 2 more to the Saxons. Weil der Stadt is behind the Black Forest, about 20 Km west of Stuttgart. It was an Imperial City, which is probably why Imperial troops were sent there.

14 June the French summoned Dilsberg Castle. This castle is on the Neckar, 12 Km above Heidelberg and not far from Neckargemünd. It controlled river traffic on that section of the river. Clearly, the French were interested in the Bergstat. Lorges was beginning to realise Swabia was a desert, but he wanted to keep his options open, and this day occupied both Bretten to the southeast and Weisloch to the north.

Both commanders apparently thought a battle unlikely. Baden's trenches were nearly complete and Lorges' own position was 'very advantageous'. Neither side would risk an attack. To break the impasse one of them would have to move to a new district.

On 15 June a party of 80 German volunteers mutinied; 10 of them tried to hand their post over to the French and the rest were described as 'sullen'. An investigation was held and the 10 were hanged. Meanwhile, the French cavalry general, Melac, took 1,000 horse against Malsch, Rothenburg, and Weisloch, all about a day's march west of Sinsheim.

On 16 June Lorges broke camp, marching 7 Km north to Langenbrücken. From POWs the Germans believed he had 45 battalions, 150 squadrons, and 17 cannon (where the other 15 went is not explained).

At 2am on 17 June Baden also broke camp. Quincy says he misread Lorges' movements and thought the French were going to turn his right flank. More likely, he was just being cautious, shifting his front as the French moved.

Orders were given for his army to move out silently. The Advance Guard was under orders to attack immediately if they encountered the French. Camp was made at Rohrbach. It would have been helpful if the sources were more explicit. Rohrbach is an extremely common German place name and there are at least three in the vicinity of Eppingen alone. The one meant is a hamlet 1,200 metres east of Sinsheim. The position was a good one, with woods on either flank. But, Lorges had no intention of marching that way. Perhaps the POW reports were correct and he feared Baden would cut him off from the north, or perhaps he simply realised there was no food to be had in Swabia.

Unopposed, on 18 June the French continued north. This day they were seen on the Gänsberg by Weisloch. Baden scouted the French with his hussars (200 of Kollonitsch and 100 of Pálffy) and set up a garrison on his line of communication at Ehrstädt, 6 Km to the east of his camp.

On 19 June came a report from French deserters that Lorges had broken camp and sent one corps *à la sourdine* to Elsenz, and another to Heidelberg. The phrase '*à la sourdine*' means 'stealthily'. Two could play at that game. Kollonitsch, colonel of that hussar regiment, fought a small engagement with 2 parties of French, one composed of partisans and the other of 400 regulars, inflicting 150 casualties and taking 137 prisoners, for a loss of 3 dead and 3 wounded.

Quincy and the B.H.K. differ on the numbers involved in Lorges' movements. According to the French deserters, 1,000 men went to Heidelberg and 4,000 plus some artillery to the Elsenz. Quincy says the Heidelberg corps, commanded by Chamilly, was 4,000 strong, and had 7 cannon, including two 24-pounders. The difference matters, since it suggests Lorges' intended line of advance. In this case Quincy is probably correct, because Lorges moved north rather than east. Elsenz the town lies roughly halfway between Sinsheim and Eppingen, a little to the west of the latter, and was only 9 Km from Baden's camp. Lorges probably hoped to fool Baden into thinking they were the advance guard of his army, bound for Heilbronn.

Chamilly went up to Heidelberg, which was held by the Germans, then down the Neckar as far as Ladenburg. The ford here was covered by entrenchments; after discharging 5 cannon as a signal, Chamilly led a grenadier assault on them and the the village, which cleared out the enemy. A pair of minor posts were also taken and the road to the Bergstat was open. Lorges rejoined Chamilly, and in the words of Quincy, 'pampered' himself by erecting bridges instead of using the ford. Unfortunately, it was swiftly learned that the Bergstat was also in a ruinous state. Since Württemberg was likewise ruined and was in any case 'paying protection', there was nothing for it but to go home.

20 June Baden received word that 10,000 French had ridden to Darmstadt and burned it in reprisal for not paying its *contribution*. Colonels Jongheim & Sandrasky, both officers of the Palatinate, were sent into the Odenwald to harass the enemy. Heidelberg's citadel was ordered to hold to the last man. The Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel was informed of these proceedings — the activity concerned him closely since the French were in a position to attack his own lands.

21 June Baden received another report, this time about the location of the French camp. It was 'from below the Mill, and extending to Neckarhausen'; also 'the 2 ramparts near Ladenburg' were occupied by 70 and 30 men, respectively, who had orders to retire if attacked. The level of detail suggests that spies rather than deserters sent the report. Neckarhausen is on the opposite bank from Ladenburg, so Lorges appears to have kept his main body south of the river. The Mill was perhaps 4,000 metres below Ladenburg; just above it, at Seckenheim, was another bridge. The reader may notice

these activities take place very near Mannheim, but that town is never mentioned. This is because it was still an abandoned ruin.

Baden received some good news. The Saxons had crossed the Neckar at Wimpfen and were now at Rappenu, only a day's march east of him. Quincy says there were only 1,000 of them; in fact, there were 6,000.

22 June: although it was becoming clear there was nothing for them in the Bergstat, the French lingered. Baden sent a courier to the Hessian corps, commanded by *Feldzugmeister Graf Lippe* telling him to move into the Odenwald in force to prevent French raids and authorising him to use the Imperial magazines at Miltenberg. He also reinforced Colonel Jongheim with a battalion of foot (Wrtby's — yes, that is how it is spelled).

23 June the Germans had some small successes. The commandant of Heidelberg caught a band of marauders in a sortie, taking 30 of them. A squad of Germans holding the hamlet of Wieblingen, just downriver from Heidelberg, repulsed 3 enemy attacks.

A note was sent to the Saxon commander, FML von Neitschütz, was ordered to join Baden posthaste. Meanwhile, the *Prinz* von Hohenzollern conducted a reconnaissance at Altweisloch Castle— Baden had determined to advance against the French. Altweisloch is now an eastern suburb of Weisloch. It sits on the plateau and Weisloch sits on the plain. A day's march from both armies, this was the logical place to camp in order to threaten the French line of retreat.

On 24 June Baden broke camp at 3am, crossing the Elsenz at Hoffenheim, 4 Km downriver (the river runs northwest here). His men marched in a single column: an Advance Guard of grenadiers, then the First Line, Second Line, and Saxons. From the way the source text is written it sounds as if Baden left room for the Saxons but they had not yet caught up. Camp was made at Altweisloch Castle, with the HQ 2,000 metres in the rear at Baiertal — probably to better direct the tardy Saxons.

Baden was dissatisfied with this camp, but after a reconnaissance north around Nussloch and Leiman, only an hour from the French, he could find no better. Fortunately (or perhaps not) the Saxons arrived. Their officers were a prickly bunch and Baden had to be very careful when assigning duties.

Flank March

Lorges responded quickly. German scouts reported the French broke camp 'hurriedly and in confusion'. There was a large tract of woodland between the Rhine and the plateau all along the river, segmented by frequent defiles (gaps). The main north-south road running through all the important towns passed east of this belt. Baden's camp at Altweisloch faced northwest, with its Right about 2,000 metres from Weisloch (roughly on line with Baden's HQ) and its Left at a place called Saintvent. Given the size of

the army this is probably a chapel or monastery on or just past the main road, about 3,000 metres from Weisloch.

Lorges was not interested in fighting, but to break contact he would have to make a flank march around Baden's camp, between the woods and the Rhine. It would be at a healthy distance — about 13 Km or a standard day's march — but Baden could still mass his cavalry and pin the French long enough for the rest of his army to move up. This would leave Lorges trapped against the Rhine and he would have to fight or surrender his whole army. So, he decided to pin Baden's army instead.

According to Quincy the French broke camp at 9pm. the B.H.K. says after midnight. Since they crossed the Neckar on 3 pontoon bridges at 6 am, the latter time is more likely. Perhaps the order was given at 9pm, which would indeed mean a hasty departure, and a confused one in the dark. A classic 'bug out'.

Lorges commanded the Right, headed by the Gendarmerie; Joyeuse the Left. According to Quincy, the cavalry marched in 3 columns on each wing, while the Foot also marched in 3 columns, one of which included the train. The columns closest to the enemy were flanked by a brigade of cavalry with supporting artillery. Such 'mini-wings' were often deployed, as line extensions, or (with attached infantry) as a chess-like 'rook'. Romainville commanded the Reserve, which remained in camp with the baggage. Apparently there were many foragers out on the plain south of the Neckar. These rejoined Lorges as he marched along.

There were two critical defiles to consider. The first was where the main north-south road passed, just west of Weisloch. It narrowed to about 2,300 metres at Nußloch, only 3,000 metres from Baden's lines. The second was at Hockenheim, about the same distance west of Baden's lines. This defile was perhaps 1,000 metres wider. The first defile had to be blocked to prevent Baden attacking the French camp; the second had to be blocked to prevent him attacking Lorges in flank as the French marched for Phillipsburg, which was only 15 Km southwest of the scene of the action. He may have been unduly worried. According to the B.H.K., Baden rejected the idea of a flank attack almost as soon as he was aware of the French motions, because there were a couple of small rivers with deep banks lying in between the two armies, the Rothbach and the Kreichbach.

The French marched through Schwetzingen to Hockenheim, a distance of about 20 Km, taking into account the circling of the woods. But, a cavalry detachment of 1,600 men under Barbesieres was sent to cover the other defile. Barbesieres' command consisted of the Petite Gendarmes, the Carabiniers, and the La Lande and du Chatelet Dragoons.

When he had first marched north, Lorges left a detachment of 200 men in a walled cemetery at Walldorf, 4,000 metres west of Weisloch. This position was a good

observation post and it also covered both defiles, being situated at the southeast corner of the woods that lay between the two armies. Barbesieres was under orders to support this post (or perhaps, the post was to act as an anchor for him). To get there he marched by the hamlets of Bruchhausen and Sandhausen, around the eastern end of the woods and onto the main road.


At Hockenheim Lorges deployed for battle across the defile, then sent orders for his baggage to pass behind him and stop at the Capuchin Monastery outside Philippsburg. The two armies were now about 8 Km apart. A notable cavalry skirmish now took place. (See the map on p.160; this does not show the action itself but does show the terrain.)

Barbesieres sent forward one of his sub-commanders, Saint Frémont, with the '*gardes ordinaires*', to observe Baden's camp at close range. According to Quincy the Germans had 155 hussars out foraging. Their leader, *Graf* Mercy, summoned about 400 horse likewise employed and attacked Saint Frémont directly. The B.H.K. says Baden, after making an early reconnaissance between Dielheim and Rauenberg in his immediate rear, had then sent 200 of the Kollonitsch Hussars from Leimen, about 6 Km to the north, against Lorges' army to harass it, and another 100 hussars to observe Walldorf. The latter are probably included in the totals above.

From the German camp it appeared that the hussars and their supports were skirmishing against a mass of French cavalry in the fields beyond the stone bridge which crossed the Rothbach, which lay between Weisloch and Walldorf. This obstacle covered Baden's Left. It had deep banks and was lined with *hayes*, making it difficult to cross, but because it wound back and forth beside the main road there were a number of stone bridges. This one probably served the road running between Walldorf and Nußloch or was near that crossroads. Baden sent 2 troops 'at a strong trot' to block the bridge and pulled 3 more troops from his Reserve at Rauenburg (3,000 metres away) to assist. These units remained on the German side of the river.

At almost the same time, Lorges was taking up station to the west at Hockenheim. He sent Joyeuse with the Cavalry of the Right and the whole of the second line cavalry — about 4,000 men — to help. These rode swiftly through the narrow gap in the woods and Joyeuse deployed the cavalry brigades of Montgommery and Cayeux along a line between Walldorf and Roth, a frontage of about 470 metres, facing Baden's left flank. By the time this was done, Barbesieres' men had bested the hussars and chased them over the bridge. They were now attempting to deal with the force on the far bank. The hero of the moment was one of Saint Frémont's officers, Villars by name — the future marshal of France — who commanded a troop of the Gendarmerie and another of line horse (probably grabbed from Joyeuse's leading elements).

1694 Wiesloch Region



1694 Cavalry Skirmish by Wiesloch



Facing the French were (according to Quincy) a troop of horse, a troop of dragoons, and a troop of hussars. The dragoons were dismounted and in enfilade in the *hayes* along the bank; there may also have been some infantry. Both sides began a new skirmish with an exchange of fire. Meanwhile the Carabiniers found a crossing just below Dornmühle. This place was a mill which stood at a crossroads serving Walldorf and Weisloch; if the site of the first bridge is correct it was 2,300 metres upstream. A single German squadron was turned to face this new threat.

Two squadrons under d'Auvergne came up in support on the French side. The German dragoons now mounted and there was a general cavalry melee. It is at this point that the French and German accounts diverge considerably. Quincy says only that the Germans were routed, suffering 150 killed and 400 taken prisoner, including *Graf* Mercy, who was wounded. D'Auvergne was mortally wounded along with 60 other dead and wounded Frenchmen. Besides d'Auvergne, Tallard was wounded, and Villars had a horse shot out from under him.

The B.H.K. provides more detail but gives a different outcome. It appears there was a stiff fight for the lower bridge; ultimately the French were unable to cross here because of the mound of dead in front of it. The Carabiniers were forced back by a body of grenadiers while the German dragoons, at this point still dismounted, kept the French at bay by the lower bridge with their musketry; the French made a dash for it but only managed to get to within 30 paces, where one of their cornets planted a standard. *Herzog* Friedrich Karl von Württemberg now appeared with reinforcements taken from the *Bereitschaft*, or Duty Reserve — it should be remembered this was not a set piece affair and part of the army was dispersed, foraging, just like the French. For such emergencies as this armies kept a percentage of their troops on standby.

Baden also countered Joyeuse's approach by deploying 3 battalions and a couple of additional dragoon regiments, supported by 2 cannon. One these units were in position the action petered out. the B.H.K. claims only 50 German casualties and a few captured; the French claimed the bodies of 2 of their officers. French losses are put at 700, including deserters.

The B.H.K.'s account seems truer, but things must have been more chaotic than described, because he does tell how Mercy was wounded, struck while on foot and trying to hack his way through a hedge. Also, the high number of senior French casualties not only indicates they had a hard time, but that the forces involved were quite large, probably involving much of Joyeuse's force and the troops Baden sent forward to block them. the B.H.K. also admits the Germans were 'disordered' by the Carabiniers. However, it is unlikely either that the French would have

pursued or that the Germans would have routed from the field. They were fighting right in front of their own camp.

No further action ensued. The next day, 26 June, the Kollonitsch Hussars returned. They reported encountering at least 20 foraging parties, totalling perhaps 300 men (other hussars killed 40). Scouting the old French camp they saw that it was still manned and that much of the baggage and the herds of livestock were still in residence. Although, probably by the time they reported this the camp had packed up. There were also parties of French still roaming the Odenwald. Baden sent 300 horse to deal with the latter. 138 POWs were sent to Sinsheim.

The French were inconveniently close, occupying a line from Roth on their Right, in front of Walldorf in the Center to St. Ilgen on their Left, a distance of 8,700 metres (including an intervening blob of woods) laid out at an angle to Baden's Left and averaging only 3,000 metres from his lines.

27 June the French put their baggage over the Rhine by passing it behind their army. The two armies were foraging very close to each other, with only the Rothbach between them. There seems to have been minimal protection (at the stone bridge, only 20 French guards were observed). the B.H.K. notes 12 French deserters, 28 prisoners, and 59 enemy casualties, probably to a number of small actions rather than one big one.

On 28 June Lorges broke camp entirely and crossed the Rhine. The whole operation went smoothly — Baden was taken by surprise and hastily dispatched a pursuing force but they were held at bay by the massed French grenadiers and 15 cannon. the B.H.K. says the rearguard numbered 10,000 men. The march to the crossing point at Philippsburg was not that long. Taking into account the need to march around the woods, no more than 15 Km. Camp was made just beyond Waghäusel, to the northeast of Philippsburg. About 60 French fell into German hands, either as prisoners or deserters.

Baden, thinking at first the French might be planning to move south into Württemberg, sent a detachment there under *Graf* Volera. But it was soon clear they were evacuating the right bank. More or less — the French liked to leave 'stay behind' garrisons and light raiding parties up and down the river. Sometimes, too, men chose not to remain with the colours but could still be a nuisance. In early July, GWM Würtz encountered large numbers of deserters in the Kinzigthal.

On 29 June, as the last elements of the French crossed the river, Baden adjusted his camp by moving forward 4-5,000 metres. His Right was on Roth and his Left on Malschenberg-Rauenberg, facing south, with both flanks covered by woods.

30 June the French camped at Walsheim in Alsace, 24 Km west of Philippsburg. The next day (1 July) they marched north to a spot between Frankenthal and the

Rhine, across from Mannheim. On 3 July 84 men and 4 officers who had been taken prisoner were returned by the Germans. The same day, French raiders out of Philippsburg stole enemy 30 horses.

Quiet Time

Meanwhile, Baden reorganised. He moved up to the Rhine, occupying the former French camp between Schwetzingen and Hockenheim. The Kollonitsch Hussars were sent to Mainz; they were replaced by the Jongheim Dragoons who returned from the Odenwald. On 30 June 100 men occupied Castle Schwetzingen, west of Heidelberg. The next day *Graf* Mercy returned, on parole, and reported the French situation. Of senior officers they had 8 dead and 12 wounded.

On 2 July scouts were sent across the Rhine, while Baden had his bakeries shifted from Heilbronn to Heidelberg. FML Neitschütz was replaced by another Saxon, FML Sinzendorf. No reason is given, but based on later information Sinzendorf seems to have got on better with the South Germans. On 3 July the Hessians exited the Odenwald onto the Bergstrasse and sent word they were coming.

4 July: great alarm in the German camp — the French have crossed the Rhine again with 2,000 horse! This turned out to be a mere rumour. Actually, Lorges was redistributing his men. He placed his Foot at Oggersheim, across from Mannheim, and sent 6 cavalry regiments up the Rhine to guard potential crossing points. The next day Baden had reports of French raiders downriver, too, at Osthofen, 7 Km north of Worms.

5 July, the Hessians, under their Landgrave, plus troops from Münster, Lüneburg, and Wolfenbüttel, camped at Bensheim on the Bergstrasse. (There were only a few of the Brunswick regiments, and the reference to Münster may be a misnomer since the Prince-Bishop was sitting this inning out.) Baden paid a visit to Heidelberg and added the Jongheim and Kurpfalz Dragoons to its garrison. The Württemberg Cuirassiers were put on convoy duty.

Spies reported that the French were planning to send a corps of 10-12,000 men to Flanders.

6 July the opposing armies remained in position. On 7 July Baden moved to Hockenheim seeking better forage. Unfortunately, he exchanged a bad camp for a worse one. The whole region was exhausted. Baden had a few choices: pull back and pounce on the French if they recrossed the Rhine, march south simply to find something to eat, or cross the Rhine himself. This latter course seemed the best, in the spirit of the grand resolutions made over the winter. Also, Alsace had food. The Jongheim Dragoons were recalled along with 6 cannon from Heidelberg. The Brückenhauptmann (bridge-master) was summoned and told to collect all the boats

and pontoons on the Neckar and bring them down to the Rhine.

Baden also took thought for Mannheim. It had remained abandoned since the French first took it in 1689. Perhaps it should be refortified. Over the next few days he examined the place and drew up plans.

The French returned 60 prisoners to him on 8 July. The Bridge-Master was less helpful. He needed 60 boats to build a bridge and could only scrounge up 44 along the whole length of the Neckar.

Meanwhile, Lorges inched closer to Mainz. On 8 July his cavalry was at Alsheim, 7 Km farther down the Rhine than before. His infantry lined the Rhine from there back to Philippsburg, and engaged in daily target practice against the German foragers on the far bank. The Kollonitsch Hussars, sent to Mainz a few days before to use it as a base for raiding found they were hemmed in by French patrols. On the other hand, large numbers of deserters began appearing at the city, averaging 50-60 a day. The common complaint was lack of pay, which was 8 months in arrears. (The same trouble plagued Noailles in Catalonia.)

On 11 July Baden went up to Mannheim to see what the situation was. French batteries on the left bank fired on his men. The same day, more Saxons — 3 foot and 2 horse regiments — arrived under the Elector's most senior general, *Graf* Reuß.

On 13 July Adjutant General Wagner was sent with a detachment of 200 horse to check out the availability of forage along the Rhine, losing a few men to fire from the other bank.

14 July Baden's senior cavalry general, Karl von Württemberg, returned from a conference with the Landgrave concerning the refortification of Mannheim. The Hessians continued to remain in their own camps, in the Bergstat. (Something about the stench of Saxon in Baden's camp.) Formal plans were drafted on 16 July, voted on by Baden's council of war, and sent to the Landgrave for approval. The Landgrave approved the plan and agreed to supply some experienced officers. Work began immediately. The council of war also determined that a Rhine crossing in force would be a waste of time, thanks to Lorges' deployments. Refortifying Mannheim would not only protect the Bergstat (hence the Landgrave's interest) but create a useful base for a future crossing, remembering that up until this point the German magazines had to be kept at a great distance from the Rhine.

The trace of the new fortification formed a line between the Rhine and Neckar southeast of the city. Quincy says the Rhine-side works were to be extended as far as 'Frederisbourg', yet another unidentifiable place name. One possibility is Freidrichsfeld, but that place is 9 Km southeast of the city center. Perhaps there was to be a

string of outworks. Local labour was brought in but the Foot and even the cavalry also helped out. Boats and pontoons were brought down from Heilbronn starting on 18 July.

On 15 July 3 German raiding columns returned from Alsace with 28 prisoners. The B.H.K.'s entry for this day reads as if the Capuchin monastery at Worms was infested with French deserters, but the entry may mean the French had a legitimate garrison there. The reader is invited to polish up his 17th Century High German language skills and confirm or dispute this fact.

During these days Lorges made some adjustments to his defence. On 18 July his HQ was at Lambsheim, 13 Km west of Mannheim. A day or two before he had cavalry foraging over the Rhine around Gernsheim, 30 Km north of Mannheim. He was also maintaining a garrison at Philippsburg: 4 battalions and 4 companies of dragoons.

Meanwhile, the hussars at Mainz had worked out a system for harassing the French screen around the city and were routinely bringing in many horses. They did not need to bring in prisoners, so many French were deserting.

The next entry for both Quincy and the B.H.K. is 23 July. On that day Baden marched his cavalry to Bruchsal, after leaving a detachment composed of 30 men from each company of grenadiers at Mannheim with orders to hold there for 4 days. The rest of the infantry concentrated at Hockenheim.

The B.H.K. recounts an argument between Baden and the Landgrave. The *Generalleutnant* wanted Hesse to supply 12 battalions for Mannheim's garrison (with the implication they would also act as a labour corps during construction). The Landgrave objected. Mannheim was an unhealthy site. But, the fortress would protect Hessian interests. Agreed, but the fortress did not exist yet and the Landgrave needed the men to cover the Rhine between the Neckar and the Main — after all the French were raiding across the river. Nothing was resolved, but from the later narrative it is clear the Landgrave did *not* commit 12 battalions to Mannheim.

Partly as a result of this 'discussion', Baden passed the hat around for additional forces, making requests of Hesse, the Elector Palatine, Münster, Wolfenbüttel, and other princes of the Empire, in an attempt to form a coherent line between Mannheim and Germersheim (the latter being a town on the left bank of the Rhine just above Philippsburg. The commanders of these contingents could either operate under his command, or act as they saw fit, just so long as the river was properly defended.

25 July General Thüngen, the Commandant of Mainz, sent 750 cavalry down to Philippsburg to cover foraging parties operating near there. He told Baden there were even French officers who wanted to desert, while his

hussars had done for perhaps 200 enemy and brought in as many horses.

On 26 July Baden brought 500 foot and 60 horse to Mannheim, along with all the Artillery officers. Baden and the officers involved themselves with technicalities while the infantry were inserted on to the Isle of Mühlau under the command of Graf Fürstenberg. Cantonments were laid out at Mannheim for 12 battalions. Large ships bearing equipment also arrived.

Although the Landgrave got his way, Baden got his 12 battalions. The regiments of Wallenfels, Kurprinz, Spielberg, and Schrautembach were ordered to Mannheim, plus 1,000 men drawn from the remaining regiments under Baden's command, forming 12 battalions in all. The Elector Palatine contributed 6 cannon.

Mühlau did not feature in the French siege of 1689. Obliterated when the Rhine was mechanically straightened in later centuries, it was the further of two islets located northwest of the town and was thus a vital bridgehead. Incidentally, the islands also interrupted river traffic and cannon emplaced there could hit convoys using the highway which ran along the left bank. But, the immediate reason the Germans garrisoned it was to prevent the French from doing the same. It was feared they would launch raids against the workmen.

On 27 July all the Bavarian battalions (13 of them, which must include at least one unofficial hire) were sent to Mainz, which was also undergoing refortification. Karl von Württemberg brought 2,000 horse, 2,000 foot, and 8 guns up to Philippsburg, to cover foraging parties there. The raft bridge intended to connect the Isle of Mühlau with the town arrived and was immediately made the target of French artillery. Installed the next day, it was fired on again, without result.

Also on 27 July the French sent a body of cavalry across the Rhine at Philippsburg. With all the enemy activity around the fortress, extra protection was deemed necessary. They took post on the counterscarp. Fearing raids, the Germans set hussars to watch them. The German foraging around Phillippsburg was intended to be provocative. This was one area on the right bank that had been spared French attentions (because they owned it). In previous years, the French army had secured Philippsburg by operating in front of it, but now it was on the other side of the river. The Germans had a famous partisan leader named La Forest working for them. Supported by 120 hussars he went the round of the local farms threatening reprisals if they continued to supply the French.

29 July Lorges marched west to the Nach River, by Kreuznach, camping at Odernheim am Glan, among the hills of the western Palatinate. Partly he may have been trying to deal with the raids coming out of Mainz, but mostly this was a search for forage. If Baden was going to take Phillippsburg's forage, he would take Thüngen's.

There was a skirmish at Philippsburg this day. Baden made a personal reconnaissance and got too close to the French cavalry. It cannot have improved his temper when he again tried to persuade the Landgrave to loan him men. The latter made some concessions. He would contribute 3 battalions, but they had to be commanded by Graf Lippe, his own man, and they would only cover the work, not engage in it. He complained that all this marching and countermarching was exhausting the Bergstat, and anyway, Mannheim was on flat ground easily defended by guns and cavalry, so why was he even needed? (Incidentally, the Hessians were not all that welcome in the Bergstat; they were extortioners when it came to billets.)

In response, Baden deluged the Landgrave with staff officers armed with satchels full of logical arguments. Baden could NOT easily defend Mannheim because he had no way to both feed his troops there AND work on the place. If Hesse provided the manpower, he could hold his army in a protective posture on good ground and keep them supplied. As an afterthought, a note was received from *Graf* von Reuss, enroute with Saxon reinforcements. He had just bridged the Neckar at Wimpfen and was thinking of crossing it.

30 July the Germans learned from an Alsatian farmer who was crossing the Rhine (probably to sell to Philippsburg) that the French were at Landau. They were sending convoys of several hundred wagons to Philippsburg.

At Mannheim, 6 companies of the Sandrasky Dragoons, a Palatine outfit, went into garrison at Mannheim. Baden's Quartermaster was looking for a new campsite at Langenbrücken (14 Km east of Philippsburg). Baden may have entertained some idea of besieging Philippsburg, but it would be enough if his men had enough to eat. He had no siege equipment.

New Plans

On 31 July Baden suddenly decided to abandon the work at Mannheim. The Landgrave was uncooperative and without his troops Baden would not have enough manpower to do the work and defend it. The stores were shipped back to Heilbronn, escorted by Spielberg and the Wrtby Regiment; the Mühlau bridges were dismantled and laid away for the future. The water levels must have been low because boats going up the Neckar from Neu Mannheim were having a hard time.

The latest intelligence (provided by *Graf* Lippe) was that the French were marching on Kreuznach, as already described. This fact was incidental to the gist of his letter, which was to the effect that the enemy's march had delayed his own and he was only at Rohrheim (35 Km southeast of Mainz, on the right bank). He promised to be at Ladenburg on the Neckar by tomorrow, with the Hessian cavalry.

Actually, by this date Lorges had doubled back from his jaunt into the Palatine hill country and was now at Badenheim, about 6 Km east of Kreuznach, and facing Mainz. By mid-war the Palatinate was starting to recover and the French could not have that, so Lorges was making a second sweep.

Chamilly joined him here with 27 battalions, having left 18 behind in the Rhine camps under Vaubecourt's command. Lorges' army now divided. The *Maréchal* took the cavalry, grenadiers, and 100 men from each battalion. The rest of the army was sent under Chamilly to Oggersheim, where it was put to work repairing the dike from Mannheim to Frankenthal. This dike was crucial for preventing the Rhine from overflowing. Chamilly was also well placed to interfere with any attempt by the Germans to re-erect a bridge at the Isle of Mühlau or the Isle of Sandhoven below Mannheim. Gun batteries were emplaced along the Rhine to harass enemy foragers on the far bank.

August saw no dramatic manoeuvres on either side, but much 'kleine krieg'.

On 1 August Baden was camped at Langenbrücken, but already scouting for a new site farther south. The next day he moved to Unteröwisheim. His army had the welcome addition of Pálffy's Hussars, who had based at Langenbrücken while observing Philippsburg. Also, he called in some garrisons: Schwetzingen, Walldorf, and the Gänsberg. Mannheim was abandoned entirely; only Weisloch remained garrisoned in that sector. The Landgrave of Hesse, perhaps feeling guilty, sent word he was willing to send reinforcements, if needed.

On 2 August some French soldiers crossed the Rhine in 2 large boats and occupied Mannheim. Otherwise, the action this day focused on the western Palatinate. Lorges HQ was at Alsheim, by the Rhine, 26 Km south of Mainz, and over 70 Km from Baden's army. Most of his infantry was strung out along the river, though if later years are any indication he probably had a reserve of massed grenadiers. The cavalry went where it willed, seeking forage and stealing cattle.

The down side of such a dispersion was a certain lack of control, and Thüngen was still collecting many deserters (up to 100 a day by mid month), usually brought in by his own cavalry. There were even 2 men from the Gendarmerie, who told Thüngen that Lorges would soon be forced to send large detachments to Flanders and Piedmont.

Sometimes, the foragers did not surrender when they met the hussars. This same day Lorges men were operating in an oblong-shaped box of about 10 by 20 kilometres between Nieder-Olm/Stadecken-Elsheim, and Flonheim/Alzey, about 20 Km northwest of his HQ. Most of the activity was down along the Selz River, which flows from the southwest until it reaches Nieder-Olm, at which point it bends northwest toward Stadecken-Elsheim and then on to the Rhine. Nieder-Olm is only 10 Km from Mainz,

but the initial attack did not come from there. Instead, it came from within their midst. 300 of Kollonitsch's men were spotted stealing horses from a temporary camp where the French stored such items.

Trying to trap the hussars, and to prevent additional forays, Lorges ordered the bridges on the Selz fortified with abatis; they already had guard posts. The Selz in the sector closest to Mainz was not fordable. This work was completed around midnight, and at dawn the hussars were corralled against the river. The bulk of them escaped by forcing one of the bridges, but not until they had suffered casualties and abandoned most of their booty.

The next record of any activity comes on 6 August, which saw Baden inspecting his forage stores. He wanted to know how long he could remain at his present camp. Stocks must have been low, because on 8 August he sent out detachments to look for fresh fields.

On 7 August Lorges raided 'under the guns' of Mainz, which responded with cannon fire and a sortie by the hussars. The latter foiled the raid but were chased back to the gates of the city. Thüngen thought the French then retired to Kreuznach, but he was wrong. On the same day, Chamilly, who was overseeing the Rhine defences, quartered at Oppenheim, 10 Km north of Alsheim, presumably with his infantry reserve.

On 8 August there were a skirmish in front of Philippsburg between 200 French infantry and 200 German infantry supported by 40 dragoons. The French were victorious and the German detachment commander was made prisoner. The B.H.K. does not record this incident.

By now Lorges had collected at least 800 wagonloads of grain, which was sent to Landau.

On 9 August the governor of Philippsburg and the commandant of Fort-Louis issued orders that local farmers should sell all their produce to them. Baden countered with an order to bring the produce into the Black Forest, on pain of confiscation of all horses and carts, with their loads.

Also on 9 August Baden learned Reuss' Saxons had crossed the Neckar and were camped between Wimpfen and Heilbronn. It does not appear Baden was waiting for them in particular, as the corps was only a small one, but their arrival would give him more flexibility.

10 August: Baden received a report from GWM Würtz in the Kinzigthal. A band of French raiders defeated one of his columns, which lost 1,000 men. The French were probably drawn from the regiments sent south after Lorges recrossed the Rhine and presumably conducted a number of such raids, though very few are recorded.

Quincy recounts an action which took place on 11/12 August. It appears that on 11 August Lorges detached *lieutenant général* Breteche with 150 dragoons and 100

grenadiers to prospect for forage on the western side of the Nahe River — this is the river that flows through Kreuznach into the Rhine at Bingen; west of it the land becomes more hilly and wooded. While sheltering from a storm at Dörrebach (13 Km west of Bingen) the next day, Breteche encountered 300 of Kollonitsch's Hussars, who launched a fierce assault at about 10pm. The French dragoons were surprised and abandoned their position. The grenadiers tried to counterattack but the numbers were too great. Breteche was forced to retire with over 30 losses. The B.H.K. does not record the incident, but the journal is written from Baden's perspective and not that of the defenders at Mainz. On the other hand, it does record that on 10 August the Landgrave of Hesse put in a request for 100 hussars and Baden offered him a whole regiment, which the Landgrave for some reason declined, possibly because he felt they were too volitail when taken enmasse.

