

Bliadhna Thearlaich

(Charlie's Year)



THE LAST JACOBITE RISING
AUGUST 1745-APRIL 1746

HISTORICAL COMMENTARY

*He either fears his fate too much
Or his desserts are small,
That dares not put it to the touch
To win or lose it all.*

James Graham, Marquis of Montrose

In the summer of the Year of Our Lord 1745, at the height of one of the seemingly unending series of European Succession Wars, rebellion reared its ugly head in the British Isles. This one was called The Forty-Five, a Rising of the mountain men of North Britain, the Highlanders of Scotland, against the alien régime of the House of Hanover that now ruled the land.

Like all human events, this Rising was far more complicated than the simplistic Scots-versus-English motif that most people accept as its basis. As a matter of fact, it was not a Scots-versus-English national war at all. It was an attempted dynastic coup that led to a brief civil war, in which some Scots and English fought for the established royal House, and others (the Scots in about equal measure), fought for the so-called Pretender, or rival claimant.

The attempt failed. Its impact, or lack thereof, is still debated, and, while the common man has either forgotten it or accepted the simple lie, the verdict among scholars is still out, probably because modern historians have as much difficulty as their “unenlightened” predecessors in dropping the baggage of a preconceived world view. Ironically, the Rising itself had its germination in preconceptions about the nature of things.

“Back in the day”, however, the Forty-Five shook Britain to its foundations. The participants, at least, foresaw that success would radically alter the course of British history. But there is one critical fact that must be understood. This act was not intended to mark the beginning of a New Order, neither did its failure inaugurate one. Rather, it was the death rattle of an Old Order.

The party or faction who instigated the affair were known as the Jacobites. They sought to topple what they perceived to be an unjust and corrupt régime, governed by a foreign prince, but they took “direct action” in order to set the clock back, not forward. This is, perhaps, one reason why the Jacobites have been Romanticised to such a great degree – trying to reestablish a Golden Age is such a noble undertaking. The other reason being that they were doomed from the start. Or were they?

Sources

The difficulty in writing about the Jacobites does not lie in a dearth of material. There are two problems: sorting out fact from fiction, and knowing where to stop. Hopefully this commentary will be of some assistance. Less is said about the immediate background than about the origins of the struggle between the Houses of Hanover and Stuart. Further study material may be found in the bibliography. It should be noted that Jacobite historical studies have passed through several stages:

1. Traitorous scum who should be exiled to America or some other barbarian outworld (18th century Whig propaganda).
2. Noble but doomed tragic heroes (19th century Romantics): *cf.* *The Dying Gaul* and sundry statuary looted from the Classical Age now residing in the British Museum).
3. A minor blot on the political landscape being of no real significance to the course of history (19th century Darwinists).
4. Anachronistic reactionary political revisionists and their running-dog monarchist-monopolist lackeys struggling against the proto-capitalist-mercantilist bourgeoisie (1950's Socialists).
5. A politically isolated group of Absolute-Monarchist lobbyists attempting to seize political hegemony by violent and subversive means (1970's political analysts).
6. A political subculture counterbalancing the established Whig Hegemony and preventing the disintegration of the overall socio-politico-economic climate (1980's sociologists).

7. More recent scholarship still has its quirks and dogmas, but facts and exact reenactments are in favour, as is the military angle, which is all to the good.

The Stuart Kings

As was just mentioned, in the popular imagination, the Jacobite Wars (1689-91, 1715-16 & 1719, 1745-46) are usually seen as a struggle for Scottish independence. As was just mentioned, nothing could be further from the truth. Again, they are also perceived as an attempt to destroy the morally corrupt régime of the day and return to the purity of the past. Now, as regards the desires of the rank and file, there may be some truth to this. Essentially, however, these events comprised a dynastic struggle between two royal Houses and their closest adherents, exclusive of the masses of the people (except in so far as the people formed a natural resource, in accordance with Rationalist kingly philosophy).

The Stuarts had been kings in Britain for a long time. The reigning monarchy today still has Stuart blood, making it one of the oldest dynasties in Europe. The Stuarts claimed a bloodline stretching back to the semi-mythical High Kings of Ireland. But the name derives from Hugh the Steward, a Norman follower of King Alexander I (1107-1124), who married into the Celtic lineage of the MacAlpin kings. Through intermarriage with one of Robert de Bruce's daughters, Hugh's descendants became kings themselves.

It was not until the end of the reign of Good Queen Bess (Elisabeth I), that the Stuarts became English as well as Scottish kings. James the VI of Scotland (1567-1625) was crowned James I of England in 1603. His claim descended from Mary Queen of Scots (1542-87), through James V of Scotland (1513-42), all the way back to the marriage of James IV of Scotland (1488-1513) with Margaret Tudor, who was the daughter of Henry VII of England. Unable to bear children herself (probably due to the syphilis which afflicted her father, Henry VIII) Queen Elisabeth had indicated her desire to see James as her successor. Of all the possibilities, he was the one most likely to continue her policies and maintain stability in the British Isles.

On his accession to the English throne, James ruled over both Scotland and England, but each nation had its own administration, laws, and customs, and Scotland and England remained separate and often antagonistic nations up until the Union of 1707. Prior to the rule of James “I & VI”, dynastic liaisons of course took place, but the closest the two countries had come to unification were the demands for vassalage made by the more vigorous English kings like Edward I and Henry VIII.

[A word should be said about Wales and Ireland. Wales, at least since the days of the Welsh-born Henry VII, was an integral part of England, with the heir to the throne holding the title of Prince of Wales. But, mainly for this reason, support for the Stuarts was much stronger in Wales than in England, and always had been. Ireland's situation was far more volatile, since it was in reality a conquered country ruled by a foreign king; the English kings, having failed to assimilate the indigenous people, sought to supplant them through colonisation. That said, a sizeable portion of the population had supported the Stuarts up until James II's defeat at the Battle of the Boyne in 1689 – thanks partly to the claim that his line was descended from the High Kings of Ireland. After James' flight from Ireland however, the Stuarts could get no help from the Irish in Ireland, though many Irish exiles did support them.]

James I & VI was the first of his line to be truly convinced that the Divine Right of Kings was the best way to achieve a politically stable society. This was cutting-edge philosophy (despite the “ancient custom” aura claimed by its proponents), and James saw himself as a man of his times. His ideas were coloured, however, by his upbringing at a savage, feudalistic Court. As a minor he had been subjected to a corrupt regent's tyrannical control, and had been repeatedly used as a bargaining chip in the factional power politics of his own nobles. Growing up as a pawn, he learned early to dissimulate, both publicly and privately, and when the time was right did not hesitate to take charge of his situation.

Divine Right seemed a perfect solution to the problem of over-mighty subjects, especially for the protection of James' sons. The French kings, in an analogous situation, had come to the same conclusion. However, King James was too canny to actually rule according to his own dogma, particularly over the more politically and socially advanced English. His English subjects had nothing to complain of except his train of Scottish carpetbaggers.

James' son Charles I (1600-49) had a certain nobleness of character (all the Stuarts were charismatic), but was hopelessly pigheaded. Raised with that dogma of Divine Right, under a relatively stable monarchy, Charles saw no reason to cloak his true beliefs. But even as Divine Right reached its full flowering, political thought, especially in England, but also in Scotland, had already outstripped it. Civil war erupted. Ultimately, in an unprecedented act, King Charles was placed on trial and executed on the orders of a small group of MPs and army officers, for refusing to sign away his kingly prerogatives.

[Numberless leaders have been slain by their followers, but this was a more or less legal trial. "More or less" depending on whether one saw the King or Parliament as the Executor of the Law – and THAT is what the trial was all about.]

Some of the perpetrators actually wanted to do away with the concept of kingship and establish a Republic, but the informed majority of the populace acquiesced in the deed because Charles was felt to be completely intransigent and incapable of assuming the role of a constitutional monarch – he could readily acknowledge he was Under The Law, but reserved to himself the sole right to impose and arbitrate that Law for his subjects. Charles believed that his martyrdom would rekindle popular support for his sons. It did so, but not until people had become heartily sick of Cromwell's Protectorate.

Unhappy King Charles' sons, Charles II (1630-85) and James II (1633-1701), who both reigned after the Interregnum of Cromwell, had vastly different characters. Charles II, who was invited back by a nation fed up with dictatorial rule, was known as the Merry Monarch; he spent most of his reign trying to be as "un-Puritan" as possible. Fickle is the word that best describes him; the sort of man who promises you promotion to VP – and the next time you pass the open office door he's glad-handing your worst rival. Charles' prime agenda, like his father's, was to make Stuart rule absolute and his realm Roman Catholic, but he was cautious and rather lazy by nature.

In 1685 Charles II died, reputedly taking Catholic last rites, to the horror of the nation. His brother James, having hovered by his bedside until the end, immediately took charge and was crowned James II. On his accession, he refused to take the Coronation Oath to defend the Protestant Religion, and made demands which threatened the vested interests of the mercantile classes, the Clergy, and even the Army. The more radical Protestants of England and Scotland therefore contrived a takeover by the popular Duke of Monmouth – one of Charles II's natural sons – in that year, which failed through a divided command, and only led to reprisals. James' days were numbered, though.

The King's Religion



The Catholics had been feared in England from the time of Queen Mary's pogroms, not for their beliefs *per se*, but as agents of an international Papal conspiracy to dominate Europe. Rather like the Communists (or their Capitalist-Industrialist enemies) in the 20th Century. What the majority of Englishmen feared was not individual Catholics, or Catholic religious doctrine (superficially not all that different from the official Anglican religion), but "Popery" – that is,

having their nation guided by the will of foreigners, specifically French or Spanish ecclesiastics.

[Above: James II.]

On the issue of personal religion, there was a broad spectrum of opinion. Many Conservative Anglicans were later willing to ally themselves with those of the Catholic faith against the greater threat of the "radical" Whigs and their republican notions – some of those "free-thinkers'" interpretations of the Bible were rather too free for a stable society. On the other side, Reform Protestants (i.e. Lutherans, Presbyterians, Baptists, etc.) who were mostly Whigs, as a rule would have nothing to do with either Conservative Anglicans or Catholics.

Even after the Civil Wars and the reaction that followed in the Restoration of Charles II, Religion was still one of the most important elements in people's lives. But it was also a matter of national security. Today, King James' espousal of Catholicism in a country where the official religion was Anglicanism would be dismissed as one of his inalienable rights; a modern monarch would likewise never conceive of imposing his own beliefs on his subjects. And the reason this is so, at least in English-speaking countries, stems directly from the choice James II made.

Because in James' day, when the King, as Head of the national Church, embraced a different Faith, and especially when that King also embraced Absolute – arbitrary – Government, he was, by implication, compelling his subjects to adopt his views or face punishment. Ironically, on a personal level King James venerated Liberty of Conscience – to the extent that Jews, Moslems, and even Atheists, received greater toleration in England than in many other countries. At least on paper. Or when dealing with James personally.

The dilemma lay in the King's role as Head of the Church, and in the fact that that Church was one of the pillars of the State. Personally, James Stuart could allow someone to follow their own conscience, just as he was following his. For King James II, however, a person who disagreed with his actions had to be, by definition, an Enemy of the State.

It is possible that some kings might have found a way out of the dilemma, but not King James. As a Court observer put it, brother Charles could "see things if he would" but James "would see things if he could". Unlike his brother, James was upright, scrupulous, and embarrassingly honest. Also unlike his brother, he was as obstinate as a mule and as blinkered as a cart horse. And at the last, he became convinced he had a mission to restore England to the Catholic Communion.

His environment did not help. He had married a French princess, who, educated by Jesuits, was vehemently opposed to Heretics – most especially when they were her own subjects. Of course she had her own coterie of like-thinking priests and companions from her homeland. James was violently in love with her and would do anything to please her (though it should be mentioned he had secretly converted to Catholicism before his marriage, so his convictions were his own). At the same time, augmenting his Absolutist views, was the remembrance of his father's death at the hands of Parliament. At all costs that pack of regicides must not dictate his life. But they did.

Whigs and Tories

As early as 1679, a man named Lord Shaftesbury had put forward an Exclusion Bill in order to prevent James from ascending the throne. Shaftesbury was Chancellor of the Exchequer, the most powerful office in England prior to the institution of Prime Minister (whose earliest members typically held the former office). He was champion of those calling for a limit to royal power – for the Rule of Law, in essence – and was the founder of what would later be called the Whig Party.

The name Whig is derived from “Whiggamore” or cattle drover, and was originally a derogatory name for the Scottish religious dissenters of the 1600’s (who ironically fought for Charles I in Scotland’s little known Bishops’ War). In 1679 it was used as a label for the opponents of the Succession of the Duke of York (James II). The Whigs saw themselves as heirs to the Puritans, upholding Parliament against the Crown, and were for the most part religious Dissenters. Their power base was the minor landed gentry and the mercantile classes, as opposed to the aristocracy.

The Glorious Revolution of 1688 saw the rise of the Whigs as a party, and they dominated political life through the reigns of King William and the Georges, with only a brief interval in the political wilderness (1710-1714) under Queen Anne. They supported the Williamite-Stuart and Hanoverian (Georgian) dynasties in accordance with the Act of Settlement (1701), which prohibited Catholics from obtaining the Crown. In addition, they approved of British involvement in the wars of the period as being a means of expanding British Trade and Influence, but particularly Trade. Doctrinally, they followed the theories of John Locke, believing that the King ruled through a Social Contract with his people. For the Whigs, the final solution against a tyrant was revolution. The 19th century Liberals had their origins in the Whig coalition and both American mainstream parties did as well.

[Republicans probably adhere to Whig principles more closely than Democrats, but neither are anything like Tories. The latter all left the Thirteen Colonies for Canada during the American Revolution].

Charles II had avoided the succession issue by dispensing with Parliament for the last four years of his reign, taking immense bribes from Louis XIV of France in lieu of taxes in order to do so. Even so, James II came to power on a tidal wave of good will, with an Administration that was staunchly opposed to Whig notions. Their enemies called them Tories.

The name “Tory” was also derogatory, and originally applied to a group of Irish Roman Catholic “outlaws” (remnants of the English Civil War-era forces known as the Irish Confederate Army), then later to the supporters of the Duke of York during the debates over the Exclusion Bill (1679-80), which preceded the Act of Settlement of 1701. Later still, the name Tory was applied to the party that upheld the doctrine of hereditary right to the throne, primarily in the name of stability and order. (It should be pointed out that support of hereditary rule, or even Divine Right, did not imply support of Absolute Rule). The Tories incorporated the High Church party, favoured the rights of the aristocracy, and supported restrictions to the rights of non-Anglicans. They also opposed involvement in foreign affairs (wars cost money, which mainly came out of taxes on the aristocracy’s estates).

The Tory Party’s high-water mark was during the reign of Queen Anne, under Robert Harley, Earl of Oxford, and Henry St John, Viscount Bolingbroke. The party was soon tainted by “Jacobitism” (*a tendency to Jacobite views; views which will be explained in these pages*) at the highest levels, and fell swiftly from power after the succession of George I. Many of its members were exiled or executed for participating in the Jacobite plots of that era. Only during the latter part of the 18th Century was the party rebuilt, becoming the Conservatives during the 1800’s. No party today comes close to holding their views, except perhaps the odd Monarchist, but there is still a vestige of the old Country Principles that they once held.

Thus the Tories upheld the traditional concepts of kingship as a Divine institution – no matter what the faults of the man – and should have provided a balance against the Whigs, some of whom

were not sure that a king was even necessary. But James, convinced of his Mission and at the same time fearful of suffering his father’s fate, rode roughshod over the Law of the Land, frightening even the staunchest supporters of the Monarchy.

He refused to allow Parliament or the Church of England to interfere in his actions. He replaced current office holders with Catholic protégés appointed by Royal Writ instead of due legal process. He gerrymandered the electoral machinery to exclude Whigs and other undesirables, and he forced the Anglican clergy to promulgate a Declaration of Indulgence that released Catholics from their political and economic bondage. When seven of the most prominent Anglican bishops were chosen to deliver a formal protest, they found themselves on trial.

As a result, the Whigs saw a future of political persecution ahead of them; the Anglican Tories, one of religious persecution. The Tories would have supported the *man*, because he was the rightful heir, though they might disagree with his policies, but James seemed to want the Tories to sacrifice their personal beliefs as well. In this confusion of outlook lay James’ failure. By the time he attempted a rapprochement with the Tories, it was too late. His entire power base had crumbled.

Even the military turned against him. The tipping point was the birth of a male heir, which was a strong indication that James’ policies would continue into the next generation. When a Whig-Tory coalition of notables launched a coup and invited the Dutch leader William of Orange to take the crown, the Royal Army made only a half-hearted attempt to face the 10-15,000 troops the Stadtholder brought with him (many of whom were British soldiers on loan). James panicked and fled the country.

Although this Glorious Revolution was a régime change by force of arms and not a popular uprising as the Whig-inspired history books have taught England’s young for many generations, it had legitimacy. William was eligible for the Crown through his wife Mary II, who was James II’s eldest daughter, and also through his mother (another Mary), who was a daughter of Charles I, married into the Burgundian House of Orange (who now acted as Stadtholders or generalissimos for the Dutch Republic). William was therefore both son-in-law and nephew of James II.

The Whigs wanted to make a clean sweep of the Palace, and were willing to accept William of Orange as king to do it, though they rammed a Bill of Rights down his throat as security against Arbitrary Rule. Besides, both his wife and her sister, Anne, as Protestants, felt their claims were better than their father’s, and many Whigs agreed.

[That Bill of Rights pays for many subsequent Whig sins. It is, even more than Magna Carta, a foundation stone of Western Democracy.]

The Tory reaction was more complex. Initially, many of them wanted to use the threat of William’s intervention to wring concessions out of James. As in the Civil War, some began by claiming that only his “evil advisors” had to go. Then, when William made it plain that he would not only clean house but also be King himself, there was general panic and confusion amongst them. After James’ flight, many of these Anglican Tories became Jacobites because they still believed that James was the hereditary ruler and William a mere usurper.

Upon the completion of this “Glorious Revolution”, William found himself presiding over a fast dissolving Whig-Tory alliance. William and Mary were requested to rule jointly, which reconciled them to some of the more moderate of James’ supporters. A dour, stiff man, King Billy was not popular. Like previous Stuarts, he ruled over an England and Scotland linked only by the royal House. The Scots, in fact, had pointedly sent him a separate invitation to demonstrate their independence. In addition, William’s main interests lay with his Dutch Republic and in his efforts to protect it from the French. To him, England was just another resource in the struggle. Fortunately, William was an able administrator, and wise enough to leave the laws of the land alone.

The Last of the Stuarts

From an examination of her character, Good Queen Anne (1702-1714), Mary's sister, would appear to have been called "good" for the same reason mobsters are called "goodfellas" or the Devil is called "Robin Goodfellow". She had betrayed her father in order to obtain the Throne after the birth of that male child put an end to her hopes of gaining it in the natural course of events, and she had tried to limit her brother-in-law, William, to a Regency. But she was a devout Anglican, and a favourite with the People for most of her reign. Clemency was her watchword. She represented Stability. She was also the last of the true Stuart monarchs.

Anne is sometimes regarded as a Whig monarch, though she disliked that party intensely, and in 1710 encouraged a Tory takeover. Admittedly, this was partly because she had fallen out with her old friends, the Marlboroughs.

[The famous Duke of Marlborough, likewise conservative by nature, was forced to back the Whigs because they were the War party and he was Captain-General of the coalition against the Bourbon powers in the War of the Spanish Succession.]

As the Eighteenth Century dawned, a Succession Crisis loomed. Out of Anne's eighteen pregnancies, only five were successful, and all but one child died by age two. The survivor died in 1700, age eleven. By 1714, the grossly overweight and diseased Queen Anne was on her deathbed. Who, then, would succeed her?

[The best evidence for Anne's malady indicates Lupus.]

There were two primary choices. One was George Augustus Welf (1660-1727), Elector of Hanover. His claim was good, but distant, being traced to James I through the marriage of James I's daughter Elizabeth to Frederick of Bohemia (the Winter King of the Thirty Years War). His two best points were his Protestant Faith and his willingness to be a Constitutional Monarch. The other choice was contentious: James Francis Edward Stuart, son of the deposed James II – the baby of the Glorious Revolution.

Equally as Catholic, but not as inflexible as his father, James Francis had spent most of his life in exile at the French Court., and seemed likely to die there as well. Yet, there were persistent rumours that William, and Anne, too, secretly favoured his return. Unless he changed his religion, however, he was definitely excluded by the Act of Settlement that the Whigs had managed to secure in 1701. His opponents also painted him, not inaccurately, as the tool of France.

On August 1, 1714, George Augustus of Hanover became King George I of England.

The Jacobite Cause



With the arrival of William of Orange and the flight of James II, the Jacobites were born. The Jacobites took their name from "Jacobus", popularly supposed to be the Latin form of the name James. By definition, a Jacobite was someone who preferred a king from the old Stuart line to that of the "Williamite" or "Hanoverian" usurpers, for any number of reasons. Some Jacobites could be life-long adherents, perhaps devoting their entire fortune to the Cause, while others were Jacobites as long as it suited their interests.

The Jacobites also included those who were simply fed up with the current régime and wanted a change.

[Above: the Old Pretender, James Francis Edward Stuart.]

The Jacobite organisation can be likened to a modern parliamentary party in some respects, with the leadership endeavouring to reconcile individuals and small groups, and

alliance patterns shifting depending on the agenda. There were a number of such groups in the actual Parliament of the time. In other respects the "movement" has the Byzantine complexity and "empire-building" flavour of the modern CIA or KGB. At the centre of the "party" were James and his most devout adherents ("toadies" for those with Whig sympathies). Surrounding them were a variety of interest groups, ranging from lukewarm to fanatic, and numerous specialists and advisors. There were six main divisions: English, Scottish, and Irish, each divided into Protestant and Catholic factions. The Irish, as might be expected, were further divided into sub-factions.

Personality conflicts also caused serious splits. One of James Stuart's early advisors, Lord Melfort, put it this way:

"There are several gangs who trust not one another and all these must be managed separately according to their tempers and desires".

Melfort, alias John Drummond, himself led one of those gangs, and was not above enriching himself at the expense of the Cause.

As an example of this loose network, consider the following scenario. The Jacobites frequently made use of smugglers in their transactions. These men may not have originally held Jacobite sympathies, but were willing to act for them as long as they could turn a profit. Over time, the interests of the two groups might coincide more and more, the smugglers finding themselves labelled as "Jacks" and eventually identifying with their patrons.

[As an interesting sidelight, this intensive use of smugglers led to the formation of large smuggling gangs, which increased the need for an adequate coast guard and customs infrastructure on the part of the British.]

The Jacobites also had a party ideology – actually more a mythology – although it was never codified. Boiled down, it amounted to something like this:

a) James Stuart and his male lineage were the rightful rulers of Britain, who had been forcibly deprived of their possessions. Any action which helped them regain what was theirs was a noble act in the true interest of the nation, even to armed rebellion, rioting, murder, espionage for a foreign power, and seeking the intervention of foreign powers in British internal affairs.

b) The British people as a whole (in their constituent nationalities, and reluctantly including the Irish) longed for James' return, and only awaited a sign for them to rise up and spontaneously overthrow their oppressors. This was a false assumption, based on that wishful thinking, which has been evident in many exile societies. It derived from the first point, that James had been wrongfully dispossessed. People tended to forget what a nasty king he had been, especially after they had sacrificed their own fortunes in his cause. Among the population at large, Jacobitism usually confined itself to anti-establishment sentiment, and vague romanticism about the fair "king over the water", in preference to the fat German one at home.

c) Because of the fallacious assumptions of point "b", the constant failures that the Jacobites kept having – since of course they could not be James' fault or the Loyal Nation's fault – must be caused by Traitors Within. This caused painful divisions within the ranks, was encouraged by *agents provocateurs*, and virtually doomed all their efforts. The exile neurosis in action again. If the Jacobites had been able to act with any unity of purpose, they should have accomplished their aims. After all, the American Revolution succeeded through the active efforts of only 2-5% of the population and with 20-40% of the people hostile to the revolutionaries, so why not a Jacobite Revolution?

One of the philosophical pillars of the Jacobite Movement stemmed from the question of contractual kingship versus hereditary kingship. As indicated above, the Whigs supported contractual kingship at least as far as demanding a choice in monarchs. This was a new concept, derived from the writings of John Locke and others, and not palatable to everyone. The traditional view of an hereditary kingship was hedged about with religious controversy. By the Act of Settlement (1701) Catholics

could not be kings of England, but many people were willing to overlook James' beliefs if he would just keep them to himself. James II had, however, taken Divine Right one step further and conceived of an Absolute Rule, wherein his word was paramount. Only the most rabid Jacobites of his day agreed, but most of his supporters forgot or ignored this point when romanticising about the Stuarts' return.

Coupled with this intellectual question of kingship was a lot of emotional rhetoric pitting the Stuarts as tragic heroes trying to stem the tide of political and general moral decline. By contrast, their opponents claimed the Stuarts were evil Absolutionists and Roman Catholics trying to turn back the clock and undo Magna Carta. There is some truth on both sides. Most hard-core Jacobites held the notions of duty and honour very highly, both in their relations with their own class, and with those beneath them, but were intolerant of other viewpoints.

Despite Whig propaganda, Jacobitism was seen by many as a legitimate alternative to Whiggish principles, which tended to encourage self-seeking materialism and a lack of social stability (*laissez faire* without restraint). Jacobitism offered the political stability to be found in hereditary rule, and the moral stability and peace that comes with a well-structured social order. In a sense, the Whig political structure was dynamic, finding its balance in change and tension, while the Jacobite ideal was almost feudal in character.

(Put it this way. If you were stuck in a workhouse under Jacobite management, you might be dressed in rags and sleeping on straw, but you'd get a Christmas bonus and a good ration of gruel. Under Whig management, you'd get a bonus if you worked harder than anyone else but the cost of your gruel and straw would be deducted from your pay, and would be of inferior grade).

James II was the epitome of his followers. He himself firmly believed he had been both betrayed and unlawfully dispossessed. Exiled to France, he found himself and his heirs recognised as legitimate sovereigns by the Bourbons, to be used as catspaws by Louis XIV. The French connection meant that the Jacobites were not merely political outs; they were officially traitors. This partly explains the lack of active support for the later Jacobite uprisings in England and even in Wales. In Scotland, there was the tradition of the "Auld Alliance" with France to counteract this view. In the Highlands especially, where most of the population was Catholic, and political forms were still feudal in nature, the Stuarts found an active following.

Ireland was initially a Stuart stronghold, and the realm where James II's gerrymandering had born the best fruit, but, as already indicated, James' abandonment of the Irish killed his support there, though many Irish individuals remained Jacobites.

The Jacobite Rebellions

In summary form, the Jacobites' activities can be divided into roughly three peak periods: 1688-97, 1714-23, and 1745-53. In between these dates Jacobitism was not strongly in evidence in the public record. The year 1708 is a special case, when the new-minted Union between England and Scotland was nearly overturned by a French invasion in support of the Jacobites and just about everyone else in Scotland.

In the initial phase of Jacobitism, Jacobites could be found among Non-jurors (those who had not taken an oath of allegiance to William and Mary because they regarded them as usurpers), Catholics, some High Church Anglicans, and even a few Quaker sects. Most of the leadership was aristocratic. The movement's main power base was in areas with a large proportion of Catholic gentry (who were in a position to mobilise their tenantry). Ideologically, their aims were confused – merely anti-Williamite.

[For a long time, Anglicans could be divided into two main groups, High and Low Church. Low Church Anglicanism, espoused by the lower orders of society, tended to have Puritan overtones. High Church Anglicanism, favoured by the aristocracy and the Court, tended to have Catholic overtones, at least in its outward ceremonial aspect. These days the division is between Liberals and Conservatives.]

By 1714, Jacobite goals had coalesced into upholding the Stuarts' hereditary right to rule, and the seeking of moral reform for the country. At this time, a large number of Anglican Tories became Jacobites due to George I's proscription of their party (he believed they had betrayed the German States by causing Britain to withdraw from the coalition against France). Popular Jacobitism was widespread, and the propaganda mills churned night and day for both sides.

This was the best time for a general rising to succeed, but the '15, as it was called, failed, largely because the Tories had been playing both sides. They covertly assisted the Old Pretender while playing up to George I. The people as a whole would not act without organisation by the elites, but the elites themselves were disorganised. Another attempt in 1719, this time with Spanish aid, failed when the Armada was wrecked (*one wonders why the Spanish bothered – if it's an Armada against England, of course it will be wrecked*).

Throughout the 1730's the Tories were repeatedly frustrated by the Whig Government, and began to turn to the Jacobites once more. In 1744, facing a hostile military buildup in the Low Countries, France attempted to invade England in support of James Stuart, but the attempt was curtailed by storms that wrecked the invasion fleet, and by the presence of the Royal Navy. French preparations in 1745 were a mere scramble for the window of opportunity that James Francis' son, Charles Edward Stuart, opened when he decided to continue the operation on his own. Although a failure, the '45 gave new life to Jacobitism, which did not die out completely until the 1760's.

[The 19th Century revived it as a strand of the cult of Romanticism, but there was no risk to the State, just the risk of being mocked by non-believers.]

The Early Jacobite Wars

After King James II's flight from England in 1688, his supporters in Ireland, Scotland and England attempted to regain the initiative from William of Orange. The English attempt fizzled immediately, and the Scottish effort, although initially showing promise, dwindled to nothing after the death of their leader, James Graham of Claverhouse, at Killiecrankie. In Ireland, the disarmed Catholic south was totally at the mercy of the Protestant north; nevertheless they raised a huge body of men, who only required arms and training in order to take back the island for James.

After arriving in France utterly demoralised, James found himself punted to Ireland by his pal, Louis XIV, accompanied by a French "Military Advisory Command Ireland". The main Jacobite army of 30,000 men mustered at Dublin, where James held his Court, and after a period of manoeuvre, was drawn up to defend the capital behind the river Boyne in 1690. Not the inevitable defeat that the Orangemen claim, it nevertheless was a defeat, and James, who by this point detested the Irish Nation, abandoned the country. The Irish fought on, primarily in hopes of striking a bargain with King William.

There were a lot of reasons why this first "rebellion" (really a dynastic squabble) failed. The most important reason was probably the difference in aims of the three allied parties – Irish, French, and Court. The Irish wanted to liberate themselves from English rule, while James wanted to use the Irish to regain his cherished Whitehall Palace in London. The French cynically saw the whole situation as a way of diverting William from taking decisive action in the Low Countries, but did not really expect James to be successful. Amazingly, the war dragged on into 1692, becoming more and more a struggle for Irish nationhood, but for all intents and purposes, James' cause had already been lost outside Dublin.

After the Boyne, James retired to the court of Saint-Germain under King Louis' protection, accompanied by a large retinue, which was to be augmented over the years, particularly by Irish and Scots exiled for opposition to their Governments. Orbiting the Sun King, James served as a permanent threat to England's stability.

The long period of internal peace under William and then Anne brought out many grievances that would otherwise have been left on the back burner. In particular, the increasing number of foreign wars that the English found themselves assisting in was disturbing – especially to the aristocracy, mostly Tory, who paid taxes. The Catholics were also forced into their old role of political whipping boy, although outright persecutions were rare. Finally, there was Scotland.

The Union of 1707 that bound Scotland to England was highly unpopular north of the Tweed, and in some English quarters as well. In 1708, James II's son, James Francis – the Old Pretender, as he became known at the time – was dispatched north. James II had died in 1701, and King Louis had given him a deathbed promise to recognise his son as James III of England. The events of 1708 were to be the most nationalistic of the Jacobite Risings. Delayed when James became ill (most likely a stress-related malady; he was prone to them), a French fleet carrying six regiments of infantry made its way up the east coast of Britain, toward a rendezvous with supporters from every religious and political persuasion in Scotland. The mission was plagued by bad luck. The weather was bad. The flotilla was pursued by the Royal Navy. And the French Commodore lost his nerve and sailed home.

The “Fifteen”



[Above: Bobbing John, 6th Earl of Mar]

“James III” had been smuggled out of England while still a baby, and had grown up at the Court of Louis XIV. Though the French “cynically used” the Stuarts, the French King was at the same time their ardent champion, and had promised whatever aid he could for their restoration. Unfortunately, since he had publicly recognised the Old Pretender as the legitimate King of England, the name “Jacobite” had become synonymous with “French lackey”.

In England, meanwhile, the question of the Succession took on greater and greater importance as Queen Anne grew older without surviving issue. The Queen had favoured the Tories for most of her reign; the Whigs could not even get a look in. For this reason, continuing support for the Old Pretender was limited to the “hereditary Jacobite” families.

Furthermore, to choose the nearer heir (James) would mean the loss of everything the Glorious Revolution had gained. On the other hand, choosing George would mean the continued involvement in European squabbles that had begun with the Dutch liaison.

Nevertheless, and despite the illegality of selecting a Catholic (according to the Act of Settlement), the choice was by no means clear. The Tories naturally favoured the Old Pretender, hoping he could be persuaded to change his faith, no doubt. The Whigs, who were all for war and economic expansion, preferred George. With the Tories still in decline as a faction, the Whigs ruled the roost. In 1714, through what almost amounted to a palace *putch*, George Augustus of Hanover became King of Great Britain and Ireland.

George could have been used for an anti-German propaganda poster. Corpulent and sluggish, he spoke almost no English, and had no great love for his new people. They in return called him “King Log”. One of his first actions on becoming King was to ban the Tories from political life. The fact that the disenchanted Tories were already courting James did not help matters. For although German Geordie's accession was uncontested, his rule was not.

The triumphant Whigs let vindictiveness get the better of them. Rebellion seemed the Tories' only hope for political survival. The Jacobites emerged from the woodwork and joined with them. “*Eight months of Hanoverian rule... had done more for the cause of James Stuart... than had four years of the Tories under Queen Anne*”. James Francis answered the call. The '15, or the Earl of Mar's Rebellion, was the first major Jacobite action since 1689. It failed for two reasons.

First, by delaying until George had assumed the throne, the Jacobites placed themselves in the position of rebels (and they could already be conveniently be labelled as traitors due to King Louis' overt support – Louis inconveniently died in 1715 so his promises of aid went unfulfilled). Second, the Jacobites were hesitant and divided in council, being a group composed of everyone who hated the Whigs.

The Old Pretender, recently exiled from the French Court to Lorraine as a political embarrassment, needed decent leadership in Britain to make the rising work. This he did not have. Lord Bolingbroke, the most competent and influential plotter in England, took himself off to Lorraine to be with his prince and left the Jacobite-Tory faction in confusion. (Bolingbroke's forte was plotting – that was *his* problem).

Uncoordinated risings took place in the West Country, northern England, and the Highlands of Scotland. The West Country rising was nipped in the bud, largely through the actions of General George Wade, who quickly garrisoned the important towns and seized the bulk of the Jacobite arms caches. The rising in northern England might never have occurred except for some wild words spoken in a public house. Only a few gentlemen and their retainers took up arms; most of them were desperate characters. They managed to link up with a party of Scots (with whom they had violent disagreements), but were crushed at the battle of Preston. Only in Scotland was a major rising successful – for a time.

The Scots marshalled a large army of both Highland and Lowland troops from some of the most prominent clans and families of the day. Even the famous Rob Roy MacGregor took a hand. This army concentrated in the lands around the town of Perth while debate raged as to what action to take. The Scots commander, the Earl of Mar, known as Bobbing John for the consistency of his political views, was overly cautious (well, he *was* only in arms because George had snubbed him at Court).

He did initiate raids against the Campbells in the west, and sent a force on a surprise move south across the Firth of Forth, but in general Mar allowed himself to be intimidated by a much smaller government force. James himself eventually showed up, but it was too late. His gloomy attitude after another bout of illness did not lend encouragement to the proceedings. After a tactically inconclusive battle at Sheriffmuir, north of Stirling, the rebellion just collapsed. James fled back to the Continent.

The rebellion was put down, but the Administration was quite lenient, only executing a few of the top leadership (most of whom were allowed to flee). The House of Hanover was secure, despite the muted aftershocks of the Swedish Plot (1717) and the less muted Glenshiel campaign (1719). When George died in 1727, England had enjoyed a decade of peace and prosperity. For almost a generation after, the Jacobites appeared to have vanished.

The Forty-Five

In a very real sense, there was a generation gap among the Jacobites of the Last Rising. Many of the older men in Britain had made their peace with the government; conversely, those abroad had become bitter and cynical, more interested in winning personal redemption or financial restitution than restoring the Stuarts. In contrast, the younger generation, led by Charles Edward Stuart, the son of the Old Pretender, had been raised in a haze of romance about the old days.

In Britain, meanwhile, there was a new ruler – or rather, two rulers. George II (1683-1760) was one, and Robert Walpole was the other. George II's ascent of the throne raised barely a murmur.

This is not to say that his reign was completely smooth and unruffled. There were tremendous social injustices to be dealt with, only they weren't dealt with, merely suppressed. Along with the stability of George's and his father's reigns came the so-called Whig Hegemony, two generations of rampant mercantilism and corruption – but also the greatest prosperity the British Isles had yet seen.

Walpole held the position of Chancellor of the Exchequer, and is often considered the first Prime Minister, in fact if not in name. The phrase “Bob's your uncle” dates from his régime – picture a young man gone to town to make his fortune and getting a “place” in the Government by joining Walpole's Crew.

Walpole's fears of the Jacobites bordered on paranoia. Realising that the Jacobite Movement was a tool of the French, he sought for peace and a balance of power in Europe. His domestic enemies sought to provoke war with France. By doing so, they would get rid of him and combat their latest trade rival at the same time. George himself was amenable to war, because he wanted to protect and expand his Hanoverian territories.

Walpole's fall in 1742 created a vacuum of parliamentary talent that greatly assisted the Jacobites. Ironically, Walpole, the quintessential Whig, was removed for his isolationist and pacifist tendencies. His replacement was Lord Granville, a man even more corrupt, whose sole focus in life appears to have been the acquisition of more and more power through the preferment and patronage of his cronies. Jacobite threats did not increase his power, so he ignored them. Fortunately he was soon replaced in turn by the Duke of Newcastle (Lord Pelham); also corrupt but somewhat more able.

As Walpole had feared, the last Jacobite Rebellion came as a French ploy. Britain had become embroiled in the struggle between Prussia, France, and Austria over the question of the succession of Empress Maria Theresa. Most important to British interests was the enmity of the Bourbons of France and Spain. In 1741, an expeditionary force was raised and sent to join the Hanoverians and Austrians camped in the Austrian Netherlands (what is now Belgium). The French were temporarily allied with the Prussians against Austria, so their focus was in Germany, and the Flanders Front remained quiet. Then, in 1743, George II led a victorious defence (despite himself) at Dettingen, on the river Main, that left France burning for revenge.

In the summer of 1744 the great *Maréchal* Maurice de Saxe prepared to take an expedition of 10,000 men to England, striking directly at their enemy's heart – London. Charles Edward Stuart, the Young Pretender, would be installed as Regent on behalf of his father, who remained in exile at Rome.

The move was aborted after a storm wrecked much of the invasion flotilla. By May of 1745 the French had regained the strategic initiative at the battle of Fontenoy and were no longer interested in invading England. But in July, Prince Charles, who had been hanging around the French Court since the previous year, decided to act on his own...



TIMELINE OF THE '45

[“*Bliadhna Thearlaich*” is usually translated “Charlie's Year”. A more literal translation would be “The Year of the Fair One”. “*Thearlaich*” is pronounced “Charvack”. Prince Charles heard the Highlanders call him that and thought they were calling him “Charlie”. Ah... my People. See how they bond with me. Actually they were calling him “pretty boy”, though in a complementary way. He looked just like their idea of a King. But looks were not enough.]

[Dates: OS = Old Style dating, as used in Britain; NS = New Style, as used on the Continent. In the 1740s, there was an 11 day difference in the calendar. It should be noted that under the Old Style, New Year's Day was celebrated in March, but this fact has been ignored in the following timeline.]

WARMUPS

1739: The War of Jenkin's Ear. The Jacobites reopen links with the French government.

1740: Maria Theresa succeeds as Empress. Europe begins the slide into a general state of war.

1741: The “Associators”, a group of prominent Scottish Jacobites, send word to their exiled brethren of their willingness to rise at any time.

1742: The French and Jacobites discuss the possibilities of landings in England or Scotland.

January 1743: The aggressive Cardinal Tencin becomes Louis XV's minister. He owes his cardinal's hat to “King” James. Tencin originates the idea of a personal landing, without troops, which will gather a following and commit the French.

June 1743: English and French troops, their countries not yet at war, confront each other at the battle of Dettingen. The English win the day despite George II's blundering – French blundering overwhelms him.

August 1743: James Butler, a leading Jacobite, is sent to England to assess the chances of Jacobite support for an invasion by the French. His report is very favourable.

November 1743: The war party among the French nobility gains the ascendancy over King Louis XV. The decision is made to declare war on England. Orders are given to make ready the shipping necessary for an invasion. In Rome, James Stuart is advised of Louis V's support for his claims.

December 1743: Prince Charles is formally invited to accompany the French expedition. This will make the invasion a domestic affair.

January 9, 1744: Charles leaves Rome in disguise, bearing a commission to act as Regent for his father. He arrives in Paris toward the end of January.

February: *Maréchal* de Saxe begins to embark 10,000 men at Dunkirk. His orders are to sail up the Thames and take London.

March 3 (NS): A part of the naval escort arrives off Dunkirk.

March 6 (NS): A violent storm disperses both the British and French fleets and sinks or grounds many of the French transports. British cutting-out parties inflict more damage. Charles, in despair, first proposes that he travel alone.

March 20 (NS): After refusing to kick Charles out of France as the British demand, France declares war on England.

April: Charles leaves the Channel coast and takes up residence in Paris.

November: The Associators, seven in number, are informed that Charles is determined to come to Scotland. Most are uneasy, but declare their support to one another. The members include the Highlander clan chiefs Lochiel and MacLeod of MacLeod (who in the end refuses to raise his clan, despite his written guarantee), and the Earl of Perth.

February 1745: Charles moves to Picardy. He is still determined to proceed. The Associators are more alarmed than ever.

May 22 (NS); May 11 (OS): The French beat the English at the battle of Fontenoy. Charles is enthused, and believes the moment is ripe. The French do not give him a sou, so he borrows enough money to pay his debts and outfit his expedition, including 1,500 muskets, 1,800 broadswords, and 20 field guns. He gains the services of a Franco-Irish slaver and a Franco-Irish pirate; they supply the ships.

July 3 (NS): The Prince's party boards the 16-gun merchant brig *Du Teillay* at the mouth of the Loire, and set sail for Belle Isle to meet their escort, the 68-gun frigate *l'Elisabeth*.

July 12 (NS): *l'Elisabeth* finally arrives at Belle Isle carrying about 700 soldiers from the Irish Brigade. (Some accounts state 60 men of de Maurapas's Marines, or 100 engineers and officers – take your pick).

July 15 (NS); July 5 (OS): The Prince sails for Scotland. *The Old Style (English) calendar is used from here on. Ghent falls to French arms.

July 9: H.M.S. Lion (58 guns) engages the two Jacobite ships off the Lizard. After 5 hours of engagement at point-blank range, both warships are disabled and limp away. The *Du Teillay* proceeds on her own after futilely attempting to take aboard the French soldiers. The town of Bruges capitulates to the French.

July 11: The *Du Teillay* is pursued by another vessel, but escapes again.

July 22: After a circuitous route, land is sighted.

THE RISING



[Above: Lord George Murray.]

August 25: Cope, now at Dalnacardoch, receives word of Jacobite intentions to attack him at the Pass of Corryarrack.

August 26: At Dalwhinnie, Cope holds a council of war and it is agreed to march on Inverness, as the "Jacks" are thought to be well entrenched in the pass. That night the Jacobite advance guard takes possession of Corryarrack.

August 27: The Highlanders prepare for battle, until informed by scouts and deserters that Cope has withdrawn north. (Cope had more trouble with the terrain than with the enemy. At Stirling he had 21 days rations. By the time he reached Dalwhinnie he had only 2 days rations). The Jacobites decide to go for Edinburgh.

August 29 Cope arrives at Inverness, his troops exhausted. He immediately arranges to be met by transport ships at Aberdeen.

September 3: The Jacobites reach Perth via Blair Atholl and the Tay valley.

September 4: Cope marches on Aberdeen. James III is proclaimed King at Perth by the Jacobite advance guard, and Charles then enters the town. Spies report his forces to be about 1,800 men. Here Lord George Murray joins the Prince. Charles has run out of his initial funds, so a general levy is taken.

September 11: The Jacobites, at 2,400 men, leave Perth.

September 13: The Jacobites cross the river Forth at the Fords of Frew, west of Stirling.

September 15: The Jacobites occupy the rather dingy Linlithgow Palace.

September 16: Cope embarks his troops. Meanwhile, the Jacobites continue their march, screened ineffectively by Gardiner's Regiment of Dragoons. In the afternoon, Edinburgh is called upon to surrender. A defence is set up with the Dragoons and local trained bands at Coltbridge, but they flee upon the Highlanders' advance, leaving their baggage behind.

September 17: Cope lands at Dunbar (instead of Leith, due to contrary winds). Meanwhile, Edinburgh's attempts at delay are forestalled by a successful surprise assault on the Netherbow Port (gate) at 5 am. The city falls, but the Citadel holds out (it is never taken). James is proclaimed King again.

September 19: Cope leaves Dunbar for Edinburgh.

September 20: The Jacobites encounter the Government Army near Prestonpans. Both sides wait out the day, unwilling to attack across unfavourable terrain.

September 21: After a night flank march, the Jacobites destroy Cope's army in the morning. No mobile Government army is left in Scotland. Waverers for the Cause are now confirmed. £3-4000 of cash are seized. Many Highlanders head home with their booty.

September 22: The Jacobites re-enter Edinburgh, with pipes and drums playing, carrying their spoils and with several hundred prisoners in their rear.

Excursus: Prestonpans 21 September 1745

In this engagement, both sides were seeking a decisive battle. The Jacobites approached from Edinburgh to the west and the "Hanoverians" from their landing site at Dunbar in the east. Earlier, after marching north against the rebels and missing them at the Pass of Corriearick, Cope had gone to Inverness, then marched round to Aberdeen, where he found a convoy to take his column south. He couldn't simply retrace his steps: for one thing he would have been one step behind the Jacobites all the way, and for another, he was short on rations. He had intended to land at Leith docks (the port of Edinburgh) but contrary winds forced him to land further east, at Dunbar.

Charlie and the "Jacks" had marched south from Glenfinnan and after similarly missing Cope's forces through faulty intelligence, taken the old military road south to Blair and the valley of the Tay. At Ruthven Barracks, the tiny permanent garrison repulsed them, so they bypassed it. The column stopped for some days at Perth, one of the old capitals of Scotland, in order to raise money and drum up recruits. Here Charles proclaimed his father James as King and welcomed many prominent Jacobites, including the reluctant Lord George Murray and the feckless but politically correct Duke of Perth. Then the miniature army had marched on Edinburgh, bypassing Stirling Castle with its even more minuscule garrison and scattering a party of Government dragoons and local militia who sought to stop them at Coltbridge, west of the Capital. Upon reaching Edinburgh the Jacobites found the gates closed against them, but after negotiations had failed they were able to seize one of the gates – the Netherbow Port – by slipping through the doors when they opened to let a carriage through.

This *coup de main* shocked the already shaky garrison and the city fell without a fight, although the octogenarian governor of the castle, General Guest, refused to surrender and began sporadically firing on the town. (George Drummond, the city provost, had assembled the city's trained bands in defence of the walls, but as

they marched through the town their numbers steadily dwindled until he was left with only 40 men or so by the time he reached the gates). Despite the threat from the castle guns, Charlie indulged in a victory parade (reputedly 20,000 people attended), and yet another proclamation of James as King. By this time, word had been received of Cope's arrival to the east of the city.

After spending two days disembarking at Dunbar, General Cope led his men cautiously along the flat coastal plain, failing to conduct a reconnaissance of the higher ground to the left (south) of him. When the two sides encountered each other near the hamlets of Prestonpans and Cockenzie, the Jacobites were approaching along the heights of Falside Hill, not from the western plain as expected by Cope.

While the Jacobites arrayed themselves on the slope above, General Cope arranged his forces. His army, consisting of four under-strength foot and two dragoon regiments, backed by a few of Lord Loudon's Highland militia, constituted almost the whole of the mobile forces in Scotland. Most were raw recruits, many of them Irish. The dragoons were dispirited after their rout by the Jacobites at Coltbridge, and their mood infected the rest of the army.


Cope's initial position was a strong one, facing south, with villages and walled parkland on his flanks, and a bog and ditch to the front at the bottom of the Highlanders' slope. Lord George Murray, Charles' principle lieutenant and field commander, judged

the ground between the armies as unsuitable for an attack. The Jacobites, at this point mostly Highlanders, were in much better spirits than the Army of Scotland, and were mainly concerned that their enemy might escape them. To this end, 500 men – 2 battalions of the Atholl Brigade – were sent to the west to prevent Cope slipping into Edinburgh via the coast road. Murray, not informed of this action, threw a tantrum when he found out, but apparently only because he had not been consulted.

With both sides declining to attack, it was too late to seek combat that day, so the armies encamped within hailing distance. Assuming they would attack downslope in the morning, O'Sullivan, Charles' quartermaster general, deployed the Camerons in a forward position, but the enemy brought them under a hasty bombardment and they were withdrawn. It seemed that a traditional downhill rush would be difficult to bring off.

Then, during the night, one of the Jacobite gentlemen recalled a little known path through the bog at the bottom of the slope. Immediately the men were roused, and orders given to slip along this path and deploy to the east of Cope's position. Messengers were sent to recall the 500 blocking troops from the west, and the whole army made its way silently, and with some difficulty, along the path.

Some accounts state that the plan was Murray's from the start, and that his officers were annoyed at having to make a flank march across Cope's front, which would alert the enemy to the plan, and even more annoyed



that Murray had not consulted them – an interesting point considering his own fit earlier in the day.]

By this time it was early morning, and a thick fog lay on the ground. Despite all precautions, the Government picquets detected them and rode off to sound the alarm. Swiftly the Jacobites deployed. General Cope's only reaction was to redeploy his men 90 degrees about, so that they faced the enemy.

[This could have been done one of two ways, either by facing the line to the left and wheeling in "column of route", or by facing "right about" and then "forming" to the right like a swing door].

"As the sun rose the mists rolled away, and revealed the two hostile hosts in their positions. There lay between them a level and naked plain, without bush or tree – in fact, it was a stubble field. The Highlanders no sooner saw the enemy than, taking off their caps, they uttered a short prayer, and pulling their bonnets over their brows, they rushed forward in their separate clans with a yell that was frightful. The stubble rustled under their feet as they ran, and there was a deep murmuring of their voices, as they all continued talking as they went. The cannon, consisting of seven pieces and four [six] coehorns, fired upon them, but did little execution, and rushing up to their muzzles they took them by storm... The men who served the guns were not regular artillerymen, but seamen, whom Cope had brought from the fleet. They fled at the furious onset of the Gaels, and left the guns in their possession.

[Actually most of the gunners fled immediately; the commanders of the coehorns and guns, respectively, with a supreme effort, managed to fire off all their pieces save one, but of course, they could not reload without crews.]

"Colonel Gardiner [Cope's lieutenant] now endeavoured to charge the advancing enemy with his dragoons, but it was in vain that he attempted to animate their craven souls by word and example – at the first volley [and a pretty ragged one at that] of the Highlanders they wheeled and fled. The same disgraceful scene took place on the left, at nearly the same moment. Hamilton's regiment of horse [dragoons] dispersed at the first charge of the Macdonalds, leaving the centre exposed on both flanks. The infantry made a better stand than the cavalry; it discharged a steady and well-directed volley on the advancing Highlanders, and killed some of their best men, amongst others a son of the famous Rob Roy. But the Highlanders did not give them time for a second volley; they were up with them, dashed aside their bayonets with their targets, burst through their ranks in numerous places, so that the whole, not being able to give way on account of the park wall of Preston, were thrown into confusion, and at the mercy of the foe."¹

[Cope, confident that his mounted element was unchallenged, had deployed the dragoons in two-rank lines instead of the usual three. For raw troops, this was asking too much.]

At this point organised resistance ceased. In a matter five or six minutes, a major battle had been decided. Prince Charles, coming up with the second line, spent the remainder of the fight trying to stop his raging followers from hacking the surviving Government troops to bits. The entire force was either killed or captured, save some hundred or so men who fled into Edinburgh, and the dragoons, who were long gone. General Cope fled to Coldstream, and later Berwick, leaving his orders, dispatches, and £2,500 in the kitty. Lord Mark Kerr, the Warden of the East March, commented acridly that he must have been the first general in history to arrive at headquarters with the news of his own defeat.

[In 1690, James II brought word of his own defeat at the Boyne to King Louis XIV.]

Reasons for Victory

Both sides were evenly matched in numbers. (Of the Government regiments, one half of Lee's was still in England, and most of Guise's was tied up garrisoning the northern forts). There were some Loyalist Highlanders, too, but they (perhaps wisely) had been set to guard the baggage at Cockenzie. The Government had both cannon and cavalry, while the Jacobites had only fifty troopers, purposely kept in the rear to reduce the noise of their approach. The Government artillery consisted of four 1.5-lbers, with six Coehorn mortars to their right, and a hundred-man artillery guard. Neither side deployed unusually. In fact, the

Jacobites accidentally left a gap in the center of their line, which the second echelon was unable to fill in time.

The advantages of high ground were discarded, since the Highlanders came down and fought on the flat. The whole turning movement appeared to place Cope at a disadvantage, by taking away the defensive benefits of his position. But in their new position, the Government right was protected by a deep ditch. Further to the right, beyond the ditch, lay a large patch of bog known as Tranent Meadows, as well as Colonel Gardiner's estate – Bankton House (after the battle the mortally wounded colonel died literally on his own doorstep and one wonders what input he gave to Cope's dispositions, as he was second in command). The left was uncovered, though, with the baggage park some 500 yards away on that flank, and the coast of the Firth of Forth nearer a mile. The walls of Preston House to the rear were some ten feet high and virtually impassable (holes had to be punched through them to allow access).

The quality of the commanders did not feature significantly; even Cope's failure to reconnoitre really had no impact on the actual course of the battle and was offset by the Jacobite leadership's inability to submit to each other's authority. It was a pure infantry frontal assault.

There was no element of surprise, beyond the speed of the attackers. The Jacobites moved at great speed, in deep columns, chasing away the cavalry and turning both flanks rapidly (one open, the other shielded). The guns were overrun as their guard retreated in disorder. Surrounded on three sides, and blocked by the walls in their rear, the infantry could not retire and were forced to surrender. The Jacobite second line never even entered the battle, spending its time trying to close the gap between the two Jacobite wings.

In fact, the key to the Jacobite victory lies in the inexperience and demoralised nature of Cope's recruits, compared with the high spirits and hand to hand fighting skill of the Highlanders, and in Cope's lack of a decent artillery train – the latter fact was the sole charge that remained against him after his court martial, though it was hardly his fault. The battle was won through shock action, enhanced by the speed and violence of the attacking troops. At the time, the ferocity of the Highlanders and their grim handiwork with the sword shocked even their own officers.

Timeline Continued

October 1745:

- The Jacobite ranks swell, the men train, and money and supplies pour in. Six Swedish 4-lbers arrive from France at Stonehaven, along with small arms and equipment.
- The "Hanoverians" begin withdrawing their troops from Flanders to deal with the rebellion, while the Whig clans organise in the north. The English people as a whole remain apathetic.
- 6,000 Dutch arrive under the terms of an old treaty, to assist against the rising. The King also returns and Parliament is convened.
- Three armies are formed to deal with the situation:

14,000 men (including the Dutch) under Field Marshal Wade at Newcastle

10,000 men under General Ligonier to defend Lancashire

6,000 men (roughly) to defend the capital and the south coast

October 3: the French council of ministers decides to send an invasion force to support Charles.

October 13: The French sign the Treaty of Fontainebleau, officially promising aid to the Jacobites.

¹Taken from Cassell's Illustrated History of England, Vol. 4, Cassell Peter and Galpin, London. pp. 500, 501.

October 17: Charles declares the Union of Great Britain dissolved.

October 24: The Treaty of Fontainebleau is ratified, committing France to give all practical assistance to the Jacobites. They begin invasion preparations.

October 29: Wade's column reaches Newcastle from points south.



October 30: Charles and his council debate the invasion of England. Most of the chiefs are against it, but in the end agree. They (specifically Murray) stipulate an advance into Cumberland (the western route).

October 31: Charles agrees to the westerly route and gives orders for the march. By nightfall the army has been concentrated. They will march in two columns, to confuse the enemy, and link up in Cumberland.

[Above: Field Marshal Wade.]

November 3: Their assembly complete, the Jacobite army begins its march. It is 6,000 strong. 500 men desert before the border, almost none after it is crossed.

November 5: Antoine Walsh, the ship owner who assisted Charles, is ordered to assemble transports for the French Channel crossing.

November 8: Charles and his group cross the Esk into Cumberland, near Canonbie.

November 9: Murray and his column join Charles at Rockcliff and the Jacobites approach Carlisle. The defenders of the town send for help to Wade.

November 10: Charles calls upon Carlisle to surrender.

November 12: The Jacobite army leaves Carlisle, marching east to counter Wade's rumoured approach along the Stanegate (a shoddy replacement of the old Roman Wall supply route). It is only a rumour; Wade is still collecting supplies and recruits in Newcastle.

November 13: Word is received at Carlisle from Wade: Roads impassable... food supplies low... thanks for coming out. The Highlanders simultaneously reappear. After the town militia deserts, the citizens prevail on the governor to surrender.

November 14: The first stirrings of trouble between Murray and the Prince – bypassed in the chain of command throughout the siege, Murray resigns his commission, which Charles accepts; the Highlanders object and force Charles to make Murray take back his commission; his diffident rival the titular Duke of Perth resigns instead.

November 15: Charles replies to a parley from the town – the citadel must surrender also. In the afternoon, the terms being agreed, the Jacobites occupy Carlisle; Charles is preceded in his triumphal entry by an hundred pipers. Meanwhile, Wade sets out from Newcastle.

November 17: Wade reaches Hexham, learns of the fall of Carlisle, and withdraws, suffering 1,000 casualties due to the terrible conditions.

November 20: The Highlanders march south, leaving 150 men as a garrison. 9,000 men under Wade pursue them at a distance, while General Ligonier's force, strung out in a cordon from Chester to Nottingham, prepares to receive them.

November 25: The Écossais Royaux, FitzJames Horse, and some Irish Piquets, all members of the French Army, and commanded by Lord John Drummond, land at Montrose.

November 27: The Jacobites reach Preston, scene of two historical defeats of the Scots – they camp on the south side of the Ribble river to avoid any bad omens. Ligonier has fallen ill a few days after accepting command and is replaced on this date by the Duke of Cumberland (Charles' cousin).

November 28: Manchester is captured by "a Sergeant, a Drummer and a Whore". Actually the Sergeant has the assistance of 5-600 local Jacobites, and manages to enlist about 180 recruits.

November 29: Charles enters Manchester. A Manchester Regiment is formed over the next few days. Word is received from France: expect an invasion by the 20th of November (OS).

December 1: The Jacobites march on Derby. Arriving at Macclesfield, they receive word that Cumberland is only 17 miles away at Newcastle-under-Lyme (to the west). Murray proposes making a feint against Cumberland, while the main body force-marches toward London. This is agreed upon and the plan works handily.

December 2: Cumberland pulls in his troops and marches on Stone, to cut the Jacobites off (he thinks) from Wales. The road south is wide open. Meanwhile, the French Irish Brigade marches for Dunkirk and embarkation.

December 3: Lord Loudon, with several companies of Highland Militia (11 companies out of an expected 20), marches from Inverness to relieve Fort. Augustus, currently besieged by the Frasers. The Frasers withdraw on Perth.

December 4: The Jacobite advance guard reaches Derby. They are only 125 miles from London, a march through easy terrain and the most civilised part of the realm. Panic reigns in London; while the King gives orders for his yachts to be made ready, there is a run on the Bank of England.

December 5: Murray reports to Charles that the chiefs are against going on. Charles is in despair. After two councils, he gives in. Now some begin to believe they should continue, but it is too late; Charles is having a fit of the sulks.

December 6: The retreat begins, aided in part by false reports of a third (nonexistent) army rapidly approaching. Drummond predicts that a French landing is immanent.

December 7: The first French troops begin loading at Dunkirk.

December 8: An emissary arrives at Derby from the English and Welsh Jacobites declaring their readiness to rise.

December 10: A French landing at Pevensey is rumoured, but proves false.

December 11: Loudon arrives at Castle Downie, Lord Lovat's residence (he is chief of a large part of the Frasers). While feigning support for the government, Lovat makes his escape, bringing yet more men to the camp at Perth.

December 12: Another bogus French landing, this time in Sussex.

December 13: The Jacobites arrive at Lancaster, dispirited and harassed by a now hostile population. They are threatened by dragoons under General Oglethorpe (Wade's command) at Preston, and by Cumberland's advance guard only 8 miles to the south. Cumberland is delayed 24 hours by orders and counter-orders regarding invasion rumours. The Jacobites gain a much-needed respite.

December 15: Charles and his army arrive at Kendal. The Duke of Perth returns to the army after an abortive attempt to collect reinforcements.

December 17: The Duc de Richelieu arrives at the Channel Ports to take command of the invasion, only to receive word of the retreat from Derby. The build-up continues, but there is no impetus. The Jacobites arrive in Penrith, just south of Carlisle.

December 18: The Jacobites, slowed by their artillery and baggage, are scouted by advanced patrols from Cumberland's forces. The Highland rearguard arrives at Clifton and Murray sets

up a blocking position. That evening, Cumberland orders the position cleared, but instead, the Highlanders again rout the dragoons. News of the Jacobite retreat reaches Richelieu, disheartening his efforts, already behind schedule due to the chancy weather.

December 19: The Jacobites re-enter Carlisle. The Prince is more cheerful, having received good news regarding the new army training at Perth, and the arrival of the French troops under Drummond.

December 20: The Jacobites vacate Carlisle, leaving a 400-man garrison, including the Manchester Regiment, merely for the whim of holding a town in England. The army recrosses the Esk, and is divided into two columns again; one feints toward Edinburgh and then marches on Glasgow, the other also marches on Glasgow following a westerly route.

December 21: Cumberland reaches Carlisle and invests the town, having to wait a week for six 18-lbers unloaded at Whitehaven. The Jacobites offer to surrender the town, but are ignored.

December 23: The Prince's column arrives at Thornhill.

December 25: Charles spends Christmas at Hamilton Palace, while Murray moves on Glasgow.

December 26: Charles enters Glasgow, a notoriously Whig town. There is no enthusiasm among the people. What the army needs is requisitioned by force. The Jacobites remain over the New Year.

December 27: The target date for the French sortie. The tides prove unfavourable.

December 29: D-Day for the French. The winds are in the wrong quarter.

December 30: After prolonged bombardment of the city's already decrepit walls, Carlisle hangs out the white flag. Cumberland wants to massacre the prisoners, but fears the political repercussions. They are eventually herded down to London, to be tried and executed or "transported" as slaves. Around this time, Lord Lewis Gordon defeats Government forces under MacLeod of MacLeod at Inverurie (near Aberdeen).

December 31: The Royal Navy is now in sufficient strength off the Downs to block a sortie from the Channel Ports. But the French are already talking of shifting the invasion troops to the Flanders campaign.

January 2, 1746: The main Jacobite army is in fit state to travel, and Charles holds a general review. The first of twelve battalions of British infantry arrive at Edinburgh. Louis demands that Richelieu embark at once, but even a token landing at Rye is thwarted by the fear of British warships.

January 3: The Jacobites leave Glasgow for Stirling. Back in Scotland, Charles is more hopeful. The Gordons are out in force, along with the Macintoshes, Farquarsons, Mackenzies, and Frasers. Charles' column arrives at Bannockburn the same day. Charles has something like 9,000 men, and proposes to take Stirling Castle, an important magazine, as well as a chokepoint into the Highlands. Meanwhile, Murray's column feints toward Falkirk, and then retires on Stirling.

January 5: Murray and Charles combine their forces. The Jacobites ferry their artillery across the Forth (three pairs of Swedish made guns: 16-lber, 12-lber, 8-lber), in the face of the Royal Navy. They demand the surrender of Stirling town that evening. The local militia, totally confused, opens fire on the parley drummer, who drops his drum and runs away.

January 6: Lieutenant-General Henry "Hangman" Hawley arrives at Edinburgh. His first action is to erect two gallows.

January 8: After a Jacobite battery is set up against Stirling, the town council decides it would be best to surrender; the terms are agreed this day. All is not well with the rebels, however. Desertion is rife, and the chiefs demand that the Prince reinstitute the regular councils of war that he had discontinued after Derby. He

refuses, and the grumbling increases. Meanwhile, the French engineer in charge of the siege, M. Mirabelle (or Mister Miraculous, as he is known) is proving himself a total incompetent. Cumberland has returned to London to oversee its defences against the French. Wade has retired from active duty, and been replaced by Hawley. In the north of England, Lieutenant-General Handasyde has replaced Cope. The French are now only going through the motions, as Marshal de Saxe siphons off troops for Flanders.

January 10: Hawley's army is concentrated at Edinburgh – the pick of the British troops. More are on the way.

January 13: Major-General Huske marches west from Edinburgh with 5 battalions, plus cavalry and militia, as the advance guard of Hawley's force. They arrive at Linlithgow. The Jacobite troops are divided between Bannockburn and Falkirk. Murray sets out from Falkirk for Linlithgow, to destroy any supplies that may be there before the enemy arrives in strength. Both sides stand off across the Avon, a local river. Eventually Murray retires on Bannockburn.

January 15: After several delays, Hawley sets out from Edinburgh.

January 17: Hawley's forces concentrate at Falkirk. Here they are joined by a large number of militia, including Loudon's 64th Regiment, the Argyll Militia, and Lord Home's brigade of Lowland Scots. Hawley now has 8,000 men. After deploying for battle each day since the 15th, the Prince's army finally marches out to find the government forces. Charles, leaving 1,000 men behind to cover Stirling, also has 8,000 men. In the early evening, the armies clash on Falkirk Muir. Aided by torrential rain and a strong wind in the faces of their enemy, the Highlanders once again defeat their opponents, although the Jacobites themselves nearly have their flank turned, and after the battle are so disorganised that it might as well have been a rout.


Excursus: Falkirk 17 January 1745

This battle was also a head-on confrontation sought by both sides, but now the Jacobites, suffering from the stresses within their leadership and weary after the aborted invasion of England, faced twelve veteran battalions of foot, three cavalry regiments, and about 2,000 Whig militia.

The Jacobites were besieging Stirling Castle, a chokepoint on the north-south invasion route. At this time Charles was ill with influenza, and to make matters worse, he refused to call a council of war – had refused to ever since the retreat from Derby began – and was scarcely on speaking terms with his primary lieutenant, Lord George Murray.

Stirling Castle had been a thorn in the Jacobite side since the start. Most of their reinforcements were gathered to the north of the Forth river, on which Stirling sits, and being bypassed at the beginning of the campaign, the castle had not only held out, but had been reinforced. Furthermore, it acted as a base for piquets and patrols covering the fords of the river (virtually the only route south from the northeast, as most of the land between the estuary and Loch Lomond was either bog or the "Ardennes-like" forest of the Trossachs. West of Loch Lomond was Campbell country, and the Campbells were Whigs. Makeshift ferries were used across the Forth estuary, but this route was fraught with the risk of an encounter with the Royal Navy.

The Lowlands as a whole had proved unsympathetic to Charlie's cause; the more so after his retreat from England. In the west, the Whigs of Glasgow and Galloway detested the Highlanders to a man, and in the east, the "Hanoverians" had reclaimed Edinburgh early on from their bases at Newcastle and Berwick. The Jacobites were penned in, with their supports on the other side of the Forth. Fortunately, they had been able to bottle up the garrison of Stirling in the castle, but the siege was not proceeding well.



The castle sits on a high outcrop of rock, surrounded by miles of alluvial plain dotted with woodland, in those days made sodden by a high water table. After weeks of preparation, a battery (of a mere 6 guns, none heavier than an 18-lber) was unmasked by the Jacks and immediately destroyed by the castle's first salvo. This was partly due to the Jacobites' master engineer, M. Mirabelle de Gordon, or Mister Miraculous, as he was known, a drunken incompetent.

As mentioned, Charles was ill and neither taking nor receiving advice. Lord George was on reconnaissance in the west, but when he did report, tactlessly told his prince he would do better to delegate command to a group of his colonels. This Charlie adamantly refused to do and spent most of his time composing a lengthy letter to that effect, when taking time out from the ministrations of his latest mistress. Meanwhile their subordinates moseyed on with the siege without direction and the Hanoverian regime marshalled its forces for another round.

Major-General Henry "Hangman" Hawley, an arrogant, hard-charging veteran who had worsted the Highlanders facing his brigade at the battle of Sherrifmuir in 1715, headed up this new effort. Unfortunately for him, he had formed his impressions of Highland warfare serving on the victorious wing of that battle – the other end of the line had itself been routed by some of the fiercest of the clan regiments. He believed that the Highlanders were terrified of cavalry (true in the past) and that one good charge should sent them packing. Although he did draw up comprehensive instructions for defeating them in a more defensive type of battle, he did not allow (or was not given) enough time to train his men in the new tactics.

From Edinburgh, Hawley's advance guard under Major-General John Huske creaked slowly toward the Jacobites, who were billeted over a wide area between Stirling and Linlithgow. Upset by his approach, the Jacks rallied at Bannockburn, site of the medieval victory of Robert the Bruce, and a well-omened location (omens being important to the superstitious Highlanders), as well as the home of Charlie's mistress. The men clamoured for action. On the 15th and 16th of January, a reported 8,500 Jacobites drew up for battle, but Hawley and the main body of his troops only arrived at Falkirk on the 16th. As the Government army did not appear to be in evidence, Charles moved out in search of them.

Lord George Murray again displayed his operational talent. He left about 1,000 men to blockade Stirling, set a portion of the remainder to making a demonstration as if marching directly on the Government camp in front of Falkirk, and circled the bulk of the army south onto the high ground of Falkirk Muir, overlooking the town from the southwest.

The Government troops were overconfident. General Hawley, after having failed to provide outposts for his camp, was taking lunch with the attractive Lady Kilmarnock (whose husband was with the Rebels, although she herself was a Whig) as the Jacobites approached. His second-in-command, General Huske, was deceived by Lord George's stratagem into mistaking the direction of the Jacobite march. The troops had been stood to since dawn, but upon seeing the rebels near at hand, the whole army was thrown into a panic, the officers crying out "Where is the general?" and "We have no orders!" Hawley was sent for, but he appeared unconcerned by the reports of imminent battle, and it was not until the Jacobites had reached the outside edge of the moor that he finally joined his army, hatless and riding hard.

In Hawley's favour are some reports that he was actually on reconnaissance on another part of the field. In this version, of events, however, the army was still facing the wrong way and had to be redeployed from its position in front of the camp, the columns straggling out across a mix of enclosure, marsh, and bog, as they closed at right angles to the speedier Highlanders.

[A key factor in the issue of speed might be that until the Seven Years War, armies did not use cadenced marching. For a force of regulars, this slowed movement considerably, since the lines had to be halted frequently to correct their dressing. The Highlanders, on the other hand, and the

militia, for whom firearms were a secondary weapon, were not as concerned with dressing, which would allow them to move much faster and in greater comfort over broken ground.]

Dusk was coming on rapidly as both sides now attempted to gain the high point of the moor. The Government dragoons got to the crest first, even though they had the steeper slope, but they were unable to prevent the Highlanders from anchoring their right flank on a bog. In addition to the advantage of ground, the Jacobites were positioned with the wind at their backs, while a storm that had come up suddenly drove rain into the faces of the government troops.


The Jacobites were to deploy in the standard formation of two lines and a reserve, but due to the nature of the ground the regiments were widely separated – the horse still wading the marshes far to the rear. With their right flank anchored and the remainder of the first line hurrying to fall in to the left, the Jacobite right found themselves charged by the three dragoon regiments, whom Hawley, ignorant of the true situation, had first ordered to cover his infantry's deployment, and then to drive the Rebels off the high ground.

The dragoons should have taken the left flank of a coordinated advance, but in fact they were compelled to charge upon a force that was four times their number, because the Hanoverian foot were still struggling up the wet slope. (Note that the diagram, based on some "official" artwork of the day, does not make this point clear – try to picture the forces starting at right angles but with the Jacobite right and the Government left converging and engaging each other first, then the rest coming up in instalments from the bottom of the picture to the top).

"The order being given, the cavalry under Ligonier [a Colonel, not the General, who was still recovering from a near-fatal illness] charged the Macdonalds, who coolly waited till the English horse was within ten yards of them, when they poured such a murderous volley into them, as dropped a frightful number from their saddles, and threw the whole line into confusion. [An estimated 80 casualties in some accounts. Again, these were dragoons, not horse.] The Frazers immediately poured an equally galling crossfire into the startled line, and the two dragoon regiments which had fled at Coltbridge and Prestonpans waited no longer; but wheeling round, galloped from the field at their best speed. Cobham's regiment stood firm, but the Highlanders continued their fire with such steady effect, and the hill and the storm were so against the English cavalry, that they also wheeled to the right and went off betwixt the two armies, under a galling discharge from the Highland left wing. The Macdonalds, seeing the effect of their fire, in spite of lord George Murray's endeavours to keep them in order; rushed forward, loading their pieces as they ran, and fell upon Hawley's two columns of infantry. Having discharged their pieces, they ran in upon the English with their targets and broadswords.

"They would have suffered severely from the English infantry, but the muskets of the English had got wet, and many of them would not go off, while the Highlanders had protected their locks with their plaids. The left, therefore, soon gave way, and Hawley, who had got involved in the crowd of flying horse, had been swept away with them down the hill, and thus had no means of keeping them to their colours. On the right of the royal army, however, the infantry stood firm, and as the Highlanders could not cross the ravine to come to close quarters with sword and target, they inflicted a severe slaughter upon them, and Cobham's cavalry rallying, soon came to their aid and protected their flank, and increased the effect on the Highlanders, many of whom began to run, imagining the day was lost. Charles, from his elevated position observing this extraordinary state of things, the enemy's left being squandered, but his right being in the act of routing his own left, advanced at the head of the second line, and checked the advance of the English right, and, after some sharp fighting, compelled them to a retreat. But in this case it was only a retreat, not a flight. These brave regiments retired with drums beating and colours flying in perfect order. They found Burrel's [Barrel's] regiment, and part of two other regiments, making a portion of Hawley's column, [that is, the Government left] still standing their ground, and uniting with them, they marched in order to the front of their camp, where the rest of the army had rallied, except the two regiments of unparalleled infamy, which never drew reign till they reached Linlithgow".²

²Cassell, pp. 516, 518.



OPPOSING FORCES
GOVERNMENT

1. 59th Foot (J. Ligonier, 300)
2. 62nd Foot (Batterau, 350)
3. 3rd Foot (Howard, 400)
4. 14th Foot (Price, 300)
5. 4th (Barrell, 300)
6. Royal Scots (400)
7. 36th Foot (Fleming, 350)
8. 13th Foot (Pulteney, 300)
9. 37th Foot (Monro, 400)
10. 34th Foot (Cholmondeley, 400)
11. 27th Foot (Blakeney, 300)
12. 8th Foot (Wolfe, 300)
13. 10th Dragoons (Cobham, 300)
14. 13th Dragoons (F. Ligonier, 180)
15. 14th Dragoons (Hamilton, 180)
16. Militia (650-700)
 - a. Glasgow Regiment
 - b. Paisley Volunteers
17. Mamore's Brigade (800)
 - a. Black Watch (1 cy)
 - b. 64th Highlanders (Loudon)
 - c. Argyll Militia

JACOBITES

- A. Cameron (800)
- B. Appin (300)
- C. Fraser (300)
- D. McIntosh (200)
- E. Farquharson (150)
- F. Cromartie (200)
- G. McPherson (300)
- H. Clanranald (350)
- I. Glengarry (800)
- J. Keppoch (400)
- K. Gordon (400)
- L. Ogilvy (500)
- M. Atholl (600)
- N. Kilmarnock/Pitsligo (180)
- O. Irish Piquets (100)
- P. Royal Ecosais (2cys)
- Q. Elcho/Balmerino (180)

Seafield Farm

Battle of Falkirk 2
17 January 1746

0 meters 200

The cavalry did not simply recoil, it wheeled to the right and rode along the front of the clan regiments for some distance, being fired on by each in turn until it fled, hotly pursued by the Jacobite right. Some dragoons broke through, but were engaged in hand to hand combat with the second line and were either beaten off or captured. The fleeing cavalry rode down their own Glasgow Militia which was dutifully anchoring the left of the Government second line all by itself, and also disrupted the advancing left (or front) of the two infantry columns. The troops who withstood this rout briefly witnessed the ominous spectacle of riderless horses galloping down from a skyline of bonneted clansmen, and were then assaulted by the Highlanders, who in following their prey had outflanked the whole Government army.

On the right side of the hill, three Government battalions held, and with volley fire, and by the fact that a ravine to their front prevented either side from coming to grips, nearly routed the Jacobites opposite them in a counterattack led by Cobham's newly-rallied dragoons.

[Everything from the Royals leftward bolted, although Barrel's bravely held its ground].

The Government army was saved from obliteration by the fact that Murray, unwisely commanding on foot, was unable to rally the clans – many men wandered the field searching for loot or merely chatting with one another about their accomplishments until it was too dark to see.

Ultimately, the Government units that were still in good order retired on Falkirk, quickly tried to destroy their camp, then fled to Linlithgow, where those who had previously run were already looting and spreading rumours of disaster. On the Jacobite side, the MacDonalds and their allies mingled with the rout, rushing on to plunder what they could, while the rest milled about in the dark trying to find their leaders, many of whom had left the field in search of their men. It took days for both sides to reorganise themselves.

Reasons for Victory

Probably the most important factor in this battle was the Government generals' continued underestimation of their enemy, and consequent lack of preparedness. General Hawley had been on the victorious wing at Sherriffmuir (1715) and was not impressed by kilts. If he had been less sanguine, he would never have ordered the dragoons to attack immediately. In doing so, given the constricted terrain, and the fact that many of his units were still in march column, he forced his cavalry and infantry to attack independently. First off, using cavalry against unbroken infantry was a recipe for disaster on the 18th Century battlefield (although at Fontenoy the Dutch-Hanoverian-Austrian horse did just that, but only as a diversionary move). Second, the dragoons did not even form line to charge, but merely rode forward in a jostling mass, anticipating that the Highlanders would panic and flee at the sight of them. Ultimately, the cavalry, when routed, started a chain reaction that disordered the entire left flank (that is the head of the deploying Government columns). The only reserve available, the Argylls, was not behind the army, but still on the right flank, nearer their camp than the action and at the bottom of the hill.

Similar evidence of haste and lack of preparedness can be seen in the wet firelocks of the troops of the left. Wet powder was such a common occurrence on the battlefield that to not take precautions by covering the locks as the Highlanders did smacks of negligence on the part of the officers, or at least a very confused assembly – especially considering that these regiments were the pick of the Army. There is evidence that the men were far more concerned with surviving an exhausting climb up and across sodden moorland than what they would do when they got to the top. (Incidentally, pre-packaged cartridge-and-ball was introduced shortly before this time and while the militia may have used antiquated arms, the regulars were issued with it – however, the locks and pans would have been the main concern). Alternatively, the men may have simply been making excuses for running away. Note that the regiments on the right apparently had no trouble with *their* muskets. These units came up last and had less of a distance to march; presumably their officers had time to think.

They were also not charged out of the gloom by screaming savages, because of the ravine in front of them.

The handling of the Hanoverian artillery is a prime example of the incompetence and lack of initiative that the British Army could display, in compensation for her normally sterling performance. The officer in question, later cashiered, had no orders and was unable to obtain them from his immediate superior, General Huske, being referred to Hawley. Unwilling or unable to disturb the General, he did nothing but return to his position, and upon finally receiving orders to bring up the guns, in his haste promptly drove them into a bog.

Part of the problem that both sides faced was the difficulty of commanding troops who disappeared from view periodically. Not only was it turning dark, and the weather bad, but the battle raged up and down a steep slope that peaked down the length of the moor from east to west. Lord George Murray at the top was unable to see or stop the confusion on the right-hand slope, and likewise, the Hanoverian commanders were unable to see how effective a stand they were making on their own right.

On the Jacobite side, decisive action by Charles saved their isolated left from being turned, a dangerous situation brought about by the precipitate advance of the MacDonalds. This insubordination, typical of Highland armies, and requiring strong leadership to keep it in check, was growing as the campaign turned from bad to worse, exacerbated by Murray's constant arguments with the Prince and his "inner sanctum" of Irish.

Ironically, the spontaneous advance caused the defeat of the Government army, as the Highlander's skill in close quarter battle again proved superior, even against seasoned troops. It is interesting to speculate as to what might have happened had the battle been conducted as a stand up firefight. Since the clansmen did not use cartridges, they were accustomed to firing a single volley and then charging. The Highlanders, opposed by disciplined troops, would probably have had the worst of it, despite their intermittent musketry practice, and either broken or charged forward in order to alleviate their sufferings, as happened at Culloden.

As a postscript, Hawley was court-martialled, but like Cope, was acquitted. For one thing, he had made himself useful to the régime in numerous "black ops" and knew too much to be dismissed out of hand. He served under Cumberland, whose attitudes and personality traits he shared, and commanded the right wing cavalry at Culloden.

[Most secondary accounts of the battle are confusing, or give a picture distorted by Hawley's whitewashed reports. For a clearer, more detailed account, read Bailey's "Falkirk or Paradise" listed in the bibliography.]

Timeline Continued

January 19: With his troops still confused and dispirited after their victory, Charles moves back to Bannockburn, while Murray remains at Falkirk with the Highlanders. The Jacobites now spend 10 days in mounting three of their six cannon against the castle.

January 29: The Jacobite "battery" is unmasked in preparation for bombardment, and is immediately demolished by the castle's defending artillery. The same day, the chiefs propose that the army retreat into the north. Charles, unable to change their minds, agrees.

January 30: Cumberland arrives at Holyroodhouse (Edinburgh) and concentrates his army.

January 31: Cumberland reaches Linlithgow with a reconstituted army and Murray withdraws his contingent to Bannockburn. The retreat begins, with the Jacobites spontaneously in flight across the Forth like a beaten army.

February 1: Cumberland arrives at Falkirk.

February 2: The Highlanders under their Prince reach Crieff, while the remainder of the Jacobites march to Perth.

February 4: Charles leaves Crieff and marches up the Tay Valley to Castle Menzies. The artillery train has been reduced to 8 guns,

despite the recent capture of H.M.S. Hazard. Cumberland's forces at Stirling leave that place for Crieff.

February 6: Charles arrives at Blair Atholl. Cumberland is at Perth, only 24 hours behind, but decides against an immediate encounter and spends two weeks in the town.

February 8: Prince Frederick of Hesse (Cumberland's brother-in-law) lands at Leith with 5,000 Hessians, and they are assigned to guard the southern Scottish counties. More Loyalist militia arrives at Perth from Argyll. These are sent into Breadalbane to harry the MacDonalds and their associates. Murray and a small cavalry force leave Montrose for Aberdeen.

February 10: Charles and the main body leave Blair and arrive at Dalnacardoch. He remains while his army continues on to Ruthven.

February 12: Charles moves to catch up with his forces.

February 15: After blowing up Ruthven Barracks, the Highlanders march on Inverness. They find it heavy going; the passes are filled with snow.

February 16: The Prince arrives at Moy Hall and is entertained by the winsome 18-year-old Lady "Colonel Anne" MacIntosh. *[Alternate sources portray her as a 20-something harridan. Either way, she was a fanatical Jacobite].* Lord Loudon Campbell leads a flying column to take him, but is foiled by the lady's retainers, who simulate an ambush (the Rout of Moy). Many of the Whig clansmen desert.

February 19: The Prince sets up his HQ at Culloden House, property of Duncan Forbes.

February 20: After thorough preparation, Cumberland's army moves out. Small forces are detached to guard critical points, but the main body marches to Aberdeen via Montrose and the coast road. Fort George, surrounded by the Jacobites, capitulates and is blown up. *[The modern fort was completed after the rising; the demolished site was originally Inverness' citadel, improved by General Wade.]*

February 21: Murray and his men, after an arduous march around the coast, rejoin the Highlanders.

February 22: A group of Highlanders besiege Fort Augustus. It holds out for 10 days.

[At right: William, Duke of Cumberland.]

March 1: Fort Augustus surrenders after a shell lands in the powder magazine. The besieging commander, Brigadier Stapleton, turns his attention to Fort William. Skirmishing continues for a week around this site.

March 12: Murray marches south with the Atholl Brigade to try and retake Blair Atholl.

March 16: Murray's force reaches Dalnacardoch. Seven outposts are attacked, all successfully. Murray seizes the Pass of Killiecrankie (south of Blair).

March 17: The attack against Blair commences, but is not effective.

March 19: The Duke of Perth sets out north of Inverness, in pursuit of Loudon and the northern militias, who disperse.

March 20: Stapleton begins his bombardment of Fort William. This continues for two weeks. Since the government dominates the sea, the garrison is in no real danger. A party of MacDonalds takes Dunrobin, the seat of the rabid Whig, Lord Reay. During this time also, the *Prince Charles* (ex-H.M.S. *Hazard*) is run aground at the Kyle of Tongue, with a vital load of stores, ammunition, and cash. 1,500 men are dispatched north to try and salvage it. They are too late, but will miss the party on April 16th.

March 30: Around this time, 3,000 Hessians and 300 cavalry under Frederick arrive at Dunkeld. They are not very enthusiastic, but the threat is enough.

April 2: Murray breaks off his siege of Blair and retires north. The Jacobites also give up the siege of Fort William and retreat on Inverness.

April 3: The Jacobites are concentrated at Inverness, except for the northern detachment and the Army of the Spey (merely an army of observation).

April 8: Cumberland, after training his men to resist the Highland Charge, leaves Aberdeen, marching around the coast in constant contact with the Royal Navy.

April 11: After lynching two Jacobite spies at Banff, the Government forces leave that place, joining up with their advance guard.

April 12: Cumberland marches on Fochabers. The Jacobite Army of the Spey, some 2,500 men, retires, leaving the vital crossings of the Spey River unguarded.

April 13: The Government troops arrive at Alves. The Jacobites march out of Inverness, and make camp at Culloden.

April 14: Cumberland reaches Nairn, only 10 miles from Inverness. As the advance guard enters the town, the Duke of Perth and his rearguard are just leaving. Skirmishing causes some casualties.

April 15: The Jacobites are drawn up in battle array, but it is Cumberland's birthday and no action ensues. He is 25, as is his cousin Charles Stuart. The MacDonalds in the latter's army are incensed when their traditional place at the right of the line is assigned to the Atholl Brigade. The Jacobite leadership proposes a night attack, but the plan goes wrong. Exhausted and starving, the troops are in no condition to fight the next day.

April 16: The Battle of Culloden. The Highlanders raggedly assemble on a piece of flat, boggy ground, in the same dispositions as before. Cumberland's troops "stand to" in less than two minutes. The Jacobites endure a "heavy" bombardment, charge piecemeal, and are mown down by canister and volley fire. Charles is persuaded to retire, covered by the still disciplined French contingent and the Lifeguards. The Rising is over. At this moment, Antwerp is surrendering to *Maréchal* de Saxe. Mons, Namur, Charleroi, and eventually Brussels follow suit.

Excursus: Culloden 16 April 1746




Culloden or Drummoissie Muir was the final and truly decisive battle of the Rising. Most authorities agree that the Jacobites were defeated before the battle began. Not only were the troops hungry, but they were exhausted by the abortive night attack on Cumberland's camp at Nairn, which Murray had felt at the time was the best hope of success, given that many of his men were away foraging or still enroute to the battlefield. (The Jacobites had about the same number of men in total as the Duke of Cumberland, but they were scattered throughout the north while the Government troops were in one location). Finally, the constant

wrangling between the various factions within the army culminated in the famous decision to take the MacDonalds away from the post of honour on the right, a decision which reputedly caused that clan to hold back in a fit of pique.

[An alternative explanation for the immobility of the MacDonalds is the threat of cavalry on the left, once the clan had advanced past the wall protecting its flank, and the very boggy ground to their front that made charging difficult in the first place. In fact, after MacDonalds were repulsed, this body of horse did charge, but encountered the Irish Piquets and Royale Ecossais, who successfully held them off, withdrawing in good order.]

The Hanoverians, on the other hand, were well organised, and in much better spirits. Cumberland was no great strategist (in fact he lost most of the battles he was entrusted with and even had to



surrender his entire command during the Seven Years War) but he was brave, and popular with the men. His army had spent the worst of the winter training to avoid the mishaps of earlier battles, using, ironically, General Hawley's maxims which should have been employed at Falkirk. For the first time, the regular companies of the Royal Artillery, mainly their Swedish-style battalion guns, would be brought to bear.

When the battle came, it opened with an artillery duel in which the Jacobites were completely outclassed. The Clans suffered under this barrage, which caused few casualties, but was demoralising because there was no effective response. They had some guns, but the bulk of the French gunners were still napping in Inverness, unaware that they were needed. Everything seemed to go wrong for the Jacobites. The Prince's orders to advance were first ignored by Murray, who felt he did not have enough men assembled, and later intercepted when a second messenger was killed.

The regiments in the first line were forced to extend their ranks in order to conform to the ground, almost creating an "echeloned" formation. Meanwhile, the second line was soon required to

defend against the threat of dragoons and militiamen on the Jacobite right flank and could not reinforce the attack.

The threat to the Jacobite right developed gradually, as the Argyll Militia broke down a series of stone walls enclosing Culloden Park, allowing the bulk of two dragoon regiments, Cobham's and Kerr's, to come behind the Jacobites. By this time the Highland Charges had been repulsed, and Charles' forces were already falling back.

The main effort was made against the Government left, possibly because the ground was firmer here (there was a dirt track), but this meant that the Jacobites were compressed into a small area, with enemy troops on their left and to their front and a wall of stones on their right. Barrell's Regiment was initially kicked back, but supported by four regiments from the Government second line helped form a dogleg, forming a kill zone into which the Highlanders poured. Fresh troops from the Jacobite left, unable to charge across the boggy ground to their front, drifted upon the right, and pressed into the mass of Highlanders already rendered immobile by the steady fire of 1,200 British regulars. The slaughter was tremendous.

For most of the battle, the MacDonalds stood by, "sulking". Eventually they charged, but by this time the other clans were falling back. At roughly the same time, the cavalry under Hawley managed to break out of the farm enclosures on the Jacobite right and charge the second line's flank, causing the rout of almost the entire force. The Prince's bodyguard, horse and foot, withdrew in good order, and continued to defend his person.


Reasons for Victory

Culloden is an excellent example of the proper employment of all three combat arms. The Government troops were not only experienced in Continental warfare, but now knew what to expect from the Highlanders. They had received extra training and were well fed and properly equipped, being accompanied by a large fleet of transports and warships lying in the Moray Firth. For the first time in the Rising, artillery played a decisive role, firing in direct support of the infantry to soften up the enemy. The infantry then engaged the bulk of the enemy (in this case defensively), while the cavalry moved to outflank the Jacobites and the artillery continued to ply the enemy ranks. With the breaking of the enemy

infantry, the Government cavalry completed the rout, followed up by the foot regiments dragging their guns with them.

Special mention is made in most accounts of the techniques taught to the British troops. Instead of thrusting with the bayonet at the man directly threatening him, each soldier was to thrust at the opponent to his right, uncovering the Highlander's shields. This drill, requiring a high degree of coordination and trust, coupled with a three-rank volley (as opposed to the more common volley by platoons), stopped the Highlanders cold.

The Jacobite Army, on the other hand, here demonstrates how not to fight. Their troops were already demoralised and divided. The leadership could not agree on what to do. The artillery was virtually useless, as the French crews did not realise their presence was required, while there were not enough horses to equip more than a few men for the cavalry. Most of the Jacobite horse fought dismounted – the foot guards, for example, were a collection of dismounted gentlemen. (Some accounts say sixty or so, total, against three dragoon regiments and Kingston's Horse – over 1,000 men). The battle therefore devolved on the Highlanders. Could they have won?



Perhaps if the whole line had assaulted quickly, maintaining their front so that all the enemy were engaged equally and prevented from converging their fire, they could have broken through, since rushing the enemy was still effective when facing black-powder weapons. They would have thus lessened their sufferings under the musket and cannon fire, and beaten the English cavalry to the punch before the latter got out of the enclosures. However, casualties would have undoubtedly been quite heavy, and since the Hanoverians outnumbered the Jacobites almost two to one, there would probably have been enough regiments available to cope with any breakthrough. Given the overall situation, it has generally been argued that they should not have fought at all.

Even at the time, there were advocates for a retreat to the hills and the waging of a guerrilla campaign. This was one reason they had retreated so far north in the first place. But, as Lord Elcho questioned, where would they have obtained food in such barren terrain? The harvest had been poor, and the men with the army were the ones needed to gather it. The recent wreck and subsequent capture of a French treasure ship meant that the Prince was forced to pay his men in bread, which naturally reduced the ration stocks further.

Moreover, fifteen hundred men were dispatched on a wild goose chase after the treasure, only to be rounded up by the northern Whig clans. Several hundred more men were scattered about, guarding the various approach routes to Inverness, or simply foraging.

The Prince's only other option was surrender. Considering the expected fate of his men (borne out by events) and the price on his own head, perhaps he felt that it would be better to go out in a blaze of glory; better for he and his men to die in battle than in the prison hulks. Like his great-granduncle one hundred years before, at the last he was led somewhat unwilling from the field, turning his back on the opportunity for martyrdom.

Timeline Continued

April 17: The Jacobites muster 4,000 men at Ruthven Barracks. Having lost confidence in his army Charles refuses their offer to continue the fight (not even attending the muster) and proposes to return to France, assemble a French army, and invade England. With this promise, the clans see no need to continue in arms and disperse. Charles heads for the west coast.

Early May: Another Jacobite muster on the shores of Loch Arkaig proves abortive. Hunted on all sides, Charles is forced to double back and go into hiding.

AFTER

Charles spent several months flitting between the Hebrides and the central Highlands, until a French ship, *L'Heureux*, collected him. He arrived in France on October 10th. The next day, de Saxe won the battle of Raucoux. Apart from a brief, "secret" visit to London as a private person in 1750, Charles did not return. By the end of 1746, the British Army had succeeded in hunting down most of the rebels, whatever their station in life, not forgetting to loot and pillage the villages they passed through as a matter of state policy. Scotland was placed under military rule. Some 3,500 prisoners were taken altogether. The nobles were mainly executed, as well as 1 in 20 of the rank and file. Those who were to hang were chosen by lot. The fate of the others, left to rot in the prison hulks speaks for itself – a casualty rate of 22% prior to being "transported" to America and the West Indies, or "volunteered" for service in India. The Transportations began in 1747 and were still running two years later. Overall, the French were the true victors; de Saxe used the British troop withdrawals to conquer Flanders and penetrate into Brabant, ultimately making the Dutch position untenable. With the Dutch suing for peace, Britain was forced to do the same, culminating in the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, in 1748. Ironically, the one successful British action of 1745 – the capture of Louisbourg, Nova Scotia, by American provincials – enabled them to restore the balance of power by trading the fortress against the French gains. The American colonists did not see the advantage, however. The trading of Louisbourg without their consent was yet another argument for self-government.

THE ARMIES

*We watched thee in the gloamin' hour,
We watched thee in the mornin' grey;
Though thirty thousand pounds they gave,
There is nane that wad betray.*

"Will ye no come back again?"

THE LEADERSHIP

*Always remember that his peers and critics define a man's reputation.
Only his character is his own. And that is often hidden with time.*

A word on general officer ranks in the British Army of the period. They are, given in ascending order, Brigadier General, Major General, Lieutenant General, General (of Infantry, Cavalry, or Artillery), Field Marshal, Captain General. A captain general would be in overall command of a theatre or even of the entire field army. The title was a rare one. Up to this time, only Marlborough and Cumberland had held it and its implications were mainly political and social, rather than military. The similar French rank of *Maréchal*, by the way, equates to the original meaning of Lieutenant General (the King's lieutenant). The field marshal was originally the man sent by the king to survey the potential battlefield and mark out the positions for the troops. General Wade was honoured with the title and during the '45 was asked to take command of the forces in Scotland – he declined the position but not the rank. Lord Stair was also a field marshal, and at times the commander of the British contingent in Flanders, but his *forte* was politics and diplomacy (he ran a highly efficient secret service from Paris). A full general (originally *Colonel General*) also might take on the job of army commander or hold a staff position under a field marshal, such as Inspector of Horse.

Lieutenant generals were the King's/captain general's primary subordinates, usually commanding a wing on the battlefield, the wing being comprised of several brigades. Major generals on the other hand, were originally intended to command *lines* of battle. For example, the captain general might command an army of two wings deployed in two lines and a reserve – or perhaps he would have a field marshal exercise the actual command while he supervised (leading to confusion when "el supremo" wanted to hog all the glory and stepped in at a critical moment). Under the army commander, a lieutenant general would lead each wing, with each line directed by a major general (directed, not commanded). The major general could take over the wing if the lieutenant general was put out of action; he might instead command a body of cavalry, which was usually on the outside of the wing. Each wing might have its own major general for each of its lines, too. Much depended on the number of high-ranking officers present on the battlefield, all demanding their share of *la gloire*. The reserve would be under the direct control of the captain general or his designate. Major generals could also be given independent command over detachments of troops, or be entrusted with the supervision of one of the combat arms (e.g. the artillery park or the cavalry screen).

The Government Leaders in the '45

Careers for the Government (i.e. Hanoverian régime) officers generally followed the same pattern: commission as cornet (horse) or ensign (foot), promotion via purchase/time in rank, patronage, and/or competence on the battlefield. The most aristocratic officers usually started in the Guards, a fashionable cavalry regiment, or even as colonels. In the end, holding a senior command depended on social status and income, but most of the British generals had enough field service – a lot of them under the Duke of Marlborough – to have some familiarity with their profession. In composition, the officer corps absorbed not only native Englishmen, but in succession large numbers of exiled Huguenots (like General Ligonier), Irishmen, and Scots (including former Jacobites). It was one mark of distinction for the British Army that it was able to weld these men into a unified officer corps – something that the Austrians and French were never able to do to the same extent.

The regimental system arose out of the political struggles between the Whigs and their Tory opponents. The Tories as the opposition "party" (political parties at this time were not official but were basically just interest groups) used the debate on the Mutiny Acts as a weapon against the Administration, citing "Cromwellian oppression" and "encroachment of liberties" and calling for "reductions in force". Knowing the Tories would use this tactic, the Whigs made sure their cost estimates were pared to the bone. In order to do this, they contracted the work of recruiting out to

senior and mid-grade officers who held the king's commission (were in fact "commissioned" to raise a body of men of a certain size). A commission was seen as a contract every bit as lucrative as, say, the supplying of biscuit weevils to the Navy. Commissions were also a reward for political support.

For those not wealthy enough to actually buy a regiment there was equity in ranks themselves. After purchasing the highest rank within his budget, an officer would serve a few years and try to save up enough cash to advance a grade, remembering that his current rank would also be for sale, just like buying and selling real estate (sometimes, like real estate, there would be a glut in the market). He might also start with a low-class line regiment, transfer to one of the "Old Corps" units, serve the Duke of York in some affair of the heart and be transferred to the Guard, then buy the colonelcy of his first regiment and use the remaining profit to invest in a few acres of waterfront (or the South Sea Bubble). Other officers, having scored a commission, tried to keep body and soul together between active campaigns (half-pay was harder to live on than our old age pension) and relied on the slower (much slower) mechanism of promotion by merit and seniority. Others never served with their colours at all, preferring to hire a substitute. A clever man could raise a number of regiments and run them like a burger stand franchise.

Another effect of this already antiquated purchase system was that the Army was top-heavy with officers – a situation with some good but mostly bad implications, as can be imagined. The colonel's income was derived from his pay, from the sale of commissions (on a fixed scale since 1720), and from what he could save out of the public monies entrusted to him for maintenance. Therefore, muster rolls were padded by listing fictitious troops, choice "placements" were found for his flunkies, and supply contracts were handed out through the colonel's contacts for "extras" (like that very expensive "third button" the regiment was "entitled" to wear). Even some necessities were dealt with this way. Corners were not only cut in expenditure, but the ignorant troops were made to pay for their own equipment. As long as it did not get out of hand, these activities were tolerated. The Army was supposed to be overseen by civilian commissaries, but there were only six of these, all gentlemen who had other interests as well. Besides, it was felt that in compensation, there would be times when the colonel would have to cough up money out of his own pocket (for example, to buy new uniforms for his men prior to a review by the King, or to outbid a rival regiment's recruiting bounty).

Although much of the administrative detail was thus handled on an individual basis, some standardisation had taken place. Line regiments had a fixed paper strength of 780 men, had the same organisation, the same basic equipment, and were trained in a similar fashion. The Old Corps regiments (1st through 6th of Foot) and the Guard were developing traditions as well, since they were kept in being during peacetime. A core of professional officers was developing, drawn from the "gentle" classes, particularly at the lower levels of command where advancement was slow. It was actually this permanent core of officers, rather than the passing parade of men, who built up the now famous regimental traditions of the British Army.

His Majesty George Augustus II, surnamed Welf (Guelph), Elector of Hanover & King of Great Britain

The son of George I, whose selection in 1715 sparked the Jacobite Rising known as the '15, George II spoke German more frequently than English and preferred Hanoverian interests to British. However, if he wanted money and arms to defend Hanover, he had to go along with Parliament. George II was more than just a figurehead for the Whigs – he saw himself as a soldier-king and strove to build good relations with his officers. He was reasonably successful in keeping Parliament out of the arena of military patronage and oversaw all senior appointments and commissions personally. Apparently George had two coats, a brown one for civil affairs, and a red one for military meetings. He also kept a log of his officers, listing their characters, their skills, and their shortcomings. George was also responsible for initiating various army regulations such as the standardisation of drill.

He was the last British king to command troops in battle, at Dettingen in 1743. The battle was written up as a victory, but was actually more like a draw. George blundered into a French trap and was only saved by the ineptness of the French generals and the bravery of his own troops. George himself was conspicuous in this regard also, standing in the front rank beside his men and personally directing artillery fire. (When beseeched by his

generals to take up a safer position, he is reputed to have exclaimed, "*what do you think I am here for – to act the poltroon?!*") In the '45 however, he lost his sangfroid as the Jacobites approached London, and prepared for flight aboard his private yacht. Under his rule, the Whig political machine and mercantilist system reached its fullest flowering, generating much antagonism among those on the outside. As a person, he was unpopular, but not to the point of generating a general uprising. Hated his father, as his son also hated him. Ugly, ugly mistresses – you'd think as a king... well anyway back to the list.

Prince William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland (1721-1765)

The 2nd surviving son of George Augustus Welf, Prince of Wales (later George II), Sweet William was created a Duke 1726. Horace Walpole wrote that he enjoyed war for its own sake, as well as women and gaming, but despised money, fame, and politics. He was said to be a dutiful son, steadfast in both his loves and his hates, and honest. He trained for the Navy but his first taste of the sea life was not to his liking (storms off Cap Ferrol), so he went into the Army instead. (It should be pointed out that Cumberland was *not* being groomed for succession). Beginning his career in the 1st Foot Guards, he became Colonel of the Coldstream Guards (2nd Guards) in 1740, and a Major-General in 1742. Cumberland was wounded while fighting at Dettingen under his father (and somewhat against the latter's wishes). Although refused leadership of the Army of the Pragmatic Sanction in 1744 because of his inexperience, after the strategic fiasco of that year he was appointed Captain-General for Flanders in 1745, leading the British assault at Fontenoy. It was hoped a prince of the blood could coerce agreement at the councils of war. Later in the year he was recalled to lead the anti-Jacobite forces. After pacifying Scotland he returned to Flanders and resumed his command. In 1747 he lost the battle of Laffeld, though heavy losses were inflicted on the French. Cumberland was made C-in-C Hanover at the start of the Seven Years War. However, he was defeated at Hastenbeck and forced to surrender his command (1757). Disgraced, he retired to Windsor Castle after resigning all his offices. Later he went into politics under his brother George III. By the time of his death his popularity had returned (he helped get rid of some of the King's advisors). His bravery was beyond question, but as the record shows, he was not a successful commander.

Fontenoy was touted as a victory of British arms on the Charge of the Light Brigade model – in other words, a glorious defeat. The victory of Culloden depended on the troops being reorganised and trained as General Hawley had instructed. Physically brave, beyond that required for the age, but also a martinet and callous of his men's lives, Cumberland was hot-tempered and rash, with a vindictive streak a mile wide. That's why they called him "The Butcher". His favourite tactic was the frontal assault. Yet he was surprisingly popular with the rank and file and had real concern for their welfare off the battlefield, probably with the rationale that sick soldiers can't fight. His officers, however, wanted to be treated like gentlemen, not slow-witted recruits.

John Dalrymple, 2nd Earl of Stair (1673-1747)

Fought under Marlborough in the War of the Spanish Succession. Probably the greatest British diplomat of that age. An expert on Scotland, he also served in Paris from 1715-1720. Stair had a genius for intrigue but was less impressive as a soldier. He lacked patience, tact, and strategic insight. In 1743 he was the commander of the Army of the Pragmatic Sanction (under George II), but he absolutely could not get on with the Allied generals. After Dettingen he resigned because King George, after ignoring his advice, claimed a victory in what was actually a French ambush. (He also put his protest in writing, in a manner intended for publication). Reinstated by the time of the Rising, he assisted Cumberland and directed affairs at the battle of Fontenoy (as much as anyone did); he then accompanied the King to London and took charge of the forces defending there. Stair supported the opposition party in Parliament (leading a group called the Patriots – basically "Little Englanders"), rather than Lord Newcastle. This got him into trouble, but as can be seen, he died in 1747.

Field Marshal Sir George Wade (1673-1748)

Irish by birth. Gazetted Ensign 10th of Foot, 1690, age 17. Fought in the Nine Years War (War of the League of Augsburg): Flanders, Portugal, Spain. Brigadier 1708. On Retired List by 1711 as a 38-year-old Major General. In 1715 he suppressed local Jacobite risings at Bath by seizing arms caches. During this period he was a hatchet-man for the Administration, carrying out dubious assignments against enemies of the State. MP for Bath in 1723. In

1724 he was sent to Scotland to survey the situation and plan the pacification of the Highlands. He also proposed the formation of the Black Watch. Wade spent 15 years building roads and forts in Scotland, for which he is still remembered. Some of his roads remain in use today. He was made Lieutenant General and became C-in-C Scotland for 1740-43. He also commanded the British contingent of the Army of the Pragmatic Sanction (and was that army's nominal chief) in Flanders 1743-44 but did not get on with the Allied generals. Promoted Field Marshal 1745. He declined to replace Cope after Prestonpans and was instead made temporary C-in-C England. During the Rising he performed dismally in contemporary eyes, but he was already a sick old man, under attack in Parliament due to allegations brought in by the "Allied" generals in order to hide their own shortcomings.

Jean Ligonier, Lieutenant-General (1680-1770)

French Huguenot from the south of France. His family was driven out by the persecutions of Louis XIV. Commissioned in the British Army in 1703. Fought under Marlborough. His own regiment, Ligonier's Horse, was a model of efficiency. A brilliant cavalry commander, but sometimes too dashing, Ligonier commanded the British contingent in Flanders in 1745. He brought the first 10 battalions of troops back, after initially advising the King that they would not be needed to put down the Rising. Tasked with establishing a cordon to block the approaches to London, he fell ill and had to be replaced by Cumberland, resulting in Hawley suffering the defeat at Falkirk instead of Sweet William. Taken prisoner by the French at Laffeld (1747) after leading the Allied cavalry in a sweep deep into the French lines, but treated kindly and eventually repatriated. Ligonier acted on numerous occasions with energy, skill, and dispatch, more than once turning the tide on the battlefields of Flanders.

Lieutenant General Roger Handasyde

One of many officers involved in suppressing the Rising, but not in the limelight. Operated under Wade, and led a column to retake Edinburgh. He was in Scotland as the Jacobites returned north, but was replaced and sent to the west shortly after.

Major General Sir Humphrey Bland

General of Cavalry while in Flanders. Employed in the same role during the Rising under Cumberland. Repulsed at Clifton, but skilfully outflanked the Jacobites at Culloden.

Major General (later Lieutenant General) Henry "Hangman" Hawley (c.1679-1759)

Commissioned in 1694, he served in the War of the Spanish Succession and the War of the Austrian Succession. Wounded at Sherrifmuir in the '15. Fought at Dettingen and in Flanders. Licentious, and a brutal disciplinarian, but only an adequate field commander (and then only under supervision). He has been described as a coarse, irascible "scoundrel" and "rapacious marauder", who was popularly but erroneously believed to be an illegitimate son of King George (otherwise, why did the Royal Family put up with him?) Hawley was nicknamed "Hangman" from a skeleton he caused to be hung in his guardroom. He was probably retained in command due to various secret services tendered during the reign of Queen Anne. Promoted to Lieutenant General upon taking over Cope's job. Understood how to fight the Highlanders, but was overconfident and defeated at Falkirk (based on his experience at Sherrifmuir, he believed that the Highlanders would not stand against cavalry – he didn't see the other side of that field). His severity in punishing his own troops may have stemmed from Cumberland's orders to make an example of them, although some historians contend that it was instead Hawley who tarnished Cumberland's reputation. Removed from command of the Scottish Army and replaced by Cumberland, but retained in a subordinate position.

Major General John Huske

Served in the '15. Mainly employed as a cavalry commander in the '45. He also served in Flanders. He accompanied Wade's relief effort toward Carlisle and was Hawley's second-in-command. Huske also served at Falkirk and Culloden. He must have been somewhat dilatory, as his march on Carlisle failed to intercept the Jacks and yet produced around a thousand casualties from the weather and terrain, and his march on Falkirk as Hawley's advance guard similarly allowed the Jacobites time to muster in defence.

Major General William Keppel, Lord Albemarle

A veteran of Dettingen and Fontenoy, where he acted as an ADC to Cumberland and was wounded, he arrived with the first reinforcements for Wade. Employed in the west of England, he also commanded the advance guard on the march to Culloden. Took over from Cumberland after the Rising. A conscientious and capable officer who gradually toned down the system of reprisals once Cumberland had gone back to Flanders. Nevertheless, he detested service in Scotland, seeing little scope for honours or advancement.

Brigadier General James, Lord Cholmondeley, MP

Colonel of the 34th of Foot, he accompanied Wade's relief effort toward Carlisle and fought at Falkirk. His letters are a prime source for historians. Earl Cholmondeley was his brother, and influential in Parliament.

Major General Sir John Cope (1688-1760)

Born in London; commissioned a cornet of the Royal Dragoons in 1707. Saw service in the War of the Spanish Succession and the War of the Austrian Succession. Knighted for bravery at Dettingen. On the 25th of December, 1743, he was made C-in-C Army of Scotland. Defeated at Prestonpans. Court-martialled but acquitted. Cope served in England for the rest of the Rebellion. He ended his career as Governor of Limerick.

Major General James Oglethorpe, MP (1696-1785)

Came from a Jacobite family and resigned his King's Commission in 1715 for this reason. Served under Prince Eugene at the siege of Belgrade (1717). Oglethorpe paid court to "James III" in 1722, but on his return to England he became a loyal Whig, playing a major role in the founding of the colony of Georgia. In 1740 he led an abortive attack on (Spanish-owned) St. Augustine, Florida. In 1742 he defeated a Spanish counterattack on Georgia. In 1744 he was commissioned to raise the 42nd of Foot to counter the French invasion threat to England (this regiment's number was passed to the Black Watch when the old 42nd was disbanded). Oglethorpe was Governor of Georgia in 1745. At the time of the Rising he was visiting England on a recruiting junket to form a body of rangers for coastline patrol in the colony. Accompanying him were a native "prince" and "princess". Oglethorpe was accused of "lingering" (goldbricking) and pro-Jacobite sympathies by Cumberland, after failing to catch the Jacobites on their retreat from Derby. Court-martialled but acquitted. He left mid-way through the conflict, with his Rangers, once the threat to England had passed. In the 1750s he reverted to Jacobitism.

John Campbell, 4th Duke of Argyll

The head of Clan Campbell and the most powerful man in Scotland, along with Duncan Forbes, the Lord President of Sessions. Charlie himself recognised his importance and the fact that it would be impossible to win him over. Although not a military man, as a Lieutenant General he headed the Army of Scotland (as opposed to Cope's office which was merely the command of the regular garrison forces) and was technically Cope's senior. One of the founders of the Black Watch. Disliked and distrusted by Cumberland and many other English leaders, as he tended to be "soft" on his countrymen in arms.

John Campbell of Manmore

Cousin and heir to Argyll. Responsible for seeing to the defence of Argyll – staffing the various forts and castles on the periphery of Campbell country. Participated at Culloden. This was man most responsible for rebuilding the strength of Clan Campbell after it had been weakened by the 3rd Duke's agrarian experiments.

John Campbell, Lord Loudon

5th of that ilk. His father was killed at Fontenoy commanding the British cavalry. Eventually Loudon attained the rank of Major General and served in America. The most militarily active of the Campbell triumvirate, he accompanied Cope on his march north, was at Prestonpans, and then worked with Duncan Forbes to recruit men for the Government while commanding the loyal forces based at Inverness. Fighting a northern sideshow against the Earl of Cromartie, he was eventually forced out of Inverness, but successfully held the north for some time, having impounded all the boats around the region of the Black Isle, thus preventing the northern Jacobites from bypassing him. Eventually, he was routed by the Duke of Perth, who had taken over from Lord

Cromartie. Forced to retreat to Skye with Duncan Forbes and Lord Reay until after Culloden.

Lord Reay, Earl of Sutherland

Commanded the Whig Highlanders in the far north and suppressed Jacobite supporters in his area. Joined with Loudon to hold against Jacobite forces at Inverness late in the Rising. Eventually he was defeated and fled to Skye, where he remained until after the Rising. The Reays were not liked by their countrymen – a later Earl employed government soldiers to drive his tenants off their land at bayonet-point, so he could experiment with sheep farming techniques.

Earl of Home

Commanded the loyalist “Lowland Brigade” of the Glasgow, Paisley, and Edinburgh militias. Fought at Falkirk. Influential in Scottish politics, and a loyal Whig.

Prince Frederick of Hesse

The future Frederick II of Hesse-Cassel. Married George II's daughter Mary in 1740 and thus was Cumberland's brother-in-law. Serving in Flanders when 7 of his battalions were requested for the suppression of the Jacobite uprising; he accompanied them. He was tasked with covering the left flank of the Government army as it advanced up the east coast to Aberdeen and then Inverness. This meant operating in the valley of the Tay, up to Blair Atholl. A hasty retreat of the Hessians in the face of an audacious advance under Lord George Murray almost severed Cumberland from his base. Frederick did not prosecute the war aggressively in Cumberland's view, probably because he was trying to husband his state's sole resource – its army. Later he became a Catholic.

General Schwartzberg

Commanded the Dutch contingent, although he appears to have been an Austrian officer. Since his units were dispersed amongst various columns he was employed on Wade's council of war. Schwartzberg served in Flanders both before and after the Rising. He seems to have had a reasonable reputation, unlike many of his more obstructionist colleagues.

The Rest

The Army List of 1740 includes a large number of generals. Bear in mind that Army Lists from this period are few and far between. Some officers are known to have died or been retired, or were serving elsewhere. Cobham, Fowke, Wentworth, and Mordaunt are mentioned in the sources as actively participating. Cobham was a cavalry commander, acting at Clifton, Falkirk, and Culloden. Fowke is reported as “energetic” and organised forces around Edinburgh both before and after Prestonpans. Mordaunt was at Culloden, commanding the reserve. Wentworth served in the west, and had been the land commander in the ill-fated Cartagena expedition of 1741.

The Jacobite Leaders in the ‘45

If the Jacobites had a debilitating weakness, it was their leadership. The prime example, O'Sullivan, the Prince's chief of staff and quartermaster-general, is a confusing character. He has received an almost uniformly bad press, yet he was a professional staff officer (he served under the successful *Maréchal* Maillebois in Italy and Corsica), and his comments on the campaign show a good understanding of the military arts. Perhaps the discrepancy lies in the fact that he and Lord George Murray did not get along. He was also an inveterate conspirator, who could be seen whispering in Charles' ear as the other officers stated their views in council.

Lord George Murray and the titular Duke of Perth were the Prince's primary Lieutenant Generals. There were two other Lieutenant Generals, Tullibardine and Strathallen, but the former (another Murray) was old and gouty, and the latter arrived later from France. The Duke of Perth, according to Murray, was a “silly, horseracing boy” and had little input into the campaign, apart from being a Catholic rallying point and politically “sound” (Murray was a Protestant).

Most Jacobite officers had seen service abroad either with the French or British armies, and sometimes further afield. At worst, a clan chief would have the usual aristocratic benefit of being born to command – as aristocrats, most acquired military experience as an obligation of their rank in society – and in any case a family member with combat experience could be chosen to actually lead

the men in battle. At the highest levels, loyalty to the Stuarts was the paramount consideration of fitness for command.

The sheer number of officers presented a problem. Almost every volunteer, it seemed, wanted a commission. This led on occasion to the spectacle of colonels leading independent companies. Some amalgamation was attempted, but only toward the end of the campaign. These amateur officers, too, while usually brave enough, lacked both the discipline and the experience of a formal command to handle the exceedingly boring and very necessary daily routines – like replacing lost footwear or checking to see that the gunpowder stores were properly fireproofed. In consequence, although the “Jacks” fought well, they were often no more than a rabble off the field. The clan regiments, where rank depended on social standing, were notorious for refusing to obey orders that did not suit them, and for taking offence at trifles.

Another point of friction lay in the antagonism between the different clans. In a rare instance, normal rivals were working together in a common cause. At Culloden, the MacDonalds nearly left in a huff because their traditional place at the right of the line was given to the Camerons. As it was, they were accused of hanging back, and in the others' eyes, mortally jeopardising the assault.

[The whole “right of the line” thing was a sticking point even among “professional” armies – in 1746, the British contingent was angered by the Austrian Duke of Lorraine's relegation of them to the left flank. Blows and insults were exchanged among the troops].

Ultimately, Charles was unable to use his army as a focused weapon submitted to one will. He could have done worse, given the material at hand. Only Montrose (a far more stable character), a hundred years before, had been able to temporarily weld the clans into an unbeatable force, but even he never fulfilled his master's purpose.

Le Chevalier, Prince Charles Edward Louis John Casimir Silvester Severino (or Xavier) Maria Stuart (1720-1788)

A difficult subject to summarise, given that the rebellion centres on him. Born in Rome, the son of James Francis Edward Stuart “the Old Pretender”, and Clementina Sobieska, his great-grandfather was king John III Sobieska of Poland, who fought the Turks at Vienna. Charles fought at the siege of Gaeta (Spain versus the Emperor) where he showed up well, earning the title of the “Young Chevalier” (from his father's own *nom-de-guerre*, the Chevalier de St. George). He celebrated his 25th birthday during the Rising of 1745 (as did Cumberland). He had been invited to Paris by the French who hoped to use him as the figurehead of an invasion in 1744. The situation changed and he was left to mooch about the French Court. With a young man's mercurial temperament, he resolved to hazard all, with or without French aid. The rest is history.

He had numerous failings: the Stuart stubbornness, an inability to read men's characters, wildly fluctuating moods, a tendency to depend on his familiar coterie rather than to reach out to win new friends, and in council giving in when he should have remained firm and taking a hard line when he should have compromised. On the plus side, he had the Stuart charm that won over many and impressed all, plus the Sobieska looks (at the time of writing these notes there is a rather attractive American actress, also descended from King John of Poland, who from the neck up looks much the same as Charlie), and a superficial ability to relate to the “common man” – although he really did not understand them at all. He was physically brave – Lord Elcho may have called him a “cowardly Italian” but the fact remains that he had to be physically restrained from riding to his death at Culloden. It was his council that wanted to retreat from Derby, not him. His mistake was in throwing a temper-tantrum instead of letting them sleep on it. After the Rising he enjoyed popularity on the Continent as a hero, but was gradually shunted into the background.

By 1748 his stubborn refusal to quit pestering Louis XV (or anyone else with resources) had alienated most of his supporters, including family members, and aided the French decision to expel him from France as part of the price for the peace treaty. Although he reputedly returned to Britain in the 1750's (to visit friends in London) he spent the last 40 years of his life as an increasingly sick and embittered alcoholic man without a purpose. Childless, and with his only brother, Henry, in Holy Orders, his branch of the Stuart line died out. It lives on in the reigning dynasty, through a much older connection.

Lord George Murray

Joined the Prince at Perth and was made his principal Lieutenant General. He had tremendous prestige, especially with the Highland elements, and a good military reputation. Murray was a devout Jacobite, believing in the doctrine of Divine Right. "Out" in the '15, and the '19, but pardoned in 1725, he was at peace with the status quo when the Rising broke out. Murray did not romanticise his prince, but joined the Rising because his conscience would not let him do otherwise, even though he stood to lose vast wealth, and more importantly, his family life. In fact, he realised there was little hope of success and felt doomed from the start. For this reason he may have found it difficult to relate to a Prince who was so enthusiastic.

Despite participation in two risings he had little practical experience of combat, having spent 20 years ministering to his estates and his family needs – yet he was insistent on his right as the Regent's Lieutenant to plan and execute operations without interference. His chief asset was his knowledge of the ways of Highlanders and his success at training them for modern war. Murray fell out with Charles on numerous occasions, especially toward the end, even resigning temporarily. He was also at odds with William O'Sullivan, Charles' Quartermaster and head of the "Irish Clique" – O'Sullivan was a capable staff officer, if not a combat commander, and Murray was good in the field and poor at staff work, so they should have combined forces. However, O'Sullivan was a "lesser personage" than Lord George; he was also prone to "cabal-like" machinations. Murray survived the Rising, eventually escaping to France.

William Murray of Atholl, Marquis of Tullibardine

The titular Duke of Atholl. Attainted for his part in the '15, and one of the leaders of the '19. His brother now held the title and was 100% Hanoverian. By now an old man, Tullibardine suffered from the gout and his appointment as one of Charles' Lieutenant Generals was mainly honorary. He accompanied Charles as one of "the Seven" – the original companions who landed at Loch-nan-uamh – as a *beau geste*, and to see Scotland and his home one last time. Escaped to France after Culloden.

James Drummond, 3rd Duke of Perth (1713-1746)

Came from a virulently Jacobite family. He was made Lieutenant General at Perth, technically coequal with Lord George Murray. Perth's dukedom was a Jacobite creation. A talented individual, but inclined toward literature and the racetrack more than soldiering. Inclined to be diffident. He was physically weak, yet had great stamina. Unlike Lord George, his joining was not a surprise – he had to escape house arrest to take part. Charles valued him more than Lord George, due to his and his family's unwavering loyalty. Murray petulantly described him as a "silly, horseracing boy" despite Perth being 32 years old. He took command briefly while Murray was in one of his sulks, and later was successful in beating the Whigs in the far north. After the Rising he escaped to France in the ship that brought the "Loch Arkaig" treasure (35,000 *louis d'or* that mysteriously vanished – probably to repair someone's lost fortunes). But he died before reaching France.

Major General William Drummond of Machany, 4th Viscount Strathallen

Joined the Prince at Perth, along with his kinsman the Duke of Perth. Fought at Prestonpans and Culloden. Replaced Sir John McDonald as Master of Horse after raising a regiment of cavalry, but spent much of his time gathering new recruits and training a second army as acting commander of all forces north of the Forth. Killed himself at Culloden by deliberately riding into enemy fire.

Lord John Drummond

Uncle of the Duke of Perth and a "reliable" Jacobite, he commanded the 800 men of the *Ecosais Royaux* and the Irish units who landed in North-eastern Scotland. Drummond was one of the original Associators, (those who wrote glowing reports of disaffection in the country and inviting James to return), along with Lochiel and Lovat, among others. Before Falkirk, he led the diversionary movement designed to entice the Government to attack. Drummond unsuccessfully attempted to rally the Jacobite second line at Culloden. Escaped to France after the rendezvous at Ruthven.

George McKenzie, 3rd Earl of Cromartie

An impoverished McKenzie chieftain, he initially held aloof, although he was sympathetic. Unlike his kinsman Lord Fortrose, however, who smothered his own Jacobite sympathies and recruited men for the Government, Cromartie got excited by the victory at Prestonpans and began recruiting for the Jacobites. He was made responsible for Jacobite interests in the far north. Captured along with his men while trying to recover Jacobite gold from the wreck of the *Prince Charles* (H.M.S. *Hazard*) at the Kyle of Tongue. Cromartie was slated for execution (he pleaded guilty at his trial) but was reprieved after his wife fainted at the King's feet.

Major General John Gordon of Glenbucket

"Old Glenbucket" had been "out" in the '15 and between times served as a double agent for the Government. He was one of the exiles who pressured the French (and James) into recalling Charles to lead an invasion. Nearly 80 years old, he was still a vigorous campaigner. Fought throughout the rising and escaped to France.

David Ogilvie of Airlie

A Lowland gentleman, Ogilvie was the eldest son of the Lord of Airlie, in Angus. Joined the Jacobite army at the start of October with 600 of his father's men from Forfar. Brought his wife with him, as she was too beautiful to be left behind with safety. Although exactly the kind of man Charles most wanted among his army, he was, like the other Lowland gentlemen, excluded from the Prince's inner circle. Charles felt the Highlanders needed his presence while men like Ogilvie needed no supervision, but instead the Prince's inattention merely alienated the Lowlanders. Ogilvie very wisely had his men enrolled in the French Army as of February 1746, so that when the end came, they were immune to "chastisement" and were treated as prisoners of war. He himself escaped with the bulk of the leadership after Culloden. Later formed Ogilvie's Regiment in French service (disbanded 1748) with some of his men. More of his men either joined the *Ecosais Royaux* or Albany's Regiment.

Alexander Forbes, 4th Lord Pitsligo

Another old man (66). Raised a troop of horse that was combined with Strathallen's. Very shabby in appearance; "*a little thin fair man... being a great scholar*". While Strathallen was busy collecting men and training them, he led the combined horse on the march to Derby. Utterly convinced that James Stuart was his rightful monarch.

Brigadier General Walter Stapleton

Commander of the Irish Piquets. Fought at Falkirk and Culloden, surrendering the last formed body of troops (in French uniforms). Died a few days later of wounds received.

Lord Lewis Gordon

Brother of the Duke of Gordon, who prudently supported the Government while his people were mustered for war against it. Spent a lot of time raising troops and money. Commanded independently in the North-east while doing so. Fought at Falkirk and Culloden. Escaped to France.

McDonald of Keppoch

One of the first to "come out", along with Cameron of Lochiel, and led the first successful action of the rebellion, capturing two companies of the Royal Scots on their way to reinforce Fort William. He was important enough to be made one of the Prince's council. Killed rallying his clan at Culloden.

McPherson of Cluny

Cluny was captured in a special raid designed to make him appear coerced into fighting for the Jacobites. He held a commission in the 64th and had in fact reported to Cope's HQ's for duty. But he was slighted by the English General, and as a man with Highland connections had stormed off to be "captured" at Ruthven. Fought throughout the Rising, but not at Culloden. Eventually "took to the heather" to escape Government search parties, and lived in a cave for eight years.

Donald Cameron of Lochiel

Lochiel was a fearsome warrior. He was called “the Gentle Lochiel” in contrast to his father, who once bit out the throat of an English soldier in hand to hand combat (“the sweetest bite I ever tasted”). The Cameron motto was “sons of the dogs, come down, and I shall give you flesh”. Without Lochiel, the Rising would have fizzled. Being a man of Honour, he went to Prince Charlie in person to say his men would not join him, and was talked around. The consensus seems to be that he believed the Chevalier’s promise of French troops.

Alexander Bannerman, 3rd Baronet of Elsick

Another hardcore Jacobite. He was appointed Lord Lieutenant of the Mearns (a region north of the Forth River and only joined the Jacobite Army in time for Culloden.

Colonel John Roy Stewart

Raised the Edinburgh Regiment from a mix of locals, Highlanders, and Government deserters. One of the few professional officers, with much service on the Continent.

Colonel John William O’Sullivan, Prince’ Charles’ Adjutant General

Lord George Murray’s *bête noire*. A professional officer in French service, he had several things going against him, *vis* his service was confined to bandit hunting in Corsica, he was an inveterate schemer, the indigenous Jacobite leaders did not like his influence on Prince Charles – neither did his exile companions – and he was Irish. O’Sullivan has received a major share of the blame for Rising’s failure, primarily in terms of poor planning and organisation, and the above mentioned relations with Murray. It is debatable, however, if anyone else would have had a better working relationship with Lord George. Not surprisingly, O’Sullivan escaped after the Rising.

M. Mirabelle de Gordon

Arriving late from France, he became the Prince’s Chief Engineer. The troops called him “Mister Miraculous”. His efforts were laughable. Drunk most of the time, he presided over the “siege” of Stirling Castle. His siege battery was demolished by the garrison’s fire the moment it was unmasked. More significantly, he had to be prodded and pushed to even get so far as having a battery to unmask.

Colonel James Grante of Lally’s Regiment

Another French-speaking son of Scotland, Grante arrived with a handful of French gunners. Unfortunately, his crews had little opportunity to show their mettle. The best time for their use would have been Culloden, but no-one bothered to tell them to show up. Grante was wounded at Culloden, but escaped.

Colonel Sir John MacDonald, of Fitzjames’ Horse

Appointed Inspector of Cavalry. Surrendered at Culloden and was exchanged as a POW.

Charles Stewart of Ardsheal

Commanded the Stewarts of Appin, who were decimated at Culloden. Ardsheal was a prominent Jacobite in his own district, to the north of Campbell country, and a noted swordsman. Like most of those listed here, he was on the Prince’s Council.

Lord Orrery, Sir Robert Abdy, Sir Watkin Williams Wynn

Representative English Jacobites. Active enough politically to deserve mention in the sources, but in the event did not take part. Their military abilities are unknown, but someone other than a Highland chieftain was needed to command the English Jacobites.

The French Leadership in the ‘45

Taken as a whole, the French army enjoyed the highest reputation at this time, but this was an illusion. In actuality, the French owed much of their reputation to refusing all but the most advantageous situations for battle. Much of *Maréchal* de Saxe’s skill lay in his ability to make bricks without straw. Their command structure was antiquated and enervated, and only became more so as the century wore on. For example, by the 1770’s a man had to prove three generations of nobility to be accepted as a Guards officer. Such men saw not just administrative details, but even problems of grand strategy, as beneath their station (as did the Highland chieftains who modelled much of their behaviour on what they

had picked up at the French Court). The Royal Army had two missions: defend the realm, and keep its aristocracy employed. Political life in France was dominated by a Court bureaucracy deliberately separated from potentially rebellious nobles, so *that* door was closed to the aristocracy.

The Army had no higher organisation above the regiment. Typically, brigades were formed on a temporary basis (though most brigades retained the same regiments for a specific war) by grouping four battalions together (six for foreigners like the Swiss and Irish). Depending on the size of the component regiments, a brigade might consist of a single regiment of four battalions, or four regiments of one battalion. The brigades were assigned to the “centre”, “wing”, or “reserve” on the day of battle. All was governed by tradition, and gaps might appear in the line of battle simply because a certain regiment had not yet arrived on the field.

There were no higher staff organisations. Usually a duty roster assigned a man to command on a particular day; his next day of command might be weeks away. This ensured all the generals had a kick at the cat (otherwise they would have complained) but also meant that a brigade commander might not even know the officers in charge of his regiments when he formed them for battle. Only those not in favour with the King (or his current mistress), or the odd nut who actually wanted to lead men in battle, would spend any time at all with the Army proper.

Like their British counterparts, the French officers were often also proprietors of regiments who sought enrichment from their investment. They also looked for it through plunder, pillage, and gilt-clad extortion (like suggesting burghers pay them not to quarter troops in their fair city). Since the King held the prerogatives of promotion and appointment, all the general officers who wanted to advance their careers camped out with him in a vast tent city far behind the Army, from whence they would journey up to the front for their day of duty, endure their command, and return panting for the fleshpots again. These were the *Haute Noblesse*, men who refused to sit for staff examinations (a shocking reform dreamt up by some bourgeois minister) because it was their right by birth to serve the king on his staff.

And there were an awful lot of these generals. Even the tough and cynical de Saxe could not rid himself of their presence – if sent back to Versailles they and their families would hound Louis’ ministers day and night crying of “discrimination”. If Louis left the Army for Versailles, they would suddenly vanish, like magpies after a shiny object, leaving only those too poor or without influence to run the Army. (De Saxe himself enjoyed dalliances with the ladies of the Court, but being a “natural son” of the Duke of Saxony he was forced to earn his reputation as a skilled workman, instead of relying on his ancestry for job security).

At the regimental level and below were three types of officer, all “professional” in that they did nothing else besides work on military matters. First, the “*Rentiers*”: dirt poor nobility who had nothing but their swords to rely on and who were exceedingly jealous of their one and only privilege – that of bearing arms for the King. These men could, after thirty years service or so, expect to rise to the command of a battalion, or very rarely a regiment, but no further. Most would not advance beyond captain. A man might spend the best part of twenty-five years clawing his way to the top by sheer ability, only to see the coveted regimental command handed over to some 16-year-old acne’d princeling.

Included also amongst these men, though socially set apart, were the bourgeois officers, many of whom went into the engineers or the artillery. Others were able to buy not a regiment, but at least a company. The nobility made them an especial target of their enmity and a scapegoat for the Army’s failures, especially when they themselves were to blame (remember the Army’s two missions – defence, and more importantly, employment for the nobility). Last were the *Officers de Fortune*, promoted from the ranks. In the early years of Louis XV’s reign they could rise high, but as the century wore on they were restricted more and more to the rank of lieutenant.

Louis Armand Duplessis, Duc de Richelieu (1696-1788)

Was, like de Saxe, a crony of the Regent, the Duc d’Orléans, during Louis XV’s minority. Unlike de Saxe, his advancement came by catering to the King’s vices. Lived through three reigns and was married as many times. Intelligent and courageous, and very attractive to women, but overly proud and a complete cynic – the perfect image of a courtier of that period. Voltaire liked him. When first assigned to the task of invading England he was very enthusiastic. But wintering in Boulogne weakened his position at Versailles, which was bad for his career.

The Rest

No other general officers are mentioned in the sources, but two possible participants are likely: Milords Clare and Bulkeley. Clare was the commander of the Irish Brigade in 1745, so he is certain to have been on the roster. Bulkeley was the Colonel of the Franco-Irish regiment of the same name. It seemed more likely that expatriate Irish officers would volunteer to serve the Stuarts. They would be given brevet ranks in order to assume command of the "native" troops (or avoid having to take their orders).

THE BRITISH ARMY

*"Flanders! Flanders! Billy!
Let us give them Brummagem!"*

Cumberland's troops at Culloden. (Brummagem is Birmingham, famous as a munitions centre, as well as a general manufactory; ironically "brummy" for a long time meant shoddy merchandise).

General Notes

The first half of the 18th Century was the formative period of the modern British Army. It was born some 80 years before the '45, out of a mixture of Cromwellian New Model regiments and returning Royalist lifeguards. Remembering Cromwell's time and the dictatorship of the Major-Generals, Parliament did not allow the Crown to keep a standing army beyond the sovereign's personal guard. Due to the recurring dangers of rebellion and England's involvement in foreign wars, this technical handicap was overcome through Parliament's yearly voting of what was known as a Mutiny Act. The Mutiny Act was originally just that – an act to validate army punishments – but it was gradually transformed into an act establishing the required troop totals for the year. Over time, this force not only became quite large, but it became established in people's minds and in custom, and was a standing army in fact, if not in theory.

By the 1700's, two separate military establishments had developed in Britain. The English establishment, including Scotland as an independent garrison command (being an unsettled region), was controlled from Horse Guards in London. Ireland was controlled from Dublin Castle, under a viceroy who was a high-ranking appointee of the King's (like the title suggests: a vice-king). Ireland, like Scotland, was also considered a garrison command. All other overseas garrisons and any expeditionary army came under the English establishment as well, though with local leadership. Coastal and city fortifications in England came under individual governorship, while the barracks and forts in Scotland and Ireland were under direct authority of the local garrison commands.

The underlying reason for a divided army was that the Irish establishment was fixed by law at a minimum of 12,000 men (a total rarely achieved) and could not be affected by cheese-paring Treasury officials in Whitehall. Thus the king could keep a larger force than that to which he was entitled by law. Unfortunately, by the '45 the Irish establishment had become a parochial backwater and was poorly maintained. It was a prime source of recruits, though.

Since there was no army in England according to the Government – just large armed groups of men on their way to some war or other, or preparing for one at some unspecified point in the future – the regiments stationed in England lived in scattered billets. Scotland and Ireland, as garrison commands, had barracks and fortifications, but these were symbols of repression that the people of England would not bear for themselves.

On James II's accession, there were 8,800 men in the army, of which 1,400 were garrison troops. To this were added 7,500 men from Ireland and 2,200 from Scotland. The Monmouth Rebellion (1685) provided an excuse for James to expand the army to 19,800 troops, and by the time the "Orange invasion" occurred in 1688, there were 40,000 men under arms. These numbers dropped significantly under the Georges; George I had roughly 22,000 men, of which two thirds were in the colonies or Flanders. This puny force (by Continental standards) encouraged hopes of rebellion with foreign aid.

As mentioned above, only the Guards and various garrison forces were supposed to be billeted in England, but with the swelling of the army, other units began to find permanent station there. In 1745 there were, on paper, some 15,000 Home troops, including the Scottish garrison of 3,000, and the Irish establishment/garrison of 2,000 (1/6th of its required strength – and most of those men were in Flanders!). These regiments were generally of low strength due to the practice of replacing operational losses from existing units before recruiting new blood. Often garrison units were divided up into penny packets at various strategic locations with duties such as policing, tax collection, and road construction. The remainder of the army, and the best part of it, was in Flanders as of 1743-44: 25,000 men totalling 18 foot regiments, 6 battalions of Guard, 13 small cavalry regiments, the Royal Artillery and other specialists.

The Army had a number of roles. It had to provide garrisons for the overseas posts required by the Navy and to police and protect the American colonies from Indian and French attacks. It had to police Britain and to provide defence against the rare threat of invasion. And it had to serve as an expeditionary force either alone (usually on one of the Navy's projects), or in conjunction with a Continental Ally. With so many different tasks it was inevitable that it should have difficulty performing them all with any degree of success, the more so because during the first half of the century, under the First Ministers Walpole and his rival Pelham, the only thought that most politicians gave the Army was whether their cousin's husband would prefer an appointment as a junior Guards officer, or command of the 3rd Dragoons.

This state of affairs really did not begin to change until the Seven Years War. At the time of the '45, the Army's reputation among its allies and enemies was a poor one. Despite its plethora of roles it was only trained as a mechanical firing machine designed to go head to head against other mechanical firing machines. Using it as a police force would be like cracking a walnut with a steam hammer, and its record in colonial engagements was abysmal.

Morale in peacetime was low. The men in any given regiment would be parcelled out over a wide area, unable to conduct any but the most basic military drills, and without a sense of unity. A major reason why the British Army became famed for its musketry was that weapon drills were something that could actually be practiced on a daily basis, while brigade-level manoeuvres were crammed from manuals or faked up on the day of battle. The Army at Fontenoy was compared by the French to a walking artillery battery, but it was only capable of executing a frontal assault.

[For a classic, if slanted, picture of the state of the Army, one should make a detailed examination of Hogarth's painting The Guards' March to Finchley, which portrays the taking up of the defence of London as the Jacobites approach.]

As an instrument of repression under the Whig government the Army was every bit as loathed as it had been under the Stuarts. The Whigs claimed a strong Army was necessary to ensure the stability of the Georgian throne against the ever present threat of the Jacobites, but in fact this threat was grossly inflated, despite the '15 and the '45. Although First Minister Walpole suffered from Jacobite paranoia, he was astute enough to use the Army to guarantee his and his cronies positions of power, mainly through patronage – awarding high office and lucrative contracts to his supporters, as James II had done when he appointed Catholics to his Army. Pelham (Lord Newcastle) wasn't paranoid, but he was even more corrupt than Walpole.

The British Army, like its opponents, was a blend of paternalistic leadership, medieval guild, and corporate institution. As the century progressed it became steadily more professional, more an instrument of the State as represented by Parliament and parliamentary interest groups rather than a playground for the aristocracy. At the top was the King, for whom the army could be a personal toy, an implement of his will, or a nuisance. For the Georges, the Army was a key prop to the throne and a means of ensuring stability in their realm, while at the same time an instrument of foreign policy. Since the House of Hanover ruled as a constitutional monarchy, Parliament had a great deal of say as to

what the Army's political boundaries were to be, especially since they held the chequebook.

Thus although the Army had been reduced in size since the time of the Stuarts, it was required to become ever more deeply involved in Continental warfare because the Whig mercantilists (who dominated Parliament for nearly a century) demanded Britain's main trade rivals be kept in their proper place – second place. On the other hand, George himself could be adamant in demanding the Army's use in the defence of his Electorate of Hanover, and it was his fear of French and Prussian encroachment as much as competition in the lace trade that drove England's strategy.

Once a Mutiny Act was ratified and the money obtained to pay the Army's wages and its upkeep, the aristocracy was responsible for raising and commanding its component parts. At those rarefied heights, military service was seen as an obligation, and as a prestigious calling. There was still a strong personal element to command – even a paternalistic one, especially at the higher levels. The regimental system was in full flower, and many fathers expected their sons to follow them by joining their old unit – and the colonel of the regiment would likewise ensure his son inherited the “family business” – because military service at the field and general officer level was seen as a way to make money as well as a calling.

The running of the Army as an institution was done by the Army Board. Operated by a small group of senior military men, it was responsible for recruiting and commissions, promotions and pay, developing training regimens and everything else necessary to ensure the Army was ready when called upon. It was also an advisory body, as its members were military personnel. The Navy was run in a similar fashion by its own board. However, both Army and Navy were supplied through the Ordnance Board, which was a civilian agency. It was responsible for uniforms, weapons, equipment, victualling, and also provided engineers, labour gangs and much of the artillery. Being responsible for supply, it handled government contracts to civilian workshops, foundries, and tradesmen of all descriptions. The opportunities for peculation were boundless.

The maintenance of internal fortifications (most of which were for coastal defence) was the responsibility of individual governors, who would deal with the Ordnance Board for such things as repairs and ammunition, and with the Army Board for manpower. They might even deal with the Navy Board if requesting heavy artillery or the protection of a few scouting vessels off their coast.

The Militia was yet another separate organisation. Supposedly a mass levy of the population, more practically – but still theoretically – able-bodied volunteers from town and village who met periodically to conduct training, and in reality a dozen or so rustics who got together once a month to drink beer if the weather was fine. When the Militia was needed, Commissions of Array made out by the authority of the King would be sent to the Lords Lieutenants of the counties stipulating the number of men required, where they were to assemble, and how they were to be equipped. The Lord Lieutenant would then contact his deputy and other local officials like the sheriff and they would set about on the one hand gathering those whose names were on the muster roll and on the other, asking their textile-mill-owning cousin to provide uniforms. Many towns still had trained bands or watch companies as well.

On the Border, things were much the same, except that it was easier to find trained men with their own equipment, and the Wardens of the Marches were also able to provide recruits. Further north, the Scots had a similar system, but due to the backwardness of the economy, much of a levy would be composed of tenant farmers belonging to one lord or another. The larger towns like Glasgow or Edinburgh had their watch companies, and in the Highlands, of course, the clan chiefs had their permanent war bands, just as in medieval times.

Coordinating it all was the War Office, a tiny organisation staffed with only a dozen clerks (mostly superannuated cronies of Walpole's or Pelham's). Parallel to the War Office was the King's

Court – not as important as most Continental courts since England was a constitutional monarchy, but still influential on a social level. If you had a Jacobite-tainted nephew and couldn't get the authorisation from the Army Board and the WO for his commissioning in the Blues, but the Duke of York's fourth favourite mistress had shared her favours with you one time, your nephew might still get in as an ensign of the 4th Irish (he would then grumble about “being exiled” and you would tell him he was lucky not to be sent to Gibraltar).

An early 18th Century army might consist of a few corps belonging to different nationalities under a prince of their own or a delegated senior general. Each corps might comprise a wing of the army, or the reserve, or even, as in the Hanoverian case, be integrated with the British troops. These corps or wings would in turn be divided into brigades, each under a general officer who was probably also a military proprietor with one of more colonelcies. The brigades were in turn composed of regiments, led in battle by the colonel's lieutenant. (The division was not in use during this period, although the French made experiments with “legions” of mixed infantry and cavalry).

In the British Army, since regiments normally had only a single battalion, the regiment developed into an administrative form, rather than a tactical field unit, and brigades were composed of a flexible number of battalions – usually 4, but sometimes 3 or as many as 6. Second battalions, if they existed, or “additional companies”, were used as recruiting depots in a system that saw a fierce competition for manpower. After a war, the regiments might be maintained, but were more often disbanded, with the officers and men seeking service with some another unit or even service with a different state. Alternatively, they might pass the time as beggars and vagrants.

The enlisted men were drawn mainly from the labouring and tradesman classes, leavened with the unwanted drafts of “scum” provided by the parishes. Most recruits were young, 17 to 25 years old, and typically those adventurous souls who had not yet settled into some other calling. Service was for “life” – that is until they could no longer perform. Soldiering was not a prestigious profession at their level and was popularly seen as a last resort. Discipline was harsh, shocking even visiting Prussian officers, but it was not applied unnecessarily, and corresponded in degree to civil punishments of the same period. And again, the bulk of the men were volunteers.

[A recruiter would avoid mentioning that his regiment was on garrison duty in the fever-ridden West Indies – there was no rotation of regiments in those days and the 38th of Foot spent 60 years in Jamaica.]

The Army at War

Once the King and the WO had decided the strategic needs for the year, they would appoint a commander to lead the field forces. He would typically be the King himself or a prince of the blood who might or might not have experience of war, but in any case someone of sufficient seniority and nobility to deal with his opposite number or any allied contingents. The term Captain-General, by the way, was not much used in the British Army – the Duke of Cumberland was given the title, but he belonged to the Royal Family, and the last Captain-General had been Marlborough. Its purpose was mainly a political one. Under the overall commander would be a number of lieutenants to lead the various higher formations or to act as quartermaster- secretary- or inspector-generals.

[If the king or one of his sons were on the field, he would usually leave any administration and the direction of a battle to a field marshal or full general – such as Lord Stair in Cumberland's case. At Fontenoy, for example, Lord Stair directed the battle, but Cumberland insisted on leading the main assault against the French line, relying on Stair to cover for him.]

As the army was assembled at one or more depots in preparation for the campaign, the Ordnance Board would be scrambling to provide the stores and transport required by the Army Board. In places like Prussia, this would of course all be done in advance. Stores would be secretly concentrated in strategically placed dumps, regiments would be dispersed around the borders so they

could easily be concentrated, and the King and his generals would burn the midnight oil planning their master stroke. In England, things did not work like that. For one thing, Parliament was too cheap to pay for the Army's maintenance in peacetime. For another, they were practising to be a Democracy.

The next step would be to ship the men to the Continent. This required agreement with the Navy Board. Warships would have to be assigned as escorts; transports would have to be requisitioned from reluctant merchants – although many seaports had long traditions of supplying vessels on demand. The hardest thing to transport was the cavalry, especially on long voyages or across rough stretches of water like the Channel. Once on the other side, days or even weeks might be required for the Army to reform, assuming all its components even arrived at all. Then there would be more delays while waiting for The Ally to make an appearance and in negotiations with the locals for yet more supplies. Midway through the campaigning season, a strongly worded letter from Parliament would arrive, telling the commanding general to get a move on. Of course, it might be that the general had encountered a situation completely different from the one envisioned in London. National politics determine grand strategy, but in this period, personal politics often determined operational strategy, and even success or failure on the battlefield.

[As an example of the difficulties of operating even fairly close to home, the Flanders campaign for 1744, which was to have been an attempt to draw out the French Army by besieging some of their border forts, was cancelled because the Dutch, who were not at war with France, even though their soldiers were killing Frenchmen, refused to pay for the transport of a British siege train, which thus sat in Antwerp until it was captured by the French. This was deliberately contrived, of course – the Dutch were still selling naval stores to their "enemies". Britain naturally did not have the means to both assemble and transport a siege train; the Army and Ordnance Boards couldn't hope to justify the expense to the Treasury. Next year the French, with an enormous siege train, carried out a similar plan perfectly.]

Once all was set, the army would march out in a great column of men, horses, and wagons, followed by an even longer tail of flocks and herds, sutlers and whores, and officers' baggage. The army also carried along with it all the repair shops and bakeries it needed to keep the men fed and the horses shod. Wise commanders would have an advance guard, or picked troops and cavalry vedettes in front and on the flanks, to provide early warning of an enemy approach. This was not always done. Although very large armies might operate on different lines, normally a single route was taken. There might be detached columns sent to seize bridges or to act as flank guard. Ideally, the road itself was reserved for the artillery and transport, while the infantry marched on the verge and the cavalry rode on their flank or took up positions at either end. Of course the term "road" must be used very loosely in this period. "Strips of ground slightly less overgrown and much muddier than the rest of the countryside" would be a better description.

Flanders and the Rhineland had canals, too, which were excellent means of communication and transport if your side had control. In the first half of the century, however, there were not many of them. Louis XIV in particular dumped a lot of money in canals for the dual purposes of trade and war, and his son Louis XV continued the work. But by the time a truly extensive canal system covering all the strategic possibilities had been developed, it was superseded by the railroad.

Each night, the Army would make camp at a sight chosen by the advance guard, whose general had that additional duty. In proximity to the enemy, a proper camp would be laid out, with tent "lines" and horse pickets. The civilians would be kept at a distance, though there would be a market of sorts – often a wagon laager. There might even be some attempt at fortification with earthworks. Sentries would be posted and cavalry patrols sent out to reconnoitre the enemy position and determine his lines of advance and retreat. If further marching was called for, the army would uncoil like a huge snake and carry on to the next destination. It was not unusual for the rear of the army to begin marching in mid afternoon, long after the advance guard had set up camp.

When at a distance from the enemy, the soldiers were kept moving around from place to place, billeted in inns and occasionally upon the general populace. The word "harbinger" dates from this time, referring to the advance parties that would enter a town and chalk out billets for the regiment. Their coming was taken as a warning for locals to lock up their daughters. At home, this same system of constant movement was designed to isolate the soldiers from the general population, prevent them from developing ties to any one region, and discourage possible coups. It was highly unpopular, both with the soldiers, who disliked being shafted by greedy innkeepers, and by the townsfolk, who found that the soldiers tended to remove anything that was not nailed down.

Desertion was always common, in peace or war. Men who deserted from one army, not knowing any other life, often joined up with a different army or took to brigandage. Sometimes men became professional deserters, joining one regiment for the bounty paid on enlistment, deserting on the march, and presenting themselves at a neighbouring regiment as new recruits. It was this fear of desertion that led to the practice of dragging the whole world along on campaign. Marches were short, usually dictated by the length of the "tail" and by the daily need to construct the brick ovens used to make bread. Normally, foraging parties were escorted by cavalry, not for their protection, but to chase down anyone who tried to run away.

Disease was a bigger killer than bullets, mainly from the over-concentration of human beings in small areas with poor sanitation, but also through the strains of campaigning. Battles were rare. Too much time and money had been spent training men in the techniques of killing to squander them in all-out battle. Armies manoeuvred for advantage and it sometimes happened that a commander surrendered before beginning a hopeless fight. Someone – probably Voltaire, it sounds like him – said that in fifteen years of war between Austria and Prussia the sole result was the transfer of a single province. By contrast, the savagery of the Highlanders, who preferred to hew at their opponents with sharp metal objects, came as a rude shock.

Since battles only occurred when both sides agreed, strategy often revolved around the best way to bring an enemy out of his defences onto ground of your own choosing. You could lay siege to a key fortification and invite a relief attempt, or actually take the place and force a counterattack, suitably intercepting it. You might threaten two or three forts with diversionary moves and then cut off the enemy's line of communications when he stuck his neck out. The rest of the time, battles occurred by accident.

Once battle occurred, it generally followed a particular sequence. The armies would be drawn up in an area that allowed the infantry to be deployed in line with a good field of fire, for maximum effect. The cavalry and any light troops would be placed on the flanks as anchors and in a position to envelop the enemy if he made a mistake. Light troops were especially useful when the flanks were secured by woods or villages, forming an obstacle that could shoot back. They were not, however, commonly used as a skirmish screen at this time. The army's front would incorporate field fortifications or clusters of buildings as redoubts, garrisoned by grenadiers detached from their parent units for the purpose and augmented by artillery batteries (this was something that de Saxe strongly advocated, although he was against extensive entrenchments, as they led to defensive-mindedness). More artillery would be clumped along the first line with perhaps howitzers or mortars behind, and each battalion would be covered in enfilade by its light battalion guns.

The second line would be arrayed the same way, but was usually weaker, with its main role being the reinforcing of the first line. In the rear would be the Reserve, consisting perhaps of the Guard, massed heavy cavalry regiments, "converged" grenadier battalions (made of composite grenadier companies), and heavy guns. The whole deployment was carried out under the eye of the captain-general or his designated lieutenant. Theoretically, he could still direct the entire battle in person, but only just. De Saxe was of the opinion that an army of 50,000 men was the best size for personal command.

Each line was commanded by a major-general, but the army was also broken into wings across its front, commanded by the King's lieutenants or the leader of a national contingent. Major-generals also commanded the cavalry wings, and the captain-general the reserve. The latter person could also "allow" the King, or perhaps the *Dauphin*, to command the reserve, especially if he was busy sizing up the enemy. A wiser choice would be a trusted senior general, but politics followed the army onto the field.

Typically (and no battle is typical), the side that perceived itself stronger or that was behind on its timetable would attack. Once the mass was set in motion there was little manoeuvre. Any envelopments or other surprises generally had to be pre-planned. The mark of a great general was his ability to recognise a weakness or misstep and be able to capitalise on it by having the necessary troops in hand. The artillery would begin the battle by attempting to disrupt and demoralise the enemy, and hopefully cause a few casualties at long range.

Most of the work was done by the infantry, with toe-to-toe volley fire followed by a bayonet charge in line. The cavalry then would pour through the gaps and complete the rout. The artillery was generally fixed in place, making the defender's role that much easier (by now artillery was deadly at short range), but some enterprising commanders managed to work their guns forward on carts or drag them up by hand to help the other arms. De Saxe's "special thing that he could do" on the attack was to weight one wing with up to two-thirds of the army, deployed in deep columns, and attempt to smash the forces opposite them – usually the British, which meant the French took a lot of casualties and sometimes didn't take the position at all.

After the battle the victorious side was usually too exhausted to pursue. It would also be near rout itself, as the men plundered the enemy baggage and stripped the dead. A pursuit merely gave the soldiers an additional opportunity to desert. One large battle often decided the outcome of the campaign, at least for that year. If one of the loser's fortifications was involved, it would capitulate, and its garrison be repatriated with instructions not to appear in arms for a while. If the enemy's line of communication was cut, they also might surrender, or if still full of fight, attempt a circuitous march back to their own territory.

For both sides, recovery would take many days of reorganisation and many weeks of resupply. There might not even be enough stocks left to conduct a second advance on the next fortification, and certainly not enough to prosecute a siege against it. So the victorious army would retire on its own bases until next year (unless led by Frederick the Great, who nearly destroyed his own army by attempting to live off his enemies' stocks).

The British Army, being a small expeditionary force, was subject to certain constraints but also had advantages over other armies. Being small, it was easier to control and to supply, and being an expeditionary army it could be removed from the conflict – except that King George's Continental possessions dictated that it remain. Being small it was also reliant on allied help, particularly the Dutch, who were singularly unreliable and unwilling allies, though the fiction was that Britain was fighting to defend their land from France. Since it was also fighting for Austria in the Austrian Netherlands, the Army was subject to the effects of Austrian politics, and resentment stemming from the fact that Britain had bailed them out financially.

The Foot

This was the time when the infantry was Queen of Battle. Before the wars with the Bourbons, the infantry comprised eight Royal Regiments and six Old Corps regiments. Sixteen more regiments were raised for foreign service in the first quarter of the eighteenth century, and several more in 1740-41.

From the regular army, 18 battalions of foot were sent to Flanders, plus 6 battalions of Guard (that is, the lot). Later, 6 more line battalions were shipped totalling 3000 men, stripping the country. In October, the 10 best battalions were recalled to fight the Jacobites, followed by another 5 battalions, and several more units were transferred to England at the same time, to guard

against possible invasion. This large-scale withdrawal left a total of only 1 infantry battalion and 5 cavalry regiments in Flanders, ending offensive operations against the French for a couple of years, and in fact, handing them Antwerp on a platter.

As the Rising began, the rest of the foot were distributed as follows:

- 4 battalions garrisoning Scotland (mostly on road building projects)
- 10 battalions on the Irish establishment (but most of these were actually in Flanders)
- 3 battalions at Gibraltar
- 5 battalions in Minorca (won at the same time as Gibraltar and holding the same strategic position that Malta would later assume)
- 6 battalions in the New World – if you include Shirley and Pepperill's American regiments that took Louisburg. One regiment was spread out between Virginia and Maine; another was in Antigua with HQ in Jamaica. In the main, defence of North America was relegated to militia units.
- 2 battalions enroute to Cape Breton
- 7 battalions in England, including the two above (one of the seven was on the Irish establishment).

The dispositions fluctuated throughout the Rising, in particular because of the successful capture of the fortress of Louisburg in Nova Scotia. Oglethorpe's 42nd and Frampton's 30th, for example, were diverted briefly to bolster the defence of England, and then sent overseas. The battalions in England were little more than cadres, as it was the wartime policy to retain regiments no matter how weak, while their recruits were sent overseas to replenish active units.

The Guard was composed of 3 regiments of two battalions each. Of the line regiments, only the 1st of Foot (Royal North British) had 2 battalions. One of these remained in Ireland and was transferred to Scotland at the start of the Rising. The other was recalled from Flanders and used to protect London. 2 further regiments, plus 1000 men from a variety of sources, were also recalled from Ireland at the time of the invasion of England.

Battalion strengths varied from the 900 men of the 43rd of Foot (The Black Watch – it was renumbered the 42nd later on) before the battle of Fontenoy to the 390 odd of the 11th of Foot after the battle. A battalion's paper strength was 780 men, realistically expected to be around 440 men in peacetime and about 660 before beginning active service. In reality, regiments of two and three hundred men were the norm – and much less in England. The Guard battalions had a much higher paper strength of 1980, going up to 3080 for the 1st Guards. Again, however, they suffered horrendous losses at Fontenoy. The average strength per line battalion at Culloden was 485 all ranks, which gives some indication of the dearth of replacements in England and the wastage of the campaign overseas.

The Royal Marines were used as garrisons at the naval bases, and aboard ship. The Marine Regiments 1-6, plus the 15th, 24th, 34th and 36th of Foot, were also still under strength after the disastrous amphibious landing at Cartagena in 1741. Superfluous marine officers provided leadership for some composite units, and at least two complete marine battalions were recalled from the Channel Fleet. (Since the marines served in detachments of only company or platoon strength, their senior officers had the plum job of holding a commission without actually having to do anything – usually).

Battalions were generally divided for administrative purposes into ten companies. Most companies comprised between 30 to 40 men (60-80 on paper), as compared with 120 to 150 men in a modern rifle company. One company was designated as a grenadier company, and was formed of men chosen for their size, skill, and élan. Light companies were not formed until the 1750's. Three companies were led by field officers (one notionally to be the colonel himself), and the other seven by captains. The grenadiers were often detached and bundled together to form converged-grenadier battalions, for use as shock troops.

Regular soldiers wore madder-red uniforms and were equipped in a standardised fashion. Some militia regiments, and particularly volunteer units, dressed in blue – blue dye was even cheaper than red and many towns had blue-dye industries. The regiments were distinguished by “facing” colours on their cuffs and lapels (blue usually being reserved for the royal regiments). The coats themselves were wool, double-breasted. They served as overcoats as well. Underneath was worn a long-skirted waistcoat and woollen breeches. Stockings and shoes were covered by high length canvas gaiters. Grenadiers wore tall, embroidered mitre caps, and had their hair plaited, while the remaining men were capped by a black tricorne trimmed with white, sporting the black cockade of the Hanoverians.

The men were equipped with an early model .75 calibre Brown Bess flintlock musket, steel ramrods, and high quality gunpowder. The ball and powder were pre-packaged in cartridges, which theoretically allowed them to be fired in the rain (although the firing pans were still exposed). From 9 to 24 rounds were carried in a cartridge box attached to a broad leather belt slung over the left shoulder. Another such belt went around the waist and supported the bayonet and short sword on the left hip. New socket bayonets had replaced the old plug variety, allowing rather inaccurate firing while fitted. (It was the Jacobite success at Killiecrankie, against troops armed with plug bayonets, which spurred this improvement). Grenadiers were also issued with hand grenades and hatchets. Additionally, each man was supposed to have a haversack or duffel bag for his kit, a bread bag for rations, and a tin canteen.

Doctrinally emphasis was placed on the shock effects of “cold steel”, but this rarely happened in practice. Battles were won mainly through firepower. Individually, a man could fire effectively twice a minute, and expect to hit his target out to about 50 yards (assuming it was not obscured by smoke). Volley fire allowed a more rapid rate and effectiveness against a large target at a greater range. En masse, a battalion volley could destroy an enemy assault, especially if held to the last minute, but if ineffective, left the battalion frantically scrabbling for its bayonets. More typical was platoon firing.

A battalion on the battlefield was divided into four “Grand Divisions” of four platoons each, with two flanking platoons of grenadiers. This made 18 platoons, with hopefully 40 men to a platoon, each in three ranks. Each rank had three firings of six platoons each, so that a third of the battalion was always loaded. Sometimes volleys were by whole platoons, in a staggered sequence, again to prevent any one point of the line being unable to defend itself, or the first rank could withhold its fire and make a fourth, often decisive, volley. The men were ordered to fire at the enemy’s belt-buckles and even their shoes, to compensate for the tendency to fire high. 100 yards was considered the maximum effective range, which again meant in practice 40-50 yards on a smoke-filled battlefield. At Fontenoy, the British devastated the French with battalion volleys modelled on the platoon system.

The Horse

Cavalry regiments were divided into horse and dragoons. The horse were “heavy” units and unsuited to operations in the Highlands. The dragoons rarely dismounted now but could fight as infantry (rather clumsily) if need be. The name comes from the “dragon” muskets that the first units carried. These units were considered a more useful arm in irregular warfare, but poorly mounted. Their dispositions at the time of the Rising were as follows:

- 5 regiments of horse and 8 of dragoons in Flanders
- 2 regiments of horse and 3 of dragoons in Ireland
- 1 regiment of horse and 1 of dragoon in England (not including the 10th Provincial Regiment known as Kingston’s Light Horse – a volunteer unit that was taken onto the regular establishment in 1746)
- 2 regiments of dragoons in Scotland (newly recruited in Ireland)

Usually seven regiments of horse are listed in the sources for this period, but the Royal Regiment of Horse Guards is never included

in those lists, so there were actually eight regiments. The seven regiments of Horse later became the regiments of Dragoon Guards. The Royals later amalgamated with the Blues (Royal Horse Guards). There were also fourteen regiments of Dragoons. Most of the latter were raised in direct response to earlier Jacobite threats. Horse regiments consisted of three troops totalling 200 men. Dragoon regiments were divided into six troops totalling 300 men, but in combat, these troops would be divided into three squadrons.

Horse regiments were expected to fight with the sword, but might still carry pistols for personal protection. There was no clear doctrine on the cavalry’s employment, so they were typically used up in pointless, headlong charges. Scouting and line of communication duties had been emphasized under Marlborough, but these skills had fallen into decline.

Special units, such as Kingston’s Light Horse, might be equipped with sabres or light firearms. Dragoons were uniformed and equipped much the same as the infantry, but lacked lapels for their coats. They also wore knee-length cavalry boots. Arms included broad swords, a pair of pistols, and a short version of the Brown Bess as a carbine. The latter was their main weapon, along with bayonets and axes. They trained for both mounted and dismounted operations.

On the battlefield, the cavalry was normally formed in three ranks like the infantry, but more loosely knit, each trooper requiring about six feet between his neighbours. Again due to their nature, each squadron was separated from its neighbour by a distance equal to its own frontage. Against other cavalry, the squadrons would trot sedately forward and engage in an open, swirling melee with the sword. The idea of cavalry taking on unbroken infantry was shunned. Napoleonic-style shock combat was not normally employed, although versus the horseless Jacobites they had the expectation of an easy victory, and tended to advance as if already pursuing a broken foe, with dire results to themselves.

A prime example of the cavalry’s “usefulness” occurred at Prestonpans, when two mounted regiments of Dragoons were routed by Highlanders on foot without firing a shot. Being an aristocratic arm, they got more than their share of idiots as well. (As a counterbalance to this hyperbole, it should be noted that Colonel Gardiner of the 13th Dragoons, who fell at Prestonpans, was an experienced and capable officer, but he had the misfortune to have taken command of a bunch of raw recruits mounted on horses bloated from improper diets).

The Guards

The Household troops were still under the personal command of the Sovereign, and were normally brigaded together. In fact, prior to the series of European wars in which Britain became involved, they were the only “standing” portion of the army permitted. Included were the regiments of the 1st (later Grenadier) Foot Guards, the 2nd (Coldstream) Foot Guards, and the 3rd (later Scots) Foot Guards. These regiments were kept well up to strength and, as mentioned above, had a larger establishment. They tended to attract the wealthy and influential, even among the enlisted ranks. However, their morale was not appreciably greater than that of the line regiments. The excessive size of the guard units was not unusual among European armies; many of the French Household regiments were more like miniature corps. Only elements of the Coldstreamers saw any action against the Jacobites, although some of the other regiments were deployed to cover London and the routes south.

The Household Cavalry included the 1st through 4th troops of Horse Guards, with two additional troops of Horse Grenadier Guards attached (all these later formed the Lifeguards). The 3rd & 4th HG and the 2nd HGG were disbanded shortly after the Rising. The remainder evolved into the Life Guards. The Horse Guards were only 60 to 80-man troops, usually mixed with the 2 troops of Horse Grenadier Guards. They followed the Sovereign about. Even their rankers were gentlemen. The Royal Regiment of Horse Guards (the Royals – not actually part of the Household, despite the name) and the King’s Horse Guards (the Blues) were full regiments. Each regiment had nine troops.

The Guns, et al.

The Royal Artillery was a new institution. The first drafts were raised in 1716; their creation influenced by weaknesses brought to light during the 1715 Rising. The Royal Artillery consisted of four companies, all on service in Flanders. They were armed with a total of nine 6-lbers and a heavy 6-lber "flag gun" (it literally carried the Colours), as well as four or five 8in howitzers, plus twenty-seven "Swedish" 3-lbers and ten 1-1/2-lber "prolong" guns for infantry support. The prolong guns had a small team of a horse and limber to make them more mobile.

Accounts also mention the use of "curricle" guns, mounted on 2-wheel carts. These may in fact be the same thing as the battalion guns, or a field expedient. The term is often used of anti-personnel guns dismounted from warships and crewed by the navy, as at Prestonpans. Coehorn mortars (an excessively overweight "portable" brass grenade launcher, with a crew of 4) were also available. The British had no formal siege train, although one was put together for Flanders from the arsenal at Woolwich, and bits and pieces were collected by the end of the Rising.

12-lber field pieces and even larger siege guns of thirty-two and sixty-four pound shot were also available, mostly taken off ships or out of fortifications. Versus the rebels, the field army mainly employed their battalion guns, as the rest were just too cumbersome. The latter, made of brass, were often served by an infantry crew. They had an effective range of some 450 yards, and were capable of firing two to three roundshot per minute. They could be loaded with "cartridge" or canister shot as well. Normally, one was placed on each flank of a battalion deployed in line, to cover that unit's front in enfilade.

The gunners relied on civilian transport and came under the Board of Ordnance, which was the government supply department, and which supplied arms and equipment to the Navy as well as providing engineers and various labour gangs. The subordination of a combat arm to two competing authorities (Army and Ordnance) was another major reason for the general ineffectiveness of artillery in a mobile role.

Civilians staffed most of the other army trades. The engineers consisted of a handful of enthusiastic officers whom nobody took seriously. Fortresses had their own garrisons commanded by governors. Supply and transport was handled by civilian contract, either through the Ordnance Board, or through enterprising businessmen attaching themselves to the army on their own. Ordnance Board contracts would be the plum ones, of course – lots of markup, lots of graft, etc. Just like today.

The English fortifications were sadly undermanned and equipped with obsolete weapons. Berwick Castle, for example, had a garrison of two, including a master gunner aged 97, and a number of cannon at least as old. Most of the internal fortifications of the country had been razed after the Civil War, either by Cromwell or the Stuarts. The ones on the south coast dated from Henry VIII's time, and the ones in Wales from William the Conqueror's. In the Highlands and Ireland, old castles were also converted to barracks – mostly by General Wade and his men in the 1720's and 30's. Company-size garrisons (sixty to eighty men), often locals, were the norm in these locations, although the newer barracks were built to house 200-300 men. Fort William had exactly four men as its permanent garrison.

The idea was presumably to flesh key garrisons out in time of war, while other locations were way stations for passing troops. Although billeting was unpopular, permanent barracks spelt repression in many people's minds, so they were not constructed in England. Indeed, the building of barracks in Scotland caused considerable turmoil; Rob Roy MacGregor for one, when troops began building a barracks on his property at Inversnaid, took action and burned it down.

Ersatz

A large number of volunteer and militia formations took part in the '45. Some guesswork is required for the County Militia, but

many of the units have been documented. The Orders of Battle given at the end of these notes include three categories of "militia" unit. The County Militias, uniformed in red or blue, and meant to work in conjunction with the line troops, proved almost useless. They were mustered and equipped under the authority of the Lord Lieutenants of the counties. These officials, along with the Justices of the Peace and the Sheriffs, were responsible for maintaining law and order in their regions, local defence, and providing recruits for the regular army.

All throughout this period, the Militia was the subject of acrimonious debate. The mechanism for calling out the Militia was outdated and subject to abuse; additionally, questions were raised about the legality of the procedures and about whom held the ultimate responsibility. The levying and use of the Militia was such a thorny political issue that even at the height of the Rising, virtually no action was taken to raise the counties except in the areas immediately threatened, and even here the hastily raised volunteer units made a much better showing.

Provincial Militia units (sometimes confusingly called County Regiments or more appropriately Noble's Regiments) were also raised for the occasion, of which there were on paper 13 foot and 2 horse, numbered in sequence after the line regiments (69th plus for the foot and 9th plus for the horse). They were presumably to be clad in proper uniforms, as they were considered "regulars". Most sources state that only 6 units were actually raised, and that only 4 actually did anything. However, their strength returns indicate an expectation of matching the regulars in size (780 men each) and the sources give mustering locations for all of them. It should be noted that faking strength returns for the purposes of fraud was common practice at this time. Numbered from the 67th to the 79th of foot and 9th to 10th of horse, they were mainly used for garrison work, but the 69th and 74th did take part in the siege of Carlisle.

Finally, local groups of loyal citizens, typically country gentry or town burgesses, raised blue-coated Volunteer units of varying sizes. These were disbanded after the Rising. As an exception, Kingston's Light Horse, formed on the Hussar model, was re-enrolled into the line as the 15th Cumberland's Dragoons (later the 15th Hussars), a unit that also incorporated the similarly named Cumberland's Hussars, which was a volunteer bodyguard troop for Sweet William. These units were reasonably successful in fulfilling the militia's traditional roles of internal security, line of communication work, and morale boosting. In general though, the population of Britain was unwarlike and sick of internal conflicts. Only in places such as the Highlands did a large body of extra-legal professional fighting men still exist. Efforts to harness this force for the regime were quite successful.

The 43rd Royal Highland Regiment (later the 42nd Black Watch) was originally a collection of six government-sponsored companies commanded by local leaders and dedicated to keeping the peace in the Highlands. It took part in the battle of Fontenoy as a regiment and was deployed to the south of England during the Rising (too many of its men had relatives in the Jacobite Army). In Scotland, the Lord President of the (Scottish) Sessions, Duncan Forbes, attempted to raise 20 new companies of Highlanders on the model of the Black Watch and the very new 64th of Foot (The Highland Regiment); 18 companies were actually created. As with the County Militias, no legal form existed for calling up the clans, who in any case were supposedly disarmed – naturally, only the loyal clans had obeyed the Government ruling.

The Argyll (Argyle) Militia was a separate entity, amounting to at least 15 companies of clansmen commanded by their own chiefs, who were suspected (like all Highlanders) of being sympathetic to the enemy. These units were organised as standard foot battalions, rather than clan bands, but again, recruitment and rearming went slowly. They participated but were unengaged at Falkirk, and had a significant role on the flanks at Culloden.

Lastly there were the 25 Companies of Invalids and 12 Independent Companies that fall under the heading of regulars. They were pretty much static units. Most were eventually formed

into line battalions (the 49th in Jamaica, and 41st at home). Besides these, a number of “additional companies” (recruiting cadres) found themselves fighting against the Jacobites as provisional battalions. It was the additional companies of the Royal Scots that were captured at the outset of the campaign.

Foreign Units

The use of mercenary troops, such as the “infamous” Hessians of the American Revolution, was not encouraged at home for the obvious reason that they would have no qualms in suppressing a discontented populace. They were also unreliable. Holland and Hesse contributed a large number of men to the campaign, but with less than spectacular results. There are rare reports that Hanoverian troops were also used (but with little substantiation).

The Hessians provided 4000-5000 men and the Dutch 6000. Dutch units were provided as part of a clause in the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), whereby the Dutch would loan the British 6000 men on demand (this is the source for the figure “6000” – whether that many were actually sent is debatable). The treaty was also invoked for the 1715 and 1719 Risings. Not surprisingly, the Dutch did not lend their best troops.

The units donated for the ‘45 were newly released by the French from the surrendered garrisons of Tournai and Dendermonde (the strengths of these garrisons –7000 – at least matches the requirements of the British). Diplomatic pressure was put on their commander to withdraw after the Écossais Royaux landed in Scotland (a major reason that unit was sacrificed), as they were not allowed to fight French troops while on parole. The Dutch were thus withdrawn and replaced by the Hessians. Incidentally, King George was aware of this defect, but the Hessian deal was still in the works, and he did not want to remove descent units from the front.

References are sometimes made in the accounts to Swiss units. Probably the Hersler (or Hirtzer) Regiment is meant – Swiss mercenaries in Dutch service now fighting for the British. Another strange unit was the Holstein-Gotthorp Regiment, composed of mercenaries from all over Germany and given to the Dutch as payment for services that Holland had rendered to Holstein in a war against Denmark. The old Dutch army had been virtually destroyed in the War of the Spanish Succession, leading to a greater reliance on mercenaries. The Dutch hussar unit was, on the best evidence, actually a Bavarian unit! – the Graf von Frangipani Hussars, newly arrived from that state. (The Elector of Bavaria had to do something to generate revenue, as his lands had been twice wasted by the Austrians). Only a 60-man troop out of the 4-squadron regiment took part.

The Hessians represent about a third of Frederick I of Hesse-Cassel’s state mercenaries, who had already been committed to working for the British in Flanders. The Allied forces had 4500 of them. When compared to the 4-5000 men sent, this suggests that the entire contingent was withdrawn from Flanders, leaving even fewer units to face the French. The British must have been hoping to finish the job before the next campaigning season. The sources report from 6 to 8 battalions in all.

These units had no qualms about fighting the French, but for some reason they were not keen to go romping around the Highlands in midwinter. They also had a beef with the British government about their pay. Contrary to popular belief, the Hessians were well liked by the Scottish populace (and by the Americans later on, the “Legend of Sleepy Hollow” notwithstanding). They were tidy and courteous and did not loot much.

It is very difficult to determine which units are which. The list of Hessian units given in the OOB below matches the sources for the Rising, but does not entirely match other sources for the Hessian Army – the regiments changed hands frequently. Hessian companies were oversized in comparison to the other forces in the Rising but not unusually so for German troops. Frederick came with his men to England (to be with his good friend and brother-in-law the Duke of Cumberland), so the 60 troopers he brought were probably his “Garde-du-Corps” squadron (although they are

described as “hussars”, possibly in confusion with Graf von Frangipani’s men, and it is even possible that the GvF remained in Scotland, because it had not been a party to the Tournai agreement.

THE JACOBITE ARMY

*A wind that awoke on the moorland came sighing
Like the voice of the heroes who perished in vain;
Not for Thearlach [Charlie] alone the red claymore was plying,
But to win back the old world that comes not again.”*

Aytoun

The forces of Prince Charles fought three major battles against the army of the House of Hanover, besides engaging in a number of skirmishes and rearguard actions, plus a few generally fruitless sieges. In most of the skirmishes and two of the three battles, the Jacobite troops were victorious – in the battles, once against recruits and once against veterans. Having proved their invincibility, they were completely defeated on Culloden Moor by troops they had previously trounced.

General Notes

Charles Stuart and his advisors were initially determined on an invasion of England backed by French regulars, which would generate a wide-scale rising of Jacobite supporters in Britain. However the French were deeply involved with their Continental campaigns by this point (although they were the ones who had invited Charles to take part in an invasion the year before) and were reluctant to make a commitment until Jacobite unity and strength had been demonstrated. Unfortunately the Jacobites wanted a demonstration of French resolve first. Because of this catch-22, the Prince, urged on by the Scottish element in his entourage, chose to land in the North. In this way he could tap into the last independent fighting force in Britain – the Highland clans. It should be noted, however, that the Jacobites also drew on other sources of manpower as the campaign progressed.

While the clan warriors were the backbone of the Jacobite army, they comprised only half of its strength. The remaining units were made up mostly of tenant farmers and townsmen from the North and East of Scotland, leavened by some Franco-Scots mercenaries and small bodies of gentlemen horse. Few of these, save the gentlemen, were volunteers. This is borne out by the poor recruiting record of such units as the Duke of Perth’s Regiment (the duke promised a thousand-man levy and turned up with a hundred and fifty souls). Desertion was also a major issue: the Atholl Brigade, for example, had less trouble recruiting but a great deal of trouble retaining its members.

The bulk of the foot soldiers were enlisted as part of their obligations to their lord, whether semi-feudal landholder or Highland chief. Contemporary chroniclers considered there were two main differences between Lowland tenants and Highland clansmen. The former, although tough fighters, had not experienced war since the 1600’s; additionally, their loyalty was suspect since they were only bound to their lords by the rent roll. The fact that this was a winter campaign may have had something to do with the general lack of interest as well. More important was the new prosperity that union with England was at last bringing, and a reluctance to upset the applecart – especially with such a group of proven incompetents as the Jacobite exiles.

In contrast to the Lowlanders, ties both of blood and of personal loyalty bound the Highlanders to their chiefs’ politics. Clan society was so ordered that in time of war, relationships took on a regimental structure, with the “tacksmen” (propertied men under the chief) providing leadership at company and battalion level. Many men had “come out” in the Lowlands during the ‘15 (the Earl of Mar’s Rebellion) but their experiences in that rising made them loath to try it again. Thus, while the clan *buannanach* were willing to fight, coercion was often necessary to muster the rest.

[The buannanach were the idle men of the clan: those who hung out at the chief’s residence waiting on orders to go steal some cattle or carry out a “hit” on a rival organisation.]

Men were sometimes conscripted on the highways or rousted out of their farms. The threat of having one's home burnt down was quite common. Mind you, much of the evidence for this comes from prisoners taken at Culloden, who no doubt played up the "unwilling conscript" line. The authorities had stated that anyone who had not tried to avoid service with the Jacobites was a rebel and subject to death or transportation.

In the Lowlands, the Jacobites used the existing tax records both for collecting taxes and levying men, at the rate of one man per £100 rent, or £5 Stirling in lieu of. This use of the tax machinery would have appeared natural to the Jacobites, as Charles considered himself the Regent. Here too, burning was used as a threat; one farm burnt could convert an entire parish to the Cause. The billeting of Highlanders on reluctant Lowlanders was another effective measure in the short term, although ultimately counterproductive. In order to spare their tenants, landlords often recruited men on the open market, and mercenaries formed a large proportion of the muster rolls.

Lastly, there were the volunteers. These provided the officer cadre (grossly inflated in size), the cavalry, and many of the Lowland troops. The only purely volunteer units were the Manchester Regiment and John Roy Stuart's Edinburgh Regiment. This last, along with the Duke of Perth's Regiment, also took on a number of deserters after Prestonpans. The Government's 64th Highlanders lost a number of men to the opposite camp, and members of Guise's Regiment (6th of Foot) were even enrolled in the French units that eventually arrived.

The Jacobite Army was thus primarily a militia host in the feudal sense, but armed and organised as much as possible on modern 18th Century lines. It was run in much the same manner as the British Army, with Charles as "captain-general" calling councils of war to decide strategy and his lieutenants (principally Lord George Murray) fighting the battles. The men themselves, though few were volunteers, were quite willing to fight on the day, if well directed, and the repute of a famous or popular leader was a greater guarantee of keeping a regiment up to strength. What the Army lacked was infrastructure. Supply was hand-to-mouth, levied from disgruntled Whigs, donated by the faithful or shipped at great cost and risk from France. This allowed the Army to move very rapidly, because it had no base of operations, but also ensured that it was a one-shot weapon.

Also, very few of the officers had the training or inclination to follow a disciplined routine that would ensure their men were properly equipped and looked after, either on the march or while in camp awaiting action. In consequence, many men left the Army and returned to at their own discretion – e.g. if a battle promising plunder was to be fought. Those that remained constantly with the colours had to put up with great hardship.

Men would slip away after a battle with their booty and, although they usually returned, it meant the Army was in a perpetual state of reorganisation. When the Jacobites marched into England, wholesale desertions occurred. Most of the men, and many of their leaders, had no desire to invade England. They wanted a Scottish Liberation and a turning back of the clock.

The Scots

The Jacobite army was organised into a Highland and a Lowland brigade. In theory, all were to be armed and equipped the same, but of course this never happened. The men were to have short coat, plaid, shoes and three pairs of hose, and to be armed with musket, pistols, and a sword. In practice, while the Highlanders were dressed pretty much as described, the Lowlanders wore breeches. In other words, each contingent wore its normal civilian attire, with blue bonnets (first instituted by Montrose while leading the Covenanters of the Civil War, and actually an anti-Royalist badge), white cockades, and a patch or strip of tartan somewhere on the person to distinguish them as combatants. The clans distinguished themselves by the traditional wearing of sprigs of greenery or feathers in their bonnets.

Organisation was by regiment, with the regiment equating to the clan (unless small, in which case the minority usually found itself

attached to a larger regiment). The term "brigade" is also used quite frequently in the sources, and this level of organisation is shown in the lists below. Unit strengths varied throughout the campaign, reflecting the age-old habits of clansmen and feudal levies of leaving the action to secure plunder and check on their families. Casualties in all battles except Culloden were slight, and even this last was not as great a butchery as might be thought from some of the accounts. Not by Continental standards anyway.

The most powerful "Brigade" was Clan MacDonald with over 2000 men. The Atholl Brigade was about 900 strong, as were the composite regiments under Lord Lewis Gordon (the Glenbucket Regiment was a separate entity from the rest of the Gordons) and Lord Ogilvie (the Forfar Regiment). The Duke of Perth's Regiment, Lochiel's Camerons, and the Frasers weighed in at 700 to 800 apiece. The Jacobite cavalry squadrons were typically between 30 to 50 strong, and were lucky if they had a mount for each trooper. The other units are a mixed bag. Lady MacIntosh raised her regiment while her husband was serving with the government forces. He was later captured by the rebels and paroled to his wife! Reputedly, the enlistment bounty in her regiment also included a kiss from the 18-year-old Lady.

[Or so the legend goes. Other accounts indicate that Lady MacIntosh was a 20-something virago who did not hesitate to clap a pistol to the head of one of her tenants when he proved reluctant.]

The Highlanders

The name "Highlander" conjures up a hulking or gnarled figure, bearded and raggedly dressed, festooned with weapons of every description. Traditionally, the wealthy were armed with musket, two or three pistols, broadsword and dirk (dagger), and of course a *sgean dubh*. (A small knife – the name means "black dagger" in reference to its handle of bog oak). The mass of both Highlanders and peasants would be armed with claymores (ancient two-handed swords or newer broadswords), lochaber axes (a polearm), spears, scythes and other farm implements. Wooden targets (shields) were also common.

By the '45 however, things were beginning to change. From the lists of captured weaponry it would appear that muskets – French or Spanish .69 calibre – were the most common weapons. Only an estimated one out of five men carried a broadsword. Firearms were seen as essential if they were to achieve some sort of parity with the enemy regulars. Every effort was made to obtain more muskets and powder, and to drill the men in their use, but there was a chronic shortage of ammunition. Smuggled French or Spanish weapons were preferred, but captured Brown Besses and even old fowling pieces were pressed into service early in the campaign. French-style belly boxes (a cartridge box worn in front suspended on a belt) were used to carry ammunition.

Tactics in battle were simple: find a patch of rough ground (the Highlanders had an unwarranted fear of cavalry), preferably above the enemy, then advance enmasse, stop and fire a volley, and then charge. These tactics were apparently introduced by the Irish Confederates of the Civil War period, a body of whom fought in Scotland under Montrose in 1645. It was an attempt – and an often successful one – to counter the superior firepower of well-armed troops. Frequently, the men would throw themselves flat while the enemy fired, then complete their rush before their opponents could reload.

From the various accounts, it appears that the regiments manoeuvred onto the battlefield in column and deployed in a four-deep firing line, in accordance with the French doctrine of the time. But during the charge, they would tend to mass in a wedge formation, everyone striving to be first in at the kill. As General Hawley wrote in his Instructions to his men:

They Commonly form their Front rank of what they call their best men, or True Highlanders, the number of which being always but few, when they form in Battalions they commonly form four deep, & these highlanders form the front of the four; the rest being lowlanders & arrant scum. When these battalions come within a large Musket shot, or threescore yards, this front Rank gives their fire, & Immediately thro' down their firelocks & Come down in a Cluster with their Swords & Targets making

a Noise & Endeavouring to pearce the Body, or Battallions before them becoming 12 or 14 deep by the time they come up to the people they attack.

The sure way to demolish them is at 3 deep to fire by ranks diagonally to the Centre where they come, the rear rank first, and even that rank not to fire till they are within 10 or 12 paces but if the fire is given at a distance you probably will be broke for you never get time to load a second Cartridge, & if you give way you may give your foot for dead, for they being without firelock or any load, no man with his arms, accoutrements &c. can escape them, and they give no Quarters, but if you will but observe the above directions, they are the most despicable Enemy that are.³

The assault was almost in the manner of the later French Revolutionary armies; indeed it would have to be in order for the relatively untrained masses to stand a chance against repeated volley fire. Significantly, those Regular formations that stood up to the charge were generally bypassed.

The Highlanders excelled at ambush and raid, and would have made an excellent guerrilla force in those respects, but they lacked the commitment to a higher ideal and the willingness to submit to authority that could have kept them in the field like modern insurgents. The further away they got from their mountains, the more discontented they became. Their commanders understood their limitations, and agreed that their amazing successes could not be expected to continue without the backing of regular troops.

The Lowland Regiments

The remainder of the Jacobite forces were primarily peasant levies. In 1715, the Lowlands “came out” in force, but by 1745, the people of this region were openly hostile to the Cause. Many of the larger Lowland units, such as those raised by Lord Lewis Gordon and the Duke of Perth, were tenants or renters from the northeast. The Atholl Brigade was a similar unit comprised of peasants toughened by life on the Highland Line. Other units were comprised of gentlemen who espoused the Stuart cause, had grievances against the government, or were so broke they were ready for anything.

Like the Highland chiefs, many of the militia officers had experience in France's wars. Attempts were made to drill and properly equip their troops, as muskets became available. Some units, like the Duke of Perth's and Ogilvie's Forfar Regiment, performed well in combat. Some of these regiments were very good indeed, particularly considering their lack of equipment and training. Ogilvie's was apparently trained enough to form square at Culloden. Others were little more than a rabble. The worst unit was probably the Manchester Regiment, formed from about two hundred and fifty out-of-work labourers who joined for food. Because of the uneven nature of these militia units, the brunt of the combat was born by the clansmen while the rest were normally deployed in the second line.

Cavalry

The Jacobite cavalry was a mixed bag. Various ephemeral units show up on the muster roll – usually troops of no more than forty or fifty men each. Most were composed of gentlemen and their personal servants, with a leavening of tradesmen and professional men. Many of the Lifeguards were members of Edinburgh and Dundee society.

Units like Bagot's Hussars (commanded by a French regular), excelled at their tasks, although they were prone to plunder, and were looked down upon by the more fashionable. The main difficulty with the horse was a shortage of mounts. Toward the end of the campaign, Kilmarnock's and Pitsligo's Horse were dismounted and converted into Kilmarnock's Foot Guards; their mounts went to equip the French FitzJames Horse. In

consequence, the cavalry had little employment except in conducting reconnaissance and providing camp security.

The cavalry was not only armed with swords, but with a plethora of firearms – usually a musket and a brace of pistols. Bagot's carried sabres befitting their hussar status, and wore tartan shortcoat and trows, with hussar caps. The Lifeguards were nattily attired in blue coats with red facings, gold-laced tricorne and waistcoats. The rest wore civilian attire.

Artillery

Guns were the Prince's hot button. Apart from several thousand muskets, he brought with him about twenty field pieces of various sorts, which were his pride and joy. He was most put out when the Highlanders dumped them in a bog. They did not intend to hold a battle on any ground where cannon could be useful.

But the Prince stuck to his guns [*sorry*]. He managed to salvage about half of the original weapons. He also captured Cope's whole train of mortars and light pieces at Prestonpans. These light cannon were later augmented in October by six 4-lbers of Swedish make, and in November by a set of six more Swedish imports: two 16-lbers, two 12-lbers, and two 8-lbers. “Swedish” referred to a style of artillery piece, but in the Jacobites' case, they were actually supplied by Sweden, through France. These were the best weapons the Jacobites had, capable of firing eight rounds a minute (in contrast with the usual three), if crewed by experienced men. Some French gunners arrived as well, and Charles found himself at last with a professional artillery train. All but the November reinforcements were lost on the retreat from Derby; the surviving guns remained with the Franco-Irish in the north and were used at the siege of Stirling.

By Culloden, the Prince had a new train, ranging from 1&1/2-lbers to 6-lbers, mostly taken from Fort George. Those actually used at Culloden were ten 3-lbers and a 4-lber Swedish gun manned by a French crew. Ill-served, they proved ineffective against the vastly more professional Royal Artillery. (Apparently most of the French gunners were not at Culloden. Not being required for the night attack, they had been left in Inverness and did not muster with the rest of the army).

The French

The French invasion force was to have been 15000 men, including 4000 cavalry. However, the units actually assigned numbered only about half that amount, and had only partially assembled by the time the Jacobites reached Derby.

[This author estimates 16 to 20 foot battalions and 6 to 10 cavalry regiments.]

The great Marshal, Maurice de Saxe, commander in Flanders, lost no opportunity to undermine his rival, Monsieur le Duc de Richelieu (commander of the invasion forces), and soon the recently assembled units were being siphoned off to the Flanders front. The only time the British naval blockade was relaxed, there were storms in the Channel.

Although the French never did send their vaunted expedition, some units of the French army, mostly expatriate Scots and Irish, arrived as a morale booster. In total, the foreign contingent amounted to some 800 men. Six “picquets”, or companies, were detached from the battalions of the Irish Brigade and sent to Scotland (two companies from each of three battalions). Their transports encountered a storm plus an enemy boarding party and the survivors were amalgamated as the Irish Picquets.

There is another version of events, however, in which the Picquets were deliberately formed as a composite unit to be a token of French commitment. This is certainly possible, as Charlie's escort vessel the Elisabeth contained 700 Irish who were unable to transfer off their damaged ship and had to return to France. Elsewhere, however, this body of 700 is written up as 60 men

³General Hawley's Orders before Falkirk, 12th January 1746, from *Battlefields of Britain*, Smurthwaite, David, Webb and Bower, London, 1987. p184. Incidentally, the “no quarter” statement is not an exaggeration. The effect of arms, legs, and heads flying about as they were hacked off was truly horrifying.

called “de Maurepas’ Marines”. Yet another source states the men were a group of 100 engineers and other officers. FitzJames Horse was a heavy cavalry regiment, originally Irish, but by now part of the regular French establishment. It arrived in Scotland at about squadron strength, *sans chevaux*, again due to enemy action on the high seas.

Additionally, the French sent the *Écossais Royaux* (Scots-Royal to distinguish them from the Hanoverian regime’s Royal Scots), under Lord John Drummond. This unit had been raised in direct response to the Jacobite pleas for aid. The sources disagree about how large the unit was at this time – most indicate that it had only a single battalion, with permission to raise a second in Scotland, and that the full establishment of 1000-1200 men was not attained until much later. The French also directly sponsored Ogilvie’s Forfar Regiment (as of February 15th, 1746) as Scottish soldiers in French pay. Ogilvie went on to raise a new regiment in French service with some of his men.

All these units were French regulars. The Irish wore red coats, since technically they were a loan from James II dating from 1689, while the Scots, who were simply exiles, wore the blue of the French foreign corps. Recruitment for the Irish regiments was done both in the British Isles and among deserters or captured merchant seamen. French regiments were either “provincial”, that is organised by region (although many of their recruits would come from elsewhere and were often Germans), or “gentlemen’s” – in other words raised by a colonel, similar to the British model. They, like the British, had their *Vieux* (Old) Corps consisting of the six senior regiments, plus a *Petits Vieux* Corps of six more, and then the rest, many of which were foreign.

Regimental numbering in the French Army was purely for seniority, rather than for identification, and changed over time. The French line regiments (of which there were 98 in total) had only one battalion in peacetime, except for senior regiments, which had two. However, due to the incessant warfare in Europe, the total number of battalions was increased, from 155 in 1740, to 227 in 1747. The number of companies varied over the years, but at this time, battalions had 14 fusilier companies of 40 men, plus a grenadier company of 45 men. As with the British, the rigours of campaigning and the falsification of returns meant that the actual strength on the ground was much lower than officially recorded.

Backing up the line infantry was a large body known as the Royal or Provincial Militia. This was first organised in 1726, and initially consisted of 100 battalions of 6 companies each. They were later given names reflecting their recruiting area, and were ranked in order of precedence. At the time of the ‘45, the battalions had 12 companies of 50 men each. In April 1745, the grenadier companies, which had been added earlier, were combined into battalions of *grenadiers-royaux*, each of 12 companies of 50 men. These units were so effective that they were reinstated several times throughout the century and eventually formed the basis for Napoleon’s *Gardes Grenadiers à Pied*. Militia units were normally used as garrison troops in their own regions, but the grenadier battalions were among those set to take part in the invasion.

The French cavalry was divided into Royal Guard, Heavy, and Dragoon. It was the pride of the army, its main strength, as well as its most expensive arm, and was still run on proprietorial terms. Despite its reputation, however, it was in many respects even more useless than the British horse. Charges were conducted at the trot because the company commanders owned their companies’ horses and did not want to wear them out. The caracole was still in use as well, and even the regiments that discarded it (the idea that each unit should conduct the same drills as every other was unthinkable) still loved to blaze away with pistol and carbine while their opponents merrily rolled up their flanks at the gallop. Little attention was paid to maintaining the horses, in comparison to learning the social arts of “riding the Ring”, to use the English term.

Heavy cavalry was known as “*cavalerie légère*”, a relic of the time when the original heavies (*cavalerie lourdes*) wore full plate armour. A heavy cavalry regiment was composed of 4 squadrons,

with 2 companies per squadron (each having up to 50 men), for a total of 400 men at best. Dragoon regiments were much stronger, with up to 1000 men, in 5 squadrons of 4 companies each. This was due to their intended role as mounted infantry. The Guard regiments, which had no role in the Rising, were huge, some of their squadrons equating to line regiments. The first “irregular” cavalry were only added in 1730, when the Hungarian émigré Berchenyi arrived with his bodyguard of hussars.

The *Artillerie-Royaux* had a grand and well-deserved reputation. On the plus side, artillery officers were trained from the bottom up and had to pass written and practical exams – but this meant they were not gentlemen. The artillery corps also included companies of miners and of artificers, for siege work and ordnance repair. Tactically, like most other armies the French employed their guns in penny packets along the line of battle rather than enmasse, and subordinated “battalion guns” to each infantry battalion. Unfortunately most battalion commanders had no idea how to use their toys. As a footnote, the French had of course their own Corps of Engineers; like the artilleryists, their officers were educated, professional, and mostly of middle class origin.

The 40 guns allotted to the French invasion never put in an appearance at all. 40 guns would be a high proportion of any army’s artillery train, even the French Army! The French army in Flanders started their spring campaign with up to 110 guns, many of which were used as siege pieces. (Numbers for this campaign vary widely on all counts). The French train, had it arrived, would have consisted of standardised pieces served by professional gunners (the French also claim to have instituted the first professional artillery arm, in opposition to British claims). However, all their guns were heavy and required a large logistical tail, although they did have a few Swedish-style 4-lbers, plus some even lighter rapid firing pieces.

The English et al.

Great hopes were pinned on an English Rising, but the only recruits the fearsome Highland Host could garner on its march south were 300 starving textile workers, hastily formed into the Manchester Regiment.

Assuming the population had “come out”, the Prince would likely have used the Georgian régime’s own militia system; possibly many of the local militia would have defected wholesale if the Jacobites had proven themselves. It is certain they were the only remaining trained body of men in England (well, sort of trained... well, at least they had shootin’-irons).

Some of the most powerful clans stood out of the dispute, while others sent contingents to fight on both sides either as a matter of policy or through a difference of opinion between chief and men. The fighting strength of the clans has been estimated at numbers approaching 15000 Jacobites and another 10000 “Hanoverians”.

[Charles was willing to invade England with a third of that number.]

The Jacobites’ initial successes did not change the neutral chiefs’ minds, except for that of Simon Fraser (Lord Lovat), who, with impeccably bad timing, changed sides just before Culloden and earned the dubious distinction of being the last Scottish peer executed for treason.

Additional aid came from an unlikely source. Sweden raised a body of 300 noblemen and their retainers, probably mostly Scottish exiles. The unit was funded by the French. They would have arrived right after Culloden, if the rebellion had not collapsed.

Siegecraft

The Jacobites had neither the time nor the resources to mount siege operations. The Highlanders in particular were unsuited to such work. Of Edinburgh, Carlisle, and Stirling, the three main fortresses dealt with, Edinburgh city was taken by seizing a gate that opened to let in a carriage. The citadel was never taken. Carlisle had a garrison of only 114 men and was crumbling away

in any case; the commandant surrendered the citadel to spare the town.

Stirling, with 500 militia, considered surrender, but the failure of the Prince's guns (after a couple of week's work, the Jacobite Grand Battery of six guns was unveiled and promptly demolished with the castle's first salvo) and the arrival of Hawley brought a reprieve. Fort Augustus, the central fort in the Great Glen was stormed, but even with the dozen or so pieces captured from it, and a solid blockade by the Jacobites, Fort William, at the

southern end of the glen, held out. "Fort George" was easily taken, being the old castle of Inverness, hastily refurbished in General Wade's time. The better-known Fort George of today was not completed until after the Rising.

Very little entrenching was done in this campaign, although the science was enjoying its golden age. Previous rebellions had seen a fair amount of digging-in and erecting of barricades, but apparently the Highlanders couldn't be bothered.

ORDERS OF BATTLE IN THE '45

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS GLEANED DURING THE COURSE OF DEVELOPING THE AUTHOR'S HISTORICAL SIMULATION (A.K.A WAR GAME) *CHARLIE'S YEAR* (PUBLISHED BY *RED SASH GAMES™*). THE GAME USES PLAYING PIECES REPRESENTING INDIVIDUAL HISTORICAL REGIMENTS OR SMALLER BODIES OF TROOPS. THE OOB ADDITIONALLY INCLUDES THE ENTIRE ORDER OF BATTLE FOR THE BRITISH ARMY IN 1745 (AS BEST AS CAN BE DETERMINED), PLUS A FEW *POTENTIAL* FORMATIONS (PARTICULARLY THE FORCES OF HIGHLAND CHIEFTAINS WHO SAT OUT THE RISING).

BRITISH ARMY OB

THE FOOT REGIMENTS

Most regiments, apart from the oldest, were known solely by their Colonel's name until 1742, at which point regimental names and numbers based on seniority began to be introduced. Not until 1881 did territorial titles become standard. During these periods of reorganisation, units were amalgamated or disbanded, and this process has continued into our own times, so that the regiments existing today do not exactly correspond with the formations existing at the time of the '45. However, many modern regiments can boast of at least some element that dates from or predates the period of the Jacobite Wars. Under the British regimental system, a colonelcy was usually an honorary position, actual command being delegated in most cases to a lieutenant colonel. This creates the confusing situation of regiments having the same name as their brigade commander or even a field marshal. Where possible, the name of the colonel holding office at the time of the '45 is used. If this information was unavailable, the names given in the Army List of 1740 are used (see bibliography). There were many changes in command between 1740 and 1745, particularly because 1745 was a vigorous campaigning year; some of the units changed colonels more than once. In these instances either latest name, or the name most prevalent in the sources is used. Facing colours are historical for the year in question (with a few uncertainties). Regimental numbers are for reference only, as they were not even codified until 1748, and not officially recognised until 1751.

"Est" (Establishment) refers to the command the unit belonged to: B for British (including Scotland) and I for Irish. The small letters are: s = Scotland; f = Flanders; g = Gibraltar; m = Minorca; a = America; e = England; i = Ireland. Dual codes indicate first and second postings, where a unit had more than one battalion.

Rgt #	Unit Name	Est.	Facing	Raised	Notes
1Gds	Wills' (2bn)	B(f)	Royal Blue	1660	(i)
2Gds	Folliot's (2bn)	B(f)	Royal Blue	1650	(i)
3Gds	Dunmore's (2bn)	B(f)	Royal Blue	1642	(i)
1	St Claire's (2bn)	I(f/i)	Royal Blue	1626	(ii)
2	Kirke's (Columbine's?)	B(g)	Sea Green	1661	(iii)
3	Howard's	B(f)	Buff	1665	(iv)
4	Barrel's	B(f)	Royal Blue	1674	(v)
5	Irwin's (Whitefoord's)	I(i)	Gosling Green	1674	
6	Guise's	B(s)	Yellow	1674	(vi)
7	Moyston's (Fowke's?)	B(g)	Royal Blue	1685	(vii)
8	Wolfe's (Onslow's)	B(f)	Medium Blue	1685	(viii)
9	Reade's (Waldegrave's)	B(mg)	Yellow	1685	(ix)
10	Pole's (Graham's?)	B(m)	Yellow	1685	(ix)
11	Soule's	B(f)	Green	1685	
12	Skelton's (Doroure's)	B(f)	Yellow	1685	
13	Pulteney's	B(f)	Philemot Yellow	1685	
14	Price's	B(f)	Buff	1685	
15	Jorden's (Harrison's)	B(f)	Yellow	1685	(x)
16	Rob. Handasyde's	B(f)	Yellow	1688	(xi)
17	Wynyard's	B(mg)	Greyish White	1688	(xii)
18	Mordaunt's (Armstrong's)	B(f)	Royal Blue	1683	
19	Howard's	B(f)	Green	1688	(xiii)
20	Bligh's (Sackville's)	I(f)	Pale Yellow	1688	
21	Campbell's	B(f)	Royal Blue	1677	(xiv)
22	O'Farrell's	B(mg)	Buff	1689	(xii)
23	Huske's	B(f)	Blue	1689	
24	Houghton's	B(e)	Willow Green	1689	
25	Sempill's	I(f)	Blue	1689	
26	Anstruther's	B(mg)	Yellow	1689	(xv)
27	Blakeney's	B(f)	Green	1689	
28	Bragg's	I(f)	Yellow	1694	(xvi)
29	Hopson's	B(e)	Yellow	1694	(xvii)

Rgt #	Unit Name	Est.	Facing	Raised	Notes
30	Frampton's (Bisset's)	I(ea)	Pale Yellow	1694	(xviii)
31	Beuclerk (W. Handasyde's)	B(f)	Buff	1702	
32	Skelton's/Harrison's (Doyle's)	B(e)	Red	1702	
33	Johnson's	B(f)	Red	1702	
34	Cholmondeley's	B(f)	Yellow	1702	(xx)
35	Otway's	I(i)	Orange	1701	
36	Fleming's	B(f)	Dark Green	1701	
37	Munro's (Dejean's/Ponsonby's)	I(f)	Yellow	1702	
38	Dalzell's	B(a)	Yellow	1702	(xxi)
39	Hargrave's? (Richbell's?)	B(g)	Green	1702	(xxii)
40	Phillips'	B(a)	Buff	1717	(xxiii)
41	Fielding's	B(e)	Blue	1719	(xxiv)
42	Oglethorpe's	B(ea)	Green	1744	(xxv)
43	Crauford's	B(f)	Yellow	1725	(xxvi)
44	Churchill's Marines	B	Yellow	1739	(xxvii)
45	Frazer's Marines	B	Green	1739	(xxviii)
46	Holmes' Marines	B	Yellow	1739	
47	Byng's Marines	B	White	1739	
48	Cochrane's Marines	B	Pale Yellow	1739	
49	Coterall's Marines	B	Green	1739	(xxviii)
50	Cornwallis' Marines	B	White	1739	
51	Duncombe's Marines	B	Yellow	1741	(xxviii)
52	Powlett's Marines	B	Dark Buff	1741	
53	Agnew's Marines	B	Orange	1741	
54	Warburton's	B(a)	Green	1741	(xxix)
55	Lee's	B(s)	Yellow	1741	(xxx)
56	Fuller (D Houghton's)	B(a)	Green	1741	(xxix)
57	Murray's	B(s)	Yellow	1741	
58	Lacelle's	B(s)	Lt Grey	1740	
59	Ligonier's (Conway's)	B(s)	Buff	1740	
60	Bruce's	I(i)	Yellow?	1743?	
61	Richbell's (Folliot's)	I(e)	Pea Green?	1743?	(xxxii)
62	Battereau's	B(f)	Royal Blue	1743?	
63	Trelawney's	B(a)	Green	1744	(xxxii)
64	Loudon's	B(s)	White	1745	(xxxiii)
65	Shirley's	B(a)	?	1744	(xxxiv)
66	Pepperill's	B(a)	?	1745	(xxxiv)
	Frazer's Provisional Battalion	B(f)	Yellow	1745	(xxxv)
	Coterall's Provisional Battalion	B(f)	Yellow	1745	
	Duncombe's Provisional Battalion	B(e)	Yellow	1745	

Independent Units

a) Companies of Invalids:

Carlisle	2 coys	Pendennis	1 coy
Chester	2 coys	Plymouth	4 coys
Guernsey	2 coys	Scilly Islands	1 coy
Hull	4 coys	Sheerness	2 coys
Jersey	3 coys	Tilbury Fort	2 coys
Landguard Fort	1 coy	Tinmouth	1 coy
various billets	5 coys		

b) Independent Companies:

Bermuda	1 coy	Jamaica	8 coys (see xxxii)
New York	4 coys	Providence Island	1 coy
South Carolina	3 coys		

c) Some Additional Companies (as of 1/1746) [Additional Companies are "march companies" – bodies of replacements.]

Dumbarton	2 coys	Newcastle	5 coys
Portsmouth	6 coys	Plymouth	6 coys

THE HORSE REGIMENTS

The Horse regiments can be numbered 1-7 or 1-8, depending on whether the RRHG (Argyle's) is included in the Line or as a Household unit. During this period, the Irish Horse was numbered separately from those on the English Establishment. Again, facing colours are historical for this date.

Rgt #	Unit Name	Est.	Facing	Raised	Notes
Household Troops:					
1&2HG	De la Ware/Hertford	B(e)	Royal Blue	1660	(xxxvi)
3&4HG	Albemarle/Shannon	B(f)	Royal Blue	1670	(xxxvi)
1&2HGG	Dormer/Effingham	B(f)	Royal Blue	1660	(xxxvi)
Horse:					
RRHG	Argyle's	B(f)	Red	1661	(xxxvii)
1	Pembroke's	B(f)	Royal Blue	1685	
2	Montague's	B(e)	Buff	1685	
3	Wade's	B(f)	White	1685	
1 Irish	Brown's	I(f)	Royal Blue	1685	
2 Irish	Wentworth's	I(i)	Lt Green	1685	
3 Irish	Cathcart's	I(i)	Yellow	1685	
4 Irish	Ligonier's	I(f)	Black	1688	(xxxviii)
Dragoons:					
1	Marleborough's	B(f)	Royal Blue	1683	(xxxix)
2	Stair's	B(f)	Royal Blue	1685	(xl)
3	Bland	B(f)	Light Blue	1685	
4	Rich's	B(f)	Pea Green	1685	
5	Evans'	I(i)	Royal Blue	1688	
6	Rothe's	I(f)	Yellow	1689	(xli)
7	Cope's	B(f)	White	1690	
8	St George's	I(e)	Orange	1693	
9	Molesworth's	I(i)	Buff	1715	(xlii)
10	Cobham's	B(f)	Yellow	1715	
11	Mark Kerr's	B(f)	White	1715	
12	Hawley's	I(i)	White	1715	
13	Gardiner's	I(s)	Green	1715	(xlili)
14	Hamilton's	I(s)	Yellow	1715	
15	Cumberland's	B	Green	1745	(xliv)
	Cumberland's Hussars	B	Green	1745	(xlv)

ROYAL ARTILLERY REGIMENT

Equipment:

6-lber field gun	x 9	
heavy 6-lber "flag gun"	x 1 (it carried the King's and Regimental Colours)	
8-inch howitzer	x 4	
3-lber prolong gun	x 27 (allotted to the line as "battalion guns")	
1.5-lber galloper gun	x 10 (for close infantry support)	

Coehorn mortars were also available in fair numbers. Other guns ranged up from 6- to 24-lbers, with the odd 48-lber thrown in. These were mostly naval or fortress artillery. Guns above the weight of a 12-lber were generally too heavy for a rapid land campaign.

GOVERNMENT MILITIA AND VOLUNTEERS

These units were all raised in 1745-46 and mostly disbanded after the rising. Note that Kingston's Light Horse is the same as the 15th Dragoons (Hussars).

Unit Name	Facings	Notes
Glasgow Enthusiasts		(xlvi)
Edinburgh Volunteers		(xlvi)
Paisley Militia		(xlvi)
Argyll Militia - 4bn	Yellow?	(xlvii)
Loudon Militia - 3bn	Yellow	(xlviii)
Inverness Black Watch		(xlix)
Stirling Militia		
Perth Militia		
Dundee Militia		
Aberdeen Volunteers		
Westmoreland/Cumberland Militia		(l)
Exon Volunteers		
Devon Volunteers		
Mordaunt's Volunteers		
Derbyshire Blues	Red	
Yorkshire Blues	Red	
Liverpool Blues (company)		
Loyal Associators or The Independents	Black	
Bristol Volunteers		
Loyal Blue Fuzileers (company)		(lxx)

<u>Unit Name</u>	<u>Facings</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Gentlemen Vol of London (2bn)		
Tower Hamlets Militia (London) (2bn)		
67 th Duke of Bolton's County Regiment		(li)
68 th Duke of Bedford's County Regiment		
69 th Duke of Montague's County Regiment	Blue?	
70 th Duke of Ancaster's County Regiment		
71 st Marquis of Granby's County Regiment	Blue	
72 nd Earl of Berkeley's County Regiment	Red	
73 rd Earl of Chomondeley's County Regiment	Yellow?	
74 th Earl of Halifax's County Regiment	Yellow?	
75 th Lord Falmouth's County Regiment	Red	
76 th Lord Harcourt's County Regiment	Yellow	
77 th Lord Gower's County Regiment		(lii)
78 th Lord Herbert's County Regiment	Blue	
79 th Lord Edgcombe's County Regiment		
Duke of Rutland's Volunteers	Blue	(liii)
Lord Kildare's Volunteers		(liii)
Lord Derby's Volunteers		(liii)
9 th Montague's Carabineers	Red?	
10 th Kingston's Lt Horse	Red	(xliv)
Oglethorpe's Georgia Rangers	Red	(liv)
Yorkshire (Oglethorpe's) Royal Fox Hunters		(lv)
Durham Association Horse	Red?	

“BLACK WATCH” – LOYAL HIGHLANDERS

Note the absence of the Inverness Militia (see above) which must be added to the 17 companies below to make the grand total of 18 units raised during the affair. The 64th is not included here, although many of the Highlanders recruited for these companies were actually incorporated into its companies. Cockades with a red (St George's) cross were worn to distinguish these men in battle.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Seaforth MacKenzie (3 coys)	(lvi)
McDonald of Sleat (2 coys)	(lvii)
Sutherland (2 coys)	(lviii)
McKay (2 coys)	(lix)
Ross (1 coy)	
Grant of Grant (1 coy)	(lx)
Munro (1 coy)	
McLeod of Assynt (1 coy)	(lxi)
2nd McLeod of McLeod (4 coys)	(lxii)

FOREIGN TROOPS

Facing colours are accurate to within a decade. The Dutch and Swiss are reputed to have had red facings, but whether the chronicler meant all the units or only some is not clear.

<u>Nationality</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Facing</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Hesse	Garde-du-Corps or part of Leibgrenadierkorps	?	(lxiii)
Hesse	Garde Regiment	Red	
Hesse	Leibgrenadier Regiment	White	
Hesse	Gen-Lt von Anspach Rgt (2bn)	White	(lxiv)
Hesse	Prince Maximillian Rgt (2bn)	Red	
Dutch (Bavarian)	Graf Von Frangipani Hussars	Red	(lxv)
Dutch (Swiss)	Hersler Regiment (3bn)	Red	(lxvi)
Dutch (German)	Holstein Gothorp Regiment (2bn)	Medium Blue	(lxvii)
Dutch	Villets Regiment(2bn)	Red	(lxviii)
Dutch	Patot Regiment(2bn)	Pink	(lxix)
Dutch	Bracknell Regiment	Dark Green	(lxx)

NOTES

(i) The Foot Guards were distinguished by the sequence of buttons worn: single buttons for the 1st Guards, pairs for Monck's Coldstreamers, triples for the Scots. The Scots Guards were formed at the start of the Civil War – 1642 – (but not brought on English establishment until 1678), the Coldstream Guards for the Second Civil War – 1650-51, and the 1st Guards (made up of former royalist exiles) upon the Restoration of Charles II – 1660. The Guard was the only body of troops that the King was legally entitled to keep under arms; the rest of the army received a rubber-stamp vote to maintain it every year, known as the Mutiny Act. The name “Grenadier Guards” was not applied to the 1st regiment until after Waterloo. Not listed is a provisional guard battalion formed after Fontenoy (presumably due to heavy casualties among the guard regiments), which was sent to England after guarding Ostend for a while.

(ii) The six senior regiments in the Army as a whole were known as the Old Corps, and the rest as the Young Corps. After a war the regiments of the young corps were mainly disbanded (except for the first six of those) while the old corps regiments were merely reduced. The first was the “Royal North British” or “Royal Regiment”. It was the only line regiment to have two full battalions at this time. The 2nd battalion went to Flanders and later transferred to London, while the 1st remained in Ireland and was shipped to Scotland piecemeal. The Royal Regiment served first with Gustavus Adolphus, and then with the French under Louis XIV for many years.

(iii) The Tangier Regiment, raised as a garrison for that location out of elements of the New Model Army. Tangier became a British possession when Charles II married Catherine of Braganza (Portugal) in 1661. The unit had a brutal reputation. Part of the Gibraltar garrison at this time. Note that the three original Gibraltar garrison units have a variety of colonels' names. I chose the most probable.

(iv) Known as “Howard's Old Buffs” to distinguish them from the 19th of Foot. The regiment was raised to serve with Prince Maurice of Nassau, and was originally known as the Holland Regiment.

(v) At the end of the Third Anglo-Dutch War, three Scottish, one Irish, and two English regiments were raised for service in the Dutch Army, as a way of keeping a standing army at no cost. The 5th and 6th of foot were recalled in 1685 and used in James II's army build up. The rest of the Brigade served as mercenaries. The 4th of Foot was sent to augment the Tangier garrison, which (apart from Portuguese and Spanish), included at various times the 2nd of Foot, the Horse Guards, the Blues, and a composite regiment of foot guards.

(vi) Guise's and the other Scots garrison units spent much of their time building and maintaining roads. This is one reason they are so spread out.

(vii) Units raised in 1685 after the Whig-supported Duke of Monmouth's Rebellion, which provided an excuse for James II to build an army of repression. The 7th of Foot already existed as the Ordnance Regiment, the first unit to be fully equipped with flintlocks. It was used to guard the artillery train, as flintlocks were safer to use around black powder. The 7th was part of the Gibraltar garrison at the time of the Rising.

(viii) Commanded by James Wolfe's (of Quebec) father. Wolfe himself was at Culloden as a Brigade Major (aide).

(ix) The 9th was part of the Minorca garrison, but transferred to Gibraltar. The 10th I suspect was also in Minorca, but this is not confirmed as there are a couple of names for the unit.

(x) Sent to southern England during the Rising. May be Harrison's, although I assigned that name to the mysterious 32nd of Foot, sometimes known as Skelton's (who also has a second regiment) or Doyle's.

(xi) Line of Communication troops in Belgium. Fought a hard little action after Fontenoy near Melle, versus strong French opposition. Units raised in 1688-89 were for the wars against King James and the Jacobites. Many of these battalions were raised by Irish Protestants.

(xii) Transferred from Minorca to Gibraltar at this time.

(xiii) The “Green” Howards, from their facings. The original regiment was raised in a record 3 days by Colonel Luttrell upon the arrival of William of Orange in 1688. Luttrell, from Somerset,

was a supporter of the Duke of Monmouth. His attempt to reinforce the Duke in 1685 was cut short by the news of the Battle of Sedgemoor. Luttrell and his followers successfully pretended to be harmless labourers and escaped home, living quietly until James II's ouster. The regiment went to work at once against the Jacobites in Ireland, where another family of Lutrells served *under* James.

(xiv) The Royal Scots Fuzileers. “North British” was the politically correct term for “Scottish” at this time.

(xv) The Cameronians - remnants of the hard-core Covenanters of the Religious Wars. They first defeated Bonnie Dundee's men at Dunkeld, 1689. Recently shifted from Minorca.

(xvi) Raised for the 1694 Third Anglo-Dutch War.

(xvii) Probably in England, but known to have been in America in 1746.

(xviii) Elements may have been formed 1689. The unit somehow also appears to have been the successor to a Marine unit formed in 1702. Had a stopover in England before proceeding to Cape Breton. Left two companies on Jersey.

(xix) 1701-02 War of the Spanish Succession. The 32nd was originally a Marine unit. “Harrison's” is conjecture on my part. It is also listed as Skelton's (but he had the 12th) or Doyle's.

(xx) The Borderers.

(xxi) Holding the Leeward Islands (Antigua).

(xxii) Sometimes listed as Richbell's, which was on the Irish establishment but deployed in England. This makes sense in that the regiment is “young”. However, the sources indicate that the 61st was Richbell's/Folliot's. Perhaps he took command of the 39th and sold out to Folliot. The 61st was definitely in England, with two companies on Guernsey and four more raising in Ireland.

(xxiii) Strung out between Virginia and Newfoundland.

(xxiv) Royal Invalids. Raised as companies of Invalids, for garrison duty. Later became The Welch Regiment.

(xxv) One of three units bearing General Oglethorpe's name. Raised in 1744 to combat the expected French invasion under de Saxe.

(xxvi) The Royal Highland Regiment (Black Watch). Later renumbered as the 42nd, its component companies were amalgamated in 1739 to form the regiment. It was sent to the south of England during the Rising, as its loyalty was suspect. There was a different 43rd a few years earlier, called Gooch's Marines. This was a four-battalion colonial unit raised in New York and disbanded in 1743.

(xxvii) These Marine units were a temporary measure and were disbanded in 1748. There is no lineal decent to the modern Royal Marines. They were Army units seconded to the Navy; hence the dual regimental numbers. Units raised in 1739 were for the War of Jenkin's Ear, against the Spanish. In 1747 they came solely under the control of the Admiralty, and in 1748 they were disbanded. The first six regiments were decimated at Cartagena (1741). HQ's for the Marines were as follows:

Canterbury (1 bn), Chatham/Rochester (2 bn), Chichester (1bn), Maidstone (1 bn), Portsmouth (1 bn), Plymouth (2 bn), Southampton (2 bn)

(xxviii) These three Marine units provided officers to two provisional battalions used in Flanders and at Plymouth (Duncombe's) and the bulk of the regiments themselves, serving in the Channel Fleet, were also recalled to England.

(xxix) Enroute to Cape Breton to support Shirley & Pepperill's seizure of Louisburg.

(xxx) After the Marines were disbanded, the regiments numbered 55-59 were renumbered 44-48. At the start of the Rising, Lee's was split in half, between Berwick and Edinburgh. The companies at Berwick were not released until after Prestonpans.

(xxxi) Deployed at Portsmouth but had new companies raised in Ireland to increase garrison forces there.

(xxxii) Formed in Jamaica from the Independent Companies stationed there. This regiment and the 62nd should not be confused

with a later pair of 62/63 regiments formed of Highlanders in 1757, many of whom were former Jacobites.

(xxxiii) In the process of recruiting when the Rising began. Most of the Loyalist Highlander companies existing at the start of the Rising belonged to the 64th. One company fought at Culloden. Disbanded during the reforms of 1748. Several men, including at least two officers defected to the Jacobites (one was MacPherson of Cluny, who raised his own unit on the Jacobite side).

(xxxiv) Shirley and Pepperill were the masterminds of the successful attack on Louisburg, Nova Scotia. These units, called "American Provincials", were kept in being to deal with various Jacobite disturbances in Massachusetts. They were disbanded in 1748, re-raised in 1754 as the 50th and 51st, and destroyed in the ill-fated attack on Niagara in 1756.

(xxxv) Formed from Additional Companies and officered by Marines. Duncombe's was used to guard POW's at Plymouth. Coterall's was formed at Carlisle and Frazer's at Newcastle.

(xxxvi) The Horse Guards and Horse Grenadier Guards were Troops of 60 men. They originated with the Royalists who were part of Charles II's army in exile. The 3rd and 4th troops of the Horse and the 2nd troop of the Grenadiers were Scots. They worked in rotation as the sovereign's personal guard (whence "Horse Guards" in London). Two troops of Horse were banded with a troop of Grenadiers. Only one troop of the HGG was in Flanders, but since there is only one counter the whole unit starts in Flanders. Soon after this date the whole mess was reconstituted as the 1st and 2nd Life Guards.

(xxxvii) The Royal Regiment of Horse Guards (The Blues). This unit has its origins in Cromwell's Life Guard of Horse. Their reputation as hell-raisers was as bad as Kirke's Tangiers (2nd of Foot).

(xxxviii) The Black Horse. The only Horse unit with a decent combat reputation at this time.

(xxxix) The King's Horse Guards (The Royals). Yes, they are dragoons. Although later amalgamated with the Blues, they were not part of the Household at this time.

(xl) Later the Royal Scots Greys. The family regiment – *Huzzah!* Remained in Flanders.

(xli) The Inniskillings. Incidentally, the 5th Dragoons ceased to exist after 1799, the regimental number remaining unused, as the unit mutinied during Wolfe Tone's rebellion. It was riddled with Irish Catholics.

(xlii) 1715 was the date of the Earl of Mar's Rebellion. All these units were formed in response to it, as dragoons were found to be highly effective anti-guerrilla units.

(xliii) Gardiner's and Hamilton's are listed on the Irish Establishment for 1740, but were obviously rotated to Scotland. The 13th was named "Gardiner's" in 1743. Both units contained a large proportion of recruits - perhaps locals, as Gardiner himself literally died on his own doorstep at Prestonpans. Gardiner was a professional, but unfamiliarity with his men compounded their poor performance.

(xliv) Formed as a volunteer unit to fight against Bonnie Prince Charlie in the '45, the 10th Kingston's Light Horse was disbanded after Culloden and its members immediately enrolled in the newly raised Cumberland Hussars (see note xl); later still, translated into the 15th Dragoons.

(xlv) Cumberland's Hussars were a specially formed bodyguard for the Duke. While their uniforms appear to have been similar to Kingston's, they were a separate organisation, of approximately a single troop in strength, later expanded to a regiment of dragoons.

(xlvi) These three units comprised Lord Home's Brigade, and were useful in holding the line of the Forth. Well represented at Falkirk, they were swept off the field by their own dragoons.

(xlvii) This is basically the Campbell clan, but they are organised and equipped as Lowland Militia, and had been for some time. Their chief and commander was Archibald, 3rd Duke of Argyll, who was also, with Duncan Forbes, one of the founders of the Black Watch. Although he and Forbes pretty much ran the country, the English distrusted him as too sympathetic to the Highlanders.

(xlviii) Never truly formed as such. John Campbell, Earl of Loudon, sought to recruit twenty companies on the model of the 43rd and 64th, but was only partially successful.

(xlix) One of the twenty companies of local government troops.

(l) 500-man unit brushed aside south of Preston. The County Militia was of notably poor quality at this time. The East and North Riding (Yorkshire) Militias are also recorded in the sources.

(li) These numbered volunteer units were temporarily incorporated into the regular army list. There is some doubt as to whether all were formed, however their strength returns claim an average of 500 to 700 men each. Halifax's and Montague's Foot (also known as the "Ordnance Regiment") served at the siege of Carlisle.

(lii) Sometimes recorded as Lord Gore's.

(liii) Where listed, these three units are generally included as members of the 13 county regiments. However, all 13 are accounted for and these three names are left over. Since the same sources that list them as part of the 13 are clear that they were never raised, I've included them as extra *potential* units.

(liv) Oglethorpe's Georgia Rangers, raised for service against the Spanish in Oglethorpe's new colony of Georgia. Raised 1738/ disbanded 1748. Meant to patrol the coasts of the new state against Spanish raiders, it was effectively to be a dragoon unit. However, during the Rising it had no mounts – nor sufficient uniforms! They were preparing to leave from Newcastle when the Rising broke out. Governor Oglethorpe himself was in England recruiting for the Rangers and for his line battalion, the 42nd (not to be confused with the later Black Watch which was the 43rd at this time). Apparently accompanying the Governor on his tour were an American Indian prince and princess. By February of 1746 was either in or enroute to Georgia.

(lv) Also known as Oglethorpe's Royal Fox Hunters, although the General was commander in name only.

(lvi) One of the dominant northern clans, the MacKenzies were old Jacobite supporters, but due to Duncan Forbes' efforts at bringing prosperity to the Highlands, the clan was divided, with the senior branch supporting the government and only those men belonging to Cromartie and Fortrose joining the rebels. Fortrose himself, however, joined the 64th!

(lvii) The most powerful branch of the McDonald clan. Their chief had undertaken to support the Jacobites the year before, but changed his mind in the interim. "Sleat" is pronounced "slate".

(lviii) The Sutherlands under Lord Reay (usually pronounced "ree") dominated the north, along with Seaforth. They ensured that the weaker clans, such as Gunn and Munro, "voted" Hanoverian.

(lix) The MacKays (usually pronounced "ma-kye", sometimes "mac-ee"), under Lord Reay, were instrumental in recovering the wreck of the Prince Charles, with its cargo of money for the Jacobites, off Tongue in the far north.

(lx) From the main body of the clan, located in the Strathspey region. Most of this huge clan remained neutral throughout the struggle.

(lxi) Assynt (pronounced "yah-sinth" or "yah-sinch-é") is in the remote NW of Scotland - so remote parts of it still have to be accessed on foot or by boat. It was a McLeod of Assynt who betrayed Montrose to the Covenanters.

(lxii) McLeod, like McDonald of Sleat, had agreed to support the Jacobites in 1744, but had been brought round by Duncan Forbes.

(lxiii) These were Frederick's bodyguard troops. It could be one company of one squadron of the first battalion of the Hessen-Darmstadt Leibgrenadierkorps (64 men) – the 1st battalion being a mounted unit – or a company of the squadron of the Hessen-Darmstadt Garde du Corps (95 men). Or it could be the Bavarian Graf von Frangipani Hussars (see below), left behind because unlike the other Dutch units, it was not composed of parolees from the Flanders campaign.

(lxiv) According to some sources, this regiment, of two battalions, should be exchanged for the 1st battalions of two other regiments: Lieb, and Hessen-Hanau Bernsdorff, a.k.a. Prinz Wilhelm. Now, a mixed regiment was sometimes called by its senior commander's name – this implies that G-L Anspach would be the Lieb Regiment commander – or it might be that the general was

present and the sources mistook his name (unlikely) for that of a regiment.

(lxv) Although this unit is not specifically named, it matches the description of a body of Dutch hussars used in the Rising, and at the same time, there is no other body of Dutch hussars that could be the culprit.

(lxvi) More accurately Hirtzel. A 3-battalion regiment, as were all the Swiss in Dutch service. From the garrison of Tournai.

(lxvii) Composed of German mercenaries hired on contract, this unit was given to the Dutch in recognition of their support against Danish claims on the Duchy of Holstein.

(lxviii) A 2-battalion regiment. From the garrison of Tournai. Served again in Flanders.

(lxix) Tissot van Patot. A 2-battalion regiment. From the garrison of Tournai. Served again in Flanders.

(lxx) More accurately Brækel. A single-battalion regiment. From the garrison of Tournai.

JACOBITE OB

MAIN JACOBITE UNITS

“Bde” (Brigade) refers to the higher organisation by which the units are often listed in the sources. The “Highland/Lowland” classification refers to units that were independent but belonged to one of the two main groupings – the Lowland Brigade or the Highland Brigade. Many of the units, particularly the Horse, went by other titles besides those listed. Unit strengths and composition fluctuated wildly throughout the campaign. Clan units were amalgamated, or their members were transferred to improve the quality of weaker formations. The “company” sized clans are listed with the larger units that they appear to have served with for the majority of the time.

<u>Unit Name</u>	<u>Bde</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Foot		
McDonald/Keppoch	McDonald	(i)
1 st McDonald/Clan Ranald	McDonald	(ii)
1 st McDonald/Glengarry	McDonald	(iii)
2 nd McDonald/Glengarry	McDonald	
McDonald/Glencoe	McDonald	(iv)
McLeod of Raasay	McDonald	(v)
Grant Company	McDonald	(vi)
McGregor	McDonald	(vii)
McKinnon Company	McDonald	(viii)
Nairne Atholl	Atholl	(ix)
Mercer Atholl	Atholl	
Menzies Atholl	Atholl	
Shian Menzies	Atholl	
Struan Robertson	Atholl	
Strathbogie	Gordon	(x)
Stoneywood's	Gordon	
Enzie	Gordon	
Lovat Fraser	Fraser	(xi)
Inverallochie Fraser	Fraser	
Foyers Fraser	Fraser	
Cluny McPherson	Clan Chattan	(xii)
Farquarson of Monaltrie	Clan Chattan	(xiii)
Lady MacIntosh	Clan Chattan	(xiv)
Clan Chattan Mixed	Clan Chattan	(xv)
1 st Cameron of Lochiel	Highland	(xvi)
2 nd Cameron of Lochiel	Highland	
Appin Stewart	Highland	(xvii)
1 st McLean	Highland	(xviii)
2 nd McLean	Highland	
McLachan	Highland	(xix)
Bannerman of Elsick	Lowland	(xx)
1 st Duke of Perth's Rgt	Lowland	(xxi)
2 nd Duke of Perth's Rgt	Lowland	
Roy Stewart's Edbgh Rgt	Lowland	(xii)
Gordon of Glenbucket	Highland	(xxiii)
1 st Ogilvie's Forfar Rgt	Lowland	(xxiv)
2 nd Ogilvie's Forfar Rgt	Lowland	
1 st MacKenzie	Highland	(xxv)
2 nd MacKenzie	Highland	
Chisolm	Highland	(xxvi)
Horse		
Elcho/Balmerino Life Gds	Lowland	(xxvii)
Baggot's Hussars	Lowland	(xxviii)
Kilmarnock Grenadiers	Lowland	(xxix)
Pitsligo Horse	Gordon	(xxx)
Strathallen's Perthshire Horse	Lowland	(xxxi)

NEUTRAL CLANS

<u>Unit Name</u>	<u>Bde(notional)</u>	<u>Est Strength</u>	<u>Notes</u>
McDougall of Lorn	Highland	200 men	
Sinclair	Highland	300 men	(xxxii)
Gunn	Highland	200 men	
1 st Grant of Grant	Highland	1000 men less	(xxxiii)
2 nd Grant of Grant		1 coy with Government	
McNeil of Barra company	Highland	100 men	
1 st McLeod of McLeod	Highland	1000 less 4 coys w/Gov	(xxiv)
McRae	Highland	100 men	(xxxv)
2 nd McDonald/ClanRanald	McDon	600 men	(xxxvi)
1 st McDonald of Sleat	McDon	1000 less 2 coys w/Gov	(xxxvii)
2 nd McDonald of Sleat			

“Est Strength” is the estimated number of fighting men in the clan.

FRENCH UNITS

Facings are individualised like the English Regulars. *Le Duc de Fronsac's* was apparently an ad hoc formation. Foundation dates for some of the units are unknown, as English language sources are very limited. Regimental numbers were not as important as in the British Army, and precedence was not always based on the age of a regiment. However, the 1600's for the French, as for the British, were the formative period for the eldest units of the modern "standing army". A "p" affixed to the date means the unit was in existence prior to 1715. "Ele" is a *Charlie's Year* game reference with some historical value: "1" = actually arrived in Scotland or made an attempt to arrive; "2" = the infantry component, fairly prepared for invasion; "3" = cavalry and artillery component, unprepared for invasion.

<u>Unit Name</u>	<u>Ele</u>	<u>Raised</u>	<u>Facing</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Marines de Maurepas	0	1745	Red	(xlviii)
Drummond's Ecossais-Royaux (1-3bn)	1/0	1744	Red	(xxxviii)
Irish Piquets	1	1745	Mixed	(xxxix)
Lally's Irish	1	1744	D Green	
Roth's Irish	1	p1715	Blue	
Dillon's Irish	1	1690	Black	(xl)
Clare's Irish	1	1690	Yellow	(xl)
Berwick's Irish	1	1698	Black	
Bulkeley's Irish	1	p1715	D Green	
Grenadiers-Royaux (4bn)	2	1745	White	(xli)
Beauvoisis	2	1667	White	
Crillon (3bn)	2	p1715	Red	
Biron (2bn)	2	p1715	Red	(xlii)
Orleans (2bn)	2	1642	Red	
Bouffler-Wallon	2	1744	Green	(xliii)
Duc de Fronsac Mixed (2bn)	2	1745	?	(xliv)
Cavalerie Legere Royal-Etranger	3	1659	Red	
Cavalerie Legere Chabrillant	3	p1715	Red	
Cavalerie Legere Clermont-Tonnerre	3	p1715	Red	
Cavalerie Legere Maugiron	3	p1715	Red	
Dragoons Septimanie	3	1744	Yellow	
FitzJames Horse	1	p1715	Blue	(xlv)
Royal Swedish Rgt	2	1745	Red	(xlvi)
Artillery Battalion (prob. Richecourt's)	3	1720	Red	(xlvii)

ENGLISH VOLUNTEERS

<u>Unit Name</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Manchester Regiment	(xlvix)

NOTES

(i) All these McDonalds and McDonells were cadet branches of the house, and lived in the glens around Fort William and to the west. The Keppochs initiated hostilities by capturing two companies of the Royal Scots prior to joining the muster at Glenfinnan.

(ii) Clanranald was probably the most fire-eating of the lot. The Prince's landing site was on his territory. Incidentally, Napoleon's Marshal Macdonald was the grandson of the man who rowed Charlie "over the sea to Skye".

(iii) The MacDonells of Glengarry fought in the rearguard at Clifton and distinguished themselves in all the other actions as well. The accidental shooting of the Young Glengarry by a Clanranald caused many of the men to desert.

(iv) The McDonalds of Glencoe, famous as the clan that got massacred in 1692, were also notorious cattle thieves and a constant plague on their neighbours. Despite their small size (120 men at most), they fought as a separate contingent throughout.

(v) Raasay is a small island between Skye and the mainland. The entire fighting strength of the clan amounted to 50 men, which is actually quite large for their territory.

(vi) The Grants of Glenmorriston, located to the west of Loch Ness. They fought as a part of the Glengarry regiment. After the Rising, some of them formed the "Seven Men of Moidart" who aided Charles in his escape and continued to wage a small guerrilla war for some time.

(vii) Even more notorious than the Glencoe McDonalds. Rob Roy was "out" in the '15, and his descendants made a good showing in the '45, although, typically, they were accused of hanging back. One of Rob Roy's sons was killed at Prestonpans.

(viii) The McKinnons came to the muster at Perth, all the way from Skye. They were attached to Keppoch's regiment for most of the Rising, but missed Culloden, being with Cromartie at the time.

(ix) The Atholl Brigade, nominally under William Murray of Atholl (his brother James held the official title to the lands, being a strong Hanover man), was a major contingent, and on the whole performed well, though subject to desertion. William, known as Lord Tullibardine, had been out in 1715 and commanded in 1719, and was now very old and gouty. Lord George Murray, who had initially remained neutral, despite his Jacobite past, was the driving force behind the brigade's creation. The Robertsons and the Menzies (pronounced "*min-gis*") were also a part of this "brigade".

(x) The Gordon Brigade, from the NE, was another large contingent of "lowland" troops. The Gordons had always been supporters of the Stuart cause, even to the championing of Charles I. They were often known as the "Gey", or "crazy" Gordons from their risky exploits in battle. The actual Duke remained neutral, but his brother Lord Lewis Gordon, set about raising the clan. He had some difficulty in recruiting due to the influence of the Kirk in the region and was forced to apply draconian measures.

(xi) The Frasers, particularly Lord Lovat, did not commit themselves until later in the campaign, and managed to be absent from Culloden, although they did operate around Loch Ness. Lovat himself, while turning a blind eye to his men's actions, continued to protest his support for King George. A slippery character, he made the fatal mistake of declaring for the Jacobites just before their defeat at Culloden. A few years later, the bulk of the clan's menfolk were serving under James Wolfe at Quebec, as the short-lived 78th Fraser Highlanders.

(xii) Ewan McPherson of Cluny held a commission in the 64th, but was slighted by Cope upon reporting for duty.

Ewan was clan chief, Lovat's son-in-law, Lochiel's first cousin, and thus an important man. He returned home, was not unwillingly taken prisoner by the Jacobites, and was soon induced to join them. His wife reported his capture, so that if the Rising failed, he would not be treated as one of the instigators. Cluny was also the nominal leader of the Clan Chattan Confederacy.

(xiii) The Farquarsons of Monaltrie & Balmoral joined the rebellion at the siege of Stirling and some of them fought at Falkirk. Although the unit was later split (because the retreat north allowed the men to visit their families), some did participate at Culloden, being among the first to charge.

(xiv) The McIntoshes were initially leaderless after their chief Angus joined one of the new government companies, but his 18-year-old wife, "Colonel Anne", was able to recruit enough men to form a battalion, reputedly bestowing a kiss on each recruit. Later, when the Jacobites captured Angus, the chief was paroled to his wife, who outranked him!

(xv) A mix of small clans under the Chattan Confederacy: McBain, Shaw, McGillavray, McQueen, McLean of Dochgaroch, and various others. One notable Jacobite was Donald McGillavray, killed at Culloden.

(xvi) One of the first clans to rise for the Prince. The old chief was in exile, so his son, also Cameron of Lochiel, spoke for the clan. He was known as the "gentle" Lochiel, in contrast to his father, who apparently bit out the throat of an English soldier during a hand-to-hand fight. It was Lochiel's example that led many other clan leaders to pledge themselves to Charles' cause.

(xvii) Present at all the Jacobites' enterprises right until the end, when they suffered horrendous losses in the charge at Culloden.

(xviii) Another staunch Stuart clan, from the isle of Mull. Their war cry was "another for Hector", recalling the days when the chief's seven bodyguards would step forward one by one to defend him in battle. They had the dubious distinction of receiving their own mass grave at Culloden, shared with the MacLachans.

(xix) Brigaded with the McLeans. Both clans were decimated at Culloden.

(xx) Bannerman of Elsick joined the rebellion shortly after Prestonpans. For most of the Rising he served as the Lord Lieutenant of the Mearns, but his unit did fight in the second line at Culloden. Bannerman escaped to France while many of his men settled in the north.

(xxi) Commanded by James Drummond, Duke of Perth, who also shared the command of the army with Murray. He was dismissed by Murray as "a silly horse-racing boy". This was not a clan regiment, and in fact, few of the Duke's own tenants joined, having bad memories of the '15.

(xxii) Formed out of various riff-raff, including deserters from Cope's army. It was one of two truly volunteer regiments, the other being the Manchester Regiment. It fought in the front line at Culloden.

(xxiii) Recruited separately and somewhat later than the Gordon Brigade. Although Glenbucket was over 70, he not only led his men into England, but fought in the second line at Culloden and later escaped to France.

(xxiv) On the French muster rolls as of 15th February 1746. Officially two single battalion regiments, but in actuality one regiment of two battalions. It was a well organised unit, with correct muster rolls, pay books, and even a uniform of a sort. After the Rising, Ogilvie and many of his men escaped to France and the unit was reconstituted in 1747 as Ogilvy's Regiment; a short-lived Albany's Regiment was also created (mainly German in composition).

(xxv) McKenzies under Lord Cromartie, including some of Lord Fortrose's men (these last were raised by Lady Fortrose in defiance of her husband's wishes). They spent most of their time in the north, and were part of the ill-fated attempt to recover the Jacobite gold wrecked at Tongue. Most of the McKenzies under Seaforth, having

been badly burned by the 1719 fiasco, remained in support of the government, but neutral. Cromartie himself was not a “notorious” Jacobite, and while declaring his intention to raise a regiment, initially declined to state who for.

(xxvi) Chisholm of Strathglass. They joined the fray at the same time as the Frasers. Four of the men nevertheless joined the Seven Men of Moidart who assisted Charles to elude his pursuers.

(xxvii) Actually two troops, Elcho’s and Balmerino’s, of 70 and 30 odd men respectively. They were the only indigenous units to have a full military uniform and were considered to be an elite unit, being used for reconnaissance, despite their “escort” designation.

(xxviii) Although they gained a reputation as looters, Baggot’s Hussars (raised originally by Murray of Broughton, the Prince’s secretary) were probably the best cavalry the Jacobites possessed, barring FitzJames Horse (which fought on foot most of the time). They were certainly aggressive skirmishers and scouts.

(xxix) Lord Kilmarnock was commissioned to raise a troop of horse from his own men; at the same time he was effectively the commander of the Perthshire Horse. Thus these two units operated as one a great deal of the time. The Colonel’s wife reputedly played a part in delaying General Hawley at Falkirk. The grenadier title was probably only honorary. Kilmarnock, by his own admission, joined the rebellion to remake his fortune. He was later executed.

(xxx) Raised by Alexander Forbes, Lord Pitsligo, along with a small regiment of foot that was used to flesh out other units. Later dismounted and combined with Kilmarnock’s Grenadiers to form Kilmarnock’s Foot Guards. Their mounts went to FitzJames’ Horse.

(xxxi) Strathallen’s Perthshire Horse was the first body of Jacobite horse to be raised. Strathallen was in charge of all forces north of the Forth while the Prince was in England, so Kilmarnock led both this unit and his own for a time.

(xxxii) Sympathetic to the Jacobite cause, but unable to act until Loudon’s northern army had been routed.

(xxxiii) Many of the clansmen were strong Jacobites, but the chief and his son remained strictly neutral, although the son, Ludovic, hunted down and arrested any Grants who did turn out for the Prince.

(xxxiv) The McLeods were a huge clan, and might easily have been divided over the struggle. As it was, only about half the clan fought for the government, and virtually none (barring the Raasay men) for the Jacobites.

(xxxv) The “wild McRaes” (pronounced Ma-Kraw) were the hereditary wardens of Eilean Donan castle (blown up by the Royal Navy in 1719) under the suzerainty of the McKenzies. They were known to have Jacobite sympathies, but were under Seaforth’s thumb.

(xxxvi) Only about half of Clanranald turned out for the Prince; once again, loyalties were divided. This neutral half represents McDonald of Boisdale’s men.

(xxxvii) Here again, while McDonald of Sleat sent a token force to the government’s aid, the bulk of the clan sat the Rising out.

(xxxviii) Raised for the aborted invasion of 1744. There was only one battalion, but permission was given to raise another in Scotland itself. In later service, the unit swelled to 1200 men in three battalions, and the Scots Brigade was augmented by the short-lived Ogilvie’s and Albany’s Regiments. (The E-R and Ogilvie’s were disbanded in 1748 since they were actually Prince Charles’ Court troops; Albany’s lasted until 1763).

(xxxix) Originally a “loan” of troops from James II, given in exchange for French advisors and better equipped French soldiers at the time of the Boyne. They still wore their red coats, although the Irish Brigade was predominantly Francophone by this time. Recruitment in Ireland had been “blind-eyed” by the British, but with the formal outbreak of war, this changed. Still, sons of exiles and men smuggled out of the country managed to keep the national character. The only prisoners from these units who were not treated as French nationals by the British were deserters from the Flanders Army, of which there were a fair number.

(xl) These two regiments, plus one other (possibly Bulkeley’s) were formed from Irishmen traded by James II for French troops during the Irish campaigns of the 1690’s. Although they were very raw and under-strength in 1690, the French got the best of the bargain in the long run. By 1745 the Irish brigade was as mixed in nationality as all the other French units. Dillon’s regiment was still in existence as late as 1814. By this time it had become an émigré unit operating with Wellington’s forces in southern France.

(xli) The Royal Grenadiers were Militia, formed from the converged grenadier companies of the militia battalions. Each was composed of 12 companies of 50 men. They did good service. Later they were formed into proper regiments.

(xlii) The Duc de Biron masterminded the arrest of Charles in Paris after the Rising, after which the Prince was deported to Avignon.

(xliii) There were two Walloon regiments at the time, the other being the Royal-Wallon, but the sources do not specify which unit this is.

(xliv) An ad hoc unit under the Duc de Fronsac. Possibly local militia battalions, a new unit raised by him, or elements from several regiments under his command.

(xlv) Most of this unit was captured at sea. Only about 150 men managed to arrive at Montrose, minus their horses. They did have their breastplates, however, along with all the other useless paraphernalia (snuff boxes, lace kerchiefs, and the like) of a chic French cavalry regiment.

(xlvi) Never sent, although in the process of raising when Culloden was fought. The Swedish connection dated back to the days of the feud between Charles XII and George I. In addition, the Swedish Army was full of expatriate Scots (and Irish, and Germans, and others).

(xlvii) France’s artillery arm was very old, but 1720 is the year that the gunners were officially organised as an Artillery Corps of five battalions, of which one was Richecourt. No actual record appears to exist of the unit slated to participate in the Rising, probably because planning had not progressed that far. French artillery battalions incorporated pioneer and sapper formations as well.

(xlviii) 60 volunteers raised by Lord Clare to accompany the Prince. They were turned back due to the naval action between *HMS Lion* and *l’Elisabeth*. Alternatively this force consisted of 100 engineers and other officers.

(xlvix) Manchester having been captured by “a Sergeant, a Drummer, and a Whore”, the Jacobites felt that this would be a great place to find recruits. While many of the people in northern England were sympathetic, few had any warlike tendencies, and the Manchester Regiment was composed of about 250 laid-off textile workers. Later abandoned in Carlisle, the members suffered cruel treatment at the hands of the government; many were subsequently drafted and sent to India in 1747. The remaining units in Charlie’s Year are notional.

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