



The Prince of Orange entering Exeter

PRO Religione et Libertate

The Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the
War of the Two Kings in England and Scotland 1689-91

Commentary

What painter can, mysterious Stewart, trace
 The various features of thy double face,
 Where truth and guile by turns assume their place.
 Each Proteus shape thou canst put on with ease,
 All honey now, all gall just as you please.
 Both mild and cruel thou art justly named,
 Ranked Atheist, yet for piety are famed.
 Thy visage is an emblem of thy heart,
 Where every passion acts a different part,
 A subtle serpent, or a harmless dove,
 All fury now, but in a moment love.
 A saint in show, but in thy carnal mind
 A slave to Mammon's drossy part inclined,
 Heaven thou pretends to probe, but Heaven does know
 All thy desires are centered here below.
 Weedling 's thy trade, and spite of all command,
 Thou finds the means to play with both your hands,
 For which Old Nick will shortly write to thee,
 'Send no word back, but come thyself to me.'

[Translation from the latin. James Philip's *Grameid*, p.xxx. N.B. the word 'weedling' is not misspelled. A good leader will assimilate opinions and facts, then issue a clear order based on his judgement. A weedling leader will couch his orders as requests for your opinion, so he can shift the burden onto you.]

Hamartia

"He was naturally candid and sincere, and a firm friend, till affairs and religion wore out all his first principles and inclinations... The Duke of Buckingham gave me once a short but severe character of the two brothers. It was the more severe, because it was true; the King [Charles II] (he said) could see things if he would: and the Duke [James] would see things if he could. He had no true judgement, and was soon determined by those whom he trusted: but he was obstinate against all other advices. He was bred with high notions of kingly authority, and laid it down for a maxim, that all who opposed the King were rebels in their hearts... He was naturally eager and revengeful: and was against the taking off any that set up in an opposition to the measures of the Court, and who by that means grew popular in the House of Commons. He was for rougher methods. He continued many years dissembling his religion, and seemed zealous for the Church of England, but it was chiefly on design to hinder all propositions that tended to unite us among ourselves."

Taken from the *Duke of Gramont's Memoirs*, [pp. 91 & 92, text and Ed. note], quoting the chronicler, Bishop Burnet. And from Maurice Ashley's *England in the Seventeenth Century*, p. 165:

"Unlike his brother, King James II was not by any means a congenial or attractive figure. Impatient, bigoted, vain, and haughty, he exacted the last ounce of the privileges of his office. He received foreign diplomatists not, as King Charles II had done, standing bareheaded in his bedchamber, but seated in a special room with his hat on. His personal conduct was no more restrained than his brother's had been, but his choice of mistresses showed inferior taste..."

These descriptions, in a nutshell, explain why King James lost his throne. Some of his contemporaries and historians believed that his riotous youth was catching up with him, and that his faculties were failing. In this author's opinion, he had both the vacillations and the obstinacy of an insecure man who cannot bear to catch himself in the wrong. Since that insecurity likely originated on the day he watched his father die, he was doomed from the start. There is a Greek word for it: *hamartia*, the 'fatal flaw'. His fall was the fall of King Lear, no less tragic because he got what was coming to him.

Sources

For sources, the reader is first referred to this author's *Remember Limerick!* Commentary, which contains a bibliography that includes works dealing with the Glorious Revolution as well as the war in Ireland.

For those interested in the Restoration Army and the conspiracy in which John Churchill was a prominent figure, John Childs' *The Army*,

James II, and the Glorious Revolution is recommended. The book examines the composition of the Army, the purpose King James envisioned for it, and how it broke in his hands when he tried to wield it.

For general histories try Maurice Ashley's *England in the Seventeenth Century (1603-1714)*, volume 6 of the Pelican History of England. It is concise and clear. This author also used Cassell's *History of England (vols. 3 & 4)* which is about 100 years old; so, the prose is superior, even if the historiography is not up to date. Macauley's *History of England* gives a detailed and picturesque, if biased account.

For the Scottish War, the most useful books were: Terry's *John Graham of Claverhouse, Viscount of Dundee 1648-1689*, Keltie's *History of the Scottish Highlands, Highland Clans and Scottish Regiments* (which is a compilation), and General MacKay's *Memoirs*. For period feel there is John Buchan's history, *The Massacre of Glencoe*. In fiction, the reader may want to try Sir Walter Scott's *Old Mortality*, which starts with the religious repressions of the 1670s and ends after the Revolution.

All dates are Old Style (Julian), which was 10 days behind our current calendar. As a convention, the forces of the Prince of Orange will be called 'Orangists' prior to his accession and 'Williamites' afterward. King James' supporters will be called Jacobites after his fall from power.

England

*Fate can play a trick with the twine
 To weave the evil and good
 In one design!*

'Fate', from the musical 'Kismet'

Before the Revolution

It is not the intention here to go over the background to the Revolution in detail. For that, see the author's *Remember Limerick!* Commentary or some standard history book. What follows is a brief summary for the congenitally lazy.

The Glorious Revolution of 1688 was a seminal event in English history; it is often taken as a symbolic dividing line between Medieval and Modern Britain, though, of course, there never is a clean break in such matters. It was both the culmination of several long-fermenting social developments and a simple *coup d'état*. Curiously, it was given its label almost immediately; the name Glorious Revolution was coined in 1689 by John Hampden, grandson of the famous Parliamentary opponent of King Charles I.

Many changes in England's constitution appeared either during or as a result of the Civil Wars which Hampden's grandfather helped spark. At the end of that period of chaos it was realised that England was not ready for Government by Faction: that a focal point above the politicians was needed. And so, they restored the Monarchy, supposedly in a 'constitutional' form. That is, the King was above Parliament, but not above the Law.

Unfortunately, the laws of England were in a state of flux. There were tomes and tomes of the Medieval and only a few handbooks of the Modern. This allowed the Restoration kings to monkey with the state machinery in a way they could not have if everything were cut and dried. They attempted to cement their rule upon the Absolutist model which was *le mode* in France, but in the true British tradition made a right hash of things.

The first king, Charles II, son of the decapitated Charles I, had an easygoing personality. This meant good times, but it also meant little got done and that the King lived hand-to-mouth, crisis to crisis. By the end of his reign there was frustration, and qualms for the future.

King James II, his brother, was a different sort of man. As an openly Catholic King of a Protestant nation, whose public statements on religious tolerance and respect for the law were not believed, his

succession was challenged by the Parliamentary faction known as the Whigs. These Whigs were a coalition of religious dissenters, remnants of the Civil War republicans, and aristocrats who had annoyed James. It may help to envision them as the monied class, or merchant class, because for the Dissenters, Trade was one of the few venues allowed them.

Whig attempts to bar James from the Throne backfired. Their opponents, the Tory faction of landed gentry and Establishment Church (plus those aristocrats in favour with James) crushed the Whigs just before his accession to power. In desperation, the Whigs staged a rebellion, led by King James' Protestant bastard nephew, James Scott, Duke of Monmouth. Defeated in battle, Scott was executed; the rebellion's immediate effect was to rally sympathy for King James.

He was allotted a large income, and allowed, for a time, to set what governmental policies he pleased. Most important of all, James increased the size of the Army to meet the crisis, then, in contravention of law and custom, retained it in being and began to mould it in his own image.

Aided by his large purse and standing army, James began clawing back lost political powers. It is sometimes said that he wished to 'turn back the clock' to his father's day. Really, he was attempting to mirror his contemporary, King Louis XIV of France, that most puissant of European monarchs, and in this sense he was actually conducting a crash program of modernisation.

Six of one, half a dozen of the other. The end result was the same; he was to be deposed three years after coming to the throne. In his rush to remodel the Monarchy, James alienated the powerful in every walk of life. But he thought he still had the Army's loyalty, and that was to prove his undoing.

As long as James' heirs were his Protestant daughters by his first wife – the one married to the Prince of Orange and the other to the Prince of Denmark – people could live with his social tinkering. He was 51 when he came to the throne. William of Orange was 35; George of Denmark 32. Even if James lasted twenty years, his heirs would have time to undo his work. But, in June of 1688, the Queen, Mary of Modena, gave birth to a son. James was Catholic, the Queen was Catholic. Therefore, the new Prince of Wales would be raised Catholic – and, raised in the *mode* of French Absolutism, which was the real issue.

It was not until news of the royal birth reached Prince William of Orange that he made the final decision to accept the pressing invitations of James' domestic enemies and take an army to England, with the intention of overthrowing the King and setting himself up in his place.

Why a 'glorious' revolution? Well... Hampden was a Revolutionary who had devoted his life to crushing Arbitrary Government; getting rid of James seemed the culmination of his career. For later historians the title contrasted with the exceedingly bloody French and American Revolutions; sometimes the event is called the Bloodless Revolution. As this author never tires of pointing out, that title is misleading. Many people died, but most were Irish, which apparently does not count.

As a matter of fact, the word 'revolution' is also misleading. The deposing of King James was an act that went beyond what many of William's supporters had in mind. They thought only of binding James to a Constitution with William's aid, or establishing a regency under the Prince. But for those whom the King had persecuted, as for the senior Army officers and politicians who sold him out, his complete replacement was a necessity. The form of government would remain a Monarchy. The dynasty would not change – William was both married to a Stuart and a Stuart on his mother's side. The whole affair was merely a *coup d'état*.

And yet... as the word was used in that day, it was a 'revolution' in that its fomenters had, as they thought, brought England's constitution

full circle. Legal loopholes were closed and England's monarchy became truly Constitutional. The three Estates were again in harmony (on paper). And to modern generations, perhaps with more justification, it also appears as a revolution, since it was a major step on the road to modern Western forms of governance. It gave birth to the Bill of Rights, and to a host of subtle political adjustments that eventually sparked further social developments.

[William did try to impose Absolutist principles (contrary to the popular view of his reign), but failed, thanks to the crisis he found himself in when his father-in-law invaded Ireland.]

But it was still a coup, not executed by idealists (luckily, or there would have been more casualties), but by men seeking to better their own positions. Some of them social climbers, others eager for gain, others acting primarily out of fear of loss. And, some of them rogues of the worst description, who thrived on chaos. It is remarkable how much good they unconsciously achieved.



Invasion

"an absolute conquest is intended under the specious and ordinary pretences of religion, liberty, property and a free Parliament"

Marquess d'Albeville, King James' Envoy at the Hague

If At First You Don't Succeed...

It took some fancy footwork for William of Orange to succeed in his endeavour, and not a little good fortune. Only after months of propaganda work, and the receipt of an official Invitation From The People Of England, and the hiring of mercenaries to hold the fort while he was away, and the accumulation of an armada, and hard bargaining with the Dutch States-General who had to pay for it all, was William finally ready to make his move.

Holland was on the eve of war with France, but King James annoyed King Louis XIV by refusing to take his warnings against William seriously and publicly refuting the notion that England and France were 'natural allies'. For his part, the Sun King allowed his temper to get the better of him in his dealings with the Emperor, sending his armies on a punitive expedition into the Rhine Palatinate, where they became bogged down in siege work. William had a small window in which to achieve a takeover, after which he could return to Holland. England in his pocket, he would have money, an army three times its original size, and a navy twice its original size. France would think hard about continuing a war with him.

The Prince moved more quickly than his enemies believed possible. His troops began loading their transports on September 12th, 1688 and completed the job by September 29th. This was accounted extremely fast work. There was usually a last period of good weather at the start of October, which the Prince hoped to make use of; his enemies thought he would miss this window and have to wait until the spring of 1689.

As a matter of fact, he did miss it. Or, rather, the equinoctial gales began early. The fleet, concentrated at Hellevoetsluis, waited three

weeks for a favourable wind, while James' supporters prayed the 'popish wind' might continue. At last, however, the 'wind turned protestant' on the 14th of October and the fleet set sail.

[Hellevætsluis, or Helvetsluis, is located on the North shore of the mouths of the Rhine and used to be the main naval base of Rotterdam. There were dockyards and a harbour large enough to accommodate the entire Dutch fleet. Both town and port were heavily fortified. By the 20th Century, however, ships were too large to use the port.]

Though the fleet 'sailed' on the 14th, it took some days to form up; William only boarded his flagship, the yacht *Brill*, on October 16th. Then,

On the afternoon of the 19th the fleet sailed from Helvætsluis, the men-of-war, in three divisions, forming a long line out at sea, and the transports driving before the breeze nearer land. The day was fine, the wind steady from the south-west; and as the eventful squadron passed the sandy downs of Schveling, the inhabitants of the Hague crowded them in thousands, and raised acclamations of anticipated success.

[Cassell's History, vol. 3, p. 555]

The Dutch were midway between Holland and England when the wind changed from easterly to northwesterly. A gale came on and the ships scattered:

But the scene rapidly changed. By ten o'clock at night a furious tempest was again raging, which dispersed the fleet, sunk one ship, damaged many others, compelled them to throw overboard great quantities of stores, and destroyed a thousand horses through being closed down under hatches. The fleet managed to regain Helvætsluis, which William himself reached on the 21st. He refused to go on shore, but sent to the states for fresh supplies, and busied himself in pushing on his repairs.

[Cassell's, vol. 3, p. 555]

William's enemies breathed a sigh of relief. The Dutch had seized the opportunity but it availed them not. Nothing now need be feared until the spring, by which time King Louis would have marshalled his armies on the Dutch border. But, William, who suffered from 'small man's disease', was too singleminded and stubborn to quit. He sailed again on November 1st, against all conventional military wisdom. At first, the Dutch made for Harwich. Willem Bentinck, the Prince's special emissary to the 'rebels', had laid the groundwork for a landing there.

Wooden Walls

George Legge, 1st Baron Dartmouth, commanded the naval forces opposing William. Because of financial constraints, only third rates and below were put in commission. According to the Secretary of the Navy, Samuel Pepys, the ships in commission for October 1688 were:

12x 'third rates' of 60-70 guns
28x 'fourth rates' of 44-50 guns
7x frigates of 20-30 guns
20x fireships (many of these will have been used for stores, prisons, or block-ships).

The number given for the Channel Fleet is variously estimated at 33 or 37 vessels of third and fourth rate. Two months later (upon the 18th of December, the day King James left Whitehall for the last time), there were 79 vessels in commission, of which most were based in the Channel. 10 of these were third rates and 26 were fourth rates, so the number 37 is likely correct.

[Legge was about 47 years old in 1688. A veteran of the Dutch Wars, he was a favourite of James' and had royal connections through his family. Interestingly, his maternal grandfather was named Washington and was elder brother to the great-great-grandfather of George Washington. He was a strong supporter of the Stuarts and held numerous important posts under Charles II and King James, including Master General of the Ordnance and Constable of the Tower. After the lost battle of Beachy Head he was dismissed by William in 1691 and imprisoned in the Tower, where he died after a few months.]