11 August Reuss arrived at Baden's camp. His men were at Eppingen, and consisted of 4 battalions, 2 regiments of horse, and 15 cannon. Tomorrow they would camp at Münzesheim, an hour east of the army.

In other news, the partisan leader La Forest caught a priest on the far side of the Rhine and has him secured at Hördt, a town on the left bank west of Baden's camp — the man is suspected of spying. All sides, but especially the French, used priests and monks as spies. They were a separate 'estate', nominally (but only nominally) beyond the warriors' world, with duties which permitted them to pass freely; they were also used for diplomatic missions. Of course, their status also meant they were not supposed to take sides.

12 August: Baden ordered his Bridge Master to once again collect all the boats on the Neckar and keep them brigaded together.

Very little is recorded for 13-15 August, on either side, only a report that Lorges army was wasting away from desertion and disease, but that is hardly a novel situation, and such reports were usually overblown.

On 16 August Baden made preparations for a move. Reinforced by Reuss and the newly returned Zollern-Sigmaringen Regiment, he was bound for Durlach, a march of about 20 Km toward the northern cusp of the Black Forest. Camp was made there the next day. On 18 August he placed his outposts, at Weingarten (100 men in the church), Stafforth Castle (200 men), and Scheibenhardt (100 horse); the garrison of Weisloch was recalled. These posts were north of Baden's army, at a distance of 5-10 Km.

[Mention is also made of 500 Commanded Horse, probably a screening force operating up and down the Rhine. For readers examining a map, remember that Karlsruhe did not exist in those days. It was soon to be the site of a major palace, with extensive woods for hunting and other pleasures, but not a town of any significance.]

19 August the French camped (nominally) at Lambsheim, 13 Km WNW of Mannheim. Most of the infantry was posted in a cordon along the Rhine, while the cavalry concentrated near Frankenthal.

20 August the Imperial bread ovens, escorted by 150 men, were established at Königsbach, 9 Km northwest of Pforzheim. Baden also sent a strong raiding force against Fort-Louis to collect prisoners. The Markgraf von Brandenburg-Bayreuth, Baden's second in command, reported sick.

On 21 August there was flooding along the Rhine. Some of the German battalions camping in low ground had to be moved. The floods did not seem to hamper the French, whose raiders were out in force, being seen at Weisloch, Hockenheim, Bruchsal, and even Bretten. They seem mostly to have issued from Philippsburg. A sizeable body was also reported at Offenbach an der Queich, just east of Landau. This may have been a reserve, or in some way connected with supply convoys. The French also reinforced a key redoubt at Hagenbach with an entire regiment. Hagenbach is 17 Km west of Durlach, on the left bank of the Rhine. It used to be right at the base of (or top of, depending on one's point of view) a loop of the river, where it was relatively easy to arrange a crossing.

The next few days saw the Germans trying to catch the French, with no success. Baden garrisoned Ettlingen to his south with 300 horse, and Bretten with 200 foot, and a day later put 150 men into Königsbach, between him and his bread ovens at Pforzheim. 50 horse were sent to Pforzheim itself a day after that. By 24 August the French were gone. The same day the German patrol sent to Philippsburg, who may have stirred up the hornet's nest in the first place, returned. It was learned that besides the regiment at Hagenbach, the French sector commander, Melac, had 600 men at Lauterburg, 7 Km southwest of that place. Like Hagenbach, it used to be much closer to the Rhine and was a potential crossing point. Lorges' main cavalry corps was reported near Kreuznach. Unknown to the Germans, on 26 August the governor of Philippsburg visited Fort-Louis and decided to refurbish an old redoubt (called the Old Redoubt) at Rheinzabern, 19 Km southwest of his fortress. This was yet another location where the Rhine made a loop in a westerly direction.

According to Quincy (and not reported in the B.H.K.), on 25 August Baden sent out a sortie of 300 men from his main camp on a secret 'enterprise' into Alsace. The B.H.K. has no entry for this day, so perhaps it really was a secret. Also from Quincy, the Landgrave of Hesse was apparently no longer in the Bergstat. He was on the Middle Rhine below Bingen, strengthening the garrisons in Trier and Cologne, where the Germans held both banks. Boppard and Rhinefels are mentioned. At Boppard the French made a probe with 300 men but were beaten off by a cavalry screen. Hesse was actually enroute for Brabant, where he had promised to help King William

(who paid better than the Emperor). It was in response to his movements that the French were considering sending reinforcements to Flanders.

However, Lorges had not yet divested himself of troops, though he did send a dragoon regiment to Mont Royal, arriving about 27 August. That day Brandenburg-Bayreuth was forced to quit the army and convalesce at his home in Franconia.

By 28 August Lorges had collected enough supplies to last him until 10 September. He would then move on to the Hunsrück, 30 Km northwest of Kreuznach. This was just about the last bit of the western Palatinate to be spared French attentions. His main purpose, however, appears to have been to assist in a renewed siege of the castle of Rheinfels. Information about this second siege (which was cancelled for reasons yet to be revealed) is even more scanty than that available for the first siege. Apparently, 12-20,000 troops from Flanders, most likely Boufflers' Moselle corps which had as usual been assisting operations there, were to undertake it. Lorges was probably only positioned to cover and assist, since it was likely the Landgrave of Hesse would respond vigorously. Of course, there is also the possibility the whole thing was a deception to tie down the Hessians; if a deception, it succeeded in its object, but the Germans came to believe they had foiled the attempt by their own actions on the Upper Rhine, as will be described. Since 100 cannon were actually collected at Mont Royal the French were probably serious.

According to German Intelligence there were now 2 French regiments of foot at Hördt and 1 at Hagenbach, and Melac had other regiments parcelled out along the Rhine, with some cavalry in reserve. The Germans put Lorges himself about 3 hours out of Kreuznach, below the town, on the left bank of the Nahe. It was said the French had many sick and had lost 12,000 men to desertion alone since the campaign opened. This is a believable figure given the widespread famine and general financial collapse in France. 1694 was France's worst year; her enemies would be hit just as hard in the future.

29: August: enemy cavalry is spotted on the far side of Remchingen, where part of the German army is camped! They have stolen 40 horses from a Saxe-Gotha regiment. This activity took place 9 Km southeast of Durlach, on Baden's supply route. For the next day the B.H.K. includes a memo to strength the various castles and manor houses in the vicinity, and another on 31 August for a watch fire to be lit on the Warthurm above Durlach if raiders are spotted.

On 30 August General Bibra reported an action at Kuppenheim, 25 Km southwest of Durlach, where 100 French attacked a bridge over the Murg River, a right bank tributary of the Rhine. Its valley cuts deep into the Black Forest, making it a natural highway. All but 13 of the enemy were killed. Also, the Germans caught a notorious

French partisan leader named La Rue, recovering 36 horses he had stolen. It was probably La Rue who raided Remchingen, though it may have been regulars from Melac's command; on 30 August he was reported at the Mayrer Hof near Philippsburg, with 1,000 horse and 500 foot (2 weak battalions).

1 September Baden held a council of war which decided a number of things. Pforzheim was to be refortified and garrisoned by the Durlach Regiment. A Grand Forage was also scheduled for the next day. After that, the Germans planned to cross the Rhine and do some damage.

There was a small action this day in the south. Usually these go unreported. General Neitschütz had been sent to the Kingzighthal some weeks back. He was having trouble with the local peasantry selling to the French fortress of Freiburg im Breisgau. This place is barely mentioned in accounts of the Nine Years' War, but it played its part in securing Upper Alsace from invasion. The Breisgau in general — between the Rhine and the Black Forest — was under French domination. And so, the German peasants were selling their produce to the fortress, as they had always done. Neitschütz had led out a band of 250 men to try and enforce Baden's rules about trading with the enemy, but was attacked by 300 French and had to take up a defensive position. After half an hour the French retired, leaving 40 dead and 38 prisoners.

On 2 September the German Grand Forage began. Baden also ordered up his pontoons from Heilbronn, bringing them down the Neckar loaded with provisions and ammunition. The Saxons were also brought down the river, though not until 12 September. The invasion was scheduled for 14 September. The Germans began stockpiling bridging materials at a place called Schreck, about a day's march south of Philippsburg. This is another one of those locations where the modern river has cut off a series of oxbows.

The French were, it seems, unaware of the impending operation. On 3 September Melac divided his command, or at least the mobile portion of it, sending half to Mannheim and half to Speyer. He rendezvoused with M. Desbordes, the Governor of Philippsburg, at Leimersheim, halfway between Philippsburg and Hagersbach, where his men harassed the German troops on the far bank by fire. The Germans discounted a rumour that Melac had 4 carts loaded with bombs with which he planned send north for a new attack on Rheinfels (see below).

During the Grand Forage Baden and his Quartermaster made a reconnaissance (3-4 September), seeking potential crossing points. Dachslanden (Daxlanden), opposite Hagenbach, seemed the most likely. Yes, the French held a redoubt on the far bank, but all the possible crossing sites were watched. Daxlanden was quite close to the current German camp. Large islands on this

section of the river would allow the Germans to mass for a breakout very close to the left bank.

A skirmish near Mainz also took place on 4 September, when Lorges' cavalry raided 'under the guns' of the city. German reports range from 50 French dead and 6 prisoners, with 10 more escaping, to 102 enemy dead, 20 prisoners, and 113 horses taken. Quincy says only 50 French dragoons took part.

There was little activity in the German camp until 8 September, apart from the foraging. Baden was away visiting his wife at Göppingen, his Adjutant was at Heilbronn arranging the pontoon train — which was to be brought overland on carts — and Württemberg, the senior general was with Baden. This left Styrum in command. (It is not clear why the provision boats coming by water could not also be used as bridging material; possibly the train was composed of expensive copper pontoons.)

On 8 September the pontoon train, amounting to 69 boats and enough equipment to fill 200 carts, reached Vaihingen an der Enz. 400 men had been sent to escort it, while Styrum made reconnaissance of Kneilingen, on the northern edge of the bridging site (6 September). Kneilingen is where the modern railway bridge and highway crosses the Rhine; Daxlanden is now a major dock facility.

On the same day another skirmish took place outside Mainz. Lorges' men were now stealing livestock — at Weissenau, they took 300 'beasts'. Therefore, a party of dragoons involved in the operation were not surprised when a delegation of peasants met them in a hamlet near Mainz and offered to sell some horses, no questions asked, for 800 Crowns. It became apparent later that they were only trying to delay the French. While the haggling continued, 2 troops of Kollonitsch's Hussars, 160 in all, rode up. The French dragoons dismounted and took up firing positions in the hamlet. The hussars exchanged fire with them and dismounted to assault the place, but the dragoons' musketry was so disciplined (7-8 shots at a time) that the hussars were pinned down. Quincy says this action lasted 2 days (or at least, overnight). About 500 rounds were fired in all. Several times the hussars called on them to surrender, but the dragoons were under orders to resist to the 'last extremity'. At the peak of the fighting, a third troop of hussars showed up. Harassed also by the peasants, the dragoons despaired of their situation, but the hussars had suffered about 60 casualties and were near breaking. Seeing another party of French who just by chance were in the vicinity, the hussars broke off the action. Most of the dragoons escaped, bringing the peasants' horses with them.

The report of this action which reached Baden the next day was somewhat altered. It said 300 hussars had defeated 2 strong parties of French and inflicted heavy losses, but then went on to say the hussars had been

forced to retreat and abandon most of their booty, which they had taken from a French convoy the previous day.

Also on 8 September Lorges sent Tallard and Frémont to Simmeren and Bacharach with 54 squadrons of horse, 21 squadrons of dragoons, and the 5-battalion Anjou brigade. This was part of the planned 'drift' into the Hunsrück.

The French may have learned something of Baden's planned crossing, for on 9 September they began strengthening their posts opposite his army. German estimates were 1,500 men: 60 at Seltz, 150 at Lauterburg, 200 at the Hagenbach Redoubt, and 700 between Leimersheim and Hördt. Seltz is the southernmost of these locations, near Rastatt. This was all the French had to cover a 35 Km front. But, there were only those few crossing points. Additional cavalry was at Lamperthiem, farther north, but it was assumed they were preparing for new raids.

The B.H.K.'s entries for the next couple of days expend a lot of text on Baden's relationship with the Saxons. The Franconian-Swabian Association was dead set against supplying them locally. Baden had to make special arrangements, and in the interim supply them with a small train and coupons for the local magazines. The situation was never properly resolved and the Saxons would soon leave the theatre, never to return. Others were also thinking of winter quarters; the Swabian billeting representative notified Baden of his arrival and was given an escort.

On 11 September the German artillery colonels went off to Pforzheim to inspect and collect the pontoon train, while the Sandrasky and Wrtyby regiments went off to escort supply columns from Bretten and Sinsheim, respectively. The B.H.K. has an interesting note about the colonels. They entered the town secretly because they were afraid the Saxons would try to requisition the pontoons. If they were copper ones, this would be a prize well worth some bad language from their 'allies'.

On the Middle Rhine, things were quiet. Thüngen expected Lorges, or a large portion of his cavalry at least, to head for Rheinfels in the near future. The belief was shared by the Landgrave, who, instead of continuing on to Brabant, put his men in to quarters along the Rhine.

12 September: Baden, who made an examination of the crossing points on a daily basis, decided the time was right to make the attempt. All the signs pointed to the French going into quarters fairly soon; their response should be slow. They were also reputed to have thousands of sick — Philippsburg was full of them, including the Lieutenant du Roi. On the other hand, the Saxons departed this morning — a mixed blessing — after receiving provisions. (They also provisioned themselves, requisitioning the Imperial hay convoy and leaving Baden with a four-day's shortage to deal with.)

[A Lieutenant du Roi was a sort of royal commissar, subordinate to the governor of a town or fortress. It was a sinecure, not essential to the bureaucratic apparatus but rather a way for the Crown to generate revenue, since applicants had to buy the office.]

On 13 September the train arrived (it is called the Brigade in the B.H.K.). Baden met it at a spot between Godau and Grötzingen, just east of Durlach, and it was immediately sent down to the river.

The reader should consult the map on p.169. Note that the bridges and redoubts shown on the map date from 1675 and the Dutch War. The description of the operation in the B.H.K. is very clear, but both the B.H.K. and Quincy are hazy on the terrain. Based on the texts, it is most likely the Germans did the obvious thing and constructed their bridge from Dachslände(n) straight across to the large island formed by the loop of the Old Rhine (Vieux Rhin). The texts speak of a 'large' island and a 'small' island. Logically, one would expect this to be the triangular shaped one with the pair of redoubts, but apparently the small island was close to the right bank, not the left. Also, at times of low water, as it was now, this passage was fordable, so no bridge was required. (If the water level rose later on they could use a ferry system.)

At the promontory directly west of Daxlanden there is an oval shaped island separated from the bank by only a thin line, indicating a small creek, which may have widened in the 20 years since the map was drawn. This is probably the small island mentioned in the text. The bridge, of 60 pontoons, would thus be laid east-west, its far end anchored at the patch of open ground on the large island. The left bank was slightly higher than the right bank but this does seem only to have presented a technical challenge to the engineers and not influenced the actual success of the crossing. The accounts do not initially mention the construction of a second bridge, and as can be seen from the map, there were two permanent bridges at Hagenbach linking the big island to the left bank. However, later entries indicate at least one pontoon bridge was erected over the Old Rhine, probably on the west side.

The operation was handled by FzM Markgraf Durlach with FML Graf Fürstenberg as his second. The pontoons were brought down to the water on 13 September under an escort of all the grenadiers in the army — 3,000 men. They were supported by 500 horse, 6 falcons, and 6 regimental guns. An overwatch post of 35 horse under a lieutenant was set up at Knielingen, where they could give warning of any outflanking moves but more importantly, look down the river for some distance to the far bank and observe the arrival of enemy reinforcements from the north — as can be seen from the map, most sections of both banks were wooded. Another 200 horse and 100 hussars were sent the next day to Philippsburg, deploying as close as they dared to the main gate to keep the garrison (and the local merchants) penned up.

At 11am on 14 September all the boats were in the backwater just south of the Daxlanden water meadows. Durlach's command crossed between 5:30am and 11am. The French were patrolling the far bank and there was an exchange of musketry as the enemies recognised each other.

The Germans found two breastworks already in existence, facing west. (One is tempted to think these are the two redoubts shown on the triangular island, but again, the small island used was close to the right bank.) These they decided to improve, while also building redoubts at either end of the big island. Baden made a tour of inspection, escorted by the Aufsess and Carlin Dragoons. He sent a rowboat across to the mainland with 12 men, who found no sign of the enemy, nor of any fixed positions, which the Germans found odd.

The French did make a few appearances as the day wore on, but always pulled back into the woods. The Germans estimated 150 horsemen. Baden surmised that the French thought that with the departure of the Saxons he was too weak to do much damage. He learned that 1,000 French had been sent to Mont Royal where a park of 100 big guns was being assembled for use in a siege of Rheinfels Castle. Another such park of 111 guns was stored within Philippsburg. They were not likely haul them out again to deal with Baden's bridgehead. Their infantry was spread out along the whole Rhine and would not mass. But, the French had an awful lot of cavalry.

Still, he estimated he could hold the big island as a permanent base with only 800 men. A battery containing the 6 falcons was erected facing Hagenbach. The main bridge was in place before nightfall, but not the one over the Old Rhine. For some reason it was not possible to use the permanent bridges; perhaps the French had broken them. Before last light, 7 troops of French horse were observed, some of whom occupied a redoubt. The night was pitch black, so Baden ordered a strong guard, but the French did not attack.

15 September work began again in the pre-dawn and the second bridge was soon completed. Baden sent his scouts across. Word soon came back that the French had gone. The 7 troops had been pulled back to Fort-Louis overnight (27 Km farther upriver) and the commandant there, Desbordes, instead of returning them distributed his men into a variety of strongpoints and rode off with 3 companies of dragoons to Haguenau, 45 Km to the southwest. Baden immediately sent 50 grenadiers to hold the French redoubt and 200 more into Hagenbach, which they found abandoned. Locals told them the French had completely evacuated the country after plundering it, leaving masses of stores behind, especially at Lauterbourg, 7 Km to the southwest. They even abandoned a cannon. This sounds like an exaggeration. The French owned Alsace, why would they 'plunder' it? It is more likely winter stocks are meant; they would have lacked the transport to move the stores before the

Germans came. The Germans found the local population ambivalent. The peasants all ran away but the gentry and government officials presented themselves and agreed to pay contributions. Baden called over the Imperial, Palatine, Franconian, and Swabian representatives to arrange for contributions for each as far south as Strasbourg. A large herd of cattle was rounded up and distributed amongst the infantry. Booty was to be had 'in heaps'.

Sensing an opportunity not to be missed, Baden sent expresses to *Graf* Reuss and the Landgrave of Hesse, urging them to cross the Rhine or make some other diversion. He also called in all his garrisons except the one at Stafforth. Neither commander obliged, at first. The Landgrave had troubles of his own at Rheinfels.

Baden started putting his army across at 3pm. 300 hussars went first, with orders to ride to Strasbourg and wreak havoc. The remaining hussars came next, ordered to fan out and locate the enemy. By the time the army completed the crossing these were on the outskirts of Landau. After the hussars came 3 regiments of dragoons, then the foot, and 12 cannon. Local people cut roads across the island to assist the cavalry. The infantry took all night to cross.

Meanwhile, Baden held a council of war. It was decided he would take 500 horse and the dragoon regiments of Sohier, Aufsess and Carlin to recce Lauterbourg. The 500 horse would stay there and 50 of them would occupy an abandoned redoubt to observe traffic on the Rhine.

16 September: unable to find a suitable camp at Lauterbourg, Baden returned to Hagenbach and ordered a camp erected there. The infantry occupied it in the afternoon. Eventually the island was cleared enough for the cavalry to cross, which they did overnight. The bulk of the artillery remained parked on the right bank of the river. It would appear most of the baggage and heavy equipment was kept on the big island, along with a strong garrison. Hagenbach was garrisoned by one battalion. As described later, Lauterbourg also received a garrison. There is no mention of entrenchments being constructed, beyond the redoubts already planned.

The Germans at Hagenbach were on the east side of a very large wedge-shaped belt of woodland, called the Forest of Lauterbourg, bound on the south by the Lauter River and on the north by a number of marshy streams, all flowing northeast to the Rhine. The Lauter is known in to military history as the foundation of the Lines of Wissembourg, a series of entrenchments running from Lauterbourg to Wissembourg, but during the Nine Years' War only the river itself presented an obstacle. Taking Lauterbourg thus gave the Germans access to Upper Alsace. Otherwise, thanks to the forest, the only direction they could go was north, down the Rhine.

Conversely, the French could only threaten the northwest quadrant of Baden's camp unless they travelled all the

way around the forest. So, apart from the big island Baden seems only to have fortified an advanced post to the northwest, at a hamlet called Langenkandel, 11 Km away. Langenkandel was on the far side of an extended tongue of the forest; the position gave early warning of any French army approaching from that angle.

Baden sent another express to the Landgrave, asking him to make a probe across the Middle Rhine once Lorges brings his army south to deal with this crisis.

The partisan La Forest captured a Gendarme who said a detachment of his unit had gone from Speyer to Landau. Late that night the hussars returned from Landau. (They had been instructed to make noise upon their return so the sentries would know they were there, but not to risk crossing the lines until daylight.) The hussars met no opposition either going or coming. Landau was garrisoned, of course, with 4 battalions and 6 companies of understrength cavalry, and plenty of cannon, but the nearest threat seemed to be a body of troops coming from Frankenthal, bound for Neustadt, in other words, no closer than 40 Km. These may have been the men reported by the captured Gendarme.

17 September was set aside for foraging. After only 2 days, the Germans collected 100,000 francs in contributions, without touching the harvest. 1,000 horse were sent to Lauterbourg and 2,000 more to Langenkandel; Baden accompanied this body. 500 of the cavalry were picqueted along a line from Minderslachen, just in front of Langenkandel, to Rheinzabern, 7 Km northeast, to cover the northern approaches to the camp, and 500 were sent to Bergzabern, 14 Km to the west, up against the Vosges, to secure a new campsite and block the gap at that end of the forest. The new camp at Bergzabern would have enough room for the Saxons, whom Baden hoped would be tempted by the plunder to show up.

GWM Sohier took another 1,000 of the best mounted troopers north to the Queich River, near Landau, to see if the enemy column was still headed that way. If he could not locate the enemy, Sohier had orders to try and 'bounce' Neustadt and return to camp through the Vosges. The hussars were operating deep within Upper Alsace to the south, and also in the Vosges, 2-3 hours beyond Landau.

The Saxons showed some interest in returning to the game. Reuss agreed to come back if Baden would supply him. He also promised to make amends for the unfortunate incident with the hay convoy. Baden gathered enough rations for 8 days and informed Reuss that all was ready. The Saxons were coming, but what about the French?

On 14 September, the day Baden began his invasion of Alsace, Lorges received word there was cannonading against a number of posts along the Upper Rhine. He formed a detachment composed of 50 horsemen from

each brigade in his First Line, plus 100 Gendarmes, and on 15 September led this column up the Rhine to examine the situation. Melac and d'Uxelles accompanied him, as did the Intendant of the Army. 4 battalions were sent under Vaubecourt to Fort-Louis. This was a precautionary move. Not until 16 September did partisans inform him that Baden was at Hagenbach, the Germans had forces at Daxlanden and a detachment of 2,000 of their cavalry was on its way to Wissembourg.

The *marquis* d'Alegre was sent to Neustadt (16 September) and Landau (17 September) with 2,000 horse. A courier was sent to Joyeuse ordering him to take the forces Lorges had left behind and march to Landau on 19 or 20 September. This was done, the heavy artillery being sent to Wachenheim (10 Km north of Neustadt) on 18 September, the main body leaving Kreuznach on 15 September and reaching Neustadt on 20 September, then Landau the next day — a march of about 80 Km.

As Lorges was also advancing, in 2 columns, he sent out Melac on reconnaissance. The latter encountered a troop of enemy raiders and savaged it, recovering their booty.

There was also some fighting in the Vosges. D'Uxelles, after stopping at Landau, moved into Upper Alsace by a circuitous route through the mountains, alerting the local militia and forming strong posts to block the passes. A concentration was also made at Hagenau, south of the German bridgehead, where M. du Heron was sent by Governor Desbordes. 300 men were assigned to garrison two nearby castles. Other parties conducted sweeps and picked up a large number of scavengers who were stripping the land bare. The Germans were even hiring marauders to operate in the woods around Strasbourg.

[The B.H.K. mentions that the Old Orders are to be republished and issued to every regiment because many are ignoring them. This may be related to the rules of engagement regarding plunder.]

On 18 September Baden was discussing refurbishing the old French redoubts in the vicinity of Hagenbach and of making other improvements to the crossing site. He probably had no intention of actually wintering on the left bank, given that so much of his army insisted on doing so elsewhere, but a permanent bridgehead would be a Good Thing.

The German assessment of the enemy's situation was as follows: when Desbordes was informed of the German crossing, he initially thought to hold Hagenbach and in fact had been enroute when he realised the Germans were too strong and diverted to Haguenau. This is where he was understood to be concentrated. Meanwhile, Melac, the next senior commander farther down the Rhine, reacted fairly quickly by sending 5,000 men from Frankenthal to Neustadt, tossing 2 Irish regiments into the nearly empty Philippsburg and sending 300 dragoons and 200 horse to Landau. Lorges himself was presumed to be on his way, but who knew when he would arrive.

Sandrasky's Dragoons and another 200 horse were sent to Philippsburg, where the next day they summoned the Lieutenant du Roi to *contribute* within 4 days to Margravate of Durlach, on pain of fire.

19 September Baden continued to improve his position and glean as much as he could from the country. 50 horse were sent to Wissembourg to round up German marauders who plundered the place (presumably after the town had paid for protection). Baden made another examination of Langenkandel and his Quartermaster visited Lauterbourg and Bergzabern. It was decided to erect a proper camp at Langenkandel. Teams of labourers, mostly soldiers, began clearing paths through the forest behind the site. (The hussars reported the peasantry had all fled to Haguenau, leaving the lands deserted. According to the latest Rumour the French were afraid Landau would be besieged.)

Note that Langenkandel was not the usual clumped hamlet but a long string of small houses and plots sandwiched between a ridge of open ground and the Durbach River. Note also that the Durbach was split into many channels. For simplicity the texts generally refer only to the Otterbach, but it is the least significant of the channels. There is marshy ground, and on the east, a tongue of forest. Note also there were some permanent bridges.

Sohier and his brigade, returned from Landau, were posted on the ridge as guards for the camp. His men were to occupy the ridge by day and withdraw into the woods overnight. He was to watch for the French and guard the bridges. The rest of Baden's troops were either foraging, scouting, or clearing roads.

On 20 September fairly accurate news was received of Lorges' motions. His army was thought to be in bad shape, with only 17 guns. Baden once again sent to the Landgrave, saying now was the time. Fortuitously, the French had given up on Rheinfels, so the latter gave serious consideration to the request. When the French headed south, the Landgrave's corps crossed the Rhine at Mainz. His forces included Hessians, and regiments from Paderborn and Münster. The Landgrave took command and marched for Kreuznach on 21 September. Lorges was not too concerned about the Hessians. He had already stripped the Palatinate bare. In Versailles' eyes, Alsace was the only important thing.

10 hussars arrived in the German camp, from Mainz; they had 8 prisoners. Far more importantly, the Saxon cavalry arrived at Mühlberg, just east of Daxlanden. Worried about his right flank, Baden again examined Rheinzabern, and also Jockgrim, 3 Km to the south of it. This town blocked the route between the Rhine and the forest. He also issued a decree that no one was to venture into the mountains (whether to plunder or desert) on pain of death.

Thanks to a rumour that Bruchsal had been cruelly plundered by the French, the Germans began demanding extra contributions, on pain of burning.

21 September: the Saxons concentrated at Mühlberg, dispersing into billets, probably because there was no room for them on the far bank. This done, however, the men crossed the river over the next couple of days. In particular they helped improve the works on the big island.

But Baden was already planning to leave. Most of the loose plunder had been gathered. The peasants had begun burning their remaining crops. In any case, the clock had run down. The French were here.

As Sohier took up his morning post on the ridge this day he spotted 8 troops of French cavalry. Scouts were sent out and 2 prisoners obtained who confirmed that Lorges was on the near side of the Queich. This was the French advance guard. On the plus side, the French probably had no guns, no more than 30,000 men at the outside, and would be exhausted. The bulk of his army having combined at Landau, Lorges had indeed dispersed some of it into strongpoints, particularly at Germersheim on the river road, to contain Baden's forces.

On 22 September Lorges set out from Landau against Louis of Baden with 42 battalions, 150 squadrons, and 60 guns (including four 24-pounders). So much for 'no artillery'. Baden's army was entrenched and would take some dislodging. His advance camp (see the map) faced northwest between Langenkandel and Freckernfeld (to the southwest, behind the same ridge), with HQ at Minfeld, just to the right of Freckernfeld, on a frontage of 6 Km.

As already noted, Lorges cavalry screen arrived first. Sohier was soon reporting he had been under enemy observation for an hour and several squadrons were now advancing against him. Baden immediately rode over to Sohier's position. By the time he arrived the French had pushed the Germans back over the Durbach and Sohier was retreating of his own accord over the Otterbach. Baden ordered the bridge over the Otterbach — most likely the one on the main road leading to Hagenbach — defended. If it were not, his campsite would be bypassed and the enemy would be bearing down on the Rhine bridge. The Saxons could hold the big island but Baden and his army would be cut off.

The French stormed the bridge, but lost momentum when they stopped to deal with a pair of regimental guns Sohier brought into action on their flank. German reinforcements arrived in the nick of time and the French were driven back by Württemberg's Cuirassiers to their own (temporary) camp on the other side of the Langenkandel ridge. Casualties in this skirmish were 3 dead and 8-10 wounded. The French brought off the regimental guns.

According to Quincy this encounter had been conducted by the Left Wing of Lorges' army, under Joyeuse, who was leading the advance. The brigade commander d'Alegre had been ordered to drive off Sohier with his own dragoons. This was done, and the dragoons proceeded to attack a number of entrenchments beyond the Durbach. These were also cleared, but Sohier pulled back through a defile which d'Alegre did not want to risk. The German camp, or at least the northeast portion of it, was overrun (because most of the men were away on work parties), and besides the two cannon the French stole a quantity of baggage. D'Alegre only lost 20 men and took 100 prisoners.

It seems Lorges' main intention was to focus Baden's attention here while he swung the rest of his army through the gap at Wissembourg and round the southern side of the Forest to Lauterbourg. Baden was surprised by the rapidity of the French approach and did not have time to recall the detachments he had at Wissembourg and Bergzabern. The men at the latter place were taken prisoner. It was thus not a case of the protagonists having a formal battle but of the French rushing around rounding up as many Germans as they could while keeping Baden's core penned in at Hagenbach.

The *Generalleutnant* decided to evacuate. There were 500 horsemen at Lauterbourg; these were recalled. Word was sent out for all the foraging parties to start making their way back as quickly as possible. The advance camp at Langenkandel was abandoned. Sohier's brigade was pulled back to Hagenbach. However, 8 battalions of the Right Wing were pushed into the woods to provide security.

A council of war was held. Arguing that if they stayed the French would give them a drubbing, Baden pointed out they were exactly one 'march' ahead of the French. They needed to leave now. They had accomplished a valuable strategic object by taking the pressure off the troops in Flanders and at Rheinfels, and a political one by showing the Sun King what his own policies felt like. The Rhine provided its own argument. The river was rising.

The baggage was packed immediately and began trundling back to Daxlanden that night. 6 regiments of foot accompanied it, sent to guard the magazines.

At 8am on 23 September Lorges marched with 2,000 horse, 3,000 foot, and 2 guns to attack Lauterbourg. Simultaneously, Joyeuse took the Left and attacked Jockgrim. This would seal off the bridgehead. The intervening ground was not practicable for either army. Lorges had intended to lay siege to Baden's camp, but since Lauterbourg was abandoned without a fight, he shifted gears and ordered a direct assault. It would take place early on 24 September.

Eight hours before, Baden visited his picquets, making sure security was tight. At 3am he had all the army's carpenters rounded up and sent out with 4 more

battalions under Fürstenberg to make abatis and hasty fieldworks between Langenkandel and Hagenbach. At dawn these men were reinforced by 2 brigades (Erffa's 13 battalions and Bibra's 10), plus all the grenadiers. 12 cannon were distributed for close support.

Meanwhile, Reuss' Saxon cavalry turned around and went back to Daxlanden. They were followed by Baden's Right Wing Cavalry. The light baggage was temporarily stowed on the small island.

Baden had lunch in Hagenbach at 3pm. He had just returned to the bridge when fighting erupted in the forest. The French infantry in front of Langenkandel had started pushing into the woods. About 1,500 men were involved, but there were a substantial number in reserve as well.

There were only 2 practicable routes through the forest, both of which had roadblocks. From the B.H.K.'s text it seems the French were surprised by their presence and halted to reassess the situation. That was when the German infantry, about 1,500 men, opened up, adding to the confusion. It did not help that the French commander, General Adjutant de Mercy, and his 100-man escort got lost blundering around in the woods and decided to make a rapid retreat. He rode back over the Derbach and left his sub-commanders to their own devices.

So far it had been an infantry fight. Baden sent up 3 regiments of cavalry in support: Sohier, La Tour, and Freudenburg. But by the time they got into position the French had broken off the fight and pulled back. The 1. Battalion of the Bavarian Kurprinz Regiment received special mention for repulsing the enemy. Baden resumed the withdrawal about an hour before sunset (5:30pm).

He extracted his men from in front of Langenkandel in the following manner, under the direction of Markgraf Durlach: the Foot was ordered to fall back through the 3 regiments of cavalry; the grenadiers then took position on the right of the main road and the Saxon Foot on the left, while the rest of the infantry passed through, followed by the cavalry reserve. Detachments ('plotons' in German and 'peletons' in French — in English, 'platoons') of grenadiers occupied a fence line they had built deep in the wood, with observation posts out in front. The rest of the grenadiers and the Saxons then pulled out. The last of the infantry were accompanied by the last 3 cannon — presumably, since the guns were distributed for infantry support, the units they were attached to brought most of the pieces with them.

Once the last units reached Hagenbach, the platoons of grenadiers were drawn in. These and a battalion of Speiberg's Regiment, which had been garrisoning Hagenbach, crossed the Old Rhine accompanied by the 300 horse of the Feldwacht or 'duty squadrons' under GWM Aufsess. The grenadiers covered the workers destroying the redoubts by the Old Rhine while Aufsess patrolled the circuit of the Old Rhine. The Quartermaster

and 10 horsemen remained at Hagenbach to give the alarm.

Meanwhile, the French had been preparing a small flotilla under M. de Chamoussau, the Engineer of Strasbourg. Their boats were musket proofed. Some were laden with stones and others with fireworks. This operation had been made practicable because on 13 September the Rhine had risen 4 feet. Quincy's text implies that this operation was already underway and was not directly related to Lorges' intended assault. He may not even have been aware of it, though it is unlikely he was not informed. In what seems to have been a separate operation, Fort-Louis also sent down a single fireship. This arrived unexpectedly sometime after midnight, but floated into or was directed into the Old Rhine instead of striking the main bridge. The Strasbourg flotilla did not arrive until Baden had completed his crossing.

[According to the B.H.K., the French made 'many mighty machines' at Fort-Louis. But, only this one fireship seems to have made it.]

On 24 September the Germans completed their withdrawal in the face of the enemy 'beautifully', without the loss of a single man. (Lorges, in fact, was still preparing his assault.) Everything was transferred from the big island to the small island and then the second bridge section was cut away. Only 4 cannon were left emplaced in a battery the Germans had erected against the old French redoubt 'to salute the old owners when they arrived'.

The operation was not perfectly perfect. For one thing, it was later discovered they had forgotten 4 more cannon. Also, there were a fair number of marauders remaining on the left bank, who do not seem to have been left there by design. Also, the Germans barely made it out in time. The French assessed it was the rising river that forced Baden's departure, not them. By 25 September most of the islands were underwater, including the German camp!

As can be imagined, the crossing lasted well into the night. There was a delay of several hours when the rising river broke the remaining bridge section. The B.H.K. says the bridge had to be extended; perhaps the river lifted it and slid it along the bank to a wider area where extra pontoons were needed. The operation recommenced at 8am on 25 September, the troops marching in the following order: cavalry, infantry, artillery, baggage, and a rearguard consisting of 6 battalions and 6 guns. The Rearguard left 480 'commandos' (commanded men, or detachments of musketeers) to cut the bridges loose. This was done and the Bridge Master had the boats — 100 of them — rounded up and taken over to the backwater south of Daxlanden. The wooden planks were given to the local peasants.

By morning, Lorges' men were flooding into the area around Hagenbach. They fired on the remaining battery

and landed 100 men on the big island, who occupied the position (apparently it was unmanned).

The Germans camped at Daxlanden and Forchheim. Lorges, discovering his enemy had flown, camped at Minfeld, by the old Langenkandel position. Many small parties of Germans had been trapped on the left bank and these were either rounded up or fled to Mainz. Baden had managed to make a good haul of livestock and grain, but had lost 3,000 men.

Joyeuse was sent north on 26 September to the Nach, by Bingen and Bad Kreuznach, to deal with the Landgrave, who was marching to Baden's assistance. He (Joyeuse) had 16 battalions and 69 squadrons. Upon news of Joyeuse's approach, the Landgrave hastily retreated to Mainz and recrossed the river, leaving a few troops to assist Thüngen. The latter had taken advantage of Lorges' absence to raid deep into the Vosges, where the hussars attacked convoys and brought back 70 horses.

Overall, Baden was pleased with how things had gone. The French had made great preparations to lay siege to Rheinfels and in his opinion, the crossing at Hagenbach had forced the French to scrap the operation. The Landgrave of Hesse, who would have had to face that onslaught alone was then able to cross the Rhine himself, at Bingen and Mainz, and begin marching south.

By 26 September Lorges' army was at Neustadt. He mobilised 8,000 peasants to assist with the gathering of supplies and improving the fortifications. Meanwhile, Tallard was detached to Kaiserlautern and Homburg with the Gendarmerie and some line cavalry, to secure the lines of communication through the Saar. These towns, 30 Km and 60 Km away, respectively, occupy the chief pass through the Lower Vosges to Saarbrücken and the Saar River.

The rest of the French marched south again to Landau, where they camped until early October, after which Lorges dispersed them to observation posts along the Rhine between GERMERSHEIM and Fort-Louis.

[The sector commanders were, from north to south, Brigadier Chalmers from GERMERSHEIM to Rheinzabern, marquis de Blainville from there to Lauterbourg, and M. Gobert from there to Fort Louis.]

Baden likewise made preparations for the winter. On 25 September a battalions-worth of grenadiers was sent to reinforce the watch on Philippsburg. On 27 September the bridging train was overhauled; only 30 boats remained in good shape so the rest were broken up. On 28 September 100 men were sent to garrison Durlach. There was a brief panic when it was reported that a large French column was marching to Fort-Louis, and Styrum was sent out to investigate, but it was just a rumour.

The B.H.K. spends most of the entries for 28-30 September raging about Saxon perfidy. First, they quit the game early. Then, they agreed to participate in the

crossing, but only after being bribed with all kinds of concessions. Now, despite receiving VIP treatment, they were whingeing that the bread ovens were too far away and demanding they be allowed to live off Swabian lands. This after doing absolutely nothing all year. What gall!

The B.H.K. also suggests that if the Saxons had hustled, Baden, reinforced in his bridgehead, could have cut his bridges loose and sent them down to the Landgrave, who had asked for them. Perhaps the two could even have linked up, squeezing Lorges between them. This grand scheme does not really seem practical, and besides, the Saxons did reinforce Baden in time to give him the extra manpower he needed to fend off the French for a day or two. In any case, the Landgrave actually wanted the pontoons for an attack on Neuenstatt an der Hart. As this was merely 'personal business' it was perhaps as well that the Saxons dallied.

On 29 September officially sanctioned German marauders still on the left bank were ordered to make their way up to Basel and cross the Rhine there, doing as much damage as they could on the way. The remnants of the bridges were carted to Pforzheim and from there to Heilbronn.

The French were bragging about their 'victory'. The Commandant of Fort-Louis threatened to burn Baden's lands in reprisal for a couple of Alsatian villages. And, the French were once more raiding out of Ebernburg by Kreuznach.

30 September Baden organised a large foraging operation. 100 hussars and 600 horse, under Freudenberg, were sent north to the Elsenz as a screen. This suggests the foraging took place between there and Heilbronn, a section of country the Saxons intended to march through. But whether it was intended to remove everything the Saxons might walk off with, or instead to create depôts for them to use, is not made clear.

In the other direction, the Germans observed some French concentrations across the Rhine near Beinheim, roughly 20 Km up the Rhine, and surmised there would be a raid in a few days. It was said the French merely intended to refortify Hagenbach, but Fort-Louis had ordered its gates closed, which was often a sign of offensive preparations. Probably the raiders would avoid contact and head upriver, to the Kinzigthal or the Breisgau, where they might encounter Baden's marauders coming down.

Baden resolved to thwart such a crossing and ordered the hussars to watch Fort-Louis. He also deployed 50 horse at Rastatt, opposite Beinheim, with musicians simulating the approach of a large corps by playing the regimental drumbeats and calls. The real army broke camp at dawn and followed after, marching in 4 columns to Muggensturm, about 6 Km northeast of Rastatt. The populace of Daxlanden were ordered to tear down all the defensive works at the camp on pain of death. The watch

on Philippsburg was maintained. Other posts were established at Ferderbach and Ettlingen, immediately behind the army, which faced southwest. A picquet line was set up between Rastatt and Kuppenheim, along the Murg River.

On October 1 the hussars returned, reporting no activity at Fort-Louis, but 3 enemy regiments at Beinheim. According to the locals, the rest were lodged in small posts all along the river, as they were before Baden made his crossing.

The next few days were taken up watching Fort-Louis and gathering the harvest. 1,000 horse under a Colonel Freyem were set to patrol the country. Another detachment of 3,000 foot and 2,000 horse foraged opposite Fort-Louis. On 3 October the French tried to stop the locals demolishing the works at Daxlanden, though it is not explained why; perhaps they hoped to use them for a bridgehead. Baden sent a column to Hügelsheim, a village directly opposite Fort-Louis; it observed nothing. Nevertheless, Baden organised a larger column to reinforce the post. On 4 October he made a personal reconnaissance.

On 5 October a call was put out for the peasantry to help with the army's harvest, and an even larger foraging was made opposite Fort-Louis on 8 October. Two days before, a French trumpeter from Landau offered to return 30 POWs, but Baden refused them, saying they were deserters.

By 7 October the Germans had gathered in 400 hay loads so far and 2,000 more were hoped for within 2 days. A messenger arrived from the Kollonitsch Hussars saying the Landgrave, to whom they were now attached, had already gone into winter quarters. They wanted to rejoin the *Generalleutnant* but were told to remain at Mainz until further notice. Notwithstanding the hussars' successes they lost 1,300 horses to the enemy since they were posted to the city; the regiment only had 1,000 men at full strength.

On 8 October, while the foraging took place opposite Fort-Louis, La Forest the Partisan tried to across the Rhine to secure some prisoners. He could not find a boat to take him across, but did learn something. On his return to camp the next day repeated information he gleaned from one of Hagenbach's town councillors (possibly the mayor) who told him the French were now divided into 3 corps: Joyeuse in the Hundsrück north of Kreuznach, a reserve corps at Homburg in the Saarland, and a corps that included the Gendarmerie on the Upper Rhine under Lorges. This last will have been a cavalry corps, since the infantry was spread out along the river.

Baden suspected an enemy raid was still on the books, and it would probably penetrate the Black Forest. The French had a few battalions around Strasbourg and supposedly a large magazine built at Wantzenau, 11 Km downriver from there. There was also an implausible

rumour floating about that the French were massing a flotilla at Strasbourg, of 60 boats, to reinforce Fort-Louis, which the enemy seemed to fear Baden would attack. The flotilla they constructed earlier might still have been in existence.

On 11 October Baden dealt with the continued threat of a raid (he discounted the flotilla) by sending the regiments of Spielberg and Fürstenberg, and the Hohenzollern Dragoons, to the Kinzigthal under the command of General Spielberg. They marched by way of the Gernsbachthal to Besenfeld, Freudenstadt, Winseln, Schiltach, Thurm and Hausach. Which is to say, they rode east past the picquet line on the Murg, southeast through that valley to the other side of the Black Forest, then south along its edge, and west down the Kinzigthal to the spot where it begins to widen out. A ride of 60-70 Km. Spielberg was to remain in the valley until further notice.

The same day the French concentrated 2,000 men at Wantzenau but did not cross. Perhaps they were waiting for the flotilla...? Actually, a small group of about 300 had crossed, at an unspecified location farther downriver. The day before, they had stolen over 100 horses and cattle and 'fined' the bailiff of Buehl 500 florins.

The German army could not remain on watch indefinitely. For the last 17 days they had been living on Baden's own lands. This did protect them from enemy attack but he did not want to exhaust them. Snow was beginning to fall and the harvest was failing. Time for the army to move east.

The bakeries had already been moved (11 October) from Malsch, behind Rastatt, to Bretten. On 12 October the foragers were called in to Muggensturm and the army marched to Grötzingen, by Durlach. There was a report from Mainz that Joyeuse had gone into quarters in Lorraine. One less thing to worry about. Apart from Lorges, who also seemed to be done for the year, that left only the Saxons.

Typically, their Duke did not want to march his men north through the snow and was demanding the best of the winter quarters in Swabia. Baden managed to keep his temper and even gave them bonus hay rations using what was called the 'Swedish measure': 15 units to the Saxons while everyone else got 10 units. Hopefully they would leave now.

Sending his artillery on to Heilbronn, where it would be stored, Baden headed east to Eppingen on 14 October, by way of Gondelsheim near Bretten (13 October). A few troops were deliberately left behind. Fürstenberg was left at Pforzheim with his own small magazine and 400 men, and the castles of Vaihingen and Neuenbürg (downriver and upriver, respectively, from Pforzheim) each had a garrison of 50 men. The castle at Bretten, called Ravensburg, was given a permanent garrison of 20 men. The last garrison along the Rhine, at Stafforth, and all the small bands of officials who were billeted on towns to collect the 'rent', were pulled out.

15 October was spent waiting for the train, under Colonel Freudenberg and escorted by his regiment. It had had to take a different route thanks to the snow. The march had been a hard one. Meanwhile, the French Wantzenau force, numbering 3-4,000 men, were at Oppenau, in the next valley north of the Kinzigthal. (They had a few cannon, too.)

Baden had his engineers lay out a trace for fortifications at Eppingen and placed more garrisons, 400 Franconians in Eppingen, 300 in Sinsheim, and 20 at Steinsberg. This project became the foundation of an extensive network of entrenchments across Swabia from the Neckar to the Enz.

The Bavarians were to cover the Neckar from Wimpfen to Heilbronn, supported by Palatine troops around Wimpfen, until their winter quarters were finalised. The Saxe-Gotha regiments hired by the Franconians would be scattered around Württemberg. Schrautembach's Darmstadt regiment would go home but stay on alert. The Durlach and Carlin dragoons would be added to Fürstenberg's force at Vaihingen, but only to cover the movement of the artillery from Pforzheim to Heilbronn; after, they would winter in the Kinzigthal. Heilbronn would have a permanent garrison of 800 men, Wimpfen 150, Lauffen 100, and Asperg (southwest of Stuttgart) 150. Pálffy's Hussars would camp at Güglingen, midway between Heilbronn and Vaihingen.

On 16 October Baden's army began to break up. The units mentioned above moved to their stations while the remainder went north or east into Franconia or Thuringia, as appropriate. The Saxons were assigned routes to return home via Schwäbisch Gmünd, far to the east — let the Bavarians share some of the pain. They did not leave without demanding that the villages enroute supply them free of charge. The Imperial government agreed to pay compensation and also gave the Bavarians leave to quarter on Imperial lands so their own country would not have to support them *and* the Saxons.

Sector commands over the winter were as follows: *Graf Styrum* with the cavalry between Heilbronn and the Black Forest, *Graf Vehlen* between Heilbronn and Mainz, General Major Gersenbrack with the Hessians between Frankfurt and Koblenz. Baden technically commanded the whole, but left the army with the other senior generals about 19 October and repaired, from Heilbronn, first to Stuttgart and then to Vienna. The last troops in the field, Swabians and Franconians, entered their quarters in the final week of the month.

Lorges also entered winter quarters, distributing his men, as ordered by Versailles, in Alsace, Franche-Comté, and the Sarre. Chamilly commanded the sector from Huningue to Mainz, and Tallard from Mainz to Luxembourg and the frontiers of Liège. The French troops at Oppenau are not mentioned again, but it is implied they were planning to winter there in order to cut costs. If they

did retreat, it was probably to the Breisgau. In late October or early November, however, Melac, on Chamilly's orders, crossed the Rhine at Philippsburg and marched down the right bank as far as Ladenburg, taking prisoner a number of important hostages at places which had refused to pay their contributions. There was no opposition.

1695 – Stalemate

Les armées d'Allemagne ne purent rien entreprendre d'un côté ni d'autre, ayant été obligées de faire des détachemens pour grossir les armées de Flandre. Cependant le Maréchal de Lorges ayant prévenu les ennemis, passa le Rhin à Philippsbourg, & fit vivre ses troupes une partie de la campagne dans leur país, qu'il mit à contribution ; & voyant que leur armée de venoit plus nombreuse que celle qu'il commandoit , il repassa le Rhin dont il garda les bords pendant toute la campagne, de maniere qu'ils n'osèrent tenter de le passer.

Quincy, Vol. III, p. 199

[Paraphrase: the armies in Germany could do little since they were required to send much of their strength to Flanders. Still, Lorges was able to cross the Rhine, and though forced to retreat was able to secure the line of the river. Quincy having made the point earlier that Louis of Baden was a good general, now demonstrates that he meant 'good' in comparison to other Allied generals, not French generals.]

The Wider War

Success in 1695 went to the Coalition. What success there was, that is. This was a year of general stalemate as all the Powers struggled to maintain their armies in the field.

On the Northeast Frontier, the Allies retook the great fortress of Namur. The *duc* de Luxembourg died during the winter, to be replaced by a much less capable general, *maréchal* Villeroi. Now there was parity between the opposing commanders. Villeroi fumbled two attempts to bring William of Orange to battle and failed to relieve Namur through overconfidence and dallying on the road. Nonetheless, if the Allies claimed the siege of Namur as a victory, the French could claim it as a success. Boufflers, the garrison commander, spun the siege out for most of the season, denying William the opportunity to capitalise on his victory. The siege also broke the Allies' finances and England's economy tanked.

In Catalonia, endemic partisan warfare flared up and seriously eroded the French position. The Spanish military made a supreme effort, hiring regiments from Germany and Italy and appointing Gastañaga, last seen being punted by William of Orange from the Spanish Netherlands, to command. He was not such a bad general, really. Noailles fell ill and had to be replaced by the *duc* de Vendôme, who was actually a better general than him in some respects. The Spanish found it impossible to make good their losses, despite naval aid from England, but the general pressure of their efforts caused the French to retrench.

Italy was quiet. Negotiations with Duke Victor were reaching the tipping point. When the French agreed to hand over their outpost of Casale after a mock siege, Savoy's allegiance was gained and it would only be a matter of time before the Duke signed a separate peace, ruining the Coalition.

At sea, the English repeated their tactic of sending naval forces to the Mediterranean. It was a relatively cheap way to boost Spanish morale, although it was really intended to gain recognition from the Italian States for the Prince of Orange's claims to the English throne. They also continued to attack French ports along the Channel coast, including Gravelines, Dunkirk, and Calais. The French, no longer able to maintain a battle fleet, came to the conclusion they did not really need one. They had enough land forces to repel any coastal descent, their colonies were not vital to the General Economy, and commerce raiding earned income for the Exchequer.

Diplomacy

The war had dragged on long enough, but both sides still hoped the other would concede first. All reports out of France spoke of abject misery among the common people, and a tottering economy. King Louis was forced to introduce a Capitation, a head tax, which yielded 30 million livres.

[If any of those old kings, or their subjects, could be present today, when taxes rake in anything from 20-80% of everyone's income, they would lock themselves in a panic room. Such a thing would have meant instant revolution and a hecatomb of tax collectors and their masters. War is the sole justification for an income tax.]

It was clear there would be no French offensives this year. But the Allies were only lagging in misery; King Louis believed if he could just hold on, the Coalition would come apart at the seams. Tellingly, when official negotiations between France and Holland resumed in June of this year, the Dutchman Dijveldt, a hardliner, was given a 'moderate' assistant, Jacob Boreel, Burgomaster of Amsterdam. The French were at last talking William's language; they agreed to recognise him as King of England, Scotland, and Ireland, just as soon as peace was concluded (but not before). They were also prepared to make a separate peace with Holland and England – the Maritime Powers – on the understanding that William and his henchmen would attempt to persuade the other members of the Coalition to come in on a general peace treaty. This meant William need not break faith with the alliance he had created, since if he failed to persuade his partners he would be at liberty to resume the war.

But then, Callières, the French envoy, was undercut, deliberately, by his own boss. While he was making all these wonderful offers, a pair of bishops made speeches in praise of James II and his queen, for which they were not punished. Part of a dispatch in which Louis revealed he was still abetting James II was leaked to the enemy.

Also, when on September 5 *maréchal* Boufflers surrendered Namur to the besieging army, he did so to the Elector of Bavaria, Governor General of the Spanish Netherlands and a potential future French ally, rather than to William. Admittedly, William was not actually at the siege, being with the covering army, but... Either William was a King in French eyes or he was not. A military solution was still an option, for both sides. And so, the war would drag on.

King Louis' sabotaging of Callières' negotiations was not as stupid as it might appear. That leak was deliberate. Other information was also leaked, most especially the existence of bilateral negotiations with the Dutch, to Duke Victor down in Piedmont. Duke Victor, already wavering, became convinced William was arranging a separate peace. Very soon, he would give 'king' William cause to regret such an action.

(The French could be too clever for their own good, but sometimes the implacable logic in their diplomatic dances is frightening.)

German politics entered what might be termed its 'late war' phase. Clearly, the war was now a contest between Louis XIV and William of Orange. Princes such as Duke Max forgo their early war rhetoric and lined themselves up with whomever was likely to be the most useful in the two looming succession crises: that of Spain and that of Poland. Or, they played the old game of holding out for more Imperial concessions. Louis of Baden's correspondence indicates the Hanoverian Elevation still rankled. Baden had been one of those opposed to it and now argued the Hanoverians should pay a higher admission price, supplying 24,000 men to the war effort. Partly, this was to compensate for the loss of the Saxons.

The Saxons were done. Emperor Leopold this year called a major levy of troops to fight the Turks. The Duke contributed about half his army to this cause and kept the remainder at home, where his policies of high taxes and forced labour, funding his building projects, his political campaign for the Polish Crown, and his mistresses, was causing major unrest.

The other North German princes ramped up their efforts, but except for a few regiments, sent most of their men to Brabant every year for the rest of the war. Only Münster sent its entire army to serve on the Rhine. This was all politics. The North Germans did not want to subordinate themselves to Imperial authority any more than they had to. They were already contributing contingents to Hungary. Serving King William meant reliable subsidies and securing the friendship of a counterweight to Leopold.

The Rhine Campaign

Thanks to a number of factors — the habitual slowness of the Germans to muster, bad weather, the lingering effects of the famine and the increasing financial crisis, and

general war weariness — no actions are recorded prior to June. Louis of Baden had the gout, so although he retained command, his second, the Markgraf of Brandenburg-Bayreuth, recently promoted to Imperial *Generalleutnant*, would muster the army.

The French had no grand plans for Germany but they did intend to feast on the enemy's side of the Rhine, as usual. Lorges' forces were almost the same as the previous year, 46 battalions, and 135 squadrons. D'Uxelles was on the ground first. He assembled the Foot between Neustadt and Landau, posting the cavalry on both sides of the Gardt River, where it could graze and tune up for the coming campaign. To prevent a repeat of last year's invasion, the area around Hagenbach was fortified and garrisoned. Copper pontoons were manufactured at Strasbourg, with some shipped by wagon to Landau, along with stocks of ammunition, and others floated down the Rhine to Philippsburg.

There was a minor hiccup on 31 May, when a band of 300 *Partisans François* — that is, *German* guerrillas — made a raid on Philippsburg, burning a mixed store of flour, wine, and fodder. The goods were not in the magazines, but laying out on the counterscarp, surrounded only by a palisade. These men were French deserters in the pay of the Germans. The B.H.K. says they attacked on 1 June. Their leader was a partisan named von Forst (possibly the ubiquitous La Forest); on 2 June he was at Heilbronn selling some horses he had stolen from Philippsburg.

The Germans heard of the French activities by 3 June. They must have had a good spy network. Of course, the French were based in Alsace, which had many... not sympathisers exactly, since German Nationalism was a thing of the future... but the Alsatian trade networks led east, not west, so information flowed in that direction. Lorges was supposedly bound for the Bergstat again and might possibly push through the Odenwald into deepest Hesse. Not wanting to experience yet another year of bullying, the population between the Neckar and Enz began fleeing the country.

On 4 June the Germans received a report of 80 French boats passing down the Rhine (this was the pontoons and their escort); there was also a report Lorges was bound for Worms (as indeed he was). Lorges HQ left Landau on 5 June; his cavalry, having marched down the Speyerbach the day before, began crossing the Rhine to Philippsburg. While waiting for the rest of the army there was a skirmish with a German post nearby. The Foot arrived at Petite Holland late on 5 June and began crossing on 6 June. Camp was made between Philippsburg and Waghäusel, 4.5 Km to the northeast. Once the whole army had crossed, the camp was moved to Bruchsal.


Upper Rhine Theatre of War

1695

Scale & Legend

●	Town
◆	Fortification
—	Shore/River
@10 Km	

1. Early June: Lorges crosses Rhine
2. Baden moves into the Eppingen Camp; armies in proximity but no battle
3. Early July: Lorges/Joyeuse retreats to Weisloch area
4. Baden follows & boxes Joyeuse in
5. Hessians join Baden
6. Late July: Joyeuse recrosses Rhine by Mannheim
7. French establish a cordon on the Rhine & forage in Palatinate for the rest of the season
8. Baden spends the summer foraging & improving entrenchments; last foraging by Strasbourg in September



In response, the Germans dispatched 100 hussars and 200 horse to Eppingen with extra supplies, and another 200 hussars to observe the enemy. Bayreuth stopped the work the army had been doing to improve Heilbronn's defences. Desperate for troops, he concentrated the garrisons of Heilbronn, Lauffen, and Wimpfen, enough to form a weak battalion. The grenadiers of the army were combined under the command of Obrist von Reischach of the Durlach regiment. Expresses were also sent to Thüngen at Mainz and to the Landgrave of Hesse.

The German infantry once again mustered at Sontheim by Heilbronn and the cavalry at Vaihingen and Dürrmenz (also on the Enz, 10 Km farther upriver). On 3 June the foot crossed the Neckar and concentrated in front of Heilbronn. The Franconian artillery and FML Prince von Hohenzollern arrived on 5 June. The Imperial artillery had been stored at Heilbronn over the winter, but the Franconian Circle had its own (fairly large) depôt at Frankfurt am Main. This gave Bayreuth enough artillery to work with.

On 6 June the German army, 12,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry, concentrated at Eppingen, its HQ setting up at Stebbach, 4 Km to the rear. The works Baden had erected the previous year were cleaned out and repaired. All the bridges on the Elsenz between Eppingen and Sinsheim were broken down (again). 200 men were installed as a garrison at the latter place (7 June). Baden was not present — he was organising the Imperial troops at Günzburg, on the Danube east of Ulm — but everything was ordered 'in the name of the *Generalleutnants*'.

The French were already making their presence known around Eppingen. A German trumpeter was sent to Lorges' camp to demand the withdrawal of their *salvaguardia*, the 'muscle' who went the rounds demanding money. The nearest French garrisons were at Menzingen and Gochsheim, 50-man posts occupying the local castles, only 10 Km away. They had also occupied Weisloch and Rothenburg toward Heidelberg, and Bretten toward the Enz (with 6 battalions). According to Quincy there were also 4 battalions at the Castle of Ravensberg, near Eppingen, but the B.H.K. does not mention them. Reports on Lorges' numbers were now fluctuating between 30- and 40,000 men.

It was said he was waiting for his heavy guns before making a move. That was good, for the Germans were not ready. The Hessians were supposed to be coming, along with the whole of the Münster contingent, but even some of the local Swabian and Franconian regiments were only now marching. The Palatine troops were at Amorbach, about 70 Km to the northeast, in the Odenwald. Expresses were even sent from the army to Baden, telling him to hurry. On 8 June the General Adjutant was dispatched to personally drag him to the camp.

According to deserters, the French under Lorges direct command numbered 39 battalions, all 16 companies of the Gendarmerie and 15 dragoon regiments, plus 54 guns and 4 mortars. The number of horse regiments was not recorded, but the Germans estimate, which was fairly accurate, came to 40 battalions and 130 squadrons, which means about 90 squadrons of horse or 25-30 regiments. His generals included Joyeuse, d'Uxelles, Villars, Tallard, and the Artillery General La Fresillière. According to some Irish deserters who came to the Germans on 10 June, three whole battalions of their compatriots were in a mutinous state and would like to switch sides, if it could be arranged.

Baden, still troubled by gout, arrived at Eppingen on 10 June after an inspection of Heilbronn's defences. He had been preceded the day before by his General of Cavalry, Castell. The French had not moved, but were spreading their tentacles wide. Their partisans had been seen at Heidelberg, so 260 grenadiers were sent there. But all indications now suggested Lorges would march to Zaisenhausen, 7 Km southwest of the German camp, either to seek battle or to block the enemy while he sent his cavalry to Pforzheim and beyond. Baden passed the word for the Württemberg militia to arm themselves.

But, nothing dramatic occurred. Both armies dug in. It turned out Lorges was, as always, more interested in taking collections than fighting, though the German campaign journal frequently says, 'the French are making ready to advance', or 'Lorges is seeking battle'; being weaker in numbers must have given the Germans the jitters. The French entrenchments are not described, but the German ones are, to some extent. Over a period of several days in mid June, beginning with the Right Wing, positions were built from Streichenberg, just north of Stebbach, north to the valley road between Richen and Berwangen, which means they must have been about 1,500 metres long. The terrain here was and is farmland among low rolling hills, interspersed with woods and cut by shallow streams. The HQ at Stebbach was on one high feature and the entrenchment began on the next one to the north, descending into a belt of woods along the valley floor. 8 battalions held this line and the Kollonitsch Hussars were stationed on the open ground beyond the right flank. Not much information is given about the Left Wing, which utilised works constructed the previous year, but these faced west rather than northwest, and were anchored on their southern end by a dense wood. The position was 3-4,000 metres east of Eppingen itself and on rising ground. Baden placed the whole of the Second Line behind the Left Wing and the Grenadiers as a general reserve beside the HQ. Batteries were of course emplaced as well. The nature of the ground permitted 'grazing fire'. Advance posts were set up in front of the Elsenz at the castles of Ravensburg and Steinsberg, with a signal arrangement in case the French should try to outflank the camp.

[Notice that Ravensburg does not have '4 French battalions'.]

Baden also sent out raiders to harass the enemy. On 11 June 18 hussars attacked the French camp, killing 5 men and stealing 8 horses. A couple of days later the Hussars were given permission to organise their own raids, as often as they liked. Meanwhile, more troops and senior general arrived, day by day.

There was a 'flap' in the German camp on 13 June when the French were reported to be marching on Zaisenhausen, as predicted. *Général* Melac was seen briefly at Pforzheim. The battalion guns were distributed and detachments sent out against the French cavalry screen.

The next day, Baden made a tour of his whole camp, fearing an immanent attack. Expresses were sent to the Palatine troops, still on the road, and to GWM Würtz in the Kinzigthal — in case the French made a subsidiary raid. Additional cannon were sent from Heilbronn (15 June) in the form of 9 twelve-pounders.

The French did have reconnaissance parties close by (Melac was seen examining the approach roads for a couple of days) but in reality they were only monitoring the Germans' activities. They did send strong bodies of cavalry to Pforzheim on a daily basis, but again, only to take collections or to forage.

Throughout June Baden was steadily reinforced, but he was wary and chose not to attack an entrenched enemy. On 17 June he established a forward post of 50 foot and 10 hussars at Castle Sternenfels, 12 Km southwest of the camp, to monitor French activity in that direction. This post, situated at the western end of a high wooded ridge called the Stromberg, which separated Baden's army from the lands by the Enz, had a long view to Pforzheim and Bretten.

The right hand entrenchment was also completed on 17 June. By 18 June Baden had received not only 100 'elite' guards (a sort of personal bodyguard who had served with him in Hungary) but the Elector Palatine's corps, giving him a total of 43 battalions and 83 squadrons, plus 4,000 Pfaltzers. This was not quite parity; the key issue was the disparity in mounted men, 83 squadrons to 135.

The Münster troops, his last major contingent, were only just arriving at the Main River, and from later entries in the campaign journal, appear to have had difficulty telling their left foot from their right. They were still on the Main at the end of the month! The Hessians were once again forced to choose between serving on the Rhine or in Brabant and decided to remain in the north, though they would assist Baden with diversionary moves.

400 of Pálffy's hussars conducted a major raid on 18 June, rounding up 200 livestock near the Rhine. They were pursued by 2,000 French horse but got away. Heilbronn's garrison was increased from 700 men to 1,000.

Though Lorges had been given full discretion, he had also been ordered not to risk a battle. According to Quincy, on 21 June, having decided his forage was running out, he gave orders to move the camp farther south, to Bretten. Interestingly, the Germans predicted this would happen as early as 19 June, based possibly on inside information, but also on the motions of the French scouts and the fact that the enemy already had bread ovens set up at Bretten under a 1,000-man guard.

Thus, on 20 June Baden led 3,000 grenadiers to Sternenfels by way of Neiderhofen, Kleingartach, and Leonbroun (that is, by the back door) and formed a string of posts to act as a tripwire. Sternenfels had its garrison doubled and Baden left 500 hussars in the adjoining forest of the Stromberg overnight, to 'play a prank' on the French.

On 21 June Baden was duly informed the French had struck their tents, but before the day was out it was reported they had erected them again... Quincy says Lorges hesitated and decided to wait the Germans out. There was also the fact that he was still awaiting much of his artillery. Perhaps, his thinking was disordered, for two days later he was struck down with a 'spotted fever' (one is tempted to suggest *German* measles).

Somewhat confused by the change in plans, Baden bided his time. On 22 June, while the army conducted exercises, Baden sent Pálffy and his hussars to Pforzheim, trying to shake the French loose from their camp by cutting off a source of forage. The reason for the 'exercises' was to shake loose a large army of beggars in his camp, among whom he suspected were many French spies.

And, on 23 June the French did indeed move, east rather than south. The French had a garrison of 80 men at the Castle of Menzingen. The camp itself was closer to Gochsheim. Their heavy guns were at Unteröwisheim, 8 Km behind them. The bread ovens were set up at Gochsheim, guarded by Melac with 100 grenadiers and 200 horse.

Lorges camped at Menzingen, halfway between Bruchsal and Eppingen. Did he intend to force a battle? Or, was he trying to push Baden's outliers back to give himself more room? It will never be known, for Lorges was struck down with his fever. There was a brief hiatus while Joyeuse assumed command. Technically, this was a temporary appointment until King Louis could send a replacement, but Joyeuse's command would be approved by the King.

Baden, though now stronger than the French, remained defensive-minded until the end of the month. He went so far as to erect a pair of hornworks beyond the Elsenz at the left end of his camp (starting 23 June). GWM Würtz, in the Kinzigthal, was ordered to move north with his troops and some local militia from Weil der Stadt to Freudenstadt (both towns are on the east side of the

Black Forest), presumably to support him if the French crossed the Enz.

There were reports among the Germans that Lorges had died, but some exchanged prisoners said no, he was just very ill, was under the care of doctors, and that his wife had been sent for — but not a priest. The Pastor of Hördt, whom the French had imprisoned as a suspected spy, was returned (25 June) and told Baden the French were low on resources and would soon have to recross the Rhine. The overwatch position at Sternenfels reported the French were packing up at Bretten (26 June). To prod the French along, Baden wrote to Thüngen at Mainz, to have him persuade the Landgrave of Hesse to make diversionary crossing.

[The Bridge Master had been collecting boats for about a month now; it is difficult to tell from the B.H.K. whether he was to loan them to the Hessians, or if the Hessians were to send him a bridge after they used it to cross the Rhine.]

On 27 June the German camp received 23 deserters. One of them had the entire French order of battle. A couple of days later the news such men brought in was all about a large detachment that Joyeuse had been asked to send to Flanders. On 29 June German scouts at Pforzheim wrote of 26 copper pontoons being sent down the Rhine from Strasbourg. This would give Joyeuse over 100 such devices — more than he needed.

[The B.H.K.'s entry for 27 June has the curious note that the Germans have been issued Swiss-style halberds for the creation of battlefield shock columns. This must be an idea Türkenlouis borrowed from his time in Hungary.]

The last day of June saw a small skirmish, the first recorded in perhaps two weeks. An enemy party was ambushed in the woods near Pforzheim. The Germans inflicted 35 casualties and captured 15 more.

A few days into July, Baden took the initiative and broke camp. On 1 July he had notice that the Hessians (who had been camped in Brabant for most of June) had crossed the Main, sweeping the Münster troops along with them. Meanwhile, the number of enemy desertions was averaging 30-40 per day and only a close watch by the French provosts was preventing more. Lorges was still indisposed — the latest rumours hinted his life was despaired of — and Joyeuse was apparently still finding his feet.

On 3 July Baden held a conference with *Generalmajor* Spiegel, a Hessian officer sent to liaise with him. It was decided they would throw a bridge over the Neckar at Neckargemünd, 9 Km upstream from Heidelberg, and that Baden would march against the French, with the Hessians and the troops from Münster joining him as they could. The next day the Bridge Master was packed off to Wimpfen to collect the bridge and float it down the river, while 200 men were sent with Spiegel to Neckargemünd. He then sent his Quartermaster to scout the land between Gochsheim, Zaisenhausen and Sickingen, a small

triangle immediately south of the French camp, known as the Heights of Gochsheim.

Things continued to go the Germans' way when on 4 July Joyeuse was forced to send Tallard with 22 squadrons and 4 companies of grenadiers back across the Rhine in response to a rumour that some Hessians and hussars were crossing the Rhine at Oppenheim, a day's march south of the Main. (Neither French nor German accounts explain why the Hessians did not simply cross at Mainz, which they already held, but there would have been a good reason.)

Otherwise, the French seemed to be standing pat. the same day they conducted a large foraging, with 10-12 troops of cavalry at Gochsheim to cover it. The foraging may have been initiated to strip the land in front of Baden's expected advance. The advance was expected, but not so soon.

Jean-Armand de Joyeuse, Marquis de Grandpré

Very little is recorded about this man. Born 1631, died 1710. Fought his first battle in 1648, age 17. Made a *maréchal de France* in 1693. It is often repeated he retired from field service after being wounded at Neerwinden that year. Quite obviously, this is false. Joyeuse appears to have been a capable commander, at least in a subordinate role — he led the Left Wing at Neerwinden. Like so many of his contemporaries he served under Turenne. There is a story that while on campaign in 1655 he was leading a convoy to Turenne's army but stopped in Arras to dally with a woman, while the convoy continued on and was attacked in his absence. It survived, but this was dereliction of duty. Joyeuse was a good soldier, so rather than make the truth public, Turenne pretended he had been executing a secret commission for him; hearing of this, Joyeuse presented himself as an abject penitent and got off with a warning.

Change of Scene

Baden also ordered a two-day foraging, a sort of competition for resources with the French. The covering parties were to set out in the evening when the picquet line was relieved. But this was a cover story. The forage guard was in reality an advance guard of 500 men and 50 carpenters who had orders to make hasty bridges over the various streams on the way to Gochsheim. At midnight, the whole army would break camp and march silently to Gochsheim. Except that the Guards trumpeters insisted on playing their usual marching note. The Gensd'armes (a 'chosen band' of cavalry, several squadrons strong, that Baden had created to match the French ones) and massed Grenadiers with 6 cannon were the Van. The Right and Left Wings would march in parallel, the Right swinging around and passing Eppingen on its left and the village of Elsenz on its right, ending up in front of French-held Menzingen with Zaisenhausen on its left. The Left would keep Eppingen on its right, moving

through the old entrenchments of the previous year on the road to Sulzfeld, halting with Zaisenhausen on its right.

The object was to surprise the French and seize the Heights of Gochsheim, which overlook the valley of the Kraich. This river, which flows from southeast to northwest, was the route armies took to get up onto the plateau; Unteröwisheim, and Ubstadt, are at the exit of the defile. While Baden's Left held Joyeuse in place, his Right would advance farther and seize the bridges at those two locations, forcing the French to dump their baggage and head due west to Heidelberg and Bruchsal. The nature of the ground being so broken with defiles they would be in total disorder.

Unfortunately, Joyeuse was already in motion. He may have had advance warning, or he may have been executing his own plans without reference to the Germans. The evacuation of Bretten on 26 June was the first phase. It was covered by the troops at Gochsheim, who, after the foraging was complete, also fell back into the camp. Joyeuse had established small garrisons at Eichersheim, Angelbach and Rothenburg, all places on the road between Eppingen to Weisloch; he was headed north. The Germans knew of these posts, which may be why Baden decided to act precipitously.

While Baden was finalizing plans for his surprise attack, Joyeuse pulled out completely, except for a reduced garrison at Menzingen (35 men), which had to surrender later, and marched 30 Km north to Walldorf. Baden followed but could gain no advantage; the French, operating with 'Germanic' clockwork precision, remained one step ahead. Even the hussars, of whom Baden sent out 300 to harass the rearguard, were unable to effect anything.

Baden ordered a camp erected on the Heights of Gochsheim, but on 6 July made reconnaissance of Unteröwisheim, and Ubstadt. At least the French had not broken the bridges. 300 hussars were sent to Steffeld, the next village up the main road toward Heidelberg. They reported seeing 3-5 troops of enemy cavalry in the distance; the next lot of bridges were also intact. Baden decided it was worth pursuing.

Joyeuse was already in his encampment. The forces spotted by his hussars were part of a screen for foragers. There were about 1,500 cavalry in all. 5 troops were stationed between Langenbrücken and Mingolsheim, the next village along the road.

While most of the German army was brought to Ubstadt between 2- and 6pm, the senior cavalry general, Karl von Württemberg, marched across country straight to Steffeld. He also sent word to the Landgrave of Hesse, now believed to be at Neckarsgemünd, to come down the left bank of the river to Altweisloch. This would put pressure on the French and keep them from crossing the Neckar.

There was a sizeable body of the enemy, probably foragers, who had retreated into the churchyard at Mingolsheim. They were still covered by the 5 troop of cavalry. Baden ordered his hussars to wait until his own advance guard was close by, and then to attack vigorously. This was done and the foragers, about 500 men, were evicted from the churchyard. As night fell Baden arranged his defences: a battalion of grenadiers in the Mingolsheim churchyard and the rest of the grenadiers drawn up along the Kraich, with a strongpoint at Kronau just south of the river, where there was a roadside chapel. 12 battalions were held in reserve. The rest of the army remained under arms all night. The bridges over the Kraich were either broken down or taken up by the Germans. No reason is given for this.

7 July Baden arranged his camp. Detached garrisons were left at Ubstadt and sent to Bruchsal. With the dawn, the protagonists were both surprised at how close their camps were, a mere 6,000 metres or so. The camps themselves were longer than that. The French were between Weisloch and St. Leon-Rot with HQ at Walldorf, the Germans about Mingolsheim. The HQs could see each other's army in full detail, but both Joyeuse and Baden felt there were so many defiles and woods between them that an attack was not practicable. Joyeuse occupied the defiles approaching his camp anyway.

Meanwhile, *Graf Lippe*, commanding the Hessians, arrived at Sinsheim. He seems not to have heeded Württemberg's advice about marching down the Neckar. The garrisons about Sinsheim, except for 100 men, were recalled to the main army. Baden was also expecting the Bavarians, who were still 2 marches away. They were ordered to join Lippe, who was to camp at Altweisloch, on the French left flank. In the night, 100 men were posted at Malschberg, halfway between Baden's position and Altweisloch. From Malschberg one apparently had a panoramic view of both armies.

The French made an attempt to roust the Germans out of Kronau but were unsuccessful.

All this time, the dreadfully ill Lorges was still with the army. Now he was evacuated to Philippsburg. The same day FML Baron Zandt and GWM Pálffy arrived from Vienna. They deserve mention only to point out that Baden's army was far from complete, despite what the order of battle said.

Joyeuse was unable to supply his army from Philippsburg, so he had the ship bridge there floated down to Ketsch, 10 Km to the northwest of his HQ. In those days the Rhine made a series of loops just above Mannheim and Ketsch, a mere hamlet, was on the riverbank. 2 bridges were built there.

The French spent 8 July erecting their bridges. Baden ordered his own bridge train brought overland to his position. He intended to build 7 small bridges over the

various obstacles in his path, so ordered a store of wooden planks to be cut and laid away at Steffeld. Lippe sent word he would be in position that evening, with 23 battalions and 31 squadrons. In Baden's rear, the garrison of Gochsheim was ordered to occupy the nearby Castle of Altenburg by force.

In the afternoon, Baden sent out his Quartermaster with a 50-man escort to see if a path could be found around the French Left. On this side there was (and is) a thick belt of forest, laced with streams, stretching between the French camp and Philippsburg, almost to the Rhine. Setting out from Steffeld, the Quartermaster was to probe into the woods in a northwesterly direction, to the left of Kronau, and find the forest path which would bring him out at St. Lehnen (now a component of St. Leon-Rot but in those days a separate community on the left bank of the Kraich. Its sister hamlet, Roodt or Rot was behind the righthand end of the French camp. The Quartermaster found this route impossible. To avoid detection they would have to hack their way through the densest parts of the forest, and even then, the French had picquets along the Kraich.

However, Baden did decide to send detachments into the forest after dark to harass the French picquets, both at St. Lehnen and Philippsburg. He also sent out the hussars that night to drive in the enemy picquet line in front of him. As a result the French spent the whole night under arms. Joyeuse also adjusted his lines the next morning, pulling his Left back to St. Lehnen. His men could be seen digging in and constructing abatis across the various defiles. From a deserter it was learned Joyeuse was keeping one cavalryman in ten ready for instant service.

The Germans spent 9 July, a Saturday, in camp while Baden had the Orders of the Day read out. Entrenching work was started, linking Kronau and Mingolsheim. About the Kraich were marshy water meadows, which had to be covered with corduroy roads.

3 signal guns were fired as the Hessians hove into view, to attract their attention. Unfortunately the noise also drew the attention of the French. Much dust was seen in the French camp and soon a strong detachment was skirmishing with the Hessian van. Details are sketchy but apparently the Hessians altered their line of march when they heard the guns and inadvertently started a flank march across the French Left. The French came off best in the affair.

Baden, however, was winning the overall struggle. Every night he sent parties to harass the French, causing them to remain on alert and wear out their horses. Lippe, whose corps formed its own camp, also joined in the fun. The French got a boost when Tallard and his 1,000 horse returned, sometime on 10 or 11 July. But their forage was growing short.

On 10 July there was a rumour the Germans intended to attack the French bridges, causing the French to muster for battle. Ironically, the rumour turned out to be true,

when later that night GWM Bibra took 1,000 men to attack the French rear. Simultaneously, Pálffy was sent with 1,000 horse and 200 hussars to attack Waghäusel. The two parties probably set out in the same direction (west) together. Bibra hooked north and in the early morning assaulted the mill at St. Lehnen with 'strong salvos and many grenades', routing the 200-man garrison. The French lost 8 dead and 3 prisoners, including the post's commander, who voluntarily remained behind. The Germans suffered 3 dead and 1 wounded. Pálffy found Waghäusel, a crossroads whereat there was a pleasure palace of the Bishop of Speyer, abandoned. Apparently the French were not attempting to maintain a direct link with Philippsburg. He managed to scrounge up one mangy prisoner.

Nothing of significance occurred for the next couple of days. Lippe, whose scouts were on the Gänsberg north of the French Right, arranged to fire 5 cannon shots if his men saw the French breaking camp, as they were expected to do any day now — their baggage was moved to the bridges on 11 July. A line of signal fires was already in place 50 paces in front of the German camp. General Thüngen arrived from Mainz to take command of the infantry of the Right. On 13 July French deserters spoke of an immanent departure. This resulted in another probe by the Germans between the French camp and Philippsburg. 2 columns of 100 horse each swam the Rhine to raid the other bank, with orders to either return the same way or ride to Mainz.

D'Uxelles was also sent across the Rhine, with a single regiment of horse and another of dragoons. He washed up at Hagenbach (the Langenkandel camp), picking up 4 battalions and another dragoon regiment on the way, plus a few free companies and a substantial body of armed peasants. This ensured the security of the most important crossing point below Strasbourg. The reason for this care an attention was that Strasbourg was a hot topic among the diplomats and King Louis was adamant it remain in his hands at least until the peace.

15 July: the hussars on the far side of the Rhine intercept the enemy's mail and bring it in; the enemy has somehow managed to do the same to the Germans. No one learns anything vital. Baden sends all his hussars to Lippe's camp, where they will be of more use in a pursuit. Apparently, only one of the French bridges is functional. Perhaps that is why they are still here? But, a party of deserters whom Bibra picked up when he attacked the mill at St. Lehnen say Joyeuse is planning to remain for some days yet.

The French did, however, tighten their lines, moving a bit closer to Ketsch on 17 July. The next day 300 French dragoons had a tussle with 100 hussars. The hussars were now using boats to cross the Rhine on a regular basis. They were also operating along the Neckar, stealing horses from the French. In this particular instance the action took place on the left bank of the

Rhine. On their way back to their ferry the party was jumped by the dragoons, who fired a volley and then charged. The hussars counterattacked, cutting their way through and escaping with 12 dead and 1 wounded, plus 2 horses lost. That night, 400 Germans went to St. Lehnen 'to make noise' and keep the French in a state of alarm.

On July 19 the French sent their baggage over the Rhine. That same day the armies received word of the fall of Casale, in Italy. On the surface this was a disaster for the French. Casale lay deep within enemy territory, on the border of Spanish Milán. Acquired before the war, it was intended as a springboard for offensives into the Spanish Milánese, and it had been a thorn in the Allies' side since war broke out in Italy, in 1690. In reality, Casale marked a French victory. It was the price they paid to have Victor Amadeus of Savoy switch sides.

The stalemate between Baden and Joyeuse ended on 20 July. Having secured his baggage, the French began pulling their army in toward the bridges. The movement was spotted by Lippe. Feldzugmeister Markgraf von Baden-Durlach, the Officer of the Day, did not wait for orders but commanded a quick reconnaissance toward Malsch and Rottemburg; 2 small redoubts made of fascines were discovered and occupied. Behind this scouting force came Durlach himself, leading with his own regiment, with some grenadier battalions on his right. Behind them came the Gensd'armes and horse grenadiers, the rest of the Right Wing, and then the Left Wing. Because the cavalry, mainly on the right, had to hump over the Malschberg the infantry was able to keep pace with them. The army collected its picquets and hussar detachments as it moved forward.

They passed through Weisloch and Waldorff, both abandoned, but halted when they came to Hockenheim. Here, where there was a large plain, the French were drawn up in battle array. Behind them was a wood, and behind that was Ketsch and their bridges.

The hussars and Hessian picquets, numbering about 2-3 troops, attacked unsupported but were easily repulsed, though they did capture the French Major General of Dragoons. The French launched a counterattack but it was halted in turn when the Germans brought up a brigade of 3,000 grenadiers and 4 cannon. Attacking here in either direction was made more difficult by the woods which surrounded Hockenheim. There was open ground to the north, but besides the woods between them and Ketsch, the French had a large wood in front of their right wing. Beyond the village on their right was the Kreich, whose banks were marshy; beyond that were more woods. So, the Germans could not easily coordinate an attack, but the French were also leery of getting entangled in the wood to their front.

By now, Lippe had brought his own corps forward and the Germans arranged themselves in a solid formation, the

Hessians on the right and the Imperials on the left. Because of the woods only infantry was stationed in the first line. The cavalry was kept in the second. The German Left was anchored on St. Lehnen and their Right was against a band of woodland north of Walldorf.

Joyeuse did not wait for the German attack. They were expecting him to try and cross the Rhine at Ketsch, probably tomorrow (21 July) since it was too late to cross today. That would be an exceedingly difficult operation and he would be bound to lose many men. Instead, he ordered the bridges removed and floated down to Mannheim. After the Germans halted and started dressing their lines, he 'bugged out' for that place, falling back in good order and using the various ditches and ruined villages for protection. The B.H.K. says they took up a position along the Hirsch-Graben or Deer Ditch, which probably refers to Mannheim's outer defences, a trench system between the Rhine and Neckar, anchored on Neckarau, about 4 Km from the city center. The French began improving this line. The extra pontoons accumulated at the start of the season were now put to good use. 4 bridges had already been laid — that is, given that there were islands in the river, 2 over one channel and 2 over the other.

Baden's army closed up, occupying the various castles and villages on the way, most of which were abandoned. There were still 3 troops of French at Heidelberg and 16 more in front of Schwetzingen, which was German-occupied. The sources do not say how they managed to maintain their position.

Both armies 'stood to' all night. Baden himself remained in the saddle. His cavalry was on standby while his infantry patrolled the defiles leading to the French position. On 21 July Pálffy was detached with 1,000 horse and both hussar regiments to Neckargemünd, where he crossed into the Bergstat. There were some French raiders to deal with.

During 22 July the two armies remained facing each other. Baden began an orderly advance to the Neckar, sending subordinate generals to Heidelberg, Leiman, and Bruckhausen. Leiman, 6 Km south of Heidelberg, was where he established his camp; Bruckhausen was just a neighbouring hamlet. He gave orders that all the bridges over the Kraich should be torn down. Presumably this was to prevent parties of French from escaping through to Philippsburg; his own army could use the eastern roads, and he intended to approach the enemy from the direction of Heidelberg.

Baden's council of war discussed ways and means. Thanks to the mix of woods and marshy ground, the maximum frontage they could achieve in an attack was only 1,000 paces. Of course, the French had the same problem. However, the question quickly became moot. That night the French passed the Rhine, the artillery first,

and pulled up the pontoons after them. The bridges were sent back to Philippsburg.

After learning from local farmers that the French cavalry crossed only at 9am and that the infantry was still crossing, Baden hoped to attack the rearguard, but his scouts must have reported difficulties in the approach because he failed to do so. Instead he drew his army up between Schwetzingen and the Neckar and brought forward his magazines to Heidelberg.

Also on 23 July there is an entry in the B.H.K. of a small raid conducted by the Germans out of the Black Forest. These men crossed the Rhine, seized some small redoubts, and spread panic. They may have contributed to d'Uxelles' departure, because the entry reports their safe return, probably a day or two before now.

Apart from his immediate predicament, the other reason Joyeuse fell back over the Rhine had little to do with Alsace. He had just been told to send a corps of 15,000 men (12 battalions and 4 regiments of dragoons) to Flanders.

On 25 July the Germans sent a trumpeter to Joyeuse, probably about a prisoner exchange. He found the French HQ at Mundenheim, just across the Rhine, and learned their army was camped between there and Mutterstadt, 9 Km southwest of Mannheim. They would not remain here long. Much weakened, and concerned that the Germans would invade Alsace, Joyeuse summoned the local militia — some *milice* battalions plus 2-3 men taken from each village — and had them man a string of redoubts along the Rhine from Huningue to Philippsburg, augmenting them with regiments of the line. He stripped the left bank of the river bare in the vicinity of Mannheim, then camped with his cavalry (and probably the massed grenadiers) at Frankenthal, 9 Km northwest of that place.

On the German side, Baden did some housekeeping. On 25 July Pálffy was sent to Mainz with 500 of the best mounted 'commanded' dragoons and both hussar regiments to prevent the French from pillaging the Palatinate as they did last year. Thüngen, Governor of Mainz, accompanied him.

26 July GWM Würtz, commander of the Black Forest zone, was ordered back there (he had, apparently reported to Baden in person) with the Sachsen-Eisenach cavalry (2 squadrons) and orders to repair the lines from Rheinfelden to Oppenau. That was a big job. Rheinfelden to Oppenau covers a sector from the Swiss border east of Basel to the latitude of Strasbourg, over 100 Km. These Lines, as mentioned before, had been started during the Thirty Years War and added to during the Dutch War of the 1670s and the present conflict. The last three years of this war would see their extension and development to something approaching a Siegfried Line, including stone redoubts with emplaced cannon.

On 27 July Baden, Bayreuth, and Thüngen held a council of war — actually a Strategic War Council — at Mainz. Graf Lippe commanded the army in their absence. There is no record in the campaign journals of the discussion, only its consequences. Eppingen and Sinsheim were to be built up as permanent winter bases, using local labour.

Mutual Reductions

On 29 July Baden and Bayreuth returned to the army and a corps was dispatched to Flanders the following day. There was a Big Siege on at Namur and Baden was required to send all the Hessian, Brunswick, and Münster troops, plus those of the Upper Rhine Circle. (The latter does not mean the Swabians, but a single 2-battalion regiment raised to fulfil Imperial commitments by the *Oberrheinische Kries*.) Baden was able to retain the services of the Münster troops, including the associated Paderborn regiment, and a battalion from Wolfenbüttel. The others marched overland to Mainz, then rode boats down to the Moselle.

The chronology in the sources is a little strange, opening the question of whether Baden's corps was sent in response to the French transfer of troops, or vice versa, or whether the troop request were made without reference to the enemy at all. The request for French troops appears to have come first, but the Germans actually dispatched their corps before the French. Tallard remained camped at Landau for a few days before marching out of the theatre; on 10 August the Germans heard he was in Lorraine and had been ordered to halt there. However, Quincy says Tallard was shadowing the Landgrave of Hesse at this time, and that the units he employed in that role returned to Joyeuse's command on 16 August. These units numbered 6 regiments of horse, 1 of dragoons, and 500 infantry. It is possible that while he was concentrating the troops needed for Flanders at Landau he sent other regiments to follow the Landgrave. The B.H.K. says the French were ahead of the Germans so that the latter were forced to regulate their march to the enemy's pace until they could clear the Moselle and cut across Jülich and Luxembourg to the Meuse. This does not square with Tallard's supposed presence in Lorraine. It then says that on 19 August the Germans learned 6 more French regiments had been sent to Flanders.

Baden was left with 10 hussar squadrons, 43 dragoon squadrons, 43 cuirassier squadrons, 19 Gensd'arme squadrons (total 115 sqn); 5 ersatz grenadier battalions and 43 line battalions. Of these, 11 battalions and 17 squadrons, including all the hussars, were at Mainz.

Speaking of the hussars, on 29 July a body of at least 500 pursued and attacked a French column as it passed through Leiningen, on the Middle Rhine 25 Km south of Koblenz. They inflicted 30-40 losses, and made repeated attacks for the next two days.

Nothing much happened in the first week of August. The Germans gathered intelligence about the French (and vice versa); the latter were estimated at 20,000 strong and the men they had sent off were still only at Landau. Joyeuse was rebuilding his cavalry, which had suffered under Baden's blockade. The latter made an examination of Mannheim with a view to perhaps, finally, refortifying it properly (August 1 through August 8). The French brought down a couple of block-ships which they sank off the mouth of the Neckar (2 August).

The day before, Karl von Württemberg was made an Imperial General Field Marshal. Since Brandenburg-Bayreuth already was one, he was given first dibs on Infantry or Cavalry, and chose the former; Württemberg, the former General der Kavallerie, continued in his old role with a more exalted title. On 8 August the prince of Saxe-Gotha promoted Colonel Wangenheim to GWM. This is interesting because the prince, an officer in Imperial service, was not a GWM himself until 1697.

The B.H.K.'s entry for 4 August reveals another source of tension on the German side: the Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt wanted the Imperial dragoons and hussars removed from Mainz because they were eating his grass. This issue was not resolved either easily or soon. On 11 August the French chased a party of hussars up to the counterscarp of Mainz, giving Thüngen a reason for retaining the cavalry.

On 6 August there was a rumour the French intended to make a crossing at Fort-Louis. Nothing immediate came of this. The rumour was repeated on 15 August but this time the crossing was to be at Daxlanden.

During the remainder of the month the French ate up all the forage in the neighbourhood, moving, toward the end of the month, to Lambsheim, 5 Km southwest of Frankenthal, where they repeated the process. All the French fortresses along the Rhine issued a decree (8 August) that the locals must report enemy movement on pain of plundering and fire.

15-17 August Baden concentrated at Weisloch and Durlach to conduct foraging operations, camping on the Gänsberg. His HQ was at Rauenburg, his Right on Weisloch, and his Left on Malsch, a frontage of about 5,600 metres. A garrison of 100 men was placed at Ladenburg (11 August) to secure communications over the Neckar. 200 horse were stationed at Schwetzingen. Having made camp, *Generalleutnant* Schwartz, commander of the Münster contingent, was detached with a mix of foot and horse to reinforce Mainz; Joyeuse had sent an observation detachment there under Brigadier Romainville. This left Baden with 45 battalions and 100 squadrons.

At 11am on 16 August the Baden opened a general war council, or *Kriegsrath*, to which all officers of General der Kavallerie rank and higher had to attend. The gist of the meeting was discussion about how some English

subsidies should be distributed; the subsidised troops were the ones sent to Mainz, less a number of regiments that, although paid for by England, were raised under the Imperial regulations. Another 111 years to go before Napoleon dissolves the Holy Roman Empire. Sigh.

The B.H.K.'s entry for 22 August has a report of French cavalry 2 hours from Leiningen, with a picquet line of infantry along the Rhine. Like the entry for 29 July, this seems to refer to forces other than those of Joyeuse's, because Leiningen is on the Middle Rhine. Presumably there was a small corps operating in that sector, just south of the Moselle, possibly with an eye on renewed operations against Rheinfels; these may be the troops who were 'shadowing' the Landgrave.

The opposing armies remained busy with their dinners until 2 September, when Joyeuse, still camped at Lambsheim, sent 12 regiments of horse to Landau, presumably to place them in a location where they could rest. Lorges rejoined the army on 4 September. On his arrival he sent off 3 detachments: to Kreutznach, to some place Quincy calls 'Doversberg', and to the environs of Mainz, with instructions to turn those zones into a desert. Doversberg is probably near Alzey, so that the French troops formed a ring around Mainz. This was in preparation for next year. The largest column marched to Oppenheim, 38 Km to the north. The cavalry left on 4 September, and the infantry the day after. This would put them within a day's march of Mainz. Lorge's own HQ was at Guntersblüm, 6 Km south of Oppenheim.

On 6 September Baden ordered a triple salvo fired for the Allied victory at Namur. Two days later he began preparations for entering winter quarters. 100 horse were sent to Ladenburg but the rest of the army, minus existing garrisons, moved to Bruchsal, where 500 men were put to work repairing the roads and bridges. On 10 September he moved to Durlach, taking quarters at Grötzingen. Command was handed over to the Duke of Württemberg and Baden went off (13 September) to Wildbad in the Black Forest.

Most of the B.H.K.'s entries for this month are one-liners. Baden was taking a cure at Wildbad. The spa was protected by a garrison of 300 grenadiers and 200 fusiliers. On 17 September the Markgraf Durlach took the cure at Pforzheim. FzM Graf d'Autel visited the *Generalleutnant* on 21 September. The holidays ended on 26 September when Baden rejoined the army and initiated winter foraging. The cavalry were ordered to start eating hay as the grass was so bad, and most units were cantoned among the villages.

On 15 September Lorges, having made an inspection of the Rhine posts, sent 4 battalions to Worms, and added 500 foot and 250 dragoons to Fort-Louis. Though the season was winding down, there were German raiding parties in the offing. On 29 September Mainz reported the success of a number of hussar parties.

The French were rumoured to be quitting the field as of 30 September. Deserters said part of the army would go to Lower Alsace and part to Zweibrücken (which was a separate administrative district), but they lingered for a few more days. The rumour may have been started by a general muster Lorges ordered for that day.

Lorges began taking steps to enter Quarters on 3 October. His detachments in the Palatinate could find no more forage as of 9 October, so part of the army was moved to Marksheim while the cavalry rested along the Nahe. On 12 October the Foot was sent under Chamilly to Karlebach, Turkheim (13 October), and Neustadt (14 October). The cavalry moved first to Marksheim, then to Kerweiler, 12 Km from Speyer. Here, Lorges officially ordered his army in to winter quarters.

[Quincy says the French cavalry was under Tallard's command. If so, then he must have returned to the Rhine on 16 August, as detailed above.]

After putting strong garrisons into Sinsheim, Eppingen, and Heilbronn, the Imperials did likewise. The Bavarians headed for home on 10 September. The last big forage on the German side took place in the vicinity of Strasbourg, on 4 October, and raided unopposed into the French Breisgau. A force of 1,200 fusiliers and 300 grenadiers had been stationed at Kuppenheim, across from Fort-Louis, since at least the end of September, but it is not clear if it remained there over the winter.

Overall, 1695 superficially went to the Coalition, though of course they wasted tremendous resources at Namur and Savoy was primed to switch sides. The verdict for the campaign along the Rhine is 'Stalemate', but the French showed more initiative, mainly due to a unified command, and were able to subsist on enemy territory for most of the season.

1696 They Make a Desert...

"Three German soldiers crossed the Rhine..."

That song is OLD. It dates at least to the Thirty Years War, possibly to the Burgundian Wars. It may go back to the days of Ariovistus.

In 1696 there were only two fronts where significant acts took place: on the sea, where an invasion of England by the French fizzled so spectacularly that it has largely been forgotten by history, and in Italy, where the war was put into terminal decline. By comparison, the Rhine was a backwater.

The Wider War

For the Grand Alliance, the Northeast was supposed to be the theatre of decision; France chose to remain on the defensive here. But, William of Orange would barely be able to move his army, let alone fight with it. The collapse of the English economy and its knock-on effect in Holland meant there would be no money to pay the troops.

In Catalonia, *maréchal* Vendôme would command against Gastañaga. Both sides were evenly matched. The French aim was to lay siege to Barcelona, but they would have to wait until next year, when more troops were available.

These would come from Italy. Duke Victor would not only sign a peace deal with the French in 1696, he would switch sides and become titular commander of the French Army of Italy! Military action would be carried on against the Spanish administration in Milán, bringing about the demilitarization of the peninsula. This would release an army apiece for the protagonists, but the Allies would not have the opportunity to use their reinforcements effectively. The French would.

The defence of the French coasts had devolved on the Army. Admirals such as d'Estrées and Tourville commanded land forces around their naval facilities, but other sections of coastline were under the care of senior army personnel. Even the King's brother, the *duc* d'Orléans, was occasionally given such a role, though not this year. The threat was real. In May, an Allied fleet would bombard Calais with 350 shells. To counter the presence of the entire French Navy at Brest (see below), the Allies would assemble 90 sail, which could easily have been used to assist a second amphibious landing at Brest. None took place, but one was threatened, in August. Rather than take on the thousands of French troops entrenched there, the Allies would sail south and bombard the islands off La Rochelle and Rochefort, the coastal town of Les Sables-d'Olonne, and attempt to take Belle Île, off Quiberon Bay. All these places were either French naval anchorages or affiliated with her merchant traffic.

France was now committed to a strategy of commerce raiding. By the start — not the end — of 1696 the Allies had lost more than 4,000 merchant ships to a combination of individual privateers and French naval sorties. The famous commander, Jean Bart, would even raid into the North Sea. France was committed to a strategy of commerce raiding, but she only half-realised the fact. Relying on real war-weariness in England and supposed support for ex-king James II, King Louis was determined to reinstall his brother monarch by force. The subsequent fleet action failed miserably.

Diplomacy

Progress on the diplomatic front was slow. The Dutch put up a good bluff, saying William did not need the Sun King's blessing for his title and that the Grand Alliance would stand or fall as one man. Recognizing the Coalition was in difficulties both diplomatically (with the pending defection of Duke Victor) and economically, the French merely kept the channels open. Only in December would they agree to accord William royal recognition (when it was clear to everyone that James II had no hope left) and agree to Swedish-mediated general peace talks at Rijswijk. By that time, Savoy had switched sides and Italy

had been demilitarized (for the duration of the war, that is).

The most valuable information that the Coalition agent, de Chenailles, was able to provide was that 1696 was to be France's last attempt to win the war. If they failed to make significant gains, then in 1697 they would make peace, regardless of the consequences. Or so it was said.

With regard to the Rhine, Türkenlouis was asked to provide a diversion. The Emperor, wrapped up in his Turkish war, seems to have yielded the initiative in the West to William of Orange and his despised republican Dutch allies. So, the Germans had a paymaster. But, they could not agree on how the money should be allocated. It was especially irritating to have the Saxons demand a piece of the pie when they had no intention of participating.

Apart from these issues, most of Baden's correspondence dealt with ideas for a siege of Strasbourg or a mini-offensive up the Moselle. These were all last minute proposals; the one for the Moselle included a list of possible contingents and their axes of advance, but it was dated 10 June.

[A letter to Louis of Baden, dated 10 June, itemizes the contingents and jumping off points for a Moselle offensive expected to take place in 3-4 days: the Hessians from Litz & Nieuwald; the Lüneburg Foot from Bonn, their cavalry from Cologne; 4,000 Münster troops from Kaiserswerth (the other 2,000 of this contingent being sent to aid Baden with 2,000 more from Saxe-Gotha). It is intended this force will join up with William's army about Aachen or Jülich.]

The correspondence also shows that a number of the smaller states were following the example of the Franconian-Swabian association and trying to form blocs with enough leverage to gain the Emperor's attention and protect themselves from the big boys. The Landgrave of Hesse was suspected of being a party to a secret protocol which would be revealed when he crossed the Rhine. A number of the princes, like Brandenburg and Saxony, were highly desirous of peace. Brandenburg stayed in the fight; Saxony did not — though he did not become a French ally.

Strasbourg never would be besieged. However, Türkenlouis put his finger on the vital point. Even from a purely military view, no matter who controlled it, Strasbourg was more dangerous to Germany than to France, simply because of its geographic situation. The 'gateway' to the Reich only opened one way. Strasbourg always had been a bone of contention between Leopold and Louis, but as the war neared its end the city loomed almost as large as William's Crown in the peace talks.

The Summer Campaign

As elsewhere, France stood on the defensive along the Rhine. It would be enough if they could once again live off German territory, saving the exchequer. The Germans,

defensive-minded as always, dismissed the idea of an offensive once they found out William of Orange could not pin the French in the Northeast, due to lack of funds. The Emperor was uninterested in funding an offensive himself, and only wanted the Imperial Circles to hold the French at bay. It is ironic, therefore that 1696 was the year the Germans made their best effort on the Upper Rhine.

Maréchal Lorges, suffering from the repercussions of his fever, was replaced by *maréchal* Choiseul. (If Quincy has been translated correctly, his wife forbade him to go to the wars!) Joyeuse was commanding in Normandy. French numbers on the Rhine were down, only 37 battalions and 106 squadrons (36,000 men) in the field army, while the Germans mustered 70,000 men. However, the Landgrave of Hesse chose to aid William in Flanders, and took 22,000 men with him. Hesse would spend the campaigning season marching back and forth between the two fronts, accomplishing nothing. When Hesse was sent to Flanders, Choiseul felt obliged to send some reinforcements himself, 2,000 veteran infantry and 4 regiments of dragoons. The B.H.K. gives the German estimate of Choiseul's army: 40 battalions, 112 squadrons, 54 cannon, and 4 mortars.

Prior to the opening of the campaign, the French commander on the ground, Melac, marked out a camp for 10,000 men between Frankenthal and Rehat, and another at Lanteren by Neustadt. At the latter place the peasants were put to work repairing roads. He also dug entrenchments by Mannheim and strengthened the redoubts along the Rhine. Choiseul marshalled his forces at Philippsburg; he himself took command on 14 May, when he arrived at Strasbourg; he proceeded to Philippsburg on 17 May.

His opponent, Louis of Baden, had 48,000 men on paper. The Allies played the propaganda card, publishing a list of their forces in full and stating their intention of taking the offensive. The full tally was:

Franconia & Swabia 24,000; Lüneburg & Holstein 9,000; Münster 7,000; Saxony (counting the various principalities as well as the Electorate) 7,000; Hesse 8,000; Palatinate 5,000; Bavaria (including the Circle troops and the Electorate) 5,000; Imperials 5,000 — Total 70,000. From this, deduct the Landgrave's 22,000 which were never in a position to assist the Rhine army. Also bear in mind that these are projected totals.

The Germans were in the field first, technically at least. A muster was ordered for 1 May. As usual, the Foot went to Heilbronn and the Horse to Dürrmenz. Some troops also rendezvoused at Vaihingen. As in the previous year, Bayreuth supervised things until Baden showed up on 23 May.


Upper Rhine Theatre of War

1696

Scale & Legend

●	Town
◆	Fortress
—	Shore/River
⋯	Entrenched
	@10 Km

1. Late May: Choiseul crosses the Rhine
2. Baden moves into the Eppingen Camp; construction
3. French camp; Choiseul decides not to attack
4. Choiseul recrosses Rhine after failing to lure Baden out; forages in the Palatinate
5. Baden marches to Mainz to link with Hessians
6. Hessians march south; Baden marches on parallel lines
7. Choiseul retreats behind Speyerbach
8. Harcourt shadows Hessians; force marches past them
9. German armies link up
10. French hold the Speyerbach; Germans fail to break line
11. Thüngen tries to cross Rhine at multiple spots, fails



The French army crossed the Rhine on 20 May, initially camping at Waghäusel (the B.H.K. says on Philippsburg's glacis), then moving to Bruchsal (21-23 May). The first objective was to interfere with some new entrenchments Baden had constructed over the winter. There is not much information about these. The Bretten-Eppingen-Sinsheim area had been tramped over and dug up since 1689. The first entrenchments were constructed west of Eppingen.

In future years the Germans camped a few kilometres farther east, on the Elsenz, and the termini at Sinsheim and Eppingen were fortified, particularly the latter. Preexisting castles west of the river were used as outposts. In 1695 the system was extended southwest, to Castle Sternenfels, which overlooked the routes an invader would take when travelling to Pforzheim and the Enz River. These works were known as the Lines of Sinsheim. But a new complex was being developed to the southwest, toward Bretten, with Sternenfels becoming the connecting node. It not only interfered with enemy transit but screened the German cavalry's assembly area at Dürrmenz. This spring, Sternenfels was connected to the valley of the Enz by a new mountain road. Overall, the Lines had a 'chevron' shape, extending southwest and north.

[Général Melac had the opportunity for a close inspection of the incomplete works about Zaisenhausen and was amazed at their scope.]

(The ideal campground on the Gochsheim Heights, south of that village, and the area bounded by Gochsheim, and Menzingen was not incorporated into a more westerly defensive line — though Zaisenhausen was. Entrenching at Eppingen meant an approaching enemy would have to chose from a number of defiles through the numerous clumps of woodland to the west. And, concentrating at Eppingen placed the German army squarely in front of the largest of those defiles, the one bearing the main road to Heilbronn. If the line had been moved west, it would have been among those same defiles, and an enemy could pick and choose which section of the Lines to attack.)

Choiseul, an aggressive commander, did not dally but pushed eastward. He had been given permission to engage in battle if he deemed it opportune. Melac led the advance guard of 2,000 cavalry, which occupied Menzingen and Zaisenhausen, east of Gochsheim, as in the previous year. The main camp was established at Gochsheim, and bound by the Kraich, the village of Sulzfeld, a stream called the Winzingerbach to the north, and the forests around Sternenfels to the south. (About 7 Km broad by 7 Km deep.)

By 24 May Baden's own small army was in position, he was reconnoitring Castle Sternenfels, and 500 hussars were harassing the French; they formed a screen from Diefenbach, 3 Km south of the castle, to Maulbronn, 7 Km southwest of the castle. Baden also had the services of some Haiduks — Hungarian irregulars — whom he

stationed in the woods by the castle. 500 men were posted at Richen on the Elsenz, 4 Km northeast of Eppingen; the bulk of the entrenchments, built over the last two years, were south of this point.

Prisoners taken by the hussars warned of the French intention to attack. Baden also wanted to take the offensive, but was currently the weaker party. There was no thought of stripping troops from either Mainz or the Black Forest, where Thüngen and Würtz continued to command. Ironically, both the French and the Coalition thought the other was on their last legs. Baden's desire was a siege of Philippsburg, with a view to trading it for Strasbourg. To take the fortress, however, Alsace would have to be invaded, so the place could be isolated. A tall order.

Claude de Choiseul-Francières

Claude, *comte* de Choiseul, *marquis* de Francières, *seigneur* d'Yroüerre, was one of the 1693 crop of French marshals. Born in 1632, he was a career soldier, becoming a brigadier in 1667, serving in the Dutch War and the minor affairs of the 1680s, and becoming a *lieutenant général* in 1676. He died in 1711. He served as senior commander on the Upper Rhine from 1696 to 1697. His performance was 'workmanlike' without being spectacular.



[The comte de Choiseul, by Haudebourt-Lescot.]

On 25 May the French sent 20 troops of cavalry to Bretten. The next day they probed Baden's left (it is not clear if the 'far' left at Bretten is meant, or the left of the main encampment; probably the latter). The battalions on that flank manned the trenches. Baden had his men erect 4 new hasty redoubts in front of the main line. Fortunately, the Franconian and Swabian artillery arrived, along with some companies of dragoons and infantry.

Finding the Left too strong, Choiseul decided to try Baden's Right. A general review was held in preparation for the attack, which was to occur at Ittlingen on the Elsenz, 6 Km north of Eppingen. That place and Richen were to be torched. However, before preparations could be completed, Baden got wind of the plans and shifted his men to cover the threatened sector. Richen, the connecting post, was strengthened with 80 more men and Aufsess' Dragoons patrolled the woods just north of Ittlingen. Before the day was out these men were skirmishing with 3 troops of French dragoons in front of Eppingen.

The attack did not come as expected. Instead, Choiseul spent 27 May building roads in his rear. The next day, deserters reported he had crossed the Kraich; he had decided Baden's position was too strong.

That day (28 May) Baden sent out a column of 500 hussars and 300 horse, plus 150 'commanded' Haiduks, to 'play a prank' on the French. The latter were just over the Kraich; Choiseul's HQ was at Münzesheim, on the river halfway between Gochsheim and Oberöwisheim. His Left was anchored on the latter place and his Right on the former. The usual rumour was abroad, that Choiseul had to send 10,000 men to Flanders. On the other hand, Melac and 8,000 cavalry occupied Bretten, so he might be planning to stay a while.

Deserters said the French found the hussars very annoying. They were so bold as to ride right up to the standards marking the regimental tent lines.

Baden ordered his entrenching work halted, temporarily. 2,500 local Württemberg peasants were recruited to hold the line of the Verhack River, a tributary of the Kraich which flows southwest past Zaisenhausen and Castle Sternenfels. This gave him more freedom.

Meanwhile, a partisan leader named Jäger Abraham, an ex-lieutenant in Aufsess' Dragoons, took out a party on his own initiative and beat up a French convoy of 250 horses. His men shot 60 of the escort and took 18 of the horses and 7 laden mules. The French went one better, though. They captured General Thüngen. The governor of Mainz routinely met with Baden and the field army before taking up his post. Sometimes, he even served in the field for a few weeks. This time, he had been sent north on a diplomatic mission to the Landgrave of Hesse, whom Baden wanted to launch a diversion. A party of 15 French partisans got on his track and after stalking him for a couple of days (he was riding in a post-calesche — the

sort of one-horse open carriage modern tourists like to ride in) they swooped in at a defile on the Bergstrasse, just shy of Heppenheim, whisking him away to Philippsburg by way of Mannheim. They did not forget his dispatch box and letters.

According to the unhappy cornet chosen to report the matter to Baden (31 May), a pursuit was started, but too late. A letter from Thüngen himself arrived the next day (just to say he had been captured and not killed). Two days later a peasant who abetted the kidnapping was found and given a summary trial, and the following day 3 spies were found operating on the Bergstrasse and arrested. Thüngen was soon paroled, but interestingly, as he wrote in a letter dated 6 June, he was unable to leave Philippsburg immediately because his capture had been reported to King Louis and now permission had to be given by Versailles. (The this might be an advantage — Louis might order him held, but might instead give him warm regards, or even a pension, one never knew.)

The rumour in the German camp was that Choiseul only intended to remain for a couple of days more, then either move north to Weisloch or south to Durlach. He was still expected to send a corps to Flanders. This seems to have been disinformation put out by the French. All Choiseul was trying to do was lure Baden out of his entrenchments by feigning weakness.

However, the French did change camps on 2 June, moving closer to Bruchsal, having run out of grass for the horses. There was a raid on their pay convoy which involved the hussars tangling with the Rear Guard, but the hussars only took 4 horses.

Baden did not follow Choiseul, who after all was not that far away, but resumed his field work. A new trench was to be dug all the way from Dürrmenz to the Verhack; currently there was only a redoubt somewhere southwest of Sternenfels. The ditch was to be 24 feet wide and 16 feet deep. In a straight line its length would have been 12-13 Km. It would effectively close off more than half of the section of good campaigning country north of the Black Forest between the Enz and the Neckar. Work slowed to a standstill around 9 June due to heavy rains.

Richen was to be turned into a permanent watch post, as was Eppingen; on 10 June the latter's commandant was ordered to round up peasant labourers to clean up the town. It would have a permanent garrison of 1,000 men. It should be noted that one reason Baden was able to make these decisions was that the Swabians were willing to cooperate. They were tired of having the French romp all over the place. Everything west of the Lines could remain a wasteland for the French to scratch out a living on while the natives barricaded themselves behind the Lines.

[These Lines pale into insignificance compared to those being constructed in Flanders.]

Throughout early and mid June Baden continued to receive reinforcements, including quite a few Bavarian regiments, and a couple of battalions from the Black Forest. The 20-year-old Duke of Württemberg arrived (with a very large retinue who were billed as 'staff'), asking to participate as a volunteer. Both he and Prinz Henry von Darmstadt had to be 'pledged' by General Thüngen (4 July).

[Eberhard Louis was not the only 'duke' of Württemberg. Baden's General of Cavalry, Friedrich Karl, is frequently mentioned in these pages. But Friedrich Karl was Duke of Württemberg-Winnental and not in line for the throne; he was Eberhard's uncle. Eberhard's mother had the young man elevated by the Emperor at age 16 (1693), which was against custom. His father had died in 1677, and his uncle was made Regent, but the latter had been captured by the French in 1693, presumably leading the family to try a different arrangement.]

There was some raiding of the camps on both sides, generally ineffective. The hussars found Choiseul had picked a spot where there were too many defiles for them to retreat easily. For their part, the French tried attacking the new trench with 200 grenadiers and lost 25 men, mainly to the hussars and Haiduks.

On 7 June Choiseul moved farther away from the Germans, who ignored his trailing coat. By 11 June he was at the Gänsberg campsite and occupying the churchyards of Hockenheim, Walldorf, and Langenbrücken — the churchyards in this part of the world were securely walled. A bridge had been floated down from Philippsburg to Ketsch. All very much like last year. Only this time he returned to Bruchsal after a decent interval.

On 12 June the Germans erected a bridge at Wimpfen, for the Saxons. Supposedly they were coming. In fact, the only Saxons to serve in the West this year were the Saxe-Gotha contingent and a handful of battalions rented to the Franconians or the Emperor.

On 14 June some of the Württemberg militia, called the *Landessausschuß*, was sent to Heimsheim, a day's march south of the Enz, where there was a good deal of plundering. This seems to have been due to the typical phenomenon of the waning years of a war — marauding bands of deserters and desperate peasants — but the B.H.K. also mentions the hussars, some of whom were based at Lienzingen, 8 Km south of Castle Sternenfels. It seems that, finding the French camp too difficult of access, they were acquiring horses by any means possible, and some times killing to obtain them. This problem was also occurring around Mainz, where General Thüngen arrived after his release (he reported in on 17 June). If this author translated the B.H.K. correctly, there was some discussion of the French and Germans joining forces to wipe out the bandits. The Germans did agree among themselves that in future a passport would be required to conduct raids on the left bank of the Rhine.

[At this point in the journal the B.H.K. mentions some restructuring of the cavalry, which may have taken place earlier. Common practice in many of the German armies had been 3 companies per squadron, with one of the squadrons being Carabiniers. In keeping with the trend which saw the massing of grenadiers into ersatz battalions, or even brigades, gensd'armes units were being created in imitation of the French Carabiniers 'regiment'. Many squadrons now only had a Left and a Right company.]

17 June: Thüngen's notification of his release arrived at Baden's HQ. Thüngen also reported the Hessians had gone to Brabant. The Landgrave was at home but planning to follow his men shortly. Baden fired off a reply asking Thüngen to serve under him in a field capacity and to bring a battalion with him. Thüngen replied the roads were impassible — it had been raining steadily for days. Because of this, Baden ordered his bridge captains to create as many small bridges as possible, to be taken along on the army's travels.

A grand foraging was decreed for tomorrow at Hilsbach and Waldangelloch, west of Ittlingen, supplemented by a raid on the French forage. (Waldangelloch is on the Eppingen-Weisloch road, thus the raid could take place under cover of the general forage.) The raid duly took place on 18 June, using 3 columns of hussars, plus supporting troops, but failed in its main purpose. They did manage to stir the French up, but kicking wasps' nests is never a good idea.

[While constructing his Lines, Baden made several personal reconnaissances around Rauenberg, on the Weisloch-Eppingen Road. On 20 June he decided to garrison more of the castles on that road, which the French had not bothered with, including Rothenburg and Eichtersheim. (The only places Choiseul had troubled to guard were Weisloch and Waldorf, out on the plain, and Heidelberg, on the right flank of his camp at Bruchsal.) This was not to prepare for an advance but to keep French patrols away from his own supply lines coming from the north. The enemy, however, had other things to think about.]

20 June Choiseul sent away 7 cavalry regiments with all their accoutrements. They were to follow the Landgrave of Hesse's corps at the request of the Moselle army commander, *général* d'Harcourt; this was reported to Baden on 22 June. Quite a large Allied corps was assembling on the Middle Rhine. According to the B.H.K. today Baden learned from the governor of Cologne that the Hessians were marching through Weid and Thurm, the Hanoverian and Celle troops were crossing the Rhine at Bonn and Mühlheim, and those of Münster at Kaiserswerth and Wesel. Harcourt feared, not without reason, that a Moselle offensive was planned.

Choiseul remained in his camp by Bruchsal until the end of the month. The Germans received more reinforcements, mostly Bavarians, who were no longer wanted in Italy. When not digging — Baden ordered the woods in front of Ittlingen be isolated to prevent the French using them for cover — the men went through their exercises. Baden's Quartermaster investigated the

Waldorf area (24 June) with a view to finding the perfect place to deny the French the strong position they had held last year. He could not find a suitable site. On 25 June GWM *Graf Friesen* was sent to visit King William, to coordinate strategy. The Lines of Dürrmenz were inspected by Baden and the Duke of Württemberg on 26 June. They were to be manned by 3,000 Württemberg militia.

Baden now felt comfortable about tackling the French. He had heard they had lost 3,000 horses due to lack of training and the wrong feed, that they had so far suffered desertions numbering about 1,000 men (342 cavalry and 668 infantry as of 2 July) and, that Choiseul intended to recross the Rhine. In addition to the large body of militia and the troops on the Middle Rhine and at Mainz, Baden was still flanked by GWM Würtz's Black Forest corps in the south, and a motley group of North German regiments based at Heppenheim in the Bergstat. (The oft-discussed Moselle offensive had once again been shelved, releasing some sorely needed troops.) In all there were about 2,000 men in the north and an unspecified number, mostly militia, in the south.

[The Bergstat corps: Nagel Dragoons (4 sqn), Paderborn Regiment (1 bn), Hattstein Regiment (1 bn), Elverfeldt Regiment (1 bn). Commander: GWM Elverfeldt.]

Thus, on 28 June Baden drew up a plan of attack. The cavalry would fabricate fascines today. Tomorrow, the army would march by Gochsheim to the Kraich, follow it down onto the plain by the right bank, then face south against the French at Ubstadt. Choiseul would be pressed close and forced to drop his artillery to get away. The northern section of the Germans Lines were left with a skeleton crew: 150 men in redoubts from Eppingen north along the Elsenz, 20 men at Rauenburg, and the Haiducks (1 battalion) at Sternenfels. Hussars were posted enmasse at Rothenburg and Dürrmenz/Lomersheim. A plan similar to last year's. And, like last year's plan, it was a day too late.

Choiseul packed up on 28 June, pulling all his garrisons in and decamping by 10pm. The French marched straight for Graben (Graben-Neudorf), 7 Km northwest, and from there to the Rhine (another 8 Km). Their bridges must already have been up because there was no delay in the crossing; they would have been sited in a loop of the river just above Germersheim.

The B.H.K. entry for 29 June includes a complaint that the German troops could have caught the French in 2 marches by heading across country as a single formation, but they were too 'spoiled' to attempt it. Baden pitched his new HQ by Gochsheim. The next day he was forced to send the Imperial cuirassier regiment Commerci away.

On 30 June the French camped at Waldsheim (now Waldsee) 8 Km north of Speyer. This did not bode well for Mainz. However, Choiseul's immediate job was to form yet another detachment for Flanders. German scouts

reported the following dispositions for the French on 3 July: Choiseul at Worms, Chamilly at Oggersheim (opposite Mannheim), Melac at Mundenheim (likewise). Melac had a cavalry corps while Chamilly commanded the infantry, part of which were distributed among Rhine-side redoubts facing Mannheim, as far south as Altrip (6 Km south of the town). Chamilly had specific orders to repair the redoubts along the Rhine.

Choiseul kept the bulk of the cavalry, 2 regiments of foot, and most of the grenadiers. His camp was about 5-6 Km north of Worms, facing the river, with his Left by Ostofen and his Right by HERNsheim (a frontage of 5,500 metres). There was a flying camp toward Heppenheim an der Wiese (7 Km southwest of Worms).

On 1 July Baden ordered the regiments in the Bergstat to concentrate at the mouth of the Neckar, between that river and Sandhoven. The hussars near there (probably Pálffy's) were likewise to concentrate at Schwetzingen and patrol the bank of the Rhine. The next day the Württemberg militia, less 100 men left at Lomersheim on the Enz, were brought forward to Bretten.

On 2 July the Kollonitsch Hussars, supported by some German troops, were sent from Dürrmenz to Bretten to interfere with the French, who were coursing in small groups on the right bank of the Rhine. The hussars were recalled on 5 July; 200 men reinforced Bretten.

4 July GFM Duke Freidrich Karl von Württemberg fell ill and repaired to Kircheim and Tübingen for a rest cure. The next day it was reported that 8 buildings in Heilbronn simultaneously burst into flames; arson was suspected. GWM Elverfeldt, commanding the Bergstat troops, reported some naval activity. French guard ships engaged the Germans with cannonades. Elverfeldt was ordered to hold on to his outposts but to pull back his main force to avoid a surprise assault.

On 7 July the Swabian ambassadors passed through Baden's camp enroute to the Hague Conference. This would prove to be one of the most significant conferences of the war, though it did not lead directly to peace. The members would be seriously upset when Savoy's defection was announced at the end of the season. Just at the moment, though, Victor Amadeus was asking for Imperial aid; and one of the regiments in the Black Forest (Neitschütz's) was ordered to Piedmont. Also this day Baden ordered a large foraging and sent detachments to observe the French.

On the night of 7 July there was a slight panic at Choiseul's HQ, when it was reported that the entire Imperial army had crossed the Rhine at Mainz. Chamilly, headquartered at Frankenthal, was ordered to advance his infantry to within 8 Km of Choiseul. However, the order was rescinded when a patrol of 500 French horse learned that the crossing involved only elements of the Bergstat corps, plus some dragoons and hussars.

8 July the Germans learned Choiseul would be receiving reinforcements. Harcourt had decided to return the 7 regiments of cavalry he requested. They also learned that Choiseul, as is evident from his dispositions, intended to keep a mobile corps of 12,000 men at Worms and spread the rest of his army along the Rhine.

Choiseul was not alone in receiving faulty intelligence. It was reported to Baden that the French, after making a grand forage, were preparing to make several small crossings of the Rhine, presumably to raid. On 11 July Baden shifted his army to Langenbrücken, leaving Bruchsal and Castle Kißloch garrisoned, then camped on the Gänsberg (19 July). On 16 July the French were reported in the Bergstat, parties being seen within half an hour of Neckargemünd, and others close to the Main River near Frankfurt. However, these were either pinprick raids or mere rumours. The *Generalleutnant* cancelled a further move to Weisloch.

The French were detaching troops hither and yon, but only to reinforce their redoubts on the Rhine. Choiseul even divided up his artillery in this manner. The fort opposite Mannheim was a particular concern, since Choiseul thought the enemy would likely cross here. He did also conduct a grand forage, to within 16 Km of Mainz (at Oppenheim), which took place without incident.

Baden continued to receive a dribble of reinforcements, including 1,000 men from Wolfenbüttel, and a newly raised Imperial regiment, the Brandenburg-Bayreuth Dragoons. On the other hand, he had to agree to release the Swabian labourers from duty so they could attend to the harvest (10 July). And, his Haiduks were getting restless. 8 or 9 ran away; a bounty of 2 ducats was placed on each man.

Very little of note occurred on either side for the rest of the month. Neither army was particularly large and both commanders were more interested in improving their fieldworks. Their camps, too, or at least the German one, became more elaborate, with guard posts and outstations. The journal entries for Baden's army record only which general visited what spa and when. Well, there was a little more. Baden decided to reinforce Mainz. *Graf Pálffy* commanded there since Thüngen was in the field. On 23 July the bulk of both hussar regiments were sent to him, to better 'incommode' the French. The Elector Palatine also appeared in the field, at Frankfurt (29 July). He was ordered to hold the Main. Eiverfeldt was sent to Lampertheim am Rhein (28 July), 9 Km southeast of Worms. As is so often the case, in those days Lampertheim was actually on the Rhine, at the base of an oxbow, which made it a prime location for intercepting raiders crossing to either side.

On 29 July GWM *Graf Friesen* arrived back in the German camp and a courier was sent at top speed to Flanders. There are no details in the B.H.K. Based on events in the Low Countries Baden may have been asked

to make a diversion. King William could make no headway; his army was unpaid because the English economy had collapsed. But, Baden also could gain no advantage. Fortunately, neither could the French.

[The envoy's name is given as GWM Count Friesen. This is probably General Friesen, but it may be a different man in English service. Someone similar appears in Italy.]

That same day Pálffy sent out a party of either 100 (the B.H.K.) or 300 (Quincy) hussars from Mainz which crossed swords with 150 French horse. The results were reported to Baden on 1 August. The French initially routed the hussars. However, the hussars rallied and beat the French in turn. The French lost 18 dead and all 3 of their captains; the hussars lost 7 dead, 10 wounded, and 1 horse wounded. A 'few' enemy horses were captured, with their equipage. Quincy says the French lost 70 horses. Baden ordered the remaining hussars under his command, then at Pforzheim, to Mainz.

On 30 July the French built a fort on the Rhine, possibly opposite Schwetzingen (as usual, Quincy's phonetically based spelling is atrocious) and garrisoned it with 200 men.

By now it was clear that the French and Germans had together locked down the Rhine. Baden could make no crossing, even at Mainz, without weakening the Bergstat and inviting French reprisals there, while his army was so secure that Choiseul felt he could not cross the river at all.

The first half of August was very quiet. Out of fodder at last, on 1 August Choiseul broke camp and marched his command back south to Pfeddersheim, 6 Km west of Worms. His lines here were anchored on that place on his Right and at Wachenheim on his Left. His camp was nearly 8 Km long, so the regiments were presumably not arranged in a continuous line. The camp was watered by the Pfrimmbach, which joins the Rhine at Worms. From Quincy's description the army was on the southern side. Remember that Choiseul had with him only the cavalry, a couple of line regiments, and the grenadiers, but d'Uxelles and Chamilly both accompanied Choiseul with their suites. After the camp was set up they returned to Frankenthal and Speyer respectively.

There is no mention of the routine, but one may assume the redoubts along the Rhine continued to be repaired and patrols conducted. The Germans were a little busier. Bayreuth commanded for some days while Baden visited Günstberg, probably to see his wife.

On 1 August the Swabian Circle reported raising 6,000 militia (*landsturm*). 2,000 were sent to the Kinzighal and 4,000 to the Lines of Dürrmenz — mainly for labour, though a few took part in the last campaigns. They were organised into companies and battalions. In both locations the fortifications were extended. At this point the Lines of Dürrmenz consisted of a series of unconnected redoubts, but Baden still wanted a trench, to be anchored

on Sternenfels. General Thüngen was in charge of the Lines.

On 9 August 1,000 men were sent to the Black Forest, so that Neitschütz's regiment could leave for Piedmont. That regiment never did actually leave. Italy was 'demilitarised' before the year was out.

On 16 August Choiseul marched to Dirmstein, 4 Km west of Frankenthal. Chamilly was then at Oggersheim building another redoubt at Altrip, where the passage of the Rhine was fairly easy; cannon were emplaced there. D'Uxelles was ordered to move to Reinzabern and send some battalions to Rheinau, 17 Km northeast of Strasbourg, in the Breisgau.

The Germans Cross the Rhine

25 August the Imperials, now near Weisloch, broke camp and headed for Mainz. At a council of war the day before it had been decided to go on the offensive. First, the army would be split. 23 squadrons and 14 battalions would go to Mainz, whither the Hessians were also bound, there being nothing else to do this summer. The Landgrave had arrived in Brabant and been told almost straight away to turn around and go play on the Moselle. When Baden summoned him, he was happy to oblige. The remainder of Baden's forces, 34 squadrons and 21 battalions, would cover the line of the Rhine, basing out of the old camp at Alt-Weisloch. They would build a string of fortified posts to connect the camp with the Elsenz at Mauer, 12 km northwest of Sinsheim and 5 Km south of Neckargemünd.

Baden, who rejoined his army on 13 August, led the Mainz corps, first to Ladenburg (25 August) where there was no forage, and then to Lampertheim, where there was both forage and Elverfeldt's command (26/27 August). 28 August Baden marched to Gernsheim, 17 Km farther north. Bayreuth, who had gone to a conference with the Elector of Mainz, rejoined the *Generalleutnant* here. On 29 August the army was at Leeheim, 12 Km farther on (in a direct line, a little longer when manoeuvring around a long oxbow of the Rhine) and on 30 August they were in the now decrepit camp of Fort Gustave, across the Rhine from Mainz and south of the Main.

That day Baden learned the Palatine troops (20 squadrons of cavalry) were behind him at Astheim, 6 Km farther up the Rhine, and that the Landgrave of Hesse was near Kreuznach, closely shadowed by Harcourt's Moselle corps.

31 August Baden's army crossed the Main and then the Rhine, camping on the outskirts of Mainz (there were existing bridges over the Main and the Rhine below the Main, but not directly from Fort Gustave over the Rhine). HQ was set up at Bretzenheim. The Landgrave was still at Kreuznach. Once the two parties joined they would outnumber the French by at least a third.

Choiseul immediately withdrew from the vicinity of Mainz, marching from Lambsheim to Oggersheim, to the

Speyerbach, collecting his outposts as he went. His chief magazines were still at Philippsburg. 2 battalions were sent to Landau and 2 more to Strasbourg. He also ordered a bridge erected over the Rhine at Daxlanden, merely as a threat.

Harcourt also did not return to the Moselle but force-marched south to join Choiseul, with 20 battalions and 40 squadrons, bypassing the Hessians. 6 battalions and a dragoon regiment were to be sent to Strasbourg. Harcourt apparently had orders to burn Neustadt, but this may be a mistranslation because it seems more likely Harcourt would *occupy* Neustadt and hold the gap between the Vosges and the Forest of Neustadt while Choiseul held the defile along the Rhine at Speyer. Which is what occurred.

Baden ordered his own bridges broken, both on the Rhine and the Main, and marched south against the French. Actually, 2 of the bridges were kept afloat, waiting to be towed up the Rhine alongside his army. Hesse marched in the direction of Worms to intercept. At Florscheim, 32 Km southeast of Kreuznach, the Landgrave met with Feldmarschall Styrum to coordinate a link up. It was decided the Landgrave would follow Harcourt and Baden would follow Choiseul, until the French made a stand.

[On 2 September Baden issued a general order for officers and volunteers to provide themselves with cuirasses. A perennial issue in all armies of the period. Cuirasses are heavy.]

On 4 September the Hessians were foraging about Marnheim on the Pffrimbach, a day's march west of Florscheim, while the Landgrave waited for a reply from Baden, who was on the Rhine at Nierstein (3 September), 30 Km northeast of him. Personally, the Landgrave wanted the armies to join at Pfeddersheim, The French were not that far off, only two rivers farther south (11-12 Km), at Neuleiningen and Kirchheim, on the Klein Wormesbach. From deserters it was learned the two French corps had also joined forces and were establishing an entrenched line on the Speyerbach, a day's march farther south, as well as a line of posts on the Queich at Landau, yet another day's march away. There were 5 French regiments in Philippsburg and 3 at Landau.

Actually, the French corps were not yet physically joined, but Harcourt had got in front of the Landgrave, so that both French corps were falling back on parallel lines, Harcourt in front of the Landgrave along the edge of the Vosges, and Choiseul along the Rhine in front of Baden. Until 5 September, when Choiseul paused on the Rehbach, the river immediately north of the Neustadt Forest. On that day he marched about 6 Km southeast to the Speyerbach's confluence with the Rhine, and dug in.

Baden reached the Pffrim on 5 September. The next day he crossed the river while the Landgrave's men captured a tower at Kirchheim garrisoned by 22 French (the B.H.K.

says 40). 100 Germans were assigned to garrison Worms.

Where did Choiseul intend to make a stand? If he chose the Queich, he would have a shorter line. If he chose the Speyerbach he would protect Philippsburg and have the benefit of preexisting entrenchments which would necessitate a formal siege rather than a battle. The latter course was confirmed at the German HQ by a report that many supply wagons were being sent to Neustadt.

7 September Baden approached Lambsheim. He left 100 men to guard Frankenthal. His ship bridges were already at Worms. The Landgrave marked time so they could advance in unison. Pálffy was detached with 800 hussars (2 full regiments) to scout the French positions. He found the countryfolk in a panic and much crop burning in evidence. The Landgrave met with Baden about 6 Km from Türckheim (Dürkheim); the latter brought with him 8 battalions from Hesse-Darmstadt and the men of Wolfenbüttel to augment the Hessian corps.

Baden also ordered Thüngen, holding the Lines by Eppingen, to make a general advance toward the Rhine. Thüngen had already made some executive decisions on 5 September, ordering the Heilbronn ship bridge carted overland to the Rhine at a suitable spot above Strasbourg, and ordering GWM Carlin with his own dragoon regiment and 500 commanded men out of the Kinzigthal to make a deep raid across the Rhine. On 8 September Thüngen sent a Colonel Horn to the Kinzigthal with some work parties and ordered a bridgehead of 200 men established by Sandhoven. By the next day these had secured Baden's bridges.

(There was a scarcely creditable report that Choiseul had been seen at Schwetzingen, on the right bank of the Rhine; the Germans discounted the rumour (not recorded in Quincy) but it is barely possible he was checking the conditions for a bridge at Ketsch.)

Siege on the Speyerbach

By the end of 8 September the Landgrave's corps was at Türckheim, only a day's march from Harcourt at Neustadt. Harcourt had a good defensive position. (Refer to the maps on pp.198-200). The gap between the heavily wooded Vosges and the heavily wooded (and swampy) Forest of Neustadt was only 3-4 Km, depending on where one measures from. The Speyerbach was a significant obstacle, indeed remained so well upriver from Neustadt. Neustadt itself was a fortified burg. Sometime in the past the Speyerbach had been engineered so that it passed around the town on all sides, as a wet moat. Below the town it flowed in two streams, one south and one north of the Forest, the latter being known as the Rehbach. Harcourt enlarged on the 'moat' concept by damming the Rehbach somewhere in the woods below the town, turning the meadowlands beside the river into a vast swamp. He also placed picquets in the Forest. About 2,000 metres north of the town the French held Castle

Hart, a solid edifice on the edge of the Vosges which would overlook the right flank of an approaching army. It was held by 200 men under M. de Chardiere. About 3,000 metres north of the town Harcourt had another garrison in the churchyard of the hamlet of Mußbach, acting as a 'speed bump'. That position was palisaded.

On 9 September Hesse and Baden joined forces, forming a solid line between Türckheim (which they found burnt) and Lambsheim. The next day they arrived in front of Harcourt's positions. This last march had not been easy. The 'boutaselle' had been blown at dawn (5:17 am) but the army did not arrive until 4pm. The lower slopes of the Vosges, facing the rising sun, were perfect for vineyards. By the time they arrived Harcourt had ordered the distribution of his battalion guns and ammunition. He had post riders and 4 signal guns at Mußbach, but the garrison at Hart Castle could see the enemy from a long way off anyway.

When the German army arrived it took up a position with the hamlet of Aßclock (Haselock) on its Left and the hills on its Right. They quickly cleared the French out of Mußbach (there is no record of a fight) and occupied the churchyard with 100 men. The army then closed up to the Speyerbach. According to Quincy, Neustadt lay in front of Harcourt's line, which indicates his army was behind the main branch of the Speyerbach and Baden's would therefore be behind the Rehbach, putting the armies about 1,000-1,500 metres apart. Castle Hart, still in French hands, would thus be on the German right flank. Very annoying.


The German army had been reorganised at Türckheim so that Baden commanded the Right and the Landgrave the Left. The army's frontage was about 8,000 metres. The whole of the Landgrave's wing and the Center faced the western point of the Forest and surrounding swamps. Only about 2,500 metres on the Right was clear for an advance, but even here were swamps, and two rivers to cross. The two sides were only half an hour apart, but they might as well have been a day away.

The *Generalleutnant* now went up on the heights on his right to have a look around, covered by the Grenadiers, who occupied the lower slopes in advance of the main army. There were vantage points behind both sides of the rivers where cannon could be emplaced; the French were already at work.

Baden ordered his army to rest for the night in battle array. The men were ordered to send their baggage to the rear. His HQ was in the Second Line, with the Gensd'armes. The Landgrave quartered at Aßclock, Picquets and relays were established along the front and against Hart Castle. The French did likewise. There were some skirmishes during the evening and, after nightfall, between them and the hussars, but nothing significant occurred.

1696 Defence of the Speyerbach





1696 Lines of the Speyerbach (Neustadt Close Up)



Except, perhaps, for the following: a German corporal and 8 hussars raided the French camp. Enroute they encountered *maréchal de camp* d'Asfeld, who was on patrol. The general was wounded and lost mantle, hat, and wig to the hussars. The same thing happened to one of his companions; in addition, 5 servants were captured, with their horses.

Harcourt expected a dawn assault and took appropriate measures during the night, deepening his entrenchments. The Germans thought he had pulled in some of his screen from farther down the river. Baden was not sanguine about an assault. After another reconnaissance from the high ground he ordered a battalion up to start work on a position overlooking the French. The enemy observed this and started a position on their side of the river to match it. They already had 2 batteries on a hill just above the town.

[The B.H.K. calls this hill the Vieberg. Since the guns are unlikely to have been on the Wolfsberg, the hill where Hart Castle was situated, the best bet is the Waldmannsberg, southwest of the town.]

Hart Castle was also to be fired on. The B.H.K.'s text is garbled, but one of the targets, whether the castle or the German parapets, soon exhibited 40 'holes'. Given the context the parapets seem more likely because Baden determined the castle could withstand several days' bombardment and wanted to reserve his fire on it until all his guns were in position. He did order up some small cannon to give cover to the workers in the trenches. Behind his lines a grand forage was conducted. The hussars, tired after harassing the French for several days, were given a rest. Bibra's brigade went into the Forest to have a look around.

Thüngen, meanwhile, was preparing for his diversionary attack. FML Sohier was left with a small observation post at Alt-Weisloch but the rest of Thüngen's corps marched southwest to the Rhine. Unlike some diversions this one could produce significant results, if Choiseul was forced to redeploy enough men to counter a Rhine crossing.

12 September the German guns were first emplaced to fire against Hart Castle and against the enemy lines on the other side of the Speyerbach, with the object of forcing them to move farther back. However, only a few ranging and nuisance shots were actually fired. The French were more lavish with their ammunition and Baden offered a pay bonus to his workmen. The B.H.K. describes, not in much detail, the taking of an old castle on the German flank. This is not Hart Castle, because that place already had a French garrison, whereas there was a race to take this one. The French won the race and garrisoned it with 100 men, but the Germans routed them out with an equal number — 50 grenadiers and 50 musketeers — placing a garrison of 200 men in it. The old maps show a number of manor houses, none of which seem to be in the right place.

13 September the Germans began to fire in earnest and the French replied in kind. The former had a height advantage and, according to deserters, at least 2 French regiments were displaced. The French only succeeded in killing 2 men and wounding 1.

Baden, having rested his hussars, released them on the enemy again. To each of the regiments he assigned 200 '*wolberittene*' or volunteer riders. Pálffy was to lead them against Metz (150 Km away, WSW) and generally cause mayhem among the Vosges, taking contributions where he could. Some men also remained behind and this night raided behind the French camp, taking 18 horses. The next night they repeated the raid and took 12 horses.

Pálffy was followed by a French detachment composed of 11 men from each regiment (presumably only cavalry, since it totalled 800 men). He found the passes too well guarded and the locals too spry in removing their moveable wealth, so he was forced, in mid October, to recross the Rhine.

Most of the German cavalry was reserved for a hoped-for breakout; the artillerymen were constructing bridges and corduroy roads to throw over the Speyerbach. to aid with the planned assault, Baden sent orders to Thüngen to cross the Rhine by Philippsburg as a diversion.

At Speyer, Choiseul brought over 6 large cannon from Philippsburg, giving his Lines a total of 101 pieces. The *Maréchal* seems to have moved about a lot; on 14 September he was at Neustadt.

The night of 12/13 September, Baden personally led 300 men to attack the French picquets, forcing them back. The B.H.K. says he 'made them flee in all directions'. This allowed the Germans to advance their trenches closer to the French lines.

14 September the Germans unmasked two more batteries, one of 3 pieces to fire on Hart Castle and one of 7 pieces to fire on the town. The general fire along the line drove 5 French regiments from their positions, despite being well dug in, and they relocated farther back in some reserve trenches on the Veihberg. Hart Castle was breached and ordered abandoned, less because of the breach than because the adjustment of the French lines put it too far away. However, Chardiere refused to quit his post, which still contained at least 60 men, so a body of 300 foot, originally assigned as a rearguard to cover the withdrawal of the 5 regiments, was left in position to maintain communications with him. According to a pair of prisoners who were exchanged, the French were annoyed that the Germans had got guns onto the heights.

Baden received an express from Thüngen saying he had passed Bretten and had with him 15 squadrons and 10 battalions; Sohier, with 30 squadrons and 17 battalions, had prepared a similar diversionary crossing opposite the Black Forest, but Thüngen sent him instead to

Sandhoven and took charge of those troops (or at least some of them, the others going to Sandhoven).

After continuing their bombardment all day, on 15 September the Germans examined the breach at Hart Castle, but the wall was still too high, so it received another day's hammering. The French hourly expected an enemy attack, but this did not materialize until 17 September. They themselves reserved their fire. Thüngen's crossing was anticipated. It was thought he would make it between Strasbourg and Fort-Louis, or at Hagenbach-Daxlanden, because 2 German regiments and a host of militia were seen in that area.

Thüngen also sent 3 *halbe-Karthaunen* from Gernsheim to Sandhoven by water, to protect the bridge. 3 more were also shipped, presumably to help his own crossing. Baden sent an express to Heilbronn for more ammunition.

The hussars continued to operate behind the French lines. These were not part of Pálffy's column. They may have had a permanent base in the hills, though. They rode as far south as Landau.

After a pause yesterday, foraging continued on 16 September. A report was received from Pálffy. He was about 5 hours from Sankt Wendel. This place is 70 Km west of Neustadt and about 40 Km from the Saar River — still a long way to go to reach Metz. His column must have ridden north and taken the main pass which goes through Kaiserslautern and Saarbrücken. He was aware the French were on his trail; they would have gone direct from Neustadt by the pass of the Speyer, which emerges onto the main pass just east of Kaiserslautern.

On 17 September the assault on Hart Castle began. The breach was ready the evening before, but darkness fell so the attack was put off. In the morning it was decided to give the place another pasting. After an all-day bombardment, at 6pm 3 signal guns were fired. The assault against the castle was made by 500 men supported by 4 battalions. The garrison made only a slight resistance, escaping out the back via a hole they had created and jumping down a short drop into a neighbouring house, where they were received by 150 of the 300 men guarding their line of communication. Here they made a stand for a while.

The Germans quickly reassembled for a follow-through attack. Bibra led some battalions from the left of the castle, while a separate, uncoordinated group of grenadiers came down the Wolfsberg from higher up on the right. The attackers failed to dislodge the French, who were ensconced in a vineyard and put up a stiff fight. A third attempt was ordered, to 'grind' them. The cavalry got involved this time, as the whole of the first line (of the Right Wing only, presumably), pressed up against 'the village' (that will be Haardt village), a little to the north. The second line occupied the first line's camp.

The 300 covered the retreat of the Hart Castle garrison and then, coming under heavy fire from enemy grenadiers on the heights above them, pulled back behind the cover of a hill. The French only lost 7-8 men in this affair, 3 of them within the castle. One man was taken prisoner. The assault went no further. The Germans had taken the position but lost 200 men. Hart Castle was garrisoned by 300 men commanded by the lieutenant colonel who led the attack; battalions were deployed on either side of the complex in support.

Baden gave orders for everyone else to stay in camp tomorrow. The army received a reinforcement of 4 battalions from Sandhoven. These seem to have been the original security force guarding the bridges; Baden needed men. Elsewhere, it was reported to him that d'Uxelles had led off a column to Strasbourg, consisting of 2 line regiments and the Alsatian militia.

The capture of the castle allowed the Germans to extend their lines into the hills and round the flank of the French position. Therefore, the French refused that flank. Most of the work was done in the night after the attack; there was 'much tumult' in their camp. They were also much plagued by the small force of hussars behind their lines, who were now denying them forage. Deserters, however, spoke of their resolution, saying the French would burn Neustadt if necessary. During 18 September the two sides periodically exchanged cannon fire. The French erected a battery in the town, demolishing some of the buildings.

On the German side nearly the entire army was in the line, only the 4 new battalions being left to hold the camp. Baden ordered his cavalry to spend their nights at 'boots and saddles'.

Throughout 19 September Choiseul was busy working on his fallback line, extending trenches from Landau to Germesheim. Some houses on the outskirts of Neustadt were demolished to create emplacements for cannon. Baden made a staff ride along the ridge overlooking Neustadt and ordered a new battery emplaced there for that evening. He also rescinded an order from last night and allowed foraging to take place. Probably, he had expected a counterattack which did not materialise. The artillery duel continued; the French were forced to relocate another 2 battalions.

On the German side the big question was whether Thüngen could make his crossing successfully. Although the attackers were pressing the French, they lacked the strength to actually break the enemy lines. Could Choiseul afford to pull regiments from his line to block Thüngen? D'Uxelles was thought to have a few spare battalions. There were also indications the French were substituting artillery for manpower. But, there was also the issue of the German supply lines; Sohier at Sandhoven feared an attack out of Philippsburg after sending those 4 battalions away.

20 September the Germans bombarded the Neustadt positions, unmasking the new battery on the ridge. Palisades were set up. On the other side, Choiseul had 3 more entrenchments dug at the most likely place for an enemy attack and ordered d'Uxelles to take a large detachment along the Rhine to check on Thüngen. The latter was collecting material for a bridge at Rhinau and had 14-15,000 men with him.

There are several places named Rhinau or Rheinau. The one meant is about 30 Km above Strasbourg, on the left bank of the Rhine. Thüngen's camp was at Wittenweier, about 4 Km ENE, on the right bank. Just south of the village of Rhinau (actually not much more than a grand redoubt with a few service huts) was Rhinau Island, roughly 10 Km long, north to south, and perhaps 1,200 metres wide at most. It was (and is) heavily wooded. Crossing to the island from the right bank was fairly easy, since the gap was narrow, though the Rhine was high. The trick would be to hack through the woods and then deploy a bridge from there to the left bank — and to get the bridge into position it would have to be floated past the Rhinau Redoubt. D'Uxelles deployed his men on an 8 Km front and secured the redoubt with the Montalet Dragoons.

[On 20 September Baden published a commendation to the Landgrave for his aid in this campaign.]

On the morning of 21 September a German survey party, escorted by a reserve detachment of 100 commanded grenadiers, went over the Speyerbach to Castle Hambach. This was over 2 Km south of the river.

[There is mention of German 'peletons' (picquets) occupying a redoubt called Verhau, which may be an old fort on a hill about 800 metres south of the river. Conversely, this may be a redoubt on the other flank, located just within the Forest.]

The French Left was refused, but not that far back, and most of the French still lined the river. Baden wanted to test the feasibility of a simultaneous attack on their front and rear. Battery positions by Hambach were marked out. It appears these guns were to remain concealed along the wood line until the assault. Later that day palisades were prepared for the hamlet below Hart Castle, and the cavalry were ordered to make fascines.

The French continued to improve their lines. Their guns at last scored a success, seriously 'disarranging' the German battery overlooking the town that evening. 500 commanded men had to be put to work repairing it.

22 September was relatively quiet. Baden's troops continued to prepare for the assault and everyone was on heightened alert. Foraging was allowed, but only grass for the horses, and all were to be back in camp by evening. The hussars continued to annoy the French.

It was on this day that, unknown to Baden, Thüngen's corps first approached the bank of the Rhine. They were received by the fire from 10 French cannon in the Rhinau

Redoubt. Failing to erect their own battery, they pulled back and tried another spot that offered weaker resistance. This appears to have been closer to their camp, on a direct line between it and Rhinau, where there were 3 substantial islands. There was a redoubt here, too, located on a promontory below Rhinau, but it was older and had less cannon. It was garrisoned by the Bressé regiment and the Galiottes. (These last were a special corps who operated the flotillas of river craft, many of them armed, which helped secure the Rhine. As a formal regiment they amounted to three companies.)

23 September at Neustadt was a repeat of the day before. A *viertel-carthaunas* was emplaced at the battery overlooking the town. 100 men were detailed to help build the new batteries south of the Speyerbach. Baden sent out a request for more ammunition.

24 September saw the French pull back out of range of the pesky battery above the town. But, they also engaged in an unusually heavy bombardment. Baden arranged for a couple of probing attacks late in the day. One involved 60 foot and 50 hussars crossing the Speyerbach by the Spithal Ford, about 500 metres below the town. The foot would hold the ford for the hussars. 150 men undertook a similar operation above the town.

25 September: a quiet day. The Germans foraged. The French tried to also, hampered by the enemy hussars, who were raking in the horses. The Landgrave went on leave to Frankfurt. So far the French have sent off 2 dragoon regiments, 1 (Gobert's) yesterday to Saarlouis and 1 (La Lande) today to reinforce d'Uxelles. But they had not made the sort of detachment which would indicate Thüngen has crossed the Rhine. Where was he?

On 26 September the hussars were operating around Wissembourg, close to Landau. The Germans were winning the artillery duel at Neustadt, but running low on ammunition. The German cavalry were told off to make 5,000 more fascines. An assault would not be easy, even if the Germans manage to hook around the French Left. Getting a column through the woods to attack south of the river will take much time. Before the day was out Baden learned of the cannonade at Rheinau, but Thüngen had not yet crossed.

27 September saw a heavy exchange of cannon fire over the Rhine all day. Two German cannon were dismounted in the opening salvo. One of d'Uxelles aides had his leg taken off and 2 soldiers nearby were killed. The general, who was on the spot, ordered a reconnaissance of the island Thüngen seemed most interested in. Based on the intelligence gathered and the activity he saw on the other bank, the commander of the patrol, a man named Montbrison, believed the Germans were making ready to put up a bridge. They were collecting boats to use as pontoons.

Montbrison offered to remain on the island and establish a position and was given 50 men each from the two

regiments (Bressé and the Galliottes). They came under heavy fire building breastworks in waist deep water — it was raining heavily. But, their efforts paid off. The Germans gave up on the idea of crossing here. A glance at the old maps shows that Thüngen was at a distinct disadvantage. On this section of the Rhine the right bank was lined with heavy vegetation while the left bank was open. D'Uxelles could easily emplace his guns, and even deploy cavalry against any bridge, while the Germans had no field of fire for their own cannon.

Thüngen detached 3,000 men to try a diversion 55 Km upriver, at Neuenburg, beyond Breisach. D'Uxelles was wise to him and sent the enterprising Montbrison with a detachment from the regiments of Montalet and Conflans. At the spot Thüngen intended to use yet another island was found. The circumstances being similar, Montbrison occupied it and dug in with 100 dragoons, 150 fusiliers, and 200 partisans. D'Uxelles marched with supporting troops (the Imécourt and Gevaudan Horse and Lautrec Dragoons). Additional forces were sent from Breisach, Huningue, and Lanscron, numbering about 3,000 militia and a few regulars to stiffen them. The Germans spent 4 hours trying to take the island then gave up, burned 5 of their boats, and decamped. This was on 30 September.

The *Generalleutnant* as yet knew none of this. He did receive a late dispatch from Thüngen, which told of the occupation of the three islands slightly north of Rhinau Island. At the time dispatch was written the Germans were preparing to cross. Meanwhile, Baden had to rush to Sandhoven, where there were strong indications the garrison of Philippsburg planned to attack his bridge. The Sandrasky Dragoons and his remaining hussars went with him. There was some good news. *Général* Saint Frémont had been sent off with 3 regiments from Neustadt to help d'Uxelles.

Neither chronicler has an entry for 28 September. The German camp is in suspense as they wait for Thüngen's crossing. The conditions in the camps are not much talked about, but in a word, they were miserable. Backed-up swamp water everywhere and a persistent heavy rain. The B.H.K. usually gives the daily take of prisoners and deserters, but there are far fewer entries than normal. Why desert when it was only more of the same?

29 and 30 September saw a heavy cannonade on both sides. The German approaches in front of Neustadt were 'pulverized'. The French had withdrawn their camp more or less out of range of the German guns. The first day a French raiding party out of Ebernburg was discovered by Jongheim's Dragoons as they were foraging and annihilated, with 43 killed and the rest captured. Ebernburg, it will be remembered, was a castle near Kreuznach that the French had held since the start of the war, used as a 'land pirate' base. On 30 September both sides issued decrees to the local civilians: the French began arresting people for supplying the Germans and

threatened to burn their villages, while the Germans said they would burn their villages if they were not supplied.

On 1 October Baden received Thüngen's official report. It was a crushing blow. The Rhine could not be crossed, despite his best efforts.

[Thüngen's movements were as follows: 11 September Altwieloch to Langenbrück; 12 September Bretten, where he ditched his baggage for greater speed and left Sohler to handle things in the rear; 13 September to Birkenfelt; 14 September to Malsch, 15 September to Otterweyher, 16 September to Appenweiher, 17 September to Zaißweiher. Here he had to stay until 20 September waiting for the guns and bridge train. 20 September to Singlingen (Dinglingen); 21 September to Wittenwirher (Wittenweiher) where he planned to erect his bridge using the three islands in the Rhine. Batteries were erected concurrently to provide support for the crossing. However, the enemy were already dug in on the far bank. Both sides cannonaded to good effect [a bit of 'spin' here]; many officer casualties. It proving impossible to cross despite this, he tried elsewhere, pinning the French while sending Carlin with 400 horse and 1,200 foot up to Neuburg. (From a comparison with Quincy this appears to be Neuenburg. 55 Km upriver, and not Neuburg opposite Hagenbach.) But, Carlin found himself opposed by 2,000 men, well dug in, so that he had to return. On 28 September they marched to Ettenheim (about 10 Km east of the river, against the Black Forest) summoned the ship bridge, and moved it by cart into the Kinzigthal. In his letter Thüngen said the foot would be sent to Dürrmenz within 8 days, but if the Rhine dropped its level the cavalry would be sent across to help Baden. Thüngen awaited new orders.]

At this, Baden entirely gave up on the idea of forcing the French lines and ordered a retreat. Some of the lighter artillery was moved on 1 October, the rest, with the baggage the next day. The decision was made easier when he contemplated the morass all around him. Making a reconnaissance nearly 6 Km north he found the state of the roads disturbing. The Swamp had spread in his rear.

The B.H.K.'s entry for 2 October is mostly an appreciation of the situation. In a word, the Germans were stuck. Sources other than Quincy and the B.H.K. indicate Baden made several abortive attacks during the 'siege' yet he was still not in a position to risk trying to break the French lines. The latter were still digging, to the extent of completing a line of support trenches and a third, reserve, trench. Not to mention the strategic fallback position at Wissembourg. The Germans had taken Hart Castle and moved into the valley of the Speyerbach, and could dominate Neustadt by fire, but the French held the slopes on the far bank and everything around them was inundated. Any spot the Germans showed an interest in was either immediately covered by a new enemy battery, or flooded. Thüngen's crossing was really the only hope, and it was a long shot. The French not only held the Speyerbach but had militia and some regulars in a whole series of well constructed redoubts all along the Rhine. Choiseul began the fight with 39 battalions and 111 squadrons; adding Harcourt's corps gave him a total of 59

battalions and 151 squadrons. Baden's combined force only numbered 49 battalions and 114 squadrons.

Extraction

On 2 October, teams using a total of 400 horses were put to work building a corduroy road at Deidesheim, 6 Km north of the Germans. That village, and possibly others, was summoned to provide labour and beasts to haul out the guns and the various small bridges laid about the camp (which would now be needed in the rear). The 4 battalions who seem to have formed a permanent camp guard were back to Sandhoven to secure that most important of bridges. The guns were pulled out of their emplacements, but crossing the morass would require 42 bridges, each 25 paces wide. 30 of these were by Deidesheim. (The land between the German camp and Deidesheim was above the water table, so only muddy from the incessant rain, not flooded.) The work, for which only 800 horses were available, would start tomorrow. Other parties would cut trees in the Forest to be sent to Türkheim, where the light artillery had already become stuck.

3 October the French began a heavy cannonade, but soon stopped. Quincy makes no mention of this and the B.H.K. does not provide a reason. It is possible the French only became aware of the German withdrawal when their batteries did not return fire.

Taking away the 3 *halbe-Karthaunen* with their ammunition required over 400 of the precious horses. Such guns were massive. Sandhoven was too far to go, so Baden ordered the bridge brought up to Worms. Ways had to be cut through the woods and vineyards so that the withdrawal could be made in some semblance of battle order. It was felt this was required because of rumours the French intended to attack the Rearguard. To hopefully stave this off, 50 men were detailed to sneak into the tail end of the Forest down by the Rehbach and make a lot of noise during the night.

The main withdrawal began on the night of 4 October. At 5pm the Feldwacht (ready force) escorted the baggage and 200 men to Deidesheim. This took only an hour. The baggage was formed into a defensive laager. At 1am the last remaining guns were extracted and sent on their way an hour before dawn (about 4:30am). At dawn, 200 hussars and 100 foot stood to. They had orders to retreat into the Forest if need be, otherwise they were to screen the retreat. Regimental baggage was collected at the standards — there was an express order that soldiers not carry personal baggage. There was no 'boutaselle' blown to indicate a march but there was a reveille (Scharwacht) as usual, which gave the signal. At that call the infantry and cavalry were to make ready to march, which they did between 8-9am.

Everything went like clockwork, despite the fact that the corduroy roads had to be constantly extended because the morass kept spreading. 2 of the enemy were shot by

the hussars when they got too close. The French were keen to pursue but could not hope to close quickly enough, thanks to the conditions they themselves helped create. There was some rumour of an attack on the ship bridge that had been thwarted by Thüngen.

The withdrawal was conducted in echelon, the Reserve first, then the Right Wing, under Baden, then each battalion and squadron in turn along the line until the last one on the left. It was done this way because the Forest gave cover on the right. The First Line paused to allow the Reserve and Second Line to clear the camp. Once these crossed the quagmire they waited for the First Line. The French only harassed the Rearguard with 5-6 troops of cavalry, losing a couple of men in a few desultory exchanges of musketry. By the end of the day they had only advanced as far as Mußbach.

The march went by Türkheim where the army rested for 2 hours, then to Lamsheim. This leg of the journey was made through yet another a nasty marsh along the banks of the Türkheimerbach, and one reason for the delay was to allow the work parties — this section was the Landgrave's responsibility — to complete the job. 100 men were left behind as a garrison.

Around 6am on 6 October the Germans hauled themselves out of the muck at Ungstein, just north of Türkheim, and marched along the left bank of the Türkheimerbach to Lamsheim, each corps marching on its own line. Camp was made at Worms; the Landgrave's corps deployed south of the city as far as Bobenheim and Baden's north of the city as far as the Pfrimmbach. By 8pm the ship bridge was secured and the Landgrave's baggage began to cross.

7 October the crossing continued: Landgrave's train, HQ, corps, then Baden's train, HQ, cavalry, infantry. The crossing was completed by 1am on 8 October. Camp on the right bank was made at Lampertheim, about 7 Km southeast of the bridge.

During the night there was alarm when the French were rumoured to have crossed over at Philippsburg. The only troops facing them there were Sohler's small command, now based at Stebbach. Thüngen's men were only now nearing Dürrmenz; next day he would be at Eppingen. Some of the German regiments that had made the crossing were rushed south. But the threat turned out to be only a '*blinden Schrecken*', a ruse by the French, who deployed drummers and trumpeters between Philippsburg and Waghäusel to play the various regimental calls.

Once the Germans were across, the bridge was dispatched to Mainz. Thüngen's two bridges were carted from the Black Forest to Heilbronn. 2 completely new bridges were planned for the Neckar at Ladenburg. Baden and the Landgrave split up. There really were small parties of French trickling across the Rhine and the Landgrave was concerned for his own lands. Also, he

was obligated to send some regiments to Flanders, presumably to winter there. After arranging the distribution of his troops, he left the army for Heidelberg. There, the Prince of Hohenzollern had created additional defenses as an extension of the Lines of Sinsheim.

What of the French? German sources put them at Landau and Strasbourg. Harcourt was heard to be well on his way back to the Moselle, via Kaiserslautern (and thence down the Saar). Hussars arriving at Mainz reported the French still occupied their old camps on the Speyerbach. But, that news was several days old.

Part of Harcourt's corps left on 10 October and the rest on 12 October. He arrived on the Moselle about 23 October. On 13 October, Choiseul, after razing the German lines on the Speyerbach, marched to Bellheim, on the Otter River about 6km west of the Rhine and 12 Km east of Landau. His cavalry was cantoned between that river and the Queich just to the north (interestingly, that would be within a large forest), while his foot was spread along the Rhine and Queich. After some time the troops were sent to proper quarters for the winter.

Immediately after the Rhine crossing Baden took his own troops south across the Neckar (9-11 October), using the 2 new bridges, which were not torn down, but instead reinforced. By that time the Hessians were at Rohrheim, 24 Km north of the Neckar, bound for the Main and beyond. 2 Palatine dragoon regiments were left on the Bergstat side of the Neckar for security. On 12 October the *Generalleutnant* concentrated his forces at Bruchsal, less Thüngen's infantry, which remained in the Lines of Dürrmenz. He had a total of 67 squadrons and 40 battalions.

With French forces of indeterminate size near Fort-Louis and Hagenau, a number of garrisons were posted to watch the Rhine, particularly the hussars, who were sent to Rastatt and Kuppenheim. The rest of the month was spent deciding whose turn it was to host which contingent over the winter. An express was sent to Münster asking for their troops to be kept in the south. The various contingents did not always agree about the quarters they were assigned. Tempers flared and there were armed clashes between the Hessian and Palatinate troops; one fight killed 24 or 25 men. The men of the Palatinate occupied the lands around Frankfurt and began to pillage. However, the situation was at last resolved by the commissioners responsible for assigning quarters.

Various bigwigs (they really were big-wigs in those days) took themselves off: the Duke of Württemberg on 16 October, Bayreuth on 18 October; Baden left to visit his wife at Pforzheim on 15 October (giving as an excuse the need to inspect the Lines of Dürrmenz) but returned the next day. The army formally disbanded on 25 October.

[The B.H.K.'s entry for 24 October mentions the pending publication of a new infantry drill book.]

For a campaign in which the general histories say nothing happened, 1696 was quite eventful. The planned siege of Philippsburg was never very likely, but after the weakening of Choiseul's army there was a chance the Germans could have occupied Alsace, perhaps even maintained themselves there. That would have isolated Philippsburg, making a siege possible in 1697.

What saved Choiseul was Harcourt's forced march past the Landgrave at the beginning of September. This gave the French a slight numerical advantage over Baden's own combined army which multiplied once they dug in. There was no reason for them to counterattack, because their lines were well inside the Palatinate or on the lands of the Bishop of Speyer. Even their fallback position at Landau was on Palatine ground. The spoil collected by Baden's hussars, and the forage gleaned by his troops, all belong to his allies — no wonder the Hessians and Palatinate troops came to blows.

Of course, Coalition grand strategy fell to the ground when Piedmont switched sides, but even that happy event (for the French) might have been scotched if Choiseul had lost a battle. Knowing this, Versailles ordered him to retreat to Landau, where he could support a siege, but he refused. By risking his career he prevented Baden from establishing himself in Alsace, and this contributed to the Italian *volte-face*. Instead of being imprisoned for disobeying orders, Choiseul was fêted at Court.

1697 — ... And Call It Peace

"The success of my arms upon which the benediction of God continues to rain, has not erased from my heart the desire that I have to make a good peace."

Louis XIV, quoted in Lynn, p.232

Strategy, in this last year of the war, was driven by two glaring facts of life, the Treaty of Turin and Succession Politics. Succession politics in this case revolved around the immanent demise of Carlos II of Spain (who 'had a bad turn' the previous summer), and which non-Spanish royal was likely to replace him. This would, of course, be resolved in the next war, the War of the Spanish Succession. For the moment, though, it meant that most of the participants in the current war were interested in coming to terms.

On the purely military side, Italy had been demilitarised. This meant the French could deploy Catinat's army to another theatre. In fact, they distributed it among all three remaining theatres of operation, giving them numerical superiority everywhere. Catinat himself was sent to Flanders. The Allies gained no advantage. Duke Victor of Savoy was on the French side. The Spanish army of Milán was either demobilized or maintaining law and order, and in any case would never have been sent away from home. The only other troops in that theatre, 18 battalions in all, went to the Hungarian or Rhine fronts.


Upper Rhine Theatre of War

1697

Scale & Legend

●	Town
◆	Fortress
—	Shore/River
⋯	Entrenched
⊖	@10 Km

1. Mid June: Choiseul takes the field
2. Harcourt's corps reinforces Choiseul late June
3. Mid June: Baden takes the field
4. End of June: Choiseul & d'Uxelles march south
5. French cross the Rhine
6. Baden marches on Strasbourg (?) or reacts to French
7. Choiseul spends the season screening Strasbourg
8. Baden marches for Mainz in mid August
9. Siege of Ebernburg 27 August - 27 September
10. Choiseul marches to relieve the siege but stops short



They included 6 Huguenot battalions in English pay as well as 4 Brandenburg and 2 Bavarian battalions.

The Wider War

For the final campaign in the Low Countries, 3 French armies would face 1 Allied Army. 144,700 men against 102,400. This gave the French enough of an advantage to take what they wanted by brute force. Finesse was still required for political reasons. It would not do to claim too valuable a prize, lest the Coalition break off the talks. So, the town of Ath was selected as the symbol of ultimate French victory. The place was not essential to either side's defensive system, but the mere act of taking it would demonstrate King William's impotence. This psychological ploy was marred by a failed attempt to bombard Brussels, but that fumble ironically broke the diplomatic deadlock when the opposing military commanders met privately; they were able to convey each master's sincere desire for peace. This in turn enabled William to browbeat his allies into signing the treaty, lest they be abandoned by him.

The greatest French victory of the year, however, occurred in Spain, when *maréchal* Vendôme captured Barcelona on 10 August. In previous years the Royal Navy had made great efforts to support Spain, but William was too close to a settlement to want to prolong the war, and no sails appeared on the horizon, dooming the city after a valiant resistance.

At sea, the *guerre de course* continued. There were two significant operations, one practical and one a feat of arms. In the Med, d'Estrées supported the siege of Barcelona, greatly contributing to its fall. In the New World, the *baron* de Pontis, a privateer, obtained King Louis' permission to raid Cartagena de Indias. The raid involved 7 ships and 1,500 men (plus other troops collected in the West Indies), paid for out of Pontis' own pocket. His aim was to intercept the treasure fleet at its source. The *Flota*, as it was called, was supposed to sail every year, but because there were always problems of one kind or another, this was not actually true, and locating it while in transit was a gamble. Taking it in port was also a gamble, since Cartagena de Indias was well guarded. Nevertheless, Pontis besieged and took the town. His squadron left France on January 9, appeared off the town in April, and obtained Cartagena's surrender on May 14. On June 1 Pontis sailed for home, avoided an English squadron, and by August 29 was back at Brest. His booty amounted to 10,000,000 *livres*.

[This raid was the inspiration for Britain's own attempt to take Cartagena during the War of Jenkins' Ear (1739-1741), which was a fiasco. Lynn says Cartagena was taken on May 2. This may be a mistake in OS/NS dates.]

While describing this raid, Lynn talks about the Nine Years' War in other places of the globe, specifically Asia and North America. In North America it is called King William's War. Here, the English and French used militia

and native war bands to make life unpleasant for one another; the war itself was just an excuse to settle local scores, though the French did employ a few line battalions. Port Royal in Nova Scotia was taken from the French in 1690, but handed back at the Peace. In India, the French fought the Dutch, not the English; the Dutch captured Pondicherry in 1693, and likewise returned it at the Peace. The English East India Company's armies, on the other hand, were twice defeated by the Mughals.

Politics

In 1697, Spain, not Germany, was the prime focus of diplomatic attention. Mostly, this can be put down to the Succession question, but there was also a desire to keep at least some French troops tied down in Catalonia. Every effort was made to keep the Spanish fighting. Knowing that peace was just around the corner, the French put the pressure on by engaging in a pair of final offensives, as noted above. If Savoy had not switched sides, the French would probably have come to terms over the winter. But, they did have the strength to fight one more round. It would be useful to have more bargaining chips, but Louis' main aim was propagandistic.

On the other hand, he could not go too far. The Bourbons had a claim on the Spanish Crown. Spain must be intimidated, but not completely humbled. He had to be sure his armies' actions did not stall the peace offensive, since Carlos II might die at any time and Louis would need those armies to back his succession claims.

[French recognition of William's own dynastic claim was in part an attempt to buy his 'vote' on the Spanish succession.]

As of February 10, 1697, when all the envoys and mediators were finally given accreditation by their respective monarchs, and recognised by the other monarchs as legitimate negotiators, an eight-point baseline was written up (repeated here to give some sense of what the parties were aiming at). The quote is from a source not otherwise used in this Commentary.

'Monsieur de Callieres, having communicated his full power from the French King for this purpose to the Mediatour [*sic*], did declare in the French King his Masters Name, that in order to a General Treaty of Peace, his Most Christian Majesty Consented and Agreed,

1. That the Treaties of *Westphalia* and *Nimoguen* should be the Basis and Foundation of the Treaty to be made with the Allies.
2. To Restore to the Empire the Town of *Strasbourg* in the Condition it was when taken by his Majesty.
3. To Restore to the King of *Spain* the Town of *Luxembourg* in the state 'tis now in.
4. The Towns of *Mons* and *Charloroy* as they are at present.
5. All places in *Catalonia* in the Kings possession which have been taken since the Treaty of *Nimeguen* in the state they were when taken.

6. To the Bishop of *Liege* the Town and Castle of *Dinant* in the state they were at the taking of them.
7. All the Reunions made since the Peace of *Nimeguen*.
8. *Lorraine* according to the Conditions of the said Treaty.'

[*D'Auvergne*, Edward, M.A. *The History of the Campagne in Flanders, for the Year, 1697*. Matt. Wotton. London, 1698. Page 7. *D'Auvergne was an Englishman from the Channel Islands, distantly related to the d'Auvergne serving in the French army who is occasionally mentioned in these pages. The Reunions were those bilateral 'thefts' of territory made by Louis XIV in an attempt to rationalize the French frontiers.*]

Separately, Callieres told Dyckvelt that Louis XIV would recognise William as King of Great Britain, without making any waves. This was not made a ninth point, though, in case the talks were broken off; they kept this particular ball in the French court (pun intended).

There were secondary issues which threatened to derail the talks, such as the Brandenburg contingent's complaint that although their Elector had Personally Declared War on King Louis, he was being lumped in with the rest of the Holy Roman Emperor's flunkies. In the end, however, the German princes found that neither William nor Leopold cared.

Among the correspondence included in the B.H.K.'s campaign journal is the phrase, 'the Empire is the dupe of the Emperor'. The letter writer was complaining not only that the Emperor, as a modern bureaucrat once said, 'had no friends, only interests', but that the Emperor was a blockhead who had isolated himself by playing his own diplomatic game.

Points 1, 2, and 7 of the proposed treaty were the only ones that interested Leopold, and to be frank, the question of the Reunions was something that concerned the Rhineland princes more than himself. It was known that King Louis was willing to bribe his brother, the *duc d'Orléans*, to (literally) give ground on that issue by relinquishing some of the items in his wife's dowry. But Leopold had not taken that bait.

The first point directed the talks toward a rough *status quo antebellum*, which was going to happen in any case. The second point, Strasbourg, was the main reason Leopold authorised Türkenlouis to keep fighting. Coordinating strategy with the upstart King William was not only dangerous because it forced the Emperor to consider the wants of his princes, but appeared to him unnecessary because he could obtain enough leverage on the French for his own needs simply by capturing Philippsburg or occupying Alsace. Türkenlouis had nearly done that last year.

Thus, the Emperor did play his own game. He seems not to have considered that King William would cut him out of the loop. The Imperial princes, using William as a counterweight to Leopold, threw their support for the last campaign behind the former, leaving Türkenlouis with

insufficient manpower to acquire the leverage Leopold wanted for himself.

The following letter, translated from the French (and thus written by a Rhinelander), gives a good sense of the late war atmosphere among the diplomats. It was written by Baron von Leyen zu Saffich to the Elector of Trier on 20 September 1697 (B.H.K. p.304). Since the Elector was both an enemy of France and someone with French connections, it may have been intended for French eyes as well.

...our affairs are in such a bad state... [I warned Vienna]... more than eight months ago, both in writing, and by my [agents], but they did not want to listen to me, and we [wasted time] unnecessarily on trifles both for the choice of place and other things. It disturbs me the most, that, after so much care and expense, and [with] so many allies together, France could not be reduced to the point of equity. I also told the Earl of Aursberg [sic], and made known elsewhere that it was necessary to make Peace before six months [were up], then we would have obtained not only Fort Louis, but Landau, Mount Royal, and other things... I know well the[ir] importance, and I have always [argued for] for the restitution of Strasbourg, and not for the equivalent, I see clearly, that the Imperials, however, only try to put the blame on me... The two parties, that is to say, the Imperials and France have the same intention, one not to return Strasbourg and the other to let the term run, to better take the equivalent. They are in agreement with Spain, and the two parties have been well off, which they had already agreed upon with M. Seyler in Switzerland. The French have never wanted to return Strasbourg, except in the last necessity. Finally, I do not wish to hope that the Imperialists will let the term of tomorrow pass, for then they will lose Strasbourg, and have no equivalent. The French no longer hear any reason, I do not see now, that they will want to increase the equivalent of the least thing; lastly, by our slow and other ways, we are the dupe of this negotiation. There is only one way for our security to remain united together, and to establish the guarantee as well as the affair of the association of the Empire. Kehl Fort must be enlarged to make a good [bridge]head and place of arms. (The Earl of Portland reported to us after this as a secret, that the King and the States would donate a Million for it.) I cannot continue the war alone, you know as well... in what state are the affairs of the court of Vienna, and [how they have abandoned] the Prince of Baden. The Turks are besides [involved with Polish affairs], and the war [in Hungary] continues, we will still have 30,000 more men in arms, who have been in Catalonia. Besides that, I am dealing with my Parliament, and if the urge took them not to supply so much money for the war, what would we do with it?

The reference to an Equivalent is to Louis XIV's various offers for any number of locations he was willing to give Leopold to assure a peace treaty as a substitute for Strasbourg. He had put a time limit on the offers, and it was about to expire.

The mention of Poland brings up the other, often forgotten succession crisis, which distracted the German princes — that of the Kingdom of Poland. Even as the Nine Years' War wound down the French *prince de Conti* traveled by sea to Danzig in a bid to obtain the throne. He had a significant party behind him but ultimately lost out to

Augustus the Strong, Duke of Saxony. It has already been noted how Saxony virtually ignored the war in the West after 1694. Bavaria was also a candidate, but with Duke Max it was just another iron in the fire. Louis of Baden was also a contender (which may explain some of the hostility between him and Saxony). Baden was able to save face in his refusal on the grounds that he was an Imperial general already employed on campaign, with neither the time nor the resources to join the race. As their price the Poles wanted him to fight for them in Silesia, an Imperial province on which the Duke of Brandenburg had designs. Baden was not that stupid.

The Last Gasp

For the campaign of 1697 the B.H.K. is reduced to a summary of fragmentary documentation since no war diary exists. This puts it on a par with Quincy's book.

In general the French pursued their habit of eating German forage while avoiding major engagements. There was a risk of major Imperial forces making an appearance, but in the event these arrived too late to make a difference. The Lines so prevalent in Flanders had mushroomed on the Rhine front too, making manoeuvre more difficult and the engagement of enemy armies in set piece battles even less likely. The commanders were again Choiseul and Baden.

The German concentrations began in early May. Three camps were formed in the 'Eppingen Gap' between the Neckar and the Black Forest. On paper were the following dispositions:

In the Lines of Sinsheim: GdK Graf von Castell and GWMs von Wangenheim, Elverfeldt, and Varennes; 11 battalions of foot (Brandenburg 4, Münster 2, Schnäbellin 2, Bibra Franken 2); 30 squadrons (Wangenheim Dragoons 4, Commercy Cuirassiers 6, Nagel Cuirassiers 4, Wartensleben Cuirassiers 4, Saxe-Gotha Cuirassiers 2, Bayreuth Cuirassiers 5, Pfirdt Dragoons 5).

At Gemmingen (5 Km in the rear of the Lines): FM Thüngen, FMLs Zandt and Bibra, GWMs Stauffenberg and Schönebeck; 24 battalions (Württemberg 2, Neitschütz 2, Huguenot 5, Bavarian 7, Schönebeck 2, Erffa 2, Reventlau 2, Lorraine 2); 46 squadrons (Sohier Dragoons 5, Taaffe Cuirassiers 5, Hannover Cuirassiers 5, Lorraine Cuirassiers 6, La Tour Cuirassiers 5, Sapieha Cuirassiers 6, Montecuccoli Cuirassiers 6, Aufseß Dragoons 4, Kollonitsch Hussars 4), plus 8 battalions of grenadiers and 21 troops of gend'armes.

[The Huguenots should number 6 battalions. Perhaps the regiments (5) were counted instead.]

In the Lines of Dürrmenz: FM Markgraf von Durlach, GWMs Freudenberg and Horn; 11 battalions (Durlach 2, Fürstenberg 2, horn 2, Saxe-Gotha 3 and Herzog Heinrich 2); 21 squadrons (Vaubonne Dragoons 5, Pr. Louis v. Württemberg Cuirassiers 4, Freudenberg

Cuirassiers 4, Stauffenberg Cuirassiers 4, Kaltenthal Dragoons (ex-Carlin) 4).

Expected were the Bavarians, of whom only 4 battalions showed up, the rest going to Flanders, where their Elector, Duke Max functioned as the Spanish Governor General and felt he needed a stronger presence to make his voice heard at the peace table. (Leib-battalion 1, Maffei 1, Haxthausen 2).

Baden's second was Thüngen. His other generals were Bayreuth, Württemberg, Count Styrum, and Taaffe — much of the cavalry in the list above was Imperial. The *Generalleutnant* lobbied for the services of Prinz Eugene, no longer employed in Italy, but was unsuccessful.

In the Black Forest were another 13 battalions and 6 squadrons holding the defiles. When 4,000 not-yet-assembled Bavarians and the Swabian militia are added to the mix the Germans fielded 40,000 men on the Upper and Middle Rhine. French estimates put the numbers at 56,000, but they were probably counting the Hessians and other potentials who never showed.

The *Generalleutnant* was severely restricted in his options. All the German princes north of the Neckar were sending their men to the Low Countries, where the final trial of strength was to take place. Adding insult to injury King William strongly suggested to Baden that he send a corps of 5-6,000 men to cover Koblenz. Oh, and another corps to protect the Bergstat. In exchange, William would allow him to keep the 6 Huguenot battalions that were marching to the Netherlands from Italy. They would remain in English pay, which was a double-edged sword. It is quite likely William was trying in this way to paralyze the Imperial forces, to force the Emperor to follow his lead, rather than the other way around. At least William had the decency to apologise to the *Generalleutnant* in writing, though he also asked for a diversionary attack!

This early muster was born of fear of what the French might do, but on the other side of the Rhine the French began to muster somewhat later. They had no intentions of crossing the river this early in the season. They did create a strong corps on the Moselle and in Luxembourg, but only as a bluff.

No movement occurred until mid-June.

Choiseul was at Lambsheim; on 6 June he moved 6 Km north to Laumershiem. He had with him all the Horse, 6 dragoon regiments, 2 brigades of infantry, and the massed grenadiers. Chamilly and 20 battalions worked on a new set of Lines following the Türkheimerbach from Türkheim to the Rhine by Oggersheim. As the crow flies, this is a distance of 25 Km. At that end of the Lines 6 more battalions occupied the Isle of Oppau, the ruins of Mannheim, and Oggersheim. (The Isle of Oppau was a large tract of land on the left bank between Mannheim, Frankenthal, and Worms, formed by an old branch of the

Rhine; the channel had by now turned into what the old maps call '*marais impracticables*'.)

Harcourt again defended the valley of the Moselle. However, once the German forces on the lower Rhine all went off to Flanders, he marched (10 June) to join Choiseul, his forces moving in 2 corps, one from Luxembourg of 6 battalions and 18 squadrons coming by way of the upper Meuse and the other, under *maréchal de camp* Locmaria from Mont Royal with 10 battalions and 9 squadrons. The latter force arrived on 21 June. Harcourt's new HQ was at Selz, 14 Km southwest of Mainz; he was to watch that place.

14 June Choiseul, lacking fodder, was forced to move. He went to Heppenheim, 4 Km southwest of Worms, where the Eisen River supplied fresh water.

On 16 June Baden ordered his army to prepare for a march to Bruchsal. The next day it camped by Gochsheim. 870 men were left in the Lines, mainly garrisoning the forward posts.

[There is a note in the B.H.K.: the 'English' — the Huguenots — still lack tents.]

The march to Bruchsal began on 18 June. The Markgraf von Bayreuth arrived to take command in Baden's absence. The French also marched this day, Choiseul camping between Worms and Ostoven to the north (a frontage of 8 Km). D'Uxelles was at Speyer, supporting Philippsburg, which was one spot the French thought might be attacked. Told that 4,000 Germans were in the Kinzigthal and might be preparing to cross the Rhine, he sent 2 of his battalions to Seltz, opposite Rastatt, and took the rest (an unspecified number) to Hagenbach. In response to the French moves, German garrisons were arranged along the Rhine opposite them.

21 June 200 of the German Gensd'armes were sent off to escort the *Generalleutnant*, now at Eppingen. He arrived the next day and took command. On 23 June 150 horse were sent back to Eppingen to wait for the Duke of Lorraine, a Very Important Person. This was Leopold the Good, who inherited the title on his father's death in 1690. He was now 17 and appointed by the Emperor to lead the final campaign in the West. Leopold was not inexperienced. In 1694 he served at the Siege of Timisoara. But, of course, Baden remained the real commander.

The same day the *Generalleutnant* held a review and was pleased with the state of the army. The guns of Philippsburg were heard to fire a triple salvo. From deserters it was learned Ath had fallen. King Louis had his final bargaining chip. Locally, it was reported Chamilly was repairing Hart Castle (assisted by a regiment of horse and another of dragoons seconded from Choiseul) and that Harcourt was at Kirm Castle (30 Km east of Kreuznach) with 6 regiments.

Lorraine arrived on 27 June, accompanied by *Graf* Taaffe von Carlinsfort. According to Quincy, Lorraine held the rank of '*maréchal de camp*' or FML but it is possible he means 'field marshal'. In any case, he was in charge and Baden was in command. A Grand Review was held. Quincy says the official troop estimate, 56,000, was on the low side for a change and that the Imperials were really far stronger than the French. The B.H.K. still puts the count in the 40,000s. Baden dispatched his artillery officers to collect siege guns from the various Imperial cities and sent out spies to obtain a copy of the French order of battle.

28 June Choiseul was still in camp. There were rumours that 3 regiments had been recalled from Freiburg im Breisgau, and a weaker rumour, put about by deserters, that Catinat, now in Flanders, was expected with a corps of 20,000 men.

29 June Baden summoned the corps at Mainz. The next day the *Graf* von Nassau-Weilburg arrived at Heidelberg with a small corps (so the Bergstat was not *entirely* unprotected). He covered the construction of a bridge over the Neckar, for the use of the Mainz corps.

That very day Choiseul exhausted his fodder and decided the time had come to concentrate his forces. D'Uxelles and Chamilly were ordered to meet him at Fort-Louis. Choiseul himself arrived there on 1 July — a ride of 95 Km. His army followed, the vanguard under the *marquis* de Renty. Du Bourg was sent on a mission with the Ligondez regiment to collect Chamilly and D'Uxelles. Chamilly was to bring up the infantry from Lampsheim. 10,000 men were left at Neustadt. D'Uxelles, at Speyer, was already on the march with his own foot when he got the order. Choiseul's personal command broke camp on 1 July, reaching Speyer that day. Locmaria and his 10 battalions and 9 squadrons met with Choiseul's force at Speyer. The next day they were at Rheinzabern, and Fort-Louis was reached about 4-5pm on 3 July.

Once More Over the Rhine

After sealing off Philippsburg and Fort-Louis for two days to prevent the leakage of information, on 4 July the French began crossing the Rhine. HQ was made at Niedebihil (Niederbühl), a hamlet on the left bank of the Murg River, midway between Rastatt and Kuppenheim. The Murg was a sluggish river, divided into two and some times three channels, making it an excellent defensive position. The French held a frontage of about 5,000 metres, facing northeast. Kuppenheim was occupied by 300 men. Ratsatt, on the far bank, seems not to have been occupied, except for its cemetery, which was given a garrison of 500 men. On the west was the Rhine, its main branch, dotted with islets, and an old channel which actually flowed into the Murg above the main confluence. Immediately to the east of Kuppenheim the Black Forest begins and Choiseul erected batteries on the slopes overlooking the Kuppenheim Gorge through which the

Murg flows. The greatest danger came from the Black Forest troops using the Gernsbergerthal, of which the Gorge formed the exits, to attack his right flank. Small parties could always climb the wooded ridges that walled the Gernsbergerthal off from Baden-Baden, 7 Km in his rear, but they would have only a nuisance value.

This was a new approach for the French. Hitherto they had avoided Louis of Baden's lands, playing the old game of making his peers jealous and suspicious by favouring him; presumably that no longer mattered. Besides, the lands farther north were played out. It also meant Baden would be forced to succour his people and pull his army out of its defensive complex. But, the overarching reason Choiseul made this move was to protect Strasbourg from any last-minute gambit. Baden was collecting siege equipment; Baden intended to besiege someplace. Philippsburg was valuable, but only to the French. Strasbourg was valuable to both sides. (Freiburg im Breisgau, a sometimes valuable fortress, is never discussed in the sources, but blocking the road to Strasbourg also blocked the road there.)

Initially the Germans thought the French were manoeuvring to block their own planned crossing. It was known they had held a council of war at Worms, and that the same day Chamilly began marching to Speyer with 6 regiments. They learned also that on 2 July 1,000 horse were sent to Fort-Louis. But they do not seem to have realised the whole army was moving. On 3 July they learned the truth. French scouts were on the Murg and their army was preparing to cross.

[The B.H.K. and Quincy are often a day out of sync on their reckoning throughout their text; the B.H.K. says the main crossing took place on 3 July. If the error was in the other direction it could be assumed the B.H.K. was merely giving the day the news was received, but that cannot be the case here.]

Baden dispatched 200 hussars to observe, followed by an advance guard of 300 dragoons and 1,000 foot under Colonel Schnäbellin which marched to Ettlingen, 16 Km northeast of the Murg. Once this force was in place the hussars (Kollonitch's) and some supporting dragoons, all commanded by a Colonel Vaubonne, were sent up the valley of the Albe River (on which Ettlingen sits) to reach the Gernsbergerthal by the back way (a march of something over 20 Km). They did not ride down that valley but crossed it and wended their way through the wooded hills for another 10 Km or more, to a spot behind the French. They observed that the enemy's camp was already very strong.

On 5 July Baden's army marched in 3 columns, his artillery in front, and camped at Ettlingen, on a 5 Km front, with his left at that place and his right on the hamlet of Schreiberhart (Silberstreifen). Nassau-Weilburg, now at Ubstadt, sent him a dragoon regiment, a new regiment from Mainz, and 4 squadrons of Gensd'armes. Nassau retained the rest of his corps against a possible sally from Philippsburg.

6 July Baden closed up to the French, camping at Muggensturm, 5 Km from the Murg. His army faced Kuppenheim, putting it an angle to the French, with his right on Muggensturm and his left toward Ettlingen. This was to take advantage of another river, the Pfiderbach, which covered his entire front and right flank. With 73 battalions and 102 squadrons, he was not much concerned about a sudden French attack. 1,200 more cavalry were sent around the end of the French lines to give the enemy a bigger headache. GWM Würtz, the Black Forest commander, was ordered to come and assist.

[The Pfiderbach entered the Rhine at Daxlanden.]

There was a brief exchange of musketry with some French scouts. The French had cast down all the bridges along the Pfiderbach. Between that river and the Murg the land was mostly marsh. On July 7 Baden had bridges thrown over these obstacles. He also occupied a chapel beyond Muggensturm, that of St. Marguerite, on the road to Kuppenheim. The French erected a bridge of their own at Rheinau, a small hamlet on the branch of the Old Rhine where it joined the Murg. This allowed them to extend their front beyond Rastatt.

The *Generalleutnant* made reconnaissances of the Malschberg in the morning and the Rauenthal in the afternoon. The former was on his left flank above the town of Malsch and the latter in front of him, beyond the Chapel. The reason for this is not explained. During the night, 100 German dragoons rode into Rastatt and occupied the churchyard — apparently the French only manned the post during the day.

At 8am on 8 July there was a stir when the French were seen to be mounted and ready to break camp, but it turned out this was only because they had heard the noise of the dragoons in the night and went on alert. Baden decided to pay a little more attention to his rear and ordered a guard placed at Daxlanden, Mühlburg, and Scheibenhardt, to watch Philippsburg and other potential crossing points. Nassau-Weilburg was ordered to dig in at Ubstadt and to also secure the bridge at Neckargemünd.

The French sent guerrillas into the mountains in fairly strong bands. A party of 70 attacked an Imperial convoy escorted by 800 horse which was passing through a gorge (possibly that of Kuppenheim) and killed 15 of the rearguard, took 8 prisoners and 16 horses, and stole 30-40 containers of wine and brandy. French deserters reported the loss of 150 French troops and 60 men, possibly in this same action or possibly due to the actions of Baden's own raiders. These activities seem to have taken place on 7 or 8 July.

On 9 July Baden made a reconnaissance down the Murg toward Steinmauren, about 6 Km from his camp and still some distance from the main channel of the Rhine. He noted the presence of many small enemy posts along the

Murg. Reports from Vaubonne and various deserters indicated the French camp was fortified in all directions. One of the deserters hinted at a French probe toward Ötigheim, a small place on the Pfiderbach about 4 Km west of the German camp, where the Murg approached very closely. Immediately a watch was placed on the potential crossing point and 4 battalions under a GWM garrisoned the hamlet.

9 July also saw a 'combat of the foragers' as Baden's men scoured the bank of the Rhine for supplies. *Graf* Mercy tried to attack French foragers operating on his side of the Murg with 400 horse but Choiseul warned his men with 3 cannon shots. 5 men were lost and 4 horses. Elsewhere the hussars captured 50 horses and some prisoners, but French cavalry took 400 horses, mostly from the Imperial supply train. There was also a great deal of 'snaphauncery' (a word coined by this author) taking place, including French snipers on the left bank of the Rhine.

On 11 July Vaubonne's men killed 20 French and took 15 horses from the rear of the French army, suffering only minimal losses. Choiseul, being hemmed in by the enemy, built 2 bridges over the Rhine so he could forage on the left bank at need.

On 12 July the French conducted a grand forage toward Steinbach about 4 Km from the town of Baden, that is, about 6 Km behind their lines. Vaubonne was operating in that area, and had made an abortive attempt to attack a convoy coming from the Rhine under Frémont on 10 July, so Chamilly himself led the foragers' escort, of 3,000 cavalry and 1,200 grenadiers. The foraging went off without a hitch, though a few grazing horses were lost to a band of hussars. Vaubonne found no weak spot in the French screen. Only one shot was fired, ironically killing Vaubonne's nephew. However, when the French withdrew, Vaubonne attacked the last troop in the rearguard with 30 hussars supported by yet more hussars and some dragoons. These enveloped the French troop, pushing it back to a *haye* garrisoned by 100 grenadiers of *régiment* Royal de Vaisseaux. Their volley checked the pursuit and gave the French horsemen time to rally. More French cavalry under the *marquis* de Praslin countercharged, so successfully that they pursued the Imperials for a long distance. About 150 Germans were slain. With two swords the *marquis* de Souvré killed an officer who held a pistol to him. Prisoners were also taken, including another nephew of Vaubonne. According to Quincy 10-12 French were lost. But Vaubonne reported the taking of 23 prisoners, though he lost 'some' of his own men.

[Other regiments mentioned are: *Feüllade*, *Royal Roussillon*, *Dauphin*, *Souvré*, *Colonel Général*, *La Reine*.]

13 July GWM Würtz was ordered to clear the French out of the Kapplerthal. The mouth of this valley, through which the Acher River runs, is about 26 Km east of Strasbourg

and was about the same distance south of Choiseul's camp. The forces in question were probably raiders working out of Strasbourg.

The next day the St. Marguerite Chapel and some other German posts were fortified, and on 15 July there was an action between the Hussars and a French post at Oos (about 7 Km south of the Murg). The post was, of course, in a cemetery. 2,000 Germans dug in at the Steinmauren cemetery, extending their lines as far as a bridge that crossed an old channel of the Murg.

But the chief event at this time, which seems to have taken place on 13 July, was another cavalry action. Quincy does not mention it. From the B.H.K. the event has to be pieced together from information received over a couple of days. The French had been foraging at Bühl, 17 Km southwest of their camp. Vaubonne learned of this and set out with a column of 500 horse, not realising the French were very much stronger. Apparently, Chamilly set an ambush, using 300 men to lure Vaubonne onto the main French position about 7 Km closer to the French camp, where *général* Melac waited concealed with 2,000 cavalry and 500 grenadiers. The action was closely fought, as the impetus of the Germans threw Melac's horsemen back; the grenadiers saved them. The first the *Generalleutnant* knew of it was when a French trumpeter came to his camp with 2 cartloads of German wounded (14 men), including a colonel of dragoons. Vaubonne suffered 120 dead (later amended in the record to under 100), including 2 captains, and had 60 men taken prisoner. One of the officers was a nephew of his — yes, another nephew.

On 16 July Choiseul had his bridge over the Old Rhine taken down and moved higher up the river. He also sent his heavy baggage to Fort-Louis. Baden learned of this and speculated the French would move to Schwarzach (he was right). The same day the French engaged the Germans occupying the Steinmauren graveyard in an artillery duel. A French engineer from Philippsburg was killed and fell in the river. An enterprising soldier swam over and fished the body out, discovering the entire order of battle for Choiseul's army. Later that day the French fired a triple salvo and a trumpeter informed the Germans that the *prince* de Conty was now King of Poland. *That* would not last long.

Another day passed before Choiseul was completely out of forage. On 18 July he decamped, bound for Lichtenau by way of Hügelsheim. Lichtenau is 10 Km farther up the Rhine than Fort-Louis; the French did not intend to return home yet.

The extraction of the French army was a mix of brilliance and folly. The actual teardown, though predicted by the Germans, was done so faultlessly that they could not interfere. Baden immediately had Rastatt occupied by 100 men and send forward 300 grenadiers, but the enemy were already out of range. Choiseul remained with

the rearguard, including the Gendarmerie and all the grenadiers (3,000 men). A party of 500 Imperial cavalry sent to harass him was caught between the line of grenadiers, who had been in ambush, and the Gendarmerie, and were cut down in large numbers, only extricating themselves with difficulty.

The B.H.K. mixes this affair with separate affair which took place that night. The French marched with difficulty because of the quantity of marshes and small streams, and had to use multiple roads. In the dark, one column took the wrong road and bumped into another. There was an extended firefight in which 2,000 rounds were expended and the two columns nearly charged each other. According to Quincy, several grenadiers and 3 or 4 officers were killed. According to the B.H.K. the French suffered 1,000 casualties. Quincy is more believable. Discharging musket balls wildly into the night does not result in a 50% hit ratio.

The new French camp faced the Black Forest with the Right at Liechtenau and the Left past Schwartzach, with the Rhine behind and the Oberwasser brook in front.

On 20 July Vaubonne clashed with a detachment of 150-200 French grenadiers. He having 500 men, the enemy fell back on two houses. Summoned to surrender, they refused, so Vaubonne torched the buildings. The French were massacred as they ran out. However, Vaubonne lost 20 men and a third nephew. The Germans were travelling through the hills on the enemy's flank. The location is given in the B.H.K. as 'Winden', and cannot be otherwise identified. After this action the dragoons were sent south to the Kinzigthal but the hussars continued to shadow the French.

The next few days were quiet. It was raining heavily, had been raining heavily, and would continue to do so. Baden remained in his old camp. On 22 July he made a reconnaissance as far as Gernsbach, in the valley of the same name. The reason is not given. On 24 July the *Generalleutnant* marched 25 Km north to Durlach, placing his HQ at Kretzingen. He found the Margraviate of Durlach in a ruinous condition. There was no forage, all the fruit trees had been cut down, and the locals had been forced to supply 8,000 sacks of foodstuffs to the French on a daily basis.

There was not much danger of Choiseul coming north again because the forage was all gone. And, there were enough troops in the Kinzigthal, south of Choiseul, to make life uncomfortable if the French did extend themselves. In any case, Choiseul was only interested in protecting Strasbourg.

(FzM Fürstenberg, seconded by FML Aufsess commanded in the Kinzigthal. Their regiments included the Durlach, Fechenbach (2nd bn), and Fürstenberg Foot, and Aufsess and Pfirdt Dragoons. GWM Würtz held the mouth of the next pass to the north, at Oberkirch.)

The French made some adjustments the next day, but nothing that affected Baden directly. By moving north, Baden signalled he had given up on Strasbourg, if it had ever been his intention to lay siege. It was too late in the season. So, some French forces could be detached and sent back across the Rhine. Speyer was reinforced, as were the Rhine redoubts. The B.H.K. also mentions a rumour that the French were to receive reinforcements from Flanders. Quincy is silent, but these troops do seem to have made an appearance. The detachment supposedly numbered 7,000 men, of whom 4,000 remained at Kaiserslautern and 3,000 were to join Choiseul; they amounted to 6 mounted and 4 foot regiments.

Partly because of the sizeable enemy force in the Kinzigthal, on 25 July Choiseul moved about 17 Km southeast to a position very close to Strasbourg's permanent bridge at Kehl, his army resting its Left at the rest of the army camped with its Right (and HQ) on Linx, 7 Km northeast of the bridge, and its Left (probably; Quincy's spelling is atrocious) on Renchen. There are some major problems with selecting Renchen (the name in Quincy is Rinsheim). It puts GWM Würtz, at Oberkirch, very close to Choiseul's left flank. The frontage, if continuous, is about 9 Km, which seems too long for such an army of that size. Also, the position straddles a mix of woodland and swamp, and crosses 2 rivers. But, there seems to be no other location with a remotely similar name.

On 26 July Nassau-Weilburg visited Baden in his camp. His visit had something to do with the French activities on the left bank of the Rhine. In will be remembered Mainz had dispatched a small corps to cooperate with Baden. Now there was suspicion the enemy intended to make a terror bombardment against the city. It was noticed that a large quantity of siege guns and mortars were being assembled at Strasbourg. On 31 July Nassau-Weilburg sent some of the Mainz troops home.

In other news, the reinforcing French regiments were reported near s Hagenbach (27 July). A magistrate at Ettlingen was arrested on suspicion of corresponding with the French (28 July). Only Vaubonne remained in contact with the enemy, dividing his 150 cavalry into 3 columns; one attached a body of 100 French foot and capture 2 captains.

On 28 July 2 brigades of French infantry and 2 regiments of cavalry under d'Uxelles, using a ship bridge sent down to them, crossed the Rhine at Au am Rhein, a hamlet opposite Lauterbourg, 10 Km north of Rastatt. In response, Baden had 4 bridges erected on the Albe River, which lay south of his camp, so he could respond quickly.

It had also been rumoured for days that Choiseul intended to cross to the left bank of the Rhine. However, on 1 August he was reported at Willstätt, about 7 Km south of his last position. That day the Hussars engaged

a party of French, killing 70 and capturing another 70. According to Quincy, this action took place on 2 August. Vaubonne seems to have drawn his men together. He had 10 squadrons near Bühl, but divided them again into 2 columns, one of which encountered the French. Quincy puts the numbers at 50 captured and 'some' casualties out of 200 cavalry in all. What Choiseul had begun to do at this time was collect the harvest. The horsemen were part of his screen.

2 August d'Uxelles was reinforced with a dragoon regiment and 2 more foot regiments. Vaubonne's men fought another engagement, taking 73 prisoners and inflicting nearly 100 casualties, for a loss of 4 dead and 4 wounded.

On 3 August Baden's army marched north to Bruchsal, arriving there the next day. The baggage was delayed thanks to the heavy rains over the last two weeks which had caused extensive flooding. On 6 August Baden moved to the Gänsberg. Nassau-Weilburg, who had been given his own corps in a new order of battle, stopped off to pick up his men at Ubstadt and arrived a day later. The German army now numbered 54 battalions and 109 squadrons.

By the report of a captured Gendarme, the B.H.K. confirms Choiseul was at Willstätt (as of 2 August at least) but Quincy says he moved there later, and recounts a different raid by Vaubonne which was made against an outpost down by the Rhine about 3 August. According to Quincy, the French were at Reinbshofsheim, 15 Km or so northeast of Strasbourg and about 11 Km north of Willstätt. The camp would have been right on the bank of the Rhine. South of the camp was a hamlet called Dandheim (Dinsheim). Vaubonne had his 10 squadrons camped to the south, between Choiseul and Strasbourg; Dinsheim lay midway between the camps, and was manned by the French by day with 300 men. Vaubonne, with 400 dragoons and hussars, surprised the detachment as it was marching to its post one morning. The French took cover in two nearby ditches. Vaubonne dismounted his dragoons and overran the ditches after a 45 minute firefight. He lost around 70 men but the French lost 200 killed and 40 prisoners. It must have been an epic fight. Pouring rain, and the main roadway was raised above the surrounding land, which was flooded.

On 4 August the French sent out 80 dragoons under M. de Montbrison from Fort-Louis. He rode as far as Mannheim on reconnaissance. Montbrison discovered the enemy were conducting a grand forage involving about 1,000 horses escorted by 3 squadrons. These Germans may have been operating out of Mainz because the B.H.K. makes no mention of such a foraging, and notes that the French strictly watched the Rhine, particularly along the section where Baden's army was deployed.

Montbrison concealed himself in a wood the day prior to the foragers working over that district. On the day the

foragers appeared, Montbrison sent out 20 men and an officer to scout them. This band attacked the foragers vigorously. Seeing this, Montbrison came out in support with the rest of his command. The French killed 10-15 enemy cavalry, both hussars and heavy horse, and captured 140 horses, plus a standard from a Saxon regiment. The 3 supporting squadrons did not countercharge, though they had a good view of the action. Montbrison returned to Fort-Louis with his booty.

On 5 August the French, having endured 3 weeks of sodden weather and flooding, and having used up their fodder, made a change of venue. It is now, according to Quincy, that Choiseul camped at Willstätt, placing his baggage at Fort Kehl. The army's Right was on Offenburg and the Left by Kork, a frontage of nearly 12,000 metres, facing ENE, toward the Kinzigtal with the Kinzig River in front.

Farther down the Rhine, M. de Lande was sent from Fort-Louis to Germersheim with the foot brigade of Béarn and the Bragalonne Dragoons. D'Uxelles was now at Speyer, less 400 horse, 100 grenadiers, and 100 fusiliers whom he sent to Mannheim and the mouth of the Neckar. Melac, spotted by the Germans at Mundenheim, across from Mannheim, on 8 August, was operating independently on Oppau Island, with a mixed force of 6 squadrons of horse, the Saily Dragoons, and 10 companies of grenadiers.

Choiseul's army was having a very hard time finding forage. The wetness of the season was ruining the crops, the grain germinating and failing before it could be cut. All the roads were washed out or boggy. According to the B.H.K., 'the enemy camp near Willstett [*sic*] is almost completely in water and morass because of the rain'. The French spent about 2 weeks repairing the roads. Vaubonne tried no more major attacks for a few days but split his men into individual companies of 40 men each and had them hunt the French foragers. Things did not always go his way. On 9 July French foragers stole 300 horses.

On 12 August Choiseul sent the Saint Maurice and Ligondez Horse to reinforce d'Uxelles at Speyer. Vaubonne sent Baden 30 prisoners. These had been taken in an action against the rear of the French camp. 50 hussars and 3 troops of dragoons had swooped through the French foragers and netted over 500 horses. Unfortunately they only managed to bring off 130 because the French occupied a village on their return route and ambushed them. Losses were light, only 3 men.

14 August the French made a grand forage by Offenburg, which lasted until 23 August. Choiseul, forced to shift his camp due to the conditions, did so during the midst of the foraging, on 19 August. The baggage crossed the Kinzigtal that night, escorted by 3 brigades of foot and horse. The army followed the next day, crossing on 5 bridges. The

new camp had Offenburg at its center, its Right at the Castle of Ortenburg, and its Left at Bühl (this is a different, hamlet-sized Bühl, now buried under a power station). The frontage was about 5,800 metres. The Kinzig was in the rear.

This position is a little odd at a casual glance. It put the Kinzigthal on the army's right flank. Probably, Choiseul was not concerned about the relatively small corps operating in that valley. It would be enough if he could find some dry ground to sit on.

On 15 August a triple salvo of 70 cannon was fired at Baden's camp for the elevation of the Duke of Saxony to King of Poland. Conty had been displaced. After a grand review, his army split up. Baden crossed the Neckar at Ladenburg with 50 squadrons and 20 battalions of Imperials, the Pálffy Hussars, all the grenadiers from the Bavarian, Swiss and English regiments (these last were the Huguenots sent from Italy), the regiments of Schnäbellin and Horn, another pair of regiments named 'Franconia' and 'Swabia' which will have been ones raised as part of their Circles' commitment to the Empire, the regiments from Wolfenbüttel, the Gensd'armes and Baden's own horse guard, plus some others. A number of volunteers also accompanied him, including princes and other men of distinction. Meanwhile, Bayreuth and Thüngen remained at Weisloch to cover the right bank of the Rhine.

Finale

The last act of the war was taking place. Probably in response to the taking of Ath in Flanders, Baden intended to lay siege to the small castle of Ebernburg. Rather a comedown from Strasbourg, but still a worthy target. The war on the Rhine would end with an Imperial victory, even if only a small one.

August 16 was a rest day. Then Baden's army began marching north: Lorsch (17), Gernsheim (18), Griesheim by Darmstadt (20), Kostheim opposite Mainz (23). Baden had had to leave the army for a few days on urgent business, but he rejoined it here. 7 battalions and 7 squadrons reinforced it out of the nearby garrisons. This gave him 29 battalions and 60 squadrons, not counting 10 squadrons of Gensd'armes and mounted grenadiers. These last were with the foot grenadiers, acting as the Reserve.

Baden passed the Main at Kostheim, then crossed the Rhine at Mainz, camping at Mombach, just north of the city on 24 August. Further rations were handed out on 25 August. Forage was limited. Two days more marching and another day's rest took them to Genzingen (29 August), within 4 Km of Kreuznach. The bridge at Mainz was brought around to Bingen (redirected to Lorch, 11 Km farther downriver, to avoid French patrols). The bridge was to facilitate the movement of siege equipment from Koblenz. 10 large cannon were also expected from Frankfurt. A courier was sent to that city to demand the

Jews supply more powder (one of those rare journal entries that remind one the war economy relied heavily on the Jewish communities in the Empire).

The peasantry around Ebernburg had already fled west to Kirn, 30 Km away. They did not regard Baden as a liberator.

Elsewhere, Vaubonne fought another small engagement with the French, suffering 7 dead and 1 wounded. The report came to Baden's HQ on 21 August. By 28 August it was thought that Choiseul had recrossed the Rhine, except for 6,000 men sent to Philippsburg. FzM Fürstenberg was ordered to bring 14 squadrons and 10 battalions to Bayreuth's camp, leaving a skeleton crew in the Black Forest. Bayreuth was busy with contingency plans. If the French marched down past his army to fight with Baden, he would erect a ship bridge at Hagenbach (already in the works) and make a diversionary crossing. But, on 25 August he heard Choiseul had only sent a detachment back across the Rhine.

On 26 August a report from Fürstenberg came in saying Choiseul was contemplating breaking into the Kinzigthal. But, on 27 August there was news of French harbingers at Oppenheim, and on 29 August there was definitive word that the French had broken camp and were near Fort-Louis, on the left bank of the Rhine.

Choiseul had been focused on an operation to break into the Kinzigthal when he received orders on 23 August to cross the Rhine and close with Baden — not to fight, but to observe. At this point the French may not have been sure what the enemy intended, though all the preparations being made for a siege would soon reveal the target. Choiseul's attack had been planned for the eve of St. Louis Day — 25 August — as a present for the King.

This is what the war had come down to: from the fall of mighty fortresses and the clash of huge armies to the protagonists pecking away at obscure castles at opposite ends of the front. Nevertheless, a present for the King is still a present. It is the thought that counts.

The key to the German position in the Kinzigthal, which lay by Gegenbach, was a side valley connecting the Kinzigthal with the valley of the Schutterbach, which exits the Black Forest at Lahr. Choiseul intended to pin the Germans in place and send a corps into their rear by way of the side valley, which started about 5 Km east of Lahr and emerged into the Kinzigthal at Biberach, about 8 Km behind Gegenbach. Unfortunately, the side valley is dominated by the [Hohen]Geroldseck Castle, which overlooks it from its northwestern slope. The castle was strongly garrisoned.

Therefore, for this operation Choiseul employed 12,000 men supported by 30 cannon and 10 heavy mortars (brought from Strasbourg). Chamilly was to command the flank march, taking 6,000 men against Castle Geroldseck.

This would involve a day's march south to Lahr, and another day to get into position for an attack against the castle. Meanwhile, Choiseul would lead his remaining 6,000 directly against Fürstenberg to pin him in place. Even if Geroldseck did not actually fall, Fürstenberg might well be forced to weaken his position by detaching reinforcements.

The operation was already in motion and Fürstenberg was beginning to react, when the new orders came from Versailles. It seems that either Choiseul had little knowledge of Baden's movements and had to be warned by Versailles, or he did not attach much importance to whatever minor siege the Germans might be contemplating. Versailles was more sensitive to the political ramifications.

Choiseul sent his train to Strasbourg on 24 August. The next day he broke camp, crossing the Rhine at Strasbourg. The Germans made an attempt on his rearguard but did not press the attack. Not knowing about the change in plans, Fürstenberg did not at first think the French were bound for the Palatinate, but that they would cross the Rhine lower down and try to get into the Black Forest someplace else. It was not until 1 September that Baden was informed by him of Choiseul's ultimate goal (probably revealed by spies at Strasbourg).

Choiseul's march north got off to a slow start. He had the Ill River, which joined the Rhine on Strasbourg's northern side, to cross. On 26 August his cavalry was at La Wantzenau and his infantry on the Isle of Ruperchau, that is, still within 10 Km of Strasbourg. 4 battalions and 7 squadrons remained at Strasbourg to observe Fürstenberg and Vaubonne.

All the French were astir. Melac's command was sent to Kaiserslautern. Harcourt was marching in from Trier with several thousand men and another detachment from Flanders was rumoured to be coming as well. On 28 August Choiseul marched to Offendorf, Benheim by Fort Louis (29), Kerweiler (2 September). Kerweiler is 4 Km from Neustadt, so the army had left the Rhine. The advance guard was at Lampsheim the same day. (The troops seen at Oppenheim on 27 August were probably conducting a routine patrol.) Choiseul was now being shadowed by Pálffy's Hussars, come up from Mainz.

Ebernburg was already under siege. Garrisoned by 8 or 9 companies (352 men) under a M. D'Arcy, the castle was in a strong position, unassailable in some directions, and well provisioned. The reader may refer to the picture on p.217. Approaching from the west, one passes through a narrow defile with hills on either side through which the Nahe River winds. Beyond the valley is a fairly wide plain bounded on east and north by the river. The castle sits at the end of a low ridge running southwest-northeast, overlooking a loop in the river from its right bank. The ridge is only 'low' in a relative sense; the castle looms

over the surrounding land, but is itself lower than the plateau through which the Nahe has cut its valley.


Just below the castle is a confluence with another, smaller river, the Alsenz, which flows down from the southwest. The eastern and southern faces of the castle's ridge are very steep, the northern slopes not so much, but long, with a village to deal with at its foot; the best approach is from the west along the ridgeback. But here, a ditch had been cut in the solid rock, 15 metres deep. The castle itself was the typical Medieval Rhine Castle, very picturesque (it has been restored), with high retaining walls at its base on south and east. The slopes were dotted with woods and vineyards.

The blockade began on 30 August when the Germans intercepted a raiding party out of the castle and turned them back. Baden made his first reconnaissance on 31 August. His army occupied Kreuznach on 3 September. He already had a watch of 200 horse on the castle, and an ambush force of 100 grenadiers nearby. The same day he picked the location for the bridge over the Rhine, which was to be between Lorch and Niederheimbach, where an island provided extra stability.

4 September the French crossed the Speyerbach. Bayreuth, meanwhile, dispatched the troops supplied by Brandenburg and Münster (4 and 3 battalions, respectively) and 10 squadrons, to assist Baden in his coming standoff with Choiseul. This same day Baden made a second reconnaissance of Ebernburg and ordered his siege train up. 6 *halbe-Karthaunen* and 2 fire mortars came from Mainz, floated down the Rhine to Bingen and then up the Nahe as far as possible. His men were already making fascines and gabions (Schanzkörben in German). In the evening, Ebernburg fired a triple salvo. Barcelona had fallen.

On 5 September Choiseul was at Lampsheim, but his patrols were already probing Baden's positions; this day the Germans captured a party of them. The *Generalleutnant* had completely surrounded Ebernburg in the night and was now picking out a line of circumvallation, harassed by the odd cannon shot from the castle. 1,000 peasants were conscripted to dig the lines. 500 more erected bulwarks for protection. (The garrison rounded up a number of villagers who had not escaped in time, but not all.) To cover his supply lines he entrenched much of his army along the Nahe down to Bingen. Bayreuth's reinforcements were preparing to board boats at Gernsheim.

6 September Chamilly rejoined the French army, bringing the rest of the infantry, except for 4 battalions under d'Uxelles, who, with 17 squadrons, covered the Rhine from Speyer to Strasbourg. Baden received 30,000 sandbags. The word in his camp was that the French were forced marching and had lost about 5,000 men since they crossed the Rhine. They were supposedly halting at Lampsheim to allow the infantry and the artillery



Nahe River

Alsenz River

100 metres

Siege of Ebernburg

30 August - 27 September 1697

from a 1705 map (possibly by Nicholas de Fer)

to catch up; some of the guns were breaking their carriages. The *Generalleutnant* does seem to have had very good intelligence. He already knew from a contact at Mont Royal that there was no French corps coming from Flanders. But he did not know the whereabouts of Harcourt. There was a skirmish involving the Hussars, who took 28 horses and 4 prisoners, but their own captain was taken because his horse was out of breath.

7 September Baden's siege train arrived at Bingen. 7,200 men, 2,000 peasants, and all the carpenters in the army worked on the lines. The gate of Ebernburg was watched by 300 grenadiers to prevent sallies. 300 more infantry were sent south to Altenbamburg, a castle in the valley of the Alsenz. (100 men rotated through this position each day.) A few days later (11 September) 50 men were put into Rheingrafenstein, a barracks-like manor house on the far side of one of the hills that formed the chokepoint on the Nahe before one reached Ebernburg — the point being it gave advance warning of an otherwise unseen French approach, and linked the siege works with the camps farther down the river.

The rest of his army foraged along the right bank of the Nahe, except for a few who went off into the western hills. Harcourt was out there somewhere. The French captured over 100 pack horses and 30 sutlers near Kirn, where *général* La Breteche had a detachment of 800 commanded men.

8 September Choiseul camped at Pfeddersheim. Baden had abatis constructed on the roads approaching his camp; in some cases he broke the roads up.

9 September the French moved to Alzey, where the bread ovens were established (the Germans kept their own ovens on the other side of the Rhine). At Odernheim, 11 Km southwest of Ebernburg, a French force suddenly appeared, 4,000 strong. The Germans went on heightened alert and began screening their foragers. Altenbamburg's garrison was increased to 400 men. Colonel Vaubonne reappears in the narrative, with the unshakeable Kollonitsch Hussars, poking and prying at the Alzey camp. He was the lead element of the reinforcements Bayreuth had sent.

Those reinforcements arrived on 10 September, and numbered 8,000 men. 3 additional regiments of dragoons arrived the next day. Choiseul was resting and foraging at Alzey. The Pálffy Hussars stole 100 of his horses today, and the Kollonitsch Hussars, operating out of Mainz, another 60. The Germans did not seriously expect the French to advance much closer, but Baden resolved on a demonstration, making a reconnaissance in force to Flonheim, 7 Km from Choiseul's camp, using his *Gensd'armes* and *Feldwacht*. This probably took place on 11 September.

On 12 September the circumvallation was completed. The regimental guns had already been positioned two days before. A line of 12 cannon was emplaced in front of

the camp to 'salute' Choiseul if he approached. Both sides foraged and were harassed by enemy cavalry, the Hussars, as always, having the advantage. Both sides were making it a policy to ruin everything they could not use, regardless of any promises made to the locals.

Choiseul had allocated d'Uxelles and 5,000 men to occupy the Rhine forts between Mannheim and Speyer, and there was a nagging worry he might try a raid on Mainz, so German militia was sent to the latter place, stiffened by the Mainz foot battalions, and Bayreuth monitored the movements along the Rhine.

On 14-15 September the siege equipment was stockpiled. Choiseul's camp stirred as if he might be planning a rescue. Vaubonne took out 400 men on a raid and 2 parties of hussars brought back 130 horses. On the evening of 15 September Baden ordered 500 grenadiers to occupy the Ebernburg cemetery, which lay directly below the castle. They were issued with 50 scaling ladders. 3,000 fascines were laid by. The next day, 100 men were sent to occupy another cemetery across the Nahe, at Münster am Stein. 100 enemy were spotted occupying a post near Altenbamburg and captured during a foggy dawn raid.

Skirmishing between the castle and the besiegers commenced in earnest on 17 September, when the French finally noticed the Germans in the cemetery below them. 3 cannon shots rang out and there was some musketry. A mutual cannonade continued all day, but only resulted in 3 wounded. German raiders, in contrast, inflicted 50 casualties.

By 18 September the siege preparations were complete. The lines of circumvallation were held by 14,000 men, 8 battalions rotating through on a daily basis. A FML was Duty Officer. 200 cavalry were stationed on the heights as a reaction force. Besides a large ammo dump, there were scaling ladders large and strong enough for 4 men to climb at once. This night 2 mortars and 4 six-pounders were emplaced by the church. 8 of the besiegers were killed and 15 wounded by fire from the castle in this endeavour. (The B.H.K. says 2 wounded on 18 September and 1 killed and 2 wounded overnight.) The French were discharging grapeshot and salvoes of musketry.

19 September the besiegers' real bombardment began, lasting all day. At this point it was just a mortar battery. Work on the cannon battery continued through the night, while 500 grenadiers and 600 fusiliers made an attack on the village. Although they controlled the church and cemetery, the village was still held by a detachment from the garrison. On the side facing the castle was a wall, 8 metres high. On the other side the French had erected palisades.

The attack began at 2am on 20 September. The palisades had been covered in pitch and straw piled along the bottom. When the attackers tried to break

through, it was set on fire. There was at least one cannon emplaced there as well; the defenders' guns accounted for a captain, a lieutenant, 6 soldiers dead and 10 wounded. (The B.H.K. says 5 dead and 7 wounded in the official account, amended by a later note to 4 dead and 5 wounded.) The defenders retreated to the castle, covered by the flames from the palisade. Once they broke in, the Germans occupied the village and swarmed over the wall without opposition.

Meanwhile, 6,000 men took up position on the other side of the hill. Both sides bombarded each other throughout the remainder of the night and all the next day, the cannon battery opening up against the retaining walls. According to the B.H.K. the mortars had 'good effect', the bombs landing within the precincts. The Germans dug a pit and set up a pair of mortars in the village to fire on the castle, then began a Grand Battery incorporating the 6 *halbe-Karthaunen* to fire against the retaining wall. 4 more of these oversized 24-pounders were brought to the lines the same day. A communication trench was dug from the village to the church.

Bayreuth reported he was preparing to cross the Rhine — if needed — with a bridge currently serving the Neckar at Heidelberg.

A detachment of French under Locmaria was reported at Leiningen, near the Rhine 25 Km south of Koblenz. This might threaten the bridge at Lorch in a day or two, but not dangerously. However, hearing that Choiseul was planning a relief, Baden ordered detachments to every approach route, 1 battalion from each regiment. Digging trenches against the castle was not really practical given the nature of the ground, but a lodgement of sorts had

already been obtained. It was rather exposed, and during the night of 20/21 they lost 7 dead and 24 wounded, all from among 'the English' — that is, the Huguenots. (The B.H.K. says 2 dead and 8 wounded during the day on 20 September and 14 wounded and 3 dead during the night.)

The batteries continued their fire all through 21 September, although the B.H.K. says the Germans 'withdrew' to celebrate the victory at Zenta, the Emperor having ordered a 'Te Deum Laudamus solemniter'. Probably a skeleton crew remained in the trenches. In any case it was not safe to dig by day. During the night they extended their works, constructing a grand battery at the foot of the hill with the object of smashing the retaining wall and creating a slope of rubble to climb up. Throughout 22 September the defenders kept the besiegers at bay, but by the end of that day the heavy siege battery had been erected at the foot of the rock. The siege lines extended on either side of it. In achieving this they lost 12 dead and 65 wounded (6 and 45 according to the B.H.K.).

Choiseul had not moved. Indeed, it seems he was more interested establishing a new camp at Pfeddersheim. On 29 September, right after Ebernburg was captured, he hastened there at top speed.

The Grand Battery opened fire on 23 September. By evening, many of the castles guns were dismantled and some had even toppled down the slope. Another battery was nearly completed on the right, as well as a pit for 2 Böller (very large mortars). A courier was also intercepted with letters for the garrison. That night it was the garrison's turn to make a grand bombardment, despite the loss of cannon, and inflict heavy losses. The B.H.K.



gives the count of German losses today as 7 dead, including a Huguenot engineer, and 19 wounded. Nonetheless, the Imperials took a guard house located behind the fort and managed to extend one trench 6 metres in length out from this post, and extend a communication trench back.

24 September the besiegers worked day and night, maintaining a constant fire and digging ever closer. Their mortars landed within the fort without much effect, but their cannon severely damaged the retaining wall, or rondel as it was called. The extra 4 *halbe-Karthaunen* were brought into position. The next day the new battery, on the right of the lines, was unmasked. (It is not clear if the 24-pounders were added to the Grand Battery or this new one.) Baden again issued orders for his covering force to be on the alert.

Daily German casualties now were very light, only 2-4 per day. Choiseul's preparations turned out to be only the dispatch of 3-4,000 men to the Rhine. By 26 September part of the eastern rondel had been shot away, exposing the bare rock. A mortar bomb struck the hospital, setting a fire which burned into the night. As the day wore on, the defenders' fire slackened. The besiegers made preparations for the first assault.

The end came on 27 September. A breach was made, and just before 2pm (the B.H.K. says 3pm), Commandant d'Arcy beat the chamade. The Officer of the Day on the besieging side was one of the Huguenots, a Brigadier M. Loche. After receiving the notification he sent for the *Generalleutnant*. The capitulation was signed that night. In exchange for the Imperials being granted the breach and 2 gates, the garrison would march out at 8am the next morning with full honours of war, all their baggage, and be allowed to rejoin Choiseul. Quincy says the cannon had to remain. The B.H.K. says they were allowed 2 pieces bearing King Louis' arms. There were only 8 working guns left in the castle. Provisions, however, were still in good supply.

The B.H.K. says the breach was not yet practicable and would have taken a few days more, hence the lenient terms. Also, it was estimated the French had funnelled more than 200,000 livres per annum in contributions through Ebernburg; the Germans were just happy to have the place back in their hands.

The garrison, replaced by 250 Germans, marched out at noon on 28 September, escorted by 60 horse, to Lauterbourg. The Imperials set about repairing the fort, garrisoning it with troops from Mainz and the Palatinate. Then, only a few hours later, Baden received word of the signing of the peace treaty, which had taken place on 22 September. Though the Emperor had not yet signed the treaty, his representatives had agreed to a 'suspension of arms', to last until 1 November.

Baden immediately broke his army up, sending it back across the Rhine. Part of it garrisoned the Bergstat, under

Bayreuth's command. Other elements went to Mainz or to their home states. Choiseul only learned of the Peace on 29 September. He was then at Pfeddersheim. 30 September he was at Marksheim, staying there until 7 October, after which the troops were set into winter quarters. D'Uxelles remained on the Speyerbach with 24 battalions and 4 squadrons and Chamilly remained at Kaiserslauten with 36 battalions and a regiment of dragoons. The rest wintered in the Sarre.

The Peace

The talks at Rijswick were moving too slowly. Tensions were high. There were a number of real sticking points, such as the recognition of William as king, and the corresponding French desire for a general amnesty for the Jacobites in France, not to mention a pension for James II's wife, Mary of Modena. Imperial interests and Spanish succession questions lay heavy on everyone's mind. The election of Augustus the Strong as King of Poland had relevance, because it put paid to French ambitions in that quarter, at least for now. It meant the removal of one more barrier to peace.

Ath had a counterproductive effect because the French envoys became arrogant; it took the flop in front of Brussels to deflate them. Even so, they refused to talk directly to the English, using the Dutch as intermediaries. The affair at Brussels also raised Spanish – and Dutch – opinions of William. They had been afraid he would sign a deal with France that excluded their interests, but by defending Brussels it seemed he would not make peace without them. The Swedish mediators were in no hurry, since they would go back in the drawer once the peace was signed. The Spanish envoy, named Don Bernardo de Quiros, was a real piece of work. He actually disobeyed Madrid, who told him to make 'peace at any price', because he, personally, thought the war ought to continue. Overriding all was the personal mistrust between William and Louis.

After the Mexican standoff at Brussels, William took the initiative and bypassed the diplomats. He sent one of his senior generals, and a close confidant, Willem Bentinck, to talk directly with *maréchal* Boufflers. The two men had first met when Boufflers was imprisoned at Maastricht after the fall of Namur. The meeting took place between the lines, in a summer house, in an orchard, at a place called Brucom, not far from Halle, on July 8. Bentinck wanted to know whether Louis truly desired peace. If so, what would it take for him to acknowledge William as a king and to disown James II. Boufflers gave him an acceptable answer.

The Treaty of Rijswick was thus really a separate peace concluded between England, Holland, and France. It took 8 meetings and the French threatening to besiege Oudenaarde, but when Bentinck told the diplomats that William was prepared to break up the Coalition, they came face to face with reality.

Madrid stomped on Don Quiros. There was no way Spain could survive a war with France; she could barely hang on even with the help of the Maritime Powers. The taking of Barcelona, which might have been avoided if Don Quiros had done his duty, was the final nail in the coffin.

It took longer for the Emperor. To begin with, his envoys had no real power to make deals. They had to refer everything to Vienna. Leopold huffed and puffed, but he did so want to keep steamrolling the Turk. Oh, why could not Willie be a good little boy and keep playing war for another year? To be fair, the Emperor's main concern was that the Spanish Succession be addressed. The Imperial signature was appended to the document on October 30, without the Succession question really being settled; in consequence the peace was understood by all to be no more than an armistice. Quincy makes a couple of additional points. First, this was the war which began the decline of Holland and the rise of England, partly due to economics but more due to the rise of the House of Orange to a regal state, weakening the republican faction. He also argues the concessions King Louis made were, laying aside France's exhaustion, which is a given, mainly made to curry favour in his bid for the Spanish Succession.

[One of the envoys was heard to say it would be better to knock Charles II on the head than to keep everyone in suspense.]

In summary, the terms were as follows: France gave up Luxembourg and the territories extorted through the prewar Reunions, but retained Strasbourg, which was essential to protect Alsace. Lorraine was returned to the Empire, under its dukes, but France had right of transit for her armies so long as they paid for food and lodging. Breisach and the right bank of the Rhine were given up by France (thus satisfying the Emperor), but the retention of Strasbourg meant she could still interfere militarily in Germany. (The French quickly built a Neuf Brisach on the opposite bank.) King Louis recognized William as King of England, Scotland, and Ireland, and agreed to stop his political support for James II, though the latter remained his pensioner. Overseas, all prizes were swapped, but the French obtained recognition of their half of Hispaniola, thus creating the country that would eventually become Haiti. Closer to home, the French reduced their tariffs on Dutch goods (pretty much the only reason the Dutch were fighting in the first place). This was also the treaty which officially sanctioned the system of Barrier Forts, locations within the Spanish Netherlands which could be garrisoned by Dutch troops.

The jury is still out on who won. Lynn argues that, although the French generals, such as Vauban, felt they had been cheated of a victory, King Louis did obtain a favourable peace, but that the balance of power coincidentally shifted against France at this time because of the Emperor's gains against the Turks. Louis' recognition of William as a king was a bitter pill, but on the matter of the Jacobites, nothing more was said, and

though he had to promise not to recognise James II's *children* as legitimate heirs, he was not forced to renounce James himself. France did not get much from nine years of war, but she did not lose anything essential, either.

Childs says the Grand Alliance was a clear winner at the peace table, because it solidified William's hold on England. When one considers the course of the War of the Spanish Succession, not to mention future world history, that argument has validity, but in the short term the greatest shift in the balance of power was between Habsburg and Bourbon. Childs does agree with Lynn on this, but, as Lynn says, the event which brought it about was the Peace of Carlowitz, in 1699, not the Treaty of Rijswijk.

Un Etat qui trouve dans foi-même de telles ressources , ne doit-il pas être considéré comme invincible, quand ses armées font commandées par des Généraux tels qu'on les a eûs dans cette guerre? Des Généraux qui par leur conduite & leur va leur ont gagné sept grandes batailles sur terre, & deux sur mer, ont conquis trente-trois places des plus fortes de l'Europe. Sans compter plusieurs autres avantages, combats & actions particulieres, qui dans un autre tems où l'on ne voyoit d'armées si nombreuses, auroient pû passer pour des batailles. Mais ce qui paroîtra encore plus étonnant, c'est que parmi un si grand nombre de combats & de sièges, les ennemis de la France ne purent citer d'autres actions à leur avantage, que la conquête de Namur, qu'ils reprirent, & le combat de la Hogue, dans lequel ils avoient une fois autant de vaisseaux que le Roy.

Should not a State which finds such resources in itself be considered invincible, when its armies are commanded by Generals as they were in this war? Generals who by their conduct and their will have won seven great battles on land, and two at sea, have conquered thirty-three of the strongest places in Europe. Without counting several other advantages, combat and particular actions, which in another time where we do not have so many armies, could have passed for battles. But what will seem even more astonishing is that among so many battles and sieges, the enemies of France could not cite other actions to their advantage, than the conquest of Namur, which they resumed, & the Hogue fight, in which they once had as many ships as the King.

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Maps Not Drawn by Author

Carte Topographique Du Cours Du Rhin Depuis Basle Jusqua Mayence: Dans Laquelle Sont Compris le Sundgau, la Haute et Baße Alsace, les Eveches de Vorms et de Spire, une partie du Palatinat et de l'Archeveche de Mayence, le Bas Comte de Catzenellenbogen, le Territoire de Francfort, le Landgraviat de Hesse Darmstadt, le Marquisat de Bade, le Territoire d'Hanau, l'Ortenau, le Brisgau &c. ; Sur laquelle on a trace les Mouvements et les Positions des Armees Fcoises. et Allemdes. des Pendant les Campagnes de 1674 et 1675. Chevalier de Beaurain. Published to accompany the *Histoire des quatre dernieres campagnes du marechal de Turenne en 1672, 1673, 1674 & 1675* by Philippe-Henri, comte de Grimoard. Berlin, 1782.