William's original strategy had been to engage and defeat the English fleet before risking his transports, but now it was all a gamble and the plan was modified so that the merchantmen sailed in convoy, protected by elements of the Dutch fleet. At 463 vessels, the convoy was much, much larger than the famous Spanish Armada of one hundred years before. When it passed Dover and Calais, 25 ships broad, the troops were drawn up on deck and cannon saluted both Dover and Calais simultaneously. Still, there were only 53 warships. Like King James, the Dutch States lacked the money to outfit their larger ships. The bulk of the formation consisted of transports, supply vessels, and tenders:

Under Lieutenant-Admiral Evertsen and Vice-Admiral van Almonde:

8x 'third rates' of 60-68 guns.
32x ships of 20+ guns.
9x frigates (of 20+ guns).
28x galliots (of the northern variety, looking like a ketch or schooner, with rounded bows and stern, and flat bottoms).
9x fireships (useful for carrying stuff).

Under Lieutenant-Admiral Schepers:

76x fluyts carrying soldiers (cargo ships with pear-shaped hulls that used block-and-tackle rigging to reduce the crew to a minimum).
120x small transports carrying 5,000 horses.
70x supply ships
60x fishing boats to be used as landing craft.

The transports were organised in columns, each commanded by one of the senior Army officers.

[A fluyt's hull was designed to maximise cargo space while keeping the deck small – because cargoes were taxed based upon the width of the deck!]

The opposing navies were not that asymmetrical in size. If the Dutch perhaps had more frigates and other ships with small complements of guns, they also had to worry about their convoy. They did have reputation in their favour, though. They were perceived to be tough opponents who won sea battles frequently.

The Downs were the usual spot for the Royal Navy to take up station. These are a roadstead off the Kentish coast between the North and South Forelands. Averaging only 12 fathoms and protected by sandbanks, the Downs offered reasonable shelter from high winds coming from most directions, being shielded by the coast and by the Goodwin Sands to the East. This was also where merchant shipping congregated when travelling to and from the Thames. From the Downs, a fleet could sally to chase any enemy ships travelling either north up the coast or west down the Channel. But it was not a perfect location. Wrecks did occur, and if the wind was from the East, the Dutch could appear without warning.

With King James advocating a more cautious deployment, Legge therefore decided to base his fleet near the Gunfleet Sands, well out in the Thames gulf, off Harwich. The usual Thames anchorage was The Nore, at the mouth of the Medway, but the Medway disaster of 1667 (when the Dutch burned Chatham and towed off the royal flagship) made it an ill-omened location. Accusations have since circulated, bolstered by an order of James to 'move the fleet farther out', that the Admiral was avoiding an encounter. However, the King approved the withdrawal from the Downs, and given that he strongly suspected William's destination to be Harwich, the Gunfleet Sands were a good spot.

The Royal Navy's loyalties were indeed divided. James believed it would fight for him, if only because as Duke of York he had once been its fighting commander. But, while King James correctly perceived himself as a popular former commander, there was still a strong Parliamentary bias from the Civil War days. More importantly, many captains were reluctant to fight because the commander of the enemy fleet was the popular Rear Admiral Arthur Herbert, to whom over half the senior officers owed their promotions.

Structure of the Williamite

Invasion Fleet

2 Pilot Boats							
His Highness							
2							
Weymann [Lord Maclesfield]							
English gentlemen							
Col. Bohun on board							
English lords							
Marshal Schomberg							
provisions and baggage of his Highness							
Nassau							
Voorst							
Scottish lords							
General Mackay							
small service tenders (gunnaces)							
19 ships of English 1 their horses 2 artillery 22 ships							
19 with infantry 1 horses 2 with artillery 22 ships							
Count van Lupp							
10 ships with horses 1 with men 11 ships							
Coll. J. Hersum							
15 ships of guards on foot and their horses 6 with dragons 1 with artillery 2 for [the equipment of Willem] Meesters							
24 ships							
small service tenders (gunnaces)							
4 ships of bodyguards 22 with dragons' horses 4 with his Highness' and the gentlemen of Owerkerck's horses							
30 ships							
Colonel l'Estang							
12 ships with cavalry 1 with men 9 with their horses and artillery ships 3 with Lord Levin's and Lord Picton's men							
12 ships with cavalry horses 1 with men 9 with their horses and artillery ships 3 with Lord Levin's and Lord Picton's men							
21 ships with cavalry horses 2 with men 23 ships							
Colonel Schaeck							
15 ships of horse guards 2 with his Highness' carriages 3 with artillery and their horses 1 with French and their horses							
21 ships							
Colonel Hottappel							

Such conspiracies as there were in the Navy were hampered by the nature of the service, since each ship was its own little world. After the Revolution, some senior naval officers apologised to the Prince of Orange for doing so little to aid him. But the rumours that Legge did not try very hard to stop William are merely rumours; he was James' man.

[Arthur Herbert, 1st Earl Torrington, was about 40 years old in 1688. He was the son of King Charles' Attorney General and brother of Chief Justice Herbert, MP for Dover. He had been a favourite of King James, and even served as his Master of the Robes, but like so many others he refused to countenance the repeal of the Test Acts and penal laws. Dismissed from office he took service with the Prince of Orange, and was actually the man who took the famous Invitation to William. He was put in command of the Dutch fleet over Evertsen and van Almonde for propaganda purposes: any naval action had to be English versus English. Bishop Burnet thought Herbert's opposition to James' policies stemmed less from conscience and more from jealousy of Legge, who was a rising star. – and an older man.]

In the event, Legge had no opportunity to put the Navy to the test. Whether he wanted to engage the Dutch or not, both wind and tide were against him when the enemy first appeared. William's fleet sailed north past the English. Where were they headed? Essex? Yorkshire? At the time, no one was completely sure where the Dutch intended to land. William kept his ideas to himself. Spies and couriers had come and gone along the East coast, and many men on both sides suspected the landing would take place either north or south of Spurn Head, by Kingston-Upon-Hull. This was the location actually desired by the King's domestic enemies, many of whom were Northern lords. In the months leading up to the invasion rumours also suggested a landing at the mouth of the Thames, near Margate. In the last month before the invasion King James seems to have plumped for Essex, probably based on intelligence gleaned about Bentinck's activities in that area. The West Country was not forgotten, but James' advisors at first considered it an alternative, not the intended target.

The consensus among historians now is that the East coast was always intended as a bluff. The southwest of England had several excellent harbours and the country people were well disposed. After being 'burned' in 1685 they might not rise but they would not hinder. Also, there were no major obstacles between Devon and London – the Thames has too many crossing places to be defensible, and in any case an invader could simply seal off the right bank at London and starve the City out.

There remains the question of Willem Bentinck waiting on the Harwich sands. Harwich is a major anchorage only 110 Km from London, and there was no reason why the Orangists could not have landed there. But the copy of a table Bentinck made early in 1688 (shown below) clearly indicates Williams' preoccupation with the West Country.

[Bentinck is sometimes recorded as accompanying the Prince, but it seems he was still in England and met William when he landed.]

There was another good reason for choosing a southern landing, which the Prince was not likely to convey to the northern earls who supported him. Just because there was so much support in the North, he would have incurred obligations to some of the most powerful magnates in England, a thing that he wished to avoid.

As for King James, he had his answer when, twelve hours later, William reappeared off the Thames, headed south. Legge sortied but the winds were severe and several of his ships were damaged. He came to anchor off Longsands, just east of Southend on the North shore of the Thames estuary, some distance south of his initial position. It was twenty-four hours before Legge could escape the Thames and go in pursuit.

Despite this, a small encounter has been reported taking place in the Straits of Dover, in which a Dutch transport was lost. The most likely solution is the taking of a straggler. It may have been one of William's English well-wishers returning home, but the loss was recorded in

Willem Bentinck's notes, which suggests a ship that had to be accounted for.

[Manoeuvring 463 vessels north, then south, just to cause a diversion, boggles the mind. Nevertheless, this is what seems to have occurred. This is why there is still speculation about William's intentions. There are accounts that place William's fleet at 6-700 vessels, but this number appears only to have been reached because a host of small ships floated out to join him in his progress.]

English Miles	Location	Rivers to Cross
24	from Rye to Newhaven	4
30	to Chichester	3
9	to Portsmouth	1
12	to Southampton	4
<i>distant from each other 3-4 miles</i>		
25	to Poole & Christchurch	2
18	to Weymouth	3
<i>Lyme between the two difficult but has to be watched</i>		
37	to Exmouth	2
15	to Torbay	2
<i>can only be defended with difficulty</i>		
4	to Dartmouth River	2
<i>a landing is possible on both banks</i>		
17	to Plymouth	3
40	to Falmouth	7

[Transcript of Willem Bentinck's notes on potential landing sites. Source: Bentinck's papers in the University of Nottingham's Special Collection]

On the 3rd of November the Dutch entered the Channel. On the 4th the Dutch were off Portland Bill while Legge was still passing the Straits. Apparently, an attempt was made to take the Portsmouth forts, but adverse winds prevented any landing. This suggests William may not have specifically picked Tor Bay as his destination, but aimed for Southampton.

Still, the aborted attack is odd. On the 5th, the Dutch accidentally sailed past Tor Bay in a fog and had to turn around, choosing not to go on to Plymouth specifically because it was garrisoned. They were willing to take the risk of colliding with Legge instead (though he was actually no farther down the Channel than Beachy Head). Now, Portsmouth was also garrisoned, heavily so. So why even attempt it? One might expect a landing at Portsmouth if it was hoped the garrison would capitulate by prior arrangement, but Portsmouth was commanded by the Catholic Duke of Berwick; in fact it only surrendered after King James left the country, while Plymouth's governor was far more malleable. Perhaps the whole thing was another diversion.

At any rate, the Dutch and English were foreordained not to fight at sea. The wind picked up from the South and drove both fleets into port, William to Tor Bay on the 5th and Legge to Portsmouth by the 7th. It had been a dangerous gamble, but the naval crossing had paid off. Would the land campaign also?

[There were no further significant naval actions until the combined Anglo-Dutch fleet engaged the French (and lost) at Bantry Bay in 1689. After that the next action was Beachy Head in 1690. There seems to be little in the way of historical records showing what the fleets did after William landed. The answer is most likely 'nothing'. The season was too far advanced, and England was battered by a series of storms that began just after Legge made Portsmouth. William's ships were engaged in unloading for a couple of days but remained, it appears, at Tor Bay until Plymouth was captured, after which they found better

shelter there. The English ships at Portsmouth fell into the Prince's hands as a matter of course when James fled the country.]

Torbay

At 3.00pm on Guy Fawkes Day – Friday, November 5th OS – the Prince of Orange landed in Tor Bay on the Devon coast. The Foot were ashore by midnight. The Horse took two days to unload. Guns and supplies were not unloaded but sent by water to Exeter due to the poor road net, where the Prince intended to establish his headquarters.

[In his Remember Limerick! Commentary this author noted that the date of the landing was chosen deliberately, but apparently this was not so. In fact, William, an agnostic (so much for 'Protestant Champion'), made a Predestination joke about it to Bishop Burnet.]

William had with him an estimated 14-15,000 men, including 3,660 cavalry, 3,000 men of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade, and even 200 negro soldiers from Surinam. The hard figure often quoted is 11,212 Horse and Foot. With 3,660 mounted men this leaves 7,552 foot soldiers. But the numbers do not include the Anglo-Dutch Brigade. Also, there were many English and Huguenot volunteers. Of formed units there were 65 companies of Horse and Dragoons, and 17 battalions of Foot. The Annex includes a list of the regiments.

[Though William's order of battle is fully known, the numbers of men present with each regiment is not. There is agreement on the number of cavalry, but the infantry battalions were understrength and the early sources either give a low estimate or the official figure, which is quite a bit higher. The figures above are taken from Childs, pp. 174-175. There were also, as was common for the period, numbers of 'additional companies' consisting of volunteers, mainly experienced soldiers (the Huguenots were a prime example), who would be used to flesh out the regiments and act as cadres to any new formations raised in England. These may have amounted to 5,000 men. This author's Remember Limerick! Commentary gave estimated strengths of 15-18,000 men, which includes the volunteers. It is not clear if this is correct. Also, the number of 14,352 Dutch troops quoted therein appears to be the paper strength.]

Overall command was given to the Huguenot Marshal, Frederick Herman de Schomberg. Commanding forces under him were a host of Dutch general officers. A number of prominent English exiles, such as Lord Henry Sydney, accompanied the Prince, and some were given field commands for the campaign.

The Dutch Army was four times as large as the English Army, even with addition of the Irish and Scots Establishments. But William's force was less than half that of James', for two reasons. First, it was naturally impossible to lease, buy, or build sufficient ships to move any additional forces. Second, the French Army of the Rhine needed watching. Though France and Holland were not quite at war they soon would be, and the crisis might come before William, who had many of the best Dutch regiments with him, could return.

The only mobile force left in Holland was at Nijmegen, under George Frederick, Prince of Waldeck. This was a corps of 28 squadrons of Horse, 5 squadrons of Dragoons, and 27 battalions of Foot (23,2790 men). Waldeck was supported by 8,000 men of Brandenburg, camped at Wesel. 16 squadrons of Horse and 36 battalions of Foot – half the Dutch Army (46,000 men) – were distributed among the fortresses of Holland and the Barrier. The Spanish (who were Dutch allies for once) had 18,000 men in the Spanish Netherlands, but many of these were actually Dutch units.

[Waldeck's corps: 4 squadrons each hired from Brandenburg, Brünswick-Lüneburg, and Heße-Kaßel and 12 squadrons from Württemberg, plus 4 Dutch squadrons; 3 dragoon squadrons from Brünswick-Lüneburg and 2 from Heße-Kaßel; 10 battalions from Brandenburg, 6 battalions from Brünswick-Lüneburg, and 2 battalions Heße-Kaßel, plus 9 Dutch battalions. The Brandenburgers at Wesel were not under contract but auxiliaries. 4 of the Brandenburg battalions with Waldeck were likewise on loan from a corps stationed at Cleves.]

The contracts for the various contingents had been worked out prior to William's decision to invade, so although it is often said that the mercenaries replaced the troops William took with him, the augmentation was not *intended* to do so. But, when dealing with the States-General it strengthened the Prince's arguments to point out that they had just added significantly to their forces and so could surely allow him an extra battalion or two. Still, he had in fact diminished their overall strength at a critical time. In other words, his gamble had better work...

Options

Both protagonists had limited options, but none of King James' were good. Pundits have blamed him for leaving London too late, or perversely for not remaining in London. Pundits are ever thus. If his



Army had not fallen apart in his hands, they would have said James acted with prudence and diligence.

The King initially discounted any invasion in 1688. It was true that William was establishing a power base in England, but he was heir-apparent, and princes always set up rival shadow courts. It is quite possible that creating a shadow court was William's sole intention initially, until the birth – and survival – of the Prince of Wales that June. With such a fact bawling loudly for attention, William might be excused for trying something desperate, and due notice was taken by his uncle. However, the Prince was also threatened by war with France.

Louis XIV was set to move east that summer and William could not be sure whether he would strike into the Palatinate, as actually happened, or north into Holland. By the fall, the Prince was relieved of doubt, except that French clearing operations were underway in Flanders and Brabant, which was alarming.

Worried by William's burgeoning interest in England's domestic affairs, King James began raising extra troops, calling up the militia, and increasing the tempo of a planned fortress construction program, but he relaxed these efforts after William's first aborted sailing, sure no second attempt would occur. Thus, he suffered 'operational surprise'.

[The construction program had mixed results. Some places were strengthened, but others were inspected and found to be utterly decrepit.]

Uncertainty over the enemy landing site and wild rumours as to the enemy's strength prevented decisive action before the invasion. Intercepted correspondence pointed to Kingston-upon-Hull, while other intelligence suggested Essex. The application of strategic thought indicated the latter, or the West Country. Since the enemy did not appear to be taking any account of Devon and Cornwall, Essex was the most likely target, with Kingston perhaps a gambler's choice.

[In fact, James was faced with an intelligence quandary similar to the one the Germans faced prior to June 6th, 1944.]

James' choices therefore were to remain concentrated at London, to divide his army in two and send half to the West and half up the East Coast or to do as he did: await the landing and then send a superior force to deal with it wherever it might be.

The first option would give William time to consolidate his position. Unchallenged, the Prince would be able to maintain the fiction that he came as a liberator, and might attain sufficient influence to force a negotiated settlement on his uncle before any battle was fought.

The second option, that of splitting the Royal Army, which was urged by some of the King's disaffected commanders, would have meant meeting the Dutch on equal terms. The fact that his secret enemies tried to convince James of this plan's soundness proves it was a bad move; the Royal Army was twice as strong as the invaders, but if only half of it came into action, success was not certain. A battle would prove William was just another conqueror, but a lost battle would be another Hastings.

The third option was the best choice under the circumstances. Concentrate at London, then, once the landing had taken place, rush to meet it with superior force.

James was not supine in the days leading up to the invasion. At the end of October he inspected Blackheath as a potential battlefield, and on November 1st inspected troops at Colchester. He summoned elements of the Irish Establishment and all of the Scottish Army, and by late October these had arrived in southern England.

Hounslow Heath was the natural mustering point, and the place where the Army carried out its annual concentration. The strategic center of England, with high roads radiating in all directions, it was roughly 250 Km from Hounslow to Exeter, in Devon, and the same from Hounslow to Hull. At a rate of 13 Km a day, fatuously assuming good roads and weather, it could take 20 days for the Royal Army to reach the landing site, half that to be in a position to intercept. But, there would be time.

William's winter passage would be rough and his regiments would be unfit for marching for a little while. He would need to test the waters of local opinion and might begin to suffer doubts if, as in Monmouth's Rebellion, the magisterial classes proved inert. A few days would also be gained from observing the course of the enemy fleet. More time could be gained by making an educated guess. Unfortunately, James guessed wrong, and began concentrating some of his regiments in Essex. But, he made swift corrections. The problem with Essex, or Kent for that matter, was that it was too close to London. To ensure the invaders could regroup the landing had to be made at a distance from the Capital.

[Just as in 1944 the Pas de Calais was really too close to Germany.]

Hull was not really a good landing spot. Most of the East coast was too exposed for a naval landing even in the best of weather. In winter it would be well nigh impossible. The Orangists would need a good harbour, but one not covered by a hostile fortress (of course, the garrison might go over to William, but this purely military analysis assumes no treachery; in any case, could William depend on treachery?) Hull and Portsmouth, the two key fortifications of the realm, were reported to be in a perfect state of defence by late October.

The Southwest coast was always more likely, assuming William was foolhardy enough to even attempt a winter invasion. Once this destination was finally divined, James called for a general muster at Salisbury. Salisbury was the halfway point between the West Country and London. Setting aside conspiracies, there was no reason to assume a different outcome than had occurred in 1685, when the Duke of Monmouth had been bottled up south of Bristol, then defeated in battle. Especially if the rumours that William had no cavalry were true. Salisbury Plain was excellent cavalry country, and James' mounted arm was comparatively strong. But, concentrating at Salisbury instead of at Hounslow risked an enemy attack before James' regiments were fully assembled.

[William did begin to move before the Royal Army was fully assembled, but for political reasons he did not attack. What such a close deployment actually meant was an opportunity for the disaffected to cross over to the Prince. Childs notes that James might have deployed even farther west, in case the Orangists tried to march north via Bristol instead of toward London, but that this was very risky also, given that the specific point of landing was unknown.]

Twenty battalions and thirty squadrons would eventually make their way down to Salisbury Plain, while six battalions and six squadrons stayed in the Capital. Leaving a largish force behind in London was simple prudence. Though the Whigs had been routed out of office, the City was still a Whig town. The numbers of regulars held back could be counterbalanced by the Militia, which, although neglected for years, managed to field seven battalions in time to meet the crisis. In any case the regiments garrisoning London were new ones. Theoretically the quite formidable Trained Bands could also be called out, but in the event the city fathers refused to do so.

Three regiments of Foot under Sir Charles Littleton were permanently stationed (since May 1688) in Kent, as a 'rapid reaction force' for that county.

The main artillery train of twenty-six cannon and four mortars, quartered in London, was sent to Finchley as early as the end of September, pending operational orders. Additional trains, called 'by-trains', were permanently stationed at Portsmouth and Hull.

Plans were completed as early as October 28th, which suggests James already suspected Essex was a blind. Once the Dutch fleet passed into the Channel the King was sure of William's true destination and final orders were issued. General Lanier was dispatched to Salisbury by way of Marlborough with six regiments of Horse. From there they would fan out and begin screening operations. The Foot were sent as the regiments became ready. At Salisbury they would come under the commander-in-chief, Lord Feversham. Some regiments, including the First Foot Guards, were sent to bolster the garrison of Portsmouth, which James believed was the intended target (and given William's

attempt on its forts his assessment may have been right). Others, particularly those of the Scots Army, held the line of the Thames.

[Or, perhaps the attempt on Portsmouth was intended to frighten James into concentrating much closer to London.]

There is still the question of whether James should have 'skulked' in London or been with the Army from the first. Both his confessor, Father Petre, and Lord Feversham, advised him to remain at Whitehall, and have been blamed for this.

But, before William actually landed there was little point in gallivanting about the country, and the King had matters of state to address. His presence had not been needed in 1685. Also, was it advisable for him to confront his nephew in person? The answer to that question might be either yes or no. The historians say yes, because William would then have been forced to show himself an invading usurper or go home. This is to ignore James' extremely potent views on family solidarity. If the Royal Army could defeat William and metaphorically bring him before the King loaded with chains, James could graciously pardon him, remove the phantom chains with his own hands, and send him back to Holland like a stern but loving uncle. If that solution is too subtle for the choleric monarch, then a simple 'why bother to draw sword personally against my insolent pipsqueak son-in-law?' may suffice.

As it turned out, the King did eventually set forth, because the news from the West was bad. It might have been better if he had remained in London; when he did join the Army it was only to be absorbed into the miasma of discouragement enveloping the royal camp.



[Louis de Duras, Earl of Feversham]

It was unfortunate that the Army's movement toward the Southwest was begun so late, but there had been little choice. In the end it probably did not matter that much, because William was not disposed to bring on a confrontation anyway. What was far more damaging was the rot within the Army and its commander's inability to deal with it.

[Lord Feversham's real name was Louis de Duras and he was a Huguenot. But though his sympathies on that count should have been with William, he does not seem to have betrayed James in any way. Rather, though a nephew of the great Turenne, he just lacked Turenne's ability.]

Meanwhile, the Prince of Orange was a prey to his own doubts, though in him it was more of a personal irritant than a halter. Camped in a cottage on Brixham beach, he was visited by a number of well wishers, but they were not as many as he had been led to believe. No doubt everyone was waiting to see what happened – *sigh*. It was essential to proceed boldly. Fortunately, the prince, though not much of a tactician, was a sound organiser, had a clear goal before him, and was of a stubborn nature. He also placed great reliance on his contacts with James' senior officer corps, especially those who had served under him and whom he knew were worried about the path King James was treading.

Conspiracy

King James received the news of William's landing immediately after concluding a stormy interview with some of his senior Anglican clergy, including the Archbishop of Canterbury and the recently imprisoned Bishop of London, whom he accused, accurately enough but only on suspicion, of having participated in a plot to bring William into the country. Their prevarications (they denied complicity but refused to do so in writing) left him in a towering passion and full of suspicion. But he did not, as yet, believe the reports of disaffection within the Army.

(Something should be said in passing about the King's Religion. Although James is always portrayed as a Catholic, and this is always made out to be *the* big issue, his embracing of Rome may have had more to do with the kind of societal control he could wield under a strong Roman Catholic regime. Then too, once he had made his choice, anyone who held different spiritual views from the King was clearly a Rebel.)

As with everything the King touched, his policies toward the military had an adverse effect. For James, this was unexpected, and in fact discounted by him. For he had spent years improving the Royal Army, making it both effective on the battlefield and an instrument of his will. This was his intention: to create an army of professionals, apolitical and devoted solely to his service and to his person.

In an age without a police force, the Militia, men of the local community under arms, had served as the ultimate arbiter when enforcing the Law, but by James' day that body was moribund. Partly for this reason and partly because the whole system of lord lieutenants and county militia was heavily imbued with the Parliamentary ethos, and in some cases unnatural *Whiggish* tendencies, James made a point of using the Army for internal security. This did not go down well with the administrative machinery of local government, nor with Parliament, nor with the common people.

For one thing, by law England was not to have a standing army, for the very reason that the King *could* use it as a tool of coercion. Resentment began to replace jubilation very soon after the crisis of Monmouth's Rebellion, at the outset of James' reign.

Innkeepers resented being given promissory notes for damages, country gentlemen resented having ravenous army officers foisted upon them at their expense, and upstanding citizens resented having their daughters outraged by drunken soldiers. James, a distant man unconcerned with things happening at a distance from him, did not properly address such matters. So long as the Army was loyal he had nothing to fear from the mob. Perhaps, if he had been given time (say, by not alienating ALL his subjects at one go), the Army might have become an extension of his will, and England would have become something like France under the Sun King.

By 1688 there were plenty of professional officers, but not all had been sundered from the land or from the communities in which they were born, and they still identified with the nation's grievances. Even

for those who regarded the Army as being above the law – an attitude encouraged by the King’s policies – there was another issue, one to which all Englishmen could relate: the question of Property Rights.

Much is always made of the religious question, of how King James, a Catholic, intended to make England a See of Rome. And, though its fears are usually overblown, popular imagination is seldom entirely wrong; this was certainly a danger. But equally, if not more important, was the question of property, which lay behind the religious issue. If James made the land Catholic, he would redistribute those lands to Catholic families, and to the families which acquiesced in his policies. This he had already started to do in Ireland.

And, there are other kinds of property. James had begun to monkey with the state machinery, gerrymandering electoral districts to ensure loyal Tory returns and replacing sheriffs and justices with his creatures. The same thing was occurring in the Church. If the King issued proclamations of indulgence for all sorts of religious groups so that they could hold public office, Dissenters and Nonconformists soon found their application forms dropped in the dustbin while Catholics were fast-tracked to top positions. Salaries were regarded as a form of property and a loss of office meant a drop in both income and status.

Army commissions were also property. James, rashly, had begun to dump certain of his officers who did not quite measure up to his mark of personal loyalty. This disturbed men who had made a substantial outlay in purchasing their commissions and were relying on the income to make their investment pay. Between fears for their financial future and fears for the sort of society their grandchildren would be born into, there was enough sap to bud dozens of conspiracies.

Childs book, *The Army, James II and the Glorious Revolution*, covers the Army Conspiracy in detail. In summary, it can be said that there was no grand coordinated plot, but that every element of society that disapproved of King James had its own conspiracy. Some men were party to more than one, and these served as liaisons between the various groups. The Army conspirators were the most important of all because their efforts, though less effective than hoped for, were still instrumental in, as Childs puts it, ‘ruining the Army’; he argues that Society as a whole remained inert, and that without the collapse of the Royal Army the Prince of Orange would have run out of steam.

As is always the case, the number of hard-core conspirators was small and their motivations complex. Some were career gamblers who sought only to better their position and carefully weighed the odds or plunged wildly, according to their humours. Some held personal grudges against James for real or imagined slights. Some cynically invoked high ideals of Liberty as a cloak, others found it convenient that their consciences dovetailed so neatly with their ambitions. A few went against James on moral grounds alone. (And some in each category turned against William in his turn; there is no pleasing everyone.)

[The Army seems to have been spared professional agitators, but that class was certainly alive and kicking in 1688. Witness the career of Robert Ferguson, who backed the Duke of Monmouth, William of Orange, AND the Old Pretender.]

The core of the conspiracy lay among the officers serving in the Anglo-Dutch Brigade. This formation, of six regiments (three Scots, one Irish, two English) and three thousand strong, had a long history and several incarnations. Under the later Stuarts, its role was to provide career opportunities for excess British officers on the cheap while at the same time keeping those of dubious loyalty at a distance.

[The officers of the Brigade were the only Englishmen that William really trusted to hold commands in his army. Marlborough’s talents ensure him a job, but William distrusted him and actually dispensed with his services later in the war with France. In contrast, several of the officers in the brigade rose to the rank of general.]

In the time of King James, though it was a valuable source of experienced cadres that he did not have to pay for (and could not have afforded) the Brigade had become a potential source of trouble. James’ son-in-law cultivated it, became patron to many of the senior officers

and their kin in the lower grades, identified with their concerns, and generally speaking, stole their loyalty from their King. Men sent into exile for political reasons were at liberty to join the organisation and disseminate their views.

[Ironically, service in the Brigade was despised by the rank and file. They felt they got all the dirty jobs and spent too much time on the drill square.]

King James made frequent requests to William over the years for the dismissal of officers whom he felt were inimical to him, but these requests were usually ignored. He was so mistrustful of the unit that when it was sent home during Monmouth’s Rebellion he divided the regiments up and employed them in garrisons far away from his rebellious nephew, who was the darling of many in the Brigade.

By 1688, James’ concerns had peaked. He decided on a clever ploy (usually credited to his henchman, Tyrconnel). In March of that year the Brigade was recalled to England. The King fully expected the Whig elements to disobey while the Catholic elements, of which there were some, would return, along with a portion of the Tory-Anglican elements; he had arranged financing and billeting for the remnant with Louis XIV of France (despite the latter’s low opinion of English mercenaries). If James got lucky, he would have brought a sizeable force of veterans back into the fold, while at the worst the Brigade would be broken and useless for William’s purposes.

As it turned out, however, the bulk of the men remained in Dutch service, though James was able to raise three new regiments from the dross, one English, one Scots, and one Irish. Some of the returnees were *agents provocateurs*. Though it remained a little understrength, William was able to bring it with him in November, where it played a valuable role in demonstrating that the Revolution was an internal English conflict and not a Dutch takeover.

Many of the military conspirators had either served in the Brigade or were friends with the current members, for example General Thomas Talmash (Tollemache) and Colonel Thomas Langston. Both Talmash and Langston belonged to the aptly named Treason Club, based out of the Rose Tavern in Covent Garden. (Only in England does one have the right to plot openly against the Government without interference.)

Langston had served under the Duke of Monmouth and had family ties with the West Country Whigs, while Talmash was a senior member of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade and one of the Treason Club’s liaisons with the Prince of Orange.

There were a number of these conspiratorial ‘clearing houses’. The Rose Tavern was the one favoured by both Army types and Whig politicians; some members being both. Most of these men were young, in their twenties and thirties. A number were rogues of the worst description (*think Long John Silver as played by Wallace Beery*).

Another key association was the Tangerines (all of whom were most definitely rogues!) This was an unofficial club of ex-Tangier veterans. Most were hard drinkers and most shared a bitterness at the Government’s abandonment of the post (in 1684). The roll call of the Tangerines will be read again in the following pages; it included many of King James senior commanders: Percy Kirke, Charles Trelawney, Sir John Lanier, Colonel Langston *again* – making him doubly important to the conspiracy – and one John Churchill, known to history as the Duke of Marlborough. The rest of the membership can be found by perusing the names of William’s English regiments. The Tangerines also boasted a famous nautical name: George Byng, 1st Viscount Torrington (not the one who was shot, but his grandfather).

A third group was the Association of Protestant Officers. This group was somewhat higher-minded than the others and might have stayed its hand if James had shown himself willing to compromise. It only formed in June of 1688, during the annual concentration on Hounslow Heath, partly out of the excitement engendered by the news of William’s preparations to challenge the birth of the Prince of Wales, and partly in outrage against the King’s latest attempts to quash the voices of the Opposition.

With such a close-knit set of plotters, the army conspiracy, though coming into being at a fairly late date, was well planned. There were few miscommunications. The primary goal was to spark mass desertions. Attempts seem to have been made to induce King James to put himself in reach of William's troops, but it is not clear if these were part of the overall scheme or an opportunistic endeavour by Churchill. As will be seen, the plot in its original conception did not come off – only about 1,000 men of the 25,000 James put up to oppose William deserted, and some of those were misled by their officers. Nevertheless, the plot's ultimate result was all that could have been hoped for.

One further group needs to be discussed here, the Huguenots. In 1685 King Louis XIV issued the Edict of Fontainebleau, otherwise known as the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. The long and the short of it was the expulsion of many Protestant Frenchmen from their native land. The Huguenots set up exile communities in Germany, Holland, and England. Exiled for practicing a religion not so very different from that practiced by many Englishmen they became both a cause to champion and a warning of what could be expected should King James' policies succeed. Hundreds participated in the invasion, while their relations in London proved invaluable as a 'fifth column'.

Lord Feversham is the exception. Coming to England in the train of the Duke of York in 1663, Louis de Duras remained loyal to James, or so it seems. At least, his inertness on Salisbury Plain is always ascribed to incompetence and not to calculation. After it was all over, William had him arrested for spoiling his plans to ship the Royal Army to Holland.

[One Orangist spy managed to infiltrate King James' inner circle and sent detailed reports in invisible ink concealed within trivial communiques. His identity has never been discovered. The Catholic side had its own agents. One notable man was a Huguenot named Tellières, who had fled to Holland from France with outstanding warrants for murder and rape against him. He merged with the exile community and spied for King Louis on the promise of a pardon. He was discovered just in time and 'shot while resisting arrest'.]

Churchill

Because he has gained such fame as the Duke of Marlborough, John Churchill's role in the Army's conspiracy has been raked over and over down through the centuries. Opinion, both at the time and later has ranged from calling him a black traitor to calling him a patriot. From the evidence, neither extreme seems to be true.

John Churchill was a member of a powerful family with royal connections but with a relatively small power base. He sought the kind of 'advancement' that would increase his influence and grant his immediate family financial security. A Tory, he supported the Stuart dynasty. For a time he served as the chief liaison between King Charles and the Duke of York, when the latter had to be sent into exile. He also served the brothers in a diplomatic role, on the military end of things; in this way he met the Prince of Orange.

He was attached to the Duke of York's suite for some years. To James, Churchill became indispensable. But Churchill grew increasingly frustrated by James' thickheaded obstinacy and his utter lack of sympathy for opinions other than his own. Churchill could put up with him, barely, because he was utterly dependent on the Duke for his advancement, but his wife, Sarah, was so disenchanted she became a Whig, and attached herself to the suite of the Princess Anne.

The role of Churchill's wife cannot be overstated; he would have done anything for her. Because of that, and because he saw that James intended to keep him in his 'indispensable' but subservient role by not awarding him any property, office, or place that might give him the wealth and power needed for independence, he too eventually joined the Whig camp, though remaining a Tory in outlook and sympathy. (Which is why he seems to 'flip-flop' in true Trimmer fashion over the years.)

James, by his nature, saw this shift of loyalty as a full-blown betrayal. He recognised Churchill's genius, he understood he was still loyal

enough to be employable, but he kept a watch on him and did not trust him with independent jobs. As a particular example, during Monmouth's Rebellion in 1685, Churchill was for all intents and purposes the commander of the Royal Army, but Lord Feversham was placed over him as its titular C-in-C. Feversham was not in Churchill's class as a general, but, as a double exile – from France and from the his own Huguenot community in England – completely loyal to James. So long as Churchill was there to get the job done, Feversham's skill set was a non-issue.

In Rowse's opinion (*The Early Churchills*), John Churchill's real intention during the Revolution was to play kingmaker. His relations with the royal family were close enough that this was entirely possible. On one level, he aimed at becoming the post-Revolution Commander-in-Chief of the Army. On another level he did hope to stop James' 'Catholicising' program, partly because its success would completely alter his conception of England and partly because his conscience was not flexible enough to become a Catholic just to gain advancement. This attitude, mixing self interest and public interest, was common to most of Churchill's contemporaries. Not all of them aimed so high, though.

To attain his ends therefore, it is believed Churchill sought to manipulate James into a meeting with William, either on the battlefield or through skulduggery, so that the King would be forced to yield. As will be seen, Churchill did eventually go over to William, but only after it became clear James had lost all trust in him and would not even take *sensible* actions if they were suggested by him.

Like many others, Churchill had expected that James would remain King, under Parliamentary constraint or under the constraint of family – i.e. his son-in-law, William. It might even fall out that James would voluntarily submit to Parliament, at which Churchill could go into high gear and lead the Army against William. Instead, Churchill found himself marginalised in the new regime; only under queen Anne did his star again rise.



[John Churchill]

The Campaign

His Highnesses Declaration

William Henry, By the Grace of God, Prince of Orange, &c. Wee have already given a full and clear Account of Our designs in this Our Expedition in Our Declaration for the Preservation of the Protestant Religion and the Lawes and Liberties of England; And since God hath thus farre blest us, that after a safe and prosperous Voyage and Landing wee are happily come to the City of Exeter; Wee have thought it necessary, most earnestly to invite all persons that are zealously affected to the Protestant religion, and to the Lawes and Liberties of their Countrey, to come and shew it by concurring with us, in this Our Undertaking for the securing and establishing of them; And Wee do promise and [a]ssure our Protection to all that shall come to Us, and do declare, that if any of those, that have assisted Us, or shall assist Us in any kind, or shall be coming toward Us for that purpose, Or shall publish, disperse, keep or read our declaration and publication of any sort, fall into the hands of our Enemies, and are ill used by them Wee will return the same usage upon all that wee find in Arms or giving any assistance to them and against us; We will take care to signifie the same to our Enemies, by which it will appear to God and to the World, that if any severe executions are committed, wee are forced to them by the Cruelties of our Enemies for the protection of Our friends. Wee doe also com[m]and and require all receivers and Collectors appointed to receive any part or parts of the revenue given by the Wisedome of former Parliaments, for the maintaining of the Dignity and honour of the Nation, and the established Lawes both in Church and State: And which are now applied to the supporting of Popery and Arbitrary Governm[ent].

[From Bentinck's papers in the University of Nottingham Special Collection.]

Exeter

The Orangists arrived at Exeter on November 9th. The 6th had been declared a day of thanksgiving, during which William met his emissary, Bentinck, at Paignton on the West side of the bay, along with other well-wishers. The march proper began on the 7th. But it poured with rain, a depressing, freezing rain onto muddy fields patched with snow, and every mile was only traversed with effort.

[The reader has probably heard of Torquay, a well known watering hole. Brixham lies on the South side of Tor Bay, Torquay on the North. Paignton stretches along the middle section. Torbay to Exeter is roughly 35 Km north of Torbay as the crow flies.]

This was not the time of year for a major campaign. Winters in the late 17th Century were harsh, and this one was set to be the worst yet. The Thames froze over in 1687, and the spring of 1688 came late. With autumn came a string of severe gales out of the North Sea, and by mid-November there was snow. Forage for the horses consisted of farmers' winter stocks. Most of the men camped in the open, without modern winter clothing and equipment. Billets were worth fighting over. As Childs describes it,

Accompanying the king [James] from London to the concentration on Salisbury Plain, the Earl of Ailesbury was thoroughly miserable as the cavalcade ploughed through roads deep in mud, and the wet and the cold gave some real point to the endless bickering between the gentlemen of the bedchamber about whose turn it was to ride in the royal carriage.

[The Army, p. 168.]

On the 7th, the Orangists got as far as Newton Abbot, only 10 Km north of the beach. Given the conditions this was not considered a bad day's march. Their army travelled along two parallel routes, probably one for the cavalry and one for the infantry.

On the 8th they made Chudleigh – only 9 Km this day. The Orangist orders of march (records of each day's planned route) have notations of distances between villages for these early days, which they do not later on, so it may be that the slow pace had something to do with a lack of guides.

While the Prince set up his Exeter headquarters most of the Horse remained at Newton Abbot. Two regiments of Dragoons and four of Foot were stationed at Exeter, while the rest of the Foot were billeted along the road between these two locations.

William made no further marches but rested his men, sent out cavalry patrols, and assessed the mood of the country (the march orders have no entries beyond cavalry movements for the dates of the 10th through the 12th, and no entries at all for the dates 14-18 November).

The enemy garrison of Plymouth, in his rear, was masked. To emphasise his role as Liberator, the Prince's troops displayed exemplary discipline. This contrasted well with the opposing Royal Army, which under James, and with his encouragement, had become a law unto itself. What the Dutch took, they paid for at market prices, and they only took after asking politely. When two soldiers made an exception by stealing chickens they were hanged.

[Childs recounts some contemporary propaganda: that the Dutch soldiers were big men, veterans of the recent Siege of Buda, unlike the weedy Irish thieves in James' army; William was also said to possess an artillery train of 200 pieces and a pontoon bridge, which no one ever saw 'because the roads were bad'. In actual fact he had 21 guns, 24-pounders, which was nothing to be sneezed at in those days. But the really telling point, as Childs indicates, was the presence of English and Huguenot exiles in William's army, who were made out to be the Vanguard of the Liberation.]

Exeter, when the Orangists reached it, was a case study of the nation's temper. The magistrates fled, while the common folk cheered with some trepidation; at first, the gates had been shut against the invaders. When a thanksgiving service was held in the cathedral, the local clergy stopped their ears and bolted outside as soon as Bishop Burnet began to read William's proclamation of deliverance. Local Dissenters locked their doors against a prominent Nonconformist minister in William's tail, Robert Ferguson by name, whom they had last seen in company with the Duke of Monmouth in 1685; nonetheless, he found an opportunity for mouthing off, as was his wont.

[Bishop Burnet, who's memoirs are a key resource for historians, had been the first to welcome the prince on the beach at Torbay. He was also a relation of John Graham of Claverhouse, who features prominently in the narrative of the Scottish war later in this commentary.]

Ferguson, who also wrote a history, was 'a tall lean man, dark brown hair, a great Roman nose, thin-jawed, heat in his face, speaks in the Scottish accent, a sharp piercing eye, stoops a little in the shoulders'. A virulent Whig, he was cast out of the Presbyterian fold for his radical views and involved himself in many wild plots and schemes. He was a deniable mouthpiece for the Earl of Shaftesbury during the Exclusion Crisis of the early 1680s, and a key organiser of the Monmouth Rebellion of 1685. Slighted by William after the Revolution, he became a Jacobite and plotted against him!]

If the West Country was a hotbed of Whiggish sympathies, it had been burned once already; they wanted no part of the Revolution until it was clear James was powerless to take revenge. A few notables hesitantly approached William, but some were rounded up by the Militia and others brought only a few men with them. The Prince of Orange saw himself falling into the role of a second Monmouth and at one point vowed he would go back to Holland and let England stew in its own juices.

William's misdirections – allowing everyone to think he would land in the North – played their part in the apparently slow response. However, if one considers the time necessary to disseminate the news of his coming and the time needed to physically reach him, his supporters were not laggardly.

The Defections Begin

By the 16th of November, things were looking up for William. Several Tory lords appeared at his Exeter lodgings on the 12th, including Lord Colchester with 70 men from his Troop of Royal Lifeguards. The most important arrival was Lord Cornbury, who appeared at Exeter on the 16th. Cornbury was the eldest son of Lord Clarendon, the brother of King James' first wife, Anne Hyde; in other words, one of the King's nephews. The Army conspirators had at last got into action. Cornbury was a protégé of John Churchill; raised in the company of the princess Anne, he was just as much under the Churchills' influence as she.

The Royal Army was only gradually moving into position on Salisbury Plain, and it is important to realise that it never did fully assemble. On paper, King James could overawe William with nearly 40,000 men to 20,000. Of these, only 8-9,000 were in garrisons or recruits left to guard London, the rest were all regulars: 24,000 English, 2,964 Scots, and 2,830 Irish.

[Numbers from Childs' Army, p.184. Scotland was now defended solely by a royal proclamation to the effect that rumours of an invasion should be ignored.]

But, Lord Feversham, the Army's commander, encumbered as he was with cannon and baggage, did not reach Salisbury until November 15th. Many of his infantry were still on the road, particularly the Irish and Scots, who had been in motion since the middle of October. Some of the units marching down to Salisbury were to be greeted by other regiments taking part in a general retreat. General Lanier's cavalry brigades were in the field before the 15th, though, and this enabled the Army plotters to make their first move.

On the night of the 13th, Cornbury led out three picked regiments of cavalry: his own, otherwise the Royal Dragoons, Berwick's or the Royal Horse Guards, and St. Albans' or Langston's Horse. They proceeded first to Axminster, 90 Km southwest of Salisbury. There, Cornbury's officers grew suspicious because he had raced ahead without any regard for march discipline. (He may have been nervous, or he may have expected this would allow William's forces to pick them off one by one.) At Axminster Cornbury told his vanguard – the other two regiments had not caught up – they were to make a raid on Honiton, 14 Km to the West. Calling for 60 troopers to make the raid, Cornbury was challenged by his regimental major (a Catholic), who asked to see his written orders.

[The Duke of Berwick was King James' 'natural' son; the Duke of St. Albans was a natural son of Charles II. Neither of these men led their regiments in person; the defections were organised by their lieutenant-colonels without their knowledge. Langston was a career officer with family connections in this part of the world.]

Losing his nerve, Cornbury took off for Honiton at a gallop, followed by a handful of the detachment who still thought he was leading the raid. Cornbury's major led the bulk of the regiment back to Salisbury. The next regiment in route, the Blues, did likewise when its commander had second thoughts after being threatened by his own major. The last regiment, Langston's, rode into Honiton, where the Orangist General Talmash welcomed the colonel. Three days later the defectors were in audience with the Prince of Orange.

(Honiton, which lies 26 Km northeast of Exeter, occupies one of the few gaps in the range of hills bounding the West edge of Salisbury Plain. William naturally had to take charge of it to ensure his eventual egress from Devon, but it appears Talmash had been ordered to the spot expressly to meet with the deserters.)

Cornbury's defection had both political and military repercussions. Militarily, the attempt to carry away three regiments of horse was not successful in either of its immediate objects: to cancel out what the plotters had believed was William's weakness in cavalry and to encourage further mass desertions. Only 100 men of Cornbury's and 30 men of the Blues, plus Langston's (perhaps 250) had been netted, and all but 150 of the bemused troopers had to be interned. Still, these were not feckless volunteer regiments, these were the Blues and Royals, the King's elite guards. If they could turn coat...

Lord Feversham was driven to an excess of caution. Unwilling to risk another such event, he curtailed his cavalry patrols and thus lost contact with the Prince's army. Moreover, he had dispatched another regiment under Sir John Fenwick to break down Keynsham Bridge; it was recalled before executing its orders, leaving the road past Bristol open.

[Keynsham Bridge crosses the Avon River southeast of Bristol, midway between the city and the town of Bath. The crossing point was needed for an army that either wished to bypass the city or to invest it.]

Politically, however, the news was devastating. Reportedly, King James quit his dinner abruptly, while the Queen and her ladies had hysterics. Some courtiers threw off the mask, openly gloating at the turn of events. Lord Clarendon professed shock at his son's treason, and secretly prepared to defect himself. With a complete lack of tact, Princess Anne remarked to her father "people are very uneasy about popery, and there are plenty more in the army who will do likewise" [quoted in Cassell's vol. 3, p. 557]. She was speaking for herself, too.

[Childs notes that William's emissary, Bentinck, had arranged billets for 1,150 – Cornbury's entire brigade – which is a clear indication that the conspirators were initially disappointed in the operation's outcome.]

James summoned a council of war. Most of his key generals were still with him: his protégé Churchill, his nephew the Duke of Grafton, General Kirke, and Charles Trelawney. Disturbed by exaggerated reports that his household troops had deserted en masse with Lord Cornbury, the King told the assembled officers that if any wished to leave his service they should hand in their commissions now. None did. Yet Churchill was his chief opponent, tying his fortunes to the Princess Anne, and Grafton was heart and soul for the Prince. James had pressured Kirke, who had been zealous for him in Monmouth's Rebellion, to become a Catholic, and that unique individual cloaked his annoyance by jesting that he had promised the Grand Turk his next change of religion would be to Islam. But of the four, Trelawney bore the King real ill will, for he was brother to the Bishop of Bristol, whom James had imprisoned in the Affair of the Seven Bishops.

[Henry FitzRoy, 1st Duke of Grafton, was the son of Charles II and the latter's longtime mistress, Barbara Villiers. Like Churchill, he belonged to Princess Anne's Cockpit circle. He was also notorious for having killed the brother of Earl of Shrewsbury in a duel. Before the invasion he had openly acted as go between for the Whigs and the Prince of Orange – so openly in fact that after making a 'secret' trip to Holland he returned in time to dine with the King, who at that very moment was reading a dispatch detailing his every move! Grafton was mortally wounded in the assault of Cork in 1690.]

Donkey

After the Cornbury Affair it was decided the Staff and the King should depart for Salisbury and try to stop the rot. Only in battle could James truly determine who would fight for him. But before he could leave, he was buttonholed by a deputation of lords, insisting he call an emergency parliament. He refused, using their own excuse, William's presence with an army, as his justification. He then abused the 'lords spiritual' for presenting themselves in this matter after they had assured him they had no interest in politics. Still fuming, he withdrew, vowing not to yield on any point of his prerogatives.

This may seem to be just another incident among many in those days of crisis, but it was in fact an extremely important moment. The point at issue, which everyone understood without mentioning it, was what is known as the King's 'dispensing power' – that prerogative of the Executive, or Royal Prerogative in the case of a monarchy, which involves the suspension of the normal laws of the land. The Estates were challenging King James by asking him to lay aside his dispensing power at the very moment he was most justified in using it.

If James had agreed lay down his dispensing power and call a parliament, the Moderates would have taken it as recognition of his repentance and willingness to act as a 'constitutional' monarch. In their view, if James displayed trust in his People, Parliament would line up behind the King in the face of William's invasion. The latter would be forced out of the country and Parliament would start making a few reforms.

A majority of the political elites had supported William's landing for just this reason, though the 'realists' thought that an additional step of coercion by William – say, in the role of regent – would be required. Only each side's fanatics hoped for the utter defeat of James or William. What none of the Moderates expected was that James would throw in the towel without a fight, paving the way for William to take the throne.

At the moment, however, James was full of fight. The King saw only an ungrateful nation blackmailing him into giving up his rights. He was the sort of man who digs in his heels at the first hint of coercion. Some human foibles are endearing; mulishness is not one of them. The minority who really did want to see James overthrown perhaps counted on his stubbornness. With the King's refusal to call a parliament, the Moderates now had no choice but to follow the will of the Fanatics.

Salisbury Plain

James was determined to put some life into his Army and start operations against William in earnest. He reached Salisbury on the 19th of November, after only two days on the road from London. The infant Prince of Wales had been carried to Portsmouth in the keeping of the reliable Duke of Berwick, the port's Governor. London was in the care of five hand-picked lords, including two Catholics and the notorious Lord Chancellor, George Jeffries (the Hanging Judge of the Bloody Assizes).

[Jeffries, curiously was contemptuous of Catholics. He was, however, James' unquestioning tool.]

The Royal Army's main camp is either generically described as 'on Salisbury Plain' or at Salisbury, without any further information. Feversham's headquarters would likely have been in the town and the regiments billeted in the surrounding villages.

At Salisbury, the King was greeted by a muddle. As mentioned before, the key point of Cornbury's cavalry escapade was that it led to the *supposition* of mass disaffection in the Army. Most of the Blues and the Royals returned to their billets, but thanks to their embarrassment and the confusion in Feversham's camp, their return was not particularly remarked. Instead, there was suspicion everywhere. That, coupled with the disaffection of many of the senior officers, was enough to render the High Command comatose.

Feversham, having broken contact with the enemy to avoid more desertions, was inert, and the inertia flowed downward. Units marched in, got no orders, and just camped where they pleased. Without direction they lounged about or went out foraging. A trickle of dispirited men began to go home. Some of the desertions were coordinated. Officers of the various clubs opposed to James, inspired by Cornbury's action, did now begin to cross into the Dutch lines. Amidst the disorder of Feversham's camp, this was not difficult.

[The armies were so separated that usually took a few days for deserters to reach the Prince.]

The Prince of Orange was not yet in action. From his point of view everything was *not* going to plan. On the 17th he held an inspection for those who had come over to him so far, and was disappointed. On the day James arrived at Salisbury, William began his advance, but it was an extremely slow one. He lacked transport – a royal order had gone out on October 20th for all draught animals to be driven 20 miles inland upon the appearance of the enemy fleet – and William's orders of march only mention three units (which may have been sent out merely as escorts for parties of deserters).

Meanwhile, a review of the Royal Army was scheduled for the 20th, to begin with Major General Kirke's mixed brigade, based at Warminster, 30 Km northwest of Salisbury. The King's selecting of this unit first indicates it was on the right of the defensive line; the brigade was so located that it could intercept any attempt to cross the Thames or the Avon.

The Comte de Roye, another Huguenot general (in fact, Feversham's brother-in-law) advised against the review, since the Orangists were reported to have regiments of foot at Wincanton, 40-odd Km west of Salisbury, and only 24 Km southwest of Warminster. That meant their cavalry patrols would be even closer. De Roye thought the King risked capture, and even counselled that the Army's entire position was

compromised. The eagerness of Generals Trelawney and Kirke to push on to their commands and their insistence the King follow, at first put down to zeal, now took on a sinister cast.

James, obstinate as ever, decided to hold the review anyway, but was prevented by a nosebleed that ran for three days; a sure indicator of great stress. For once, de Roye's advice seemed justified, for later on the morning of the 20th came news of a Royalist defeat at Wincanton.

[Frederick Charles, Comte de Roye et de Roucy, came to England in 1687 after serving as Grand Marshal of the Danish Army. His wife was Feversham's sister. (And also an aunt of the Marquis de Miramont, whose name crops up as the recipient of a commission from King James to raise a Huguenot cavalry regiment; King William confirmed that commission and Miramont later served his interests in Savoy). De Roye was made Earl of Lifford so that his wife, one of the Queen's ladies-in-waiting, could receive proper honours at Court. The title was only on a letter given him by James; nonetheless everyone had to pretend he was a real earl. De Roye and Feversham were cordially hated by the rest of the Huguenots for staying loyal to James. It was by de Roye's suggestion that the order to remove the draught animals had been given, and he also pushed the King down to Salisbury post-haste – after his brother-in-law had given the opposite advice! De Roye died of an illness at Bath in 1690. He had a son in the 1st Lifeguards who, like Miramont, stayed in service under William and who was confirmed as Earl of Lifford.]

There were no Orangist regiments in the vicinity of Wincanton. Elements of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade (25 soldiers under a Lieutenant Campbell) had been out buying horses when 120 troopers of the Troop of 'Scotch' Lifeguards, led by Patrick Sarsfield, pounced on them. The troopers were beaten off. Despite the smallness of this affray, James was now convinced his liberty was in danger. That evening, he called another council of war. Inexplicably, though warned of their intended treachery, he invited Churchill and Grafton to attend.

[The action at Wincanton saw 8-9 Dutch KIA and 6 POWs against 4 KIA and 2 WIA for the Lifeguards.]

Feversham, de Roye, and General Dumbarton, colonel of the 1st of Foot, advised a withdrawal; Churchill and Grafton advised concentrating at Warminster (plausible if one's strategy was to be in range of Bristol and yet still cover London). The discussion went on until midnight. By then, it was clear the King was not going to listen to Churchill, so the latter and Grafton made their excuses and left; they rode immediately to the Orangist camp, followed by a few soldiers (about 20) and some lesser officers. Their departure was discovered in the morning.

[Though Dumbarton's Regiment became the Royal Scots, and recruited its members in Scotland, it was not on the Scottish Establishment. It had originally been raised for the French Army.]

Kirke was arrested, though only for disobeying an order. At the council he was told to fall back on Devizes, 20 Km to the northeast of Warminster, to cover the Army's line of retreat on the northern side. The general mumbled excuses. Suddenly suspicious, King James ordered him sent under guard to Andover, well to the rear, but when Lord Feversham examined his case a day or two later he was released, at which he made for the West. In his profane way Kirke had professed his disgust at the desertions of Churchill and Grafton and thus persuaded Feversham of his basic loyalty.

(Kirke's disgust need not have been feigned. Marshal Schomberg, commander of the Orangist Army, commented acidly that Churchill was the first lieutenant general he had seen run away from his colours. There is a sense, even in the cases of the hardbitten Kirke and the self-seeking Churchill, not so much of black treachery as of a desire by the defecting officers, who were one and all professional men, of preserving their military honour as they sought, not to depose, but to manipulate King James. They were reluctant to desert outright until it was clear he no longer trusted them.)

Charles Trelawney and Churchill's brother also took themselves off the day of the council. They belonged to Kirke's brigade; indeed nearly all the brigade's officers seem to have been in on the conspiracy, for when William sent a body of 800 Dragoons and 400

Foot to the environs of Warminster, most of them accepted the invitation, along with 200 men.

The Retreat

To return to the council of war. It was decided the Army was in no state to fight. The treachery of key commanders, the disorganisation, the weather, all clearly mandated a retreat. The Army would cross the Thames by Reading, where Feversham would pause to let the cavalry eat up the neighbourhood. After that, there was no plan. King James would be penned into London, blockaded by the Dutch fleet, and forced to negotiate. Possibly, the negotiations might be protracted, and William recalled to Holland to deal with a French invasion. That was the great hope. Privately, the King thought of fleeing the country.

The end was still some way off. William's army only reached Honiton on the 21st and Axminster on the 22nd. Here the Prince met Grafton and Churchill. On the 23rd, 1,200 Horse under Bentinck (possibly the Dutch Horse Guards, which were his regiment) were sent off to Wincanton, but at Sherborne, 13 Km southwest of Wincanton, they learned for certain that the Royal Army was in retreat.

Plymouth and its Governor, John Granville, Earl of Bath, surrendered on the 24th. Needed as a base for the Dutch fleet, and a potential threat to William's communications, its fall was both necessary and, isolated as it was by William's cavalry patrols, inevitable, but the dithery Earl did not merely capitulate, a week after he had privately decided to defect, he publicly declared for William and arrested the papist officers among the garrison before opening the gates. This was bad enough, but Granville had been a staunch Royalist during the Civil Wars and one of the architects of the Restoration. Indeed, he had shared the young Charles II's exile. Such a defection struck King James like a hammer blow.

[Granville was also cousin to George Monck, the Parliamentarian general.]

With the fall of Plymouth, the Orangists could proceed to London. William's outriders entered Salisbury on the 24th, in the teeth of a gale, while King James was passing through Andover, 26 Km to the Northeast. He had supper with his other son-in-law, George of Denmark, as well as the Duke of Ormond, both of whom left for William's camp as soon as they rose from the table. They took some other notables with them.

[Prince George, husband of Princess Anne, was nicknamed 'Est-il possible?' because that was all he ever said. His stupidity is said to have been proverbial, but he may not have been all that dense. James disliked him, but William did, too, so in neither reign were people disposed to sing his praises. He lacked ambition, but had physical courage.]

James Butler, 2nd Duke of Ormond, was, as his name suggests, Anglo-Irish; his father had been a Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. Though Ormond was of Princess Anne's party and opposed James on religious grounds, he became a Jacobite on the accession of King George I. After all, one must draw the line somewhere.]

There was no attempt at hot pursuit, just a steady advance behind James' retreating forces. The Orangists, whose main camp was now at Sherborne, remained there until the 26th. In fact, on that day William rode back 21 Km to the West, to Crewkerne, where Trelawney and the other deserters from Warminster rendezvoused with him. They all returned to Sherborne on the 27th. (On this day William learned of the fall of Plymouth and of Kirke's arrest.) Taken up with receiving important personages, the Prince did not arrive at Wincanton until the 30th.

On the 1st of December, William arrived at Hindon, still 22 Km west of Salisbury. Here he received a King's Messenger with a request for safe conducts for James' Commissioners, as well as the Dutch Ambassador, and, unexpectedly, Lord Clarendon, who had done a bunk. General Headquarters remained here until the 3rd, but the troops, and probably William himself, were moving forward. Bristol, empty of any garrison, was taken by Charles Talbot, Earl of Shrewsbury, and Sir John Guise, with two regiments of Foot, on December 2nd.

[Shrewsbury was one of the Immortal Seven who signed the invitation to William. He resented James' attempts to convert him, but though he was instrumental in devising the joint rule of William and Mary he refused to abjure James as lawful king and resigned his offices. Though he returned to office under Queen Anne, he had Jacobite leanings.]

On the 4th the headquarters was shifted to Amesbury, 11 Km north of Salisbury. Three gales struck England during these days, leading both sides to fear for the safety of their fleets. William was very glad of securing Plymouth.

On the 6th the Prince reached Collingbourne Kingston, 16 Km north-northwest of Amesbury, Lord Cornbury was detached to sweep through Marlborough, 15 Km to the North, while the forces released from watching Plymouth, commanded by Lord Henry Sydney, advanced from Lyme (24th November), via Beaminster, to Amesbury.

[Henry Sydney, 1st Earl Romney, was brother to Algernon Sydney, a 'martyr' in the Rye House Plot. Both Algernon and their third brother, the Earl of Leicester, were Parliamentarians during the Civil Wars; Henry being the youngest by twenty years, did not play a role in the wars, but was imbued with the same spirit. Like Shrewsbury, Sydney is counted among the Immortal Seven – he actually penned the Invitation. Under William he was a Lord Lieutenant of Ireland and Master-General of the Ordnance, as well as Colonel of the First Foot Guards.]

Hungerford, about 37 Km west of Reading, was reached by William on the 7th of December. The Prince's contingent of English was now organised as a separate body (it seems) and camped at Lambourne, 11 Km to the North.

[It is not clear why this was done. Perhaps it had always been William's intention as soon as there were enough English troops. Or, there may already have been differences of opinion; the Dutch were respected, but not liked. Or, perhaps William thought his northern flank should be guarded by natives who could receive approaching supporters in their own language.]

James' Commissioners rode out from Reading to begin negotiations. A pause ensued as demands and counter-demands passed back and forth, though Major-General Walrad led a probe, possibly with the *Garde Dragoners* Regiment, 13 Km east to Newbury.

[Some general histories place William at Hungerford on the 27th of November, where he supposedly received James' commissioners on the 28th, but the dates above are taken from official records. Such an error can be explained this way: the historian has mistaken '7th of December' for the Gregorian, or modern date, in which case the 27th of November comes out – 10 days prior; per the conversion table – as the Julian date. But the '7th of December' in the official records is the Julian date; the Gregorian date would thus be the 17th of December.]

On the 9th, a skirmish (not mentioned in any general histories, it seems) was reported in the rear of the Orangist army, at the hamlet of Littlecott, about 9 Km north of Amesbury. This involved Dutch troops under Major General Naßau-Dietz fighting a body of Scots and Irish from James' army, possibly double-deserters or simply marauders.

William moved his headquarters, now styled the 'Court's quarters', to Newbury on December 10th. The English Wing was sent on to Wallingford, 23 Km northeast of Newbury, to secure the Thames crossing there. Naßau-Dietz, Major-General Walrad, and the *Garde Dragoner* rode to Reading, while Bentinck, probably with a mixed force including the Guard Horse, took the crossing at Streatley, 8 Km south of Wallingford. At Reading it was learned that 500 men of the Scots Guards had defected.

The Battle of Reading

Curiously, the copiers of William's march orders make no reference to the Battle of Reading, though the defection of the Scots Guards (Dunmore's Foot) is the indicator of it. It was not a significant battle, but it was the campaign's only official one. Accounts vary in details. The common facts are that Lord Feversham left 500 or 600 men to guard the Thames crossing at Reading, and that the locals, disturbed by the fact that there were 'papists' among the force, sent to William for aid.

Now, since it had already been decided that the Orangists would not approach within 30 miles of London; occupying Reading might be interpreted as a violation of that agreement. However, a body of 250 'Dutch' Horse – the *Garde Dragonniers* and some Huguenot volunteers, in fact – was dispatched from Newbury anyway. Like the action at Littlecott, it was probably perceived as one of the 'Irish Alarms' that were becoming more and more prevalent as men deserted. These scares involved bands of Irish attempting to return home; though they often pillaged they were as often lynched by the locals, all tending to a spirit of discord that needed to be suppressed.

The composition of Feversham's blocking force is variously given as 600 Irish dragoons or alternatively a battalion of the Scots Guards and elements of Lanier's Horse, with for good measure, 50 Irishmen of some unnamed unit: 600 men in all.

600 'Irish dragoons' is possible but unlikely. That would be Richard Hamilton's new regiment, at double its paper strength. Its presence is not accounted for in the local histories, nor does it dovetail with the 500 deserting Scots. For the alternate order of battle there are two substantiating accounts.



[Broad Street, Reading, focus of the Battle of Reading]

In a common version of the battle, the 50 Irish hold the approaches to the bridge, but the other units permit the Dutch to infiltrate around them, after which a frontal assault routs the Irish, total casualties being between 20 and 50 defenders.

A local history of Reading has a different account. First, it states that all 500 (not 600) of the defenders were Irish. This sounds like the dragoons, but the account further states that there was one (1) troop of Horse (not dragoons) and one (1) battalion of infantry.

Warned of the approach of the Dutch, the defenders deployed facing west, putting the troop of Horse (from Lanier's regiment, obviously) at the corner of Castle Street, concealed in the yard of the Bear Inn, and a strong body of Foot (probably pikemen) across Broad Street, with a sentinel in the Church of St. Mary's bell tower. The walls of the churchyard were lined with musketeers.

Themselves warned by the inhabitants, however, the Dutch approached via Pangbourne Lane (Oxford Road), a hedge-lined route that could not be observed. Surprised, the 'Irish' blocking force was driven back into the Market, where their panic infected their comrades. As they scurried through the streets, *franc tirailleurs* harassed them with musket fire and stones from the houses. They suffered 50 casualties and the loss of their colours, while only 5 Dutch were killed.

Adding the 500 Scots Guards to this account clarifies matters. The idea that Feversham's men were all Irish probably comes from a celebratory ballad calling them 'papists', which one can take as slang for 'King James' soldiers'. Or, possibly, the accents of the Scots Guards sounded Irish enough to people who had never seen a Scotsman. The regimental-sized defection recorded in William's campaign notes is a clue that the defending force consisted of *only* the Scots Guards battalion, 500 strong, and the troop of Lanier's Horse (50

men), and that therefore the '50 Irish' were not a separate body, but the 50 who died, leaving 500 to change sides.

According to William's records, the defecting guardsmen were led by a sergeant and two corporals who had formerly served in the Dutch Army. It may be that their officers, possibly Catholics, were killed or prudently removed themselves.

The day after this affray, the 11th, William acted on an invitation to visit Oxford, and travelled as far as Abingdon. Most of his army stayed put, but he probably took a strong escort as the invite was also a rendezvous with some of the northern earls, who had marched south with a large body of militia. At Abingdon the Prince was apprized of the flights of King James early that morning and of the Queen the day before, and changed his plans accordingly.

The State of the Country

For King James, all the news of the country was bad. Cheshire had risen under the parliamentary leader and former political prisoner, Lord Delamere, who was marching south and had already reached Manchester. Lord Devonshire (counterintuitively MP for Derbyshire) was also out; indeed, the whole of the Midlands and the North, except for a few Catholic enclaves, declared themselves for William during the first half of December.

[The 2nd Lord Delamere was Henry Booth, member of a family who had supported the Restoration and who would later become what were known as 'Whig Jacobites'. The 1st Duke of Devonshire was William Cavendish, current leader of the anti-Catholic faction in Parliament and one of the signatories to the Invitation to William.]

Lord Danby, sometime first minister under King Charles II, was mustering forces for William at York – although Danby, unlike those in Exeter who had just signed a declaration to support the Prince *carte blanche*, sought to establish himself as a 'third force'; seeing in William only a means of bringing James to heel.

The kingdom's fortifications fell in numerous ways. In some instances, a token demonstration was required. In others, conspiracy paved the way. Senior officers surrendered, junior officers arrested senior officers. At the urban centers it was a matter of local politics, with the incumbent Tory administration either handing the keys over to friendly Whig neighbours or fleeing in the night, fearing mob reprisals.

Danby's men had swiftly taken Scarborough Castle on the North Sea coast (not much of a victory, since it was empty.) The Isle of Wight, an historic Royalist refuge, surrendered on the 9th of December. The last royal fortresses of significance were Portsmouth, Berwick, and Hull. Both Portsmouth and Hull were tough nuts, fully garrisoned. But the lieutenant-governor of Hull had arranged to hand over the place back in September, and he did so on December 3rd, after admitting certain agents who arrested the governor and the Catholic commander of one of the line regiments stationed there.

[The lieutenant-governor, one Lionel Copley, was rewarded with the governorship of Maryland. His motives were apparently purely mercenary.]

Berwick was taken on the 15th of December; Carlisle capitulated the same day. The forts protecting various river mouths, such as Tilbury on the Thames, and the Tynemouth forts, changed hands without fanfare. Portsmouth held to the end on the off chance that the King might need to escape that way, but with the fall of the Isle of Wight it was no longer a viable departure point; it surrendered on the 20th.

The End

While his regime was disintegrating, the King made his way to London. The Prince of Wales was also sent back from Portsmouth to London overland – a risky move since he and his guardians were without escort, though in the spirit of the times enemy soldiers might just as readily have waved them on with the doff of a cap.

[Baron Dartmouth, still commanding the Channel Fleet at Portsmouth, balked at the political risks of smuggling the baby out of England, telling James he could not guarantee success.]

At Whitehall, James received the *coup de grâce*. His daughter Anne had fled to the Orangists. By the account of Churchill's wife, Sarah, the news that Churchill and Prince George had changed sides,

"put the princess in a great fright. She sent for me, told me her distress, and declared that, rather than see her father, she would out at a window. This was her expression. A little before a note had been left with me to inform me where I might find the bishop of London – who in that critical time absconded – if her royal highness should have occasion for a friend. The princess, in her alarm, immediately sent me to the bishop. I acquainted him with her resolution to leave the court, and to put herself under his care."

[Cassell's, vol. 3, pp.560-561.]

Despite the note of panic, the flight seems to have been prearranged. The bishop sent a private coach for the princess, around midnight, and she and Sarah slipped out of their lodgings – the princess was already under close guard, it may be noted – and so to the bishop's town house. From there they made their way out of the city and north, to Nottingham, where more insurgents were mustering. The princess left a letter, addressed to the Queen, saying that her husband, Prince George, had only left to make terms on behalf of the King, and that she herself wished to avoid her father's first flush of wrath.

Anne's flight was the greatest shock James had yet suffered. He mooned about the palace; courtiers reported lapses of reason. And yet he would not yield, but attempted to prevaricate. The campaign was essentially concluded, but as with all coups, there was a considerable mess to clean up, and out of that mess, some advantage might be gained. At the last, though, he decided to reject the country that had rejected him.

As of the 13th of December, what remained of Feversham's command, about 4,000 men, lay 25 Km to the east of Reading, between Uxbridge and Windsor, a 10 Km long box north of the Thames and west of the little River Pinn. There was no command and control. Childs points out, however, that even now the Army, though broken as a fighting force, was still loyal to the King, and that the final touch that sent it crashing in ruin was applied by James himself and not by William. Or, rather, it was applied by Lord Feversham acting on the King's vaguest of vague written instructions.

The King wrote his commander-in-chief a letter on the 11th by way of the Countess de Roye, Feversham's sister. In it he expressed his opinion that, *"if I could have relied upon all my troops I might not have been put to this extremity I am in, and would have at least had one blow for it."* Most of the letter was rambling and incoherent, and to a man so lacking in initiative as Feversham, utterly useless, except for this phrase: *"though I do not expect you should expose yourselves by resisting a foreign army and a poisoned nation."* Out of that, Feversham construed an order to disband the Army. He rounded up all the senior commanders he could find at Uxbridge and gave them this instruction, then wrote to William informing him of the step he had just taken.

Between the 12th and the 13th of December, William moved his base to Henley-on-Thames, 10 Km to the northeast of Reading. On the 12th he received Feversham's note. It did not please him. To disband the Royal Army would cause chaos as the men, some of them unpaid, some of them retaining their weapons, dispersed to their homes, if they had one, or took to the streets of London. The Irish and Catholics would be trying to escape and making all sorts of mischief. William had hoped to add many regiments to his army before he returned to Holland, but now the force was ruined.

[It is debatable whether the Army would have been much use to him anyway, without the complete overhaul it was later to receive. Since much of it remained loyal to James there would have been a danger of it changing sides in any battle where King Louis decided to present the exiled monarch as a totem.]

The ensuing mess was mitigated somewhat by the liberal interpretation of Feversham's order by the officers who received it and by the prompt action of the Prince. The English officer corps had no desire to see

unpaid 'demobbed' soldiers forming mobs of their own and looting London or the various estates they came across on their way home. Different interpretations of the order were made, but generally speaking, the Irish and Catholic soldiers began to be discharged while the residue kept with the colours, to submit to William at an appropriate time. Churchill and the Duke of Grafton, both popular commanders, oversaw the affair. Lord George Livingstone, acting commander of the Scots Army, applied to the Prince for he and his men to return to Scotland as a unit, a request that was granted.

At Henley, William received a deputation of the London magnates. His army was set in motion toward London along the line of the Thames, taking surrenders and submissions and establishing order along the way. The records indicate the force was strung out for 20 Km, from Walrad's vanguard at Bray, a hamlet near Maidenhead, back to Sydney's rearguard at Reading. An odd diversion is recorded for Naßau's-Deitz's brigade, which doubled back to Warborough near Abingdon, some 22 Km northwest of Reading and well behind the Prince. No explanation is given but it is likely they were requested by the local authorities as protection against bands of Irish soldiers.

Confusion was reigning as parties of unsupervised Irish attempted to reach the western ports for a passage home, causing more 'Irish Alarms' at the towns they passed through. Sometimes they were lynched just for being Irish, and sometimes they looted first.

From the 14th to the 16th the Prince was at Windsor. The brigades of Naßau-Deitz, Bentinck, and Walrad stayed put, but on the 14th Baron Ginkel took some of the cavalry to Great Marlow, and Sydney was sent on a reconnaissance 10 Km southeast of Reading to Branshill, Barkham, and Arborfield.

[There are a couple of Great Marlows close to the Orangists' line of march. The one meant is probably that near Henley, 19 Km northeast of Reading. The other is to the South, near Basingstoke.]

The advance resumed on the 16th. There was no question of investing London, it was a triumphal progress. William learned that King James had been arrested at Faversham (*spelt with an 'a'*), as he tried to take ship to France. This involved the Prince in discussions of how to handle the situation. On the Irish question, he ordered that the men be returned to their regiments, though disarmed, so at least they would be under discipline. Some obeyed and others, along with the Catholic gentry who had harnessed themselves to James' wagon, kept on their way for the Continent or for Ireland, where they would take service again in the war that was about to break out across the Irish Sea. Later, William would purge all his English regiments.

The King had been discovered attempting to flee the country but had been brought back to London on the 16th, to a confusion of cheers and jeers. Some wanted him put on a legal leash in William's charge, others hinted he had only to call upon the Nation and it would rise. Though the City magistrates categorically refused to call out the trained bands in James' defence, William was unnerved and made no move to check his uncle.

On the 17th, the Prince stayed at Sion House, home of the Duke of Somerset, just north of Richmond. (It should be remembered that though Richmond is now within London, in his day, Sion House was a country estate.) The march orders for his army list billets at Chiswick, Acton, Fulham, Ealing, Hounslow, Richmond, and Twickenham, all of which were hamlets well outside the city limits. Anti-papists mobs were raging within the City.

[A list of billets for the Orangist forces in the vicinity of London, on the 16th:

*Schomberg's HQ & Staff
1x Guards battalion
Prins van Birkenfeld
3x Guards battalions
Birkenfeld's Brigade
Sidney's Brigade
General Naßau & 1x Bn
of Wijnbergen's Brigade*

*Collingbourne Kingston
West Everly
Chute
N. Tidworth, S. Tidworth, Haxton
Appleshaw, Shoddenden, Kimpton, Thruxton
Amesbury
Great Bedwyn*

<i>1x Bn Wijnbergen's Brigade</i>	<i>Burbage</i>
<i>2x Bns Wijnbergen's Brigade</i>	<i>Overton, Ludgershall</i>
<i>Scots lords & refugee officers with Garde du Corps</i>	<i>Amport, Boscombe, Wilton</i>
<i>Royal Horse Guards (?)</i>	<i>Beechingstoke, Wilsford</i>
<i>Cornbury & Langston Dragoons</i>	<i>Marlborough</i>
<i>Canon's Dragoons</i>	<i>Preshute, Clatford</i>
<i>Coning's Foot</i>	<i>Wooton Rivers</i>
<i>Garde Dragoners</i>	<i>Tidcombe, Wexcombe, Marten, Shailborne</i>
<i>Marwitz's Dragoons</i>	<i>Ham, Buttermere, Harding Farm</i>
<i>Waldeck & Lippe Horse</i>	<i>Stoke</i>
<i>Bentinck & Heyden Horse</i>	<i>West Grafton</i>
<i>Soppenbræk (Boncour) Horse</i>	<i>East Grafton</i>
<i>'sGravenmær's Foot</i>	<i>Draycot FitzPayne</i>
<i>Oyen & Reisel Horse</i>	<i>Pewsey</i>
<i>Flodorf & Obdam Horse</i>	<i>Manningford Abbots</i>
<i>N-Zuylenstein & Schack Horse</i>	<i>Wilcot</i>
<i>Montpouillan's Horse</i>	<i>Manningford Bruce</i>

The Dutch Foot Guards comprised the two official Gardes te Væt battalions, plus Graben's 'White Guards'. The 4th battalion is perhaps Tollemache's of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade, which was colloquially known as 'the Dutch Guards'. It is not clear whether 'Prins van Birkenfeld' refers to the regiment or the man, but since his brigade has a separate listing it is more likely the man. The RHG entry was technically 'Gardes te Paarde' (Horse Guards in Dutch), but that Dutch regiment was also known as Bentinck's, and his name appears farther down, so the first listing probably means the defected elements of King James' own mounted guards. There is no name even remotely similar to Coning's Regiment in either the English or Dutch OOBs, but it may be an aggregation of volunteer companies.]

King James, meanwhile, gloomily presided over a meeting of his Privy Council, which sent Feversham to William asking for terms. The Prince's actions spoke volumes. He placed Feversham under arrest (on a mental charge of 'sabotage'). James took the hint. On the 18th he left London for Rochester, whence he would depart for France on the night of the 23rd. As he left Whitehall for the last time, the Prince of Orange approached the grounds, to the fickle shouts of the multitude.

William was on the cusp of attaining his aim, the Throne of England. But, having launched a winter campaign, he found at its end that the army he had hoped to add to his own in the coming war with France was useless. Discipline was shot, experienced cadres in some cases missing, the cavalry worn out. The artillery train was found abandoned in a field. He put the English troops into winter quarters, at a distance from the Capital, and instead of sending his own regiments home, kept them on as a garrison for the unruly City, crossing his fingers that Louis XIV would not start his own campaign early. It would be mid-February before he had the Kingdom in order, and by that time he would be forced to deal with a real war in Ireland.

The events of the winter and the subsequent three years of war in Ireland have been covered in this author's *Remember Limerick!* Commentary (for more scholarly reading try that commentary's bibliography). What that commentary did not address is the campaign in Scotland, an omission which will now be rectified.

Scotland

It might be said that, in England, the genius of liberty rose, serene, spotless, and beautiful, out of the slight turmoil incidental to the time and crisis. But in Scotland, she burst upon the sight, with maniac looks, dishevelled attire, and still brandishing in her hand the dagger with which she had fought her way through the strife.

Chambers' History of the Rebellions in Scotland, p. 33.



Church and State

"these popish, heretical, Arminian, schismatical innovators, and most pernicious corrupters of religion amongst us"

[Peter Smart, Puritan]

Scotland in the 17th Century was a place of turmoil. In the Highlands, where society was still tribal, whatever education the upper classes might have there was endemic raiding and feuding. Some clans were bribed by the Crown to keep the peace, others were bribed to enforce the peace, and still others were not bribed, and broke the peace.

The Lowlands, by contrast, suffered harsh repression by the Crown. The economy was isolated from Europe, breeding widespread poverty, while the laws favoured the rich. These economic factors were overlaid by religious issues which made the struggles vicious in nature.

The reader is probably aware that during the general European Reformation a man named John Knox came to Scotland preaching the Calvinist doctrine that became known as Presbyterianism. The Lowlands adopted his ideas relatively uniformly, aided by the fact that before James I's day (at the turn of the 16th Century) the monarchy was weak, which allowed the preachers of Reform a certain amount of freedom. The Highlands, being too remote for instant conversion, kept to their old ways, except where certain lords turned to the new doctrine – most notably the Earls of Argyle.

The net effect, as in England under the Tudors, was the breakup of the old Catholic order. But the Reformation in Scotland differed in one critical point from the Reformation in England. In England, though Reform theology began at the grassroots, it was quickly adopted at the highest levels and coopted by the Monarchy. In Scotland, it remained in the soil and was always a 'religion of protest'.

Upon the death of Queen Elisabeth I in 1603, the Scottish King, James VI, became also King James I of England, ruling both kingdoms, as well as Ireland, as independent properties. He tried to unite his realms by establishing uniformity of laws and of religion, with a singular lack of success. His son, Charles I, had rather worse luck. He lost his head over it.

At its inception, the Church of Scotland, or Kirk, was run on strict presbyterian lines – that is, governed by representative assemblies of elders. (The name Presbyterian has doctrinal connotations as well, but those would be a digression.) However, King James I declared a policy of ‘no bishop, no king’, by which he meant a republican Church was inimical to Monarchy. By the reign of Charles I, the Kirk had become a compromise edifice, having a Calvinist doctrine but a hierarchy of bishops to run it. Democratic assemblies of elders were sometimes convened, but only to consider purely doctrinal issues. The bishops were chosen by the King in consultation with the Church body, which was at least better than having them buy their offices outright from the King. Most people seemed happy with the situation, but King Charles was not satisfied.

He proceeded to split the Kirk with his ‘Erastianism’, which in the physical took the form of an Anglican-style prayer book. Charles felt he was enriching a rather boring style of service. The High Anglican liturgy is very colourful, with beautiful prose and choirs, vestments and candles, and stained glass windows. No statues of saints to kiss, though – that would be popish idolatry. To the Presbyterians, however, stained glass was as much a device of the Whore of Babylon as dancing.

Describing things that way makes it all seem rather silly, but what ‘Erastianism’ really meant, and what the most ignorant rustic could see it meant, was the subordination of the Church to the State, the blackest of all heresies – because State control of a Faith steals its soul. Men will die to prevent it, and men did die in Scotland over a simple prayer book.

[‘Erastian’ from the Swiss theologian Thomas Erastus.. Poor old Erastus never advocated a State-controlled Church, he only opposed the presbyterian form of church governance without considering the alternatives. Doctrinally, the ‘Carolines’ (from King Charles) as they became known, emphasised Free Will over strict Predestination. There is not enough room here to explain what those terms meant theologically; it is enough understand this deviation bred horror among the hardcore Presbyterians.]

With the appearance of the new prayer book and its enforced use, riots broke out. A National Covenant was drawn up and signed by huge numbers of people, rich as well as poor, pledging the rejection of the new form of worship, the removal of all bishops (most of whom, being royal appointees, had done as they were told and made their dioceses use the infernal book), and a return to ‘pure’ Presbyterianism. King Charles decided this amounted to rebellion against his rule – as his father had said, ‘no bishop, no king’. The First Bishops’ War of 1638 was the result. Those who signed the Covenant were named Covenanters.

[Ironically, the Royalist hero, Montrose, was one of the initiators of the Covenant; the famous blue bonnets of the Covenanting armies were his idea. His enemy the Earl of Argyll also signed the document. Montrose later fought for the King only because he felt the Covenanters had gone too far and were trying to establish a theocracy.]

The conflict merged with the English Civil War – in fact, it was one of the primary crises that sparked the general struggle. During the 1640s Lowland Scotland became a virtual theocracy, much as the Puritans took charge in England. Though the Scots Parliament was itself a purely lay organisation (since there were no bishops anymore), it was overseen by the commissars of the Kirk.

[This is the flip side of State-control: Church-control of the State. In this case the Faith still has a soul, but it has to be warped and twisted to conform with the sin-nature of the Secular World, and the result is a bigoted self-righteousness and a blind, as opposed to reasoned, fanaticism.]

The Covenanters at first sided with the English Parliament, hoping to establish Presbyterian rule in England. After Charles I and his Lieutenant in Scotland, the Marquis of Montrose, were defeated in 1645, the Covenanters, seeing the English Puritans wanted to go their own way, sided with King Charles, then sold him out in order to buy peace, then backed his son, Charles II, at which Oliver Cromwell took the war to them.

After the Covenanters’ defeat at Worcester in 1651, Scotland was united with England as part of the general Commonwealth established by Cromwell. The Kirk lost its political power as Scotland’s laws and parliament were suspended, but did not lose its spiritual force.

At the Restoration Scotland received back her independence as a separate kingdom under the rule of Charles II. However, there were changes. Scotland had enjoyed trading privileges under the Commonwealth, privileges she had not enjoyed before. Now, they were removed.

Worse still, ‘Prelacy’ (or episcopacy – rule by bishops) was reintroduced to the Kirk. These bishops were not chosen in consultation with the church elders, but simply appointed by the Crown. This did not sit well with the Covenanters. They had supported Charles II in his hour of need on the understanding that he would guarantee the purity of the Kirk; he had reneged on the deal.

[The Episcopal Church proper originated in 1690 and involved a group of people known as Non-jurors. A non-juror was someone who did not feel they could swear allegiance to William III. Since most of the Scots bishops had been supporters of Charles II and James II, most were non-jurors. To reduce their influence in the Scottish Parliament, legislation was passed making the Kirk once again presbyterian in governance. The non-juror clergy and their remaining flocks became the Episcopal Church. Prior to the Revolution, the entire Kirk was supposedly episcopal, with those rejecting the concept being branded Nonconformists.]

The Lords of the Articles were also a bone of contention. The Lords of the Articles was a parliamentary standing committee which formulated and composed the laws. Charles II ruled from Whitehall through a series of Commissioners; with the addition of a Commissioner the Lords became a kind of Cabinet. The Commissioners only treated with the Lords of the Articles, not with the Scots Parliament as a whole. Being a source of royal patronage for a privileged few, the interests of the Commissioners were regarded before those of everyone else.

Since the Scots Commissioners were cordially hated they were routinely opposed. Since they were royal representatives, the King took each instance of opposition as a personal affront. The first Commissioner was the notoriously greedy Earl of Melfort, but the worst was the Duke of Albany, better known to history as the Duke of York, or, as he later became, King James II.

Rampant grassroots opposition to these two items, the new episcopal structure of the Kirk and the Lords of the Articles, led to a period during the early 1680s known as The Killing Time.

The Killing Time

“We are the only true whigs. Carnal men have assumed that triumphant appellation, following him whose kingdom is of this world. Which of them would sit six hours on a wet hill-side to hear a godly sermon? I trow an hour o’t would staw them. They are ne’er a hair better than them that shamena to take upon themselfs the persecuting name of bludethirsty tories. Self-seekers all of them, strivers after wealth, power, and worldly ambition, and forgetters alike of what has been dree’d and done by the mighty men who stood in the gap in the great day of wrath.”

[Old Mortality, Sir Walter Scott]

Thanks to the Clarendon Code, a series of acts passed by the English Parliament for implementation in all three kingdoms, and issued to Scotland by decree through the Lords of the Articles, severe penalties were imposed on anyone who did not adhere to the episcopal form of church governance.

As a single instance of one of these acts, 400 ministers of the Kirk lost their livings. That is, they were fired and their churches either boarded up or staffed with the creatures of the local bishops. In all, about one-third of the Scottish pastors refused to accept the imposition of bishops over them. Many of their churches remained empty, as the people, rather than compromise their beliefs, chose to worship in secret. Those who did so were labeled Nonconformists; they considered themselves to be the True Kirk and those who accepted the episcopal compromise to be Erastian Amalekites, Arminian Heretics, and Sons of Belial.

[‘Arminian’, from *Jacobus Arminius*, an opponent of Calvin. The doctrinal differences between Calvinism and Arminianism are subtle and therefore very contentious. They have yet to be resolved. In 17th Century Britain, Calvinist opposition to the Arminians became a political issue when Charles I began to favour the Arminians (due to their high level of education) and promoted some to high office. After the Restoration the term Arminian was still used as a term of abuse by the Calvinists, who identified them, inaccurately, with those bent on making the Kirk episcopal.]

[The epithet of ‘Amalekite’ (hereditary enemies of biblical Israel) was applied to those Covenanters who thought it was all right to back Charles by those who believed they would lose their souls in so doing. ‘Amalekites’ because to ally with Charles was to ally with Israel’s (i.e. the True Kirk’s) enemies. On campaign, Charles was physically separated from the ‘flock’ of the Covenanting Army to prevent him contaminating it.]

[Technically, Roman Catholics were Nonconformists, too, but they are never included because they did not belong to the Kingdom of the Saints, being instead destined for Perdition as rank infidels.]

The Nonconformists conducted their services wherever they could, often in the open air away from civilisation. Such gatherings were called ‘conventicles’. Conventicles were of course targeted by the Clarendon Code not on religious grounds but because such gatherings were hotspots of political sedition. A group of more than five people constituted an illegal gathering.

The same splits occurred in England and Ireland, so in 1669 and again in 1672, Charles II issued blanket Indulgences in an attempt to heal the breaches he had opened. However, ministers who had lost their livings were only allowed back in the fold if they agreed not to preach on divisive issues. Some agreed and others did not. According to the writer Daniel Defoe, the die-hards refused because:

“1) They would not accept of our Indulgence for worshipping God by the licence of the bishops; because they said they had abjured Prelacy in the Covenant, and had declared the bishops to be anti-scriptural and anti-Christian; and to take licence from them was to homologate [i.e. approve] their authority as legal, which they detested and abhorred.

2) They would not take the Oath of Supremacy because they could not in conscience allow any king or head of the Church but Jesus Christ.

3) They would not pray for the king, or swear to him, because he was a persecutor of the Church, and thereby an enemy to God, because he had renounced the oath of God in the Covenant, and until he had repented, they would have nothing to do with him.

4) Being debarred all manner of liberty to worship God in public, and on the severest penalties forbidden to assemble themselves together, either in the churches or in private families; and believing it at the same time their duty according to the Scriptures, not to forsake assembling, they could not satisfy their consciences to obey man rather than God.”

If the Covenanters were angry with Charles II for breaking his bargain, the King and his brother were exasperated by their ‘holier-than-thou’ attitude. Their punishments for infringing the Clarendon Code were draconian. People who failed to attend an officially sanctioned church were fined. Preaching at a conventicle was made a capital offence. Torture, allowed by Scottish law but rarely used prior to the coming of the Duke of Albany, was employed to gain confessions, often before attempting gentler methods.

In 1678 the whole of southwest Scotland felt the impact when 6,000 Catholic Highlanders and 3,000 Lowland militia were billeted in the most notorious Covenanting districts and permitted to plunder without restraint.

There had been a small rebellion in 1666 (the Pentland Rising, squashed at Rullion Green), but the Quartering of the Highland Host led to a major outbreak in 1679, starting with the assassination of Bishop Sharp, the Archbishop of St. Andrews. Two pitched battles were fought, at Drumclog and Bothwell Brig.



[Battle of Drumclog]

At Drumclog, Government dragoons under Captain John Graham of Claverhouse clashed with a large body of Covenanters, just come from a conventicle where they had been incited to violence. The Covenanters had about 200 Foot and 40 Horse, reasonably well armed and led, and an excellent position behind a bog. Claverhouse had his Troop. Unable to close, Claverhouse’s dragoons exchanged fire with the Covenanters and began to win the firefight. At that point a Covenanting officer named William Cleland led his detachment around the bog to attack the dragoons, and despite heavy fire succeeded in routing them. Claverhouse lost 36 men killed.

[Cleland, a gamekeeper by profession, also fought at Bothwell Brig, fled to Holland, joined the Duke of Argyle in his abortive invasion in 1685, and acted as agent for William of Orange in 1688. He was killed at the battle of Dunkeld in 1689.]

Bothwell Brig occurred three weeks later. Emboldened by their success, the Covenanters had swollen in strength to 6,000 men. Their leaders decided to march... well, they disagreed where, but Edinburgh was the ultimate prize. The Government army, 5,000 strong, met them just south of Hamilton, on the banks of the Clyde. The Covenanters were on the left bank and the Government on the right, and the battle centered on the taking of the bridge.

The Covenanters suffered from their habit of subordinating themselves to religious commissars ignorant of the ways of warfare. Their commander was Robert Hamilton of Preston, who had been in charge at Drumclog, but he was only a figurehead in both battles. Overall command of the Government side went to the Duke of Monmouth (whom Cleland, on the other side, would support in 1685 against King James II). Apart from a large body of militia, Monmouth had two regiments of dragoons, including Claverhouse’s Troop. The Covenanters were crushed. Estimates of the dead range from 7 to 700, but 1,200 were taken prisoner and transported to Barbados to become the original Red-legs.

[As one might expect from the name, Transporting involved shipping undesirables to distant colonies where they were out of sight and out of mind. Transportees might be enslaved on arrival, forced to serve as indentured labour (receiving their freedom after a set number of years), or, less frequently, arrive as free men, in which case they were expected to hack a living out of the wilderness.]

The victory was decisive, but it proved hard to root out all the malcontents, and a small group of Covenanters remained under arms. The man who emerged to lead them was a doctor of divinity called Richard Cameron, and they became known as the Hill Men, or the Cameronians.

During the summer of 1680, Cameron preached at conventicles around the Southwest, calling for war against Charles II and earning a price on his head. On the 22nd of July he was marked down by a local laird and a body of dragoons under Andrew Bruce of Earlishall engaged him and

his bodyguard of 60 men at a spot called Airds Moss. Cameron was killed and his head paraded through the streets of Edinburgh.

The Cameronians remained in existence as bands of outlaws. They were difficult to eradicate; like most insurgents, they were members of a sympathetic populace, tilled the land like everyone else, and only took their shooting irons out of the hayrick when there were easy targets nearby.

In 1684 one outlaw, James Renwick by name, published the Renwick Declaration, in which he threatened to return violence on the authorities if they continued to persecute the Saints; in 1685 this declaration was seconded by one that rejected James II as the new king. 1685 was the year of Monmouth's Rebellion and the complementary abortive campaign by the 9th Earl of Argyle. Argyle was persuaded not to raise his own clan first, because of the latent dislike of Highlanders in the Southwest. His attempt to raise the Covenanters was poorly coordinated, with dire results for him. He was captured and executed by the Government. (It did not help that the Covenanters saddled Argyle with twelve commissars, each with his own opinion.)

Renwick and the other Cameronian outlaws managed only to murder a few off duty soldiers, while the Government cracked down even harder on those who attended conventicles, introducing the death penalty for anyone who did not on oath reject the Renwick Declaration and arresting people simply for possessing a Bible.

But the troubles continued to simmer, spreading east to the Capital, where, as King James II's reign entered its second and third years the cry was 'no popery!' The Scots never did have a honeymoon period with James. No disillusionment for them: he was still and always the Duke of Albany, who encouraged the use of the Boot and the Thumbscrew.

The years before the Revolution saw a series of outrages against Catholics and 'rabblings' in the streets of the major towns. At the same time, though, the Covenanters were granted a reprieve as part of James' attempt to make his 'catholicising' policies palatable by cloaking them in religious tolerance. Of course, they took this as a sign of weakness. By 1688 all he had managed to do was empower the Covenanters and league them with the Episcopalians against his Catholic appointees.



[Battle of Bothwell Brig]

[William III pardoned the original Cameronians, and during the tumultuous days after his accession to the English throne a group of them served as guards for the Convention that was debating how to accept him as King of Scotland. In April of 1689, when it became clear that there was to be a new conflict in Scotland, 1,200 Cameronians were recruited to form Lord Angus' militia regiment; after sterling service at the battle of Dunkeld the regiment was taken

onto the Line, as the later 26th of Foot. For some decades after, the Cameronians, whose name was used loosely for what might be called the 'paramilitary wing' of the Kirk, were a force to be reckoned with, particularly during the crisis of the Union in 1707 and 1708. Their potential strength was assumed to balance nicely both against the numbers of Highland fighting men available and against the strength of the Scots Army.]

Bonnie Dundee

"We sing the Scottish wars, and civil strife, the lines of battle, and ranks bristling with many standards, the encounters of a horrid contest. And we sing the noble Leader, calling brave men to arms for an exiled King, and himself rushing to meet cruel wounds. We sing the Graham, the great Hero, terrible in the dust of battle, mighty in spirit and in arms. We tell of warlike deeds for times to come."

From Philip's Grameid, liber primus.

Very few people in Lowland Scotland regretted the removal of the former Duke of Albany from his throne. Most of the notable men simply transferred their allegiance to William without demur, including those who had been James' own appointees. The Lord Chancellor, the Earl of Perth, was an exception. He was a Catholic, and a recent appointee. He left Edinburgh on December 10th and attempted to flee the country but was captured. There were also the Marquess of Atholl and the Duke of Gordon. Atholl, an Episcopalian, restricted his opposition to the realms of constitutional debate; he was voted down, narrowly, and having lost his chance decided to keep his estates by 'taking the waters' at Bath. Gordon, like Perth, was a Catholic appointee of James'; he was also Constable of Edinburgh Castle, and so chose to hold his charge for King James until forced to surrender. And then, there was John Graham of Claverhouse.

[Perth fled because his life was in danger. He was hated by the Covenanters for promoting the idea of quartering Highlanders in their territory, and for introducing the thumbscrew (prior to his day the only legal device of torture was the Boot, which was a sort of thumbscrew for the foot).]

The reader should be aware that there are two John Grahams: the man, and the myth. His death in battle turned him into a Jacobite martyr, but while he did have some 'magic' with the Highland clans, he was no military genius but a solid regimental officer, a diligent professional with rather more 'dash' than most. He was 40 years old when he raised the Highlands for King James.

John Graham's back story is that of a propertied gentleman of moderate means who under ordinary circumstances would not rise very high. His family came from the lands around Dundee and were cousins to that James Graham, Marquis of Montrose, who led the clans for King Charles I during the Civil Wars. He was educated at St. Andrews and was a fellow pupil of the chronicler Burnet. Whether he competed his degree is debated, but he was noted for his literary skill, as well as a rather odd love of the neighbouring Gaelic culture to which he did not belong. In religion he chose to follow the new Episcopalianism partly because it was the religion of his class, and partly out of a friendship he had developed with the Archbishop of St. Andrews.

[Perhaps his love of the Gael is not so odd. Raised on tales of his famous cousin's exploits, he might easily become fascinated by the men who fought for him. Claverhouse's greatest ally among the Highlanders had served under Montrose.]

In 1672 John Graham followed the path that many young Scots gentlemen of moderate means took and enlisted in one of the regiments that Charles II raised as auxiliaries for Louis XIV's war with Holland. These regiments, whose members also included the ill-starred Duke of Monmouth, Graham's future opponent Hugh MacKay, and the not-yet-famous John Churchill, were withdrawn from service in 1674 (due to English public opinion). MacKay and Graham were two of many who did not return home but sought service with their former enemy, William of Orange.

The first of the legends about Claverhouse date from this time. He is said to have saved the life of the Prince of Orange at the Battle of Seneffe; the legend says that afterward he felt William had not given

him his due and so he left his service in a huff. By his own account, Claverhouse did render a significant service of some kind, and he was not the sort of man to brag, but the evidence for it being at Seneffe is lacking. This is typical of many of the stories surrounding him. They have more than a kernel of truth but have grown in the telling.

It is alternatively said that he grew dissatisfied with the Dutch service in general, having attained the rank of Captain in 1676 but being denied further promotion. There is a legend of Claverhouse and MacKay falling into rivalry over promotions, perhaps more than once. Certainly, after the campaigning season of 1677 Claverhouse left the Prince's service.

Perhaps the truth is that Claverhouse felt he had completed his military education with the attainment of his captaincy and wanted to join the English or Scottish Army, which was the goal of most officers serving abroad who had not put down roots on the Continent. MacKay's path was the alternative one. Given that Claverhouse held no lasting grudge against MacKay their rivalry seems to have been a friendly one. As for the Prince, he had more officers than vacancies, but gave Claverhouse a warm testimonial to Charles II.

Getting into the English service was very difficult, however. There was a long waiting list. The Scots Army was his own nation's, and it was always looking for talent. In 1678 he was offered a post as lieutenant in the newly raised Duke of York's Horse, otherwise His Royal Highness' Regiment of Horse, or Mordaunt's (after the colonel, Henry Mordaunt, Earl of Peterborough). One of the troop commanders was Graham's relation, the current Marquis of Montrose, who offered Graham the job on the advice of the Duke of Albany. It meant a reduction in rank, but such sacrifices were common. Better a reduction in rank than no job at all. But, Claverhouse refused and the post went to a kinsman. This act fuelled the legend of bad blood between Claverhouse and William, since the latter's recommendation was key to Duke James' condescending to use his influence. It may have been that Graham had no desire to take a drop in rank, but the regiment was also headed for the Continent. Rejecting a post that came through the recommendation of a royal personage was a risky move but there seems to have been no fallout. By the end of 1678, and by direct application of Albany's patronage a second time, Claverhouse had command of an independent troop of Scottish cavalry. There were three such troops and all three ultimately combined to form a regiment of which he became the colonel.

It was as commander of this troop that he established his reputation as a Persecutor of the Saints. In other words, he was given the thankless job of rousting conventicles in Dumfriesshire and Annandale. A professional officer, too poor to make his way except by the punctilious execution of orders issued by his one patron, and possessed of boundless energy, he showed himself zealous in this task, becoming an object of hatred to the Covenanters.

In his defence it can be noted, first, that he ultimately married into a family of strong Covenanter convictions, and second, that if he never questioned his orders (*"I must acknowledge that till now in any service I have been in, I never inquired further in the lawes than the orders of my superiour officers"*), he never exceeded them. He was frustrated because the Covenanters assembled freely just outside the bounds allotted to him, but he never crossed those bounds; his superior told him he was a fool to obey the letter of his instructions.

Still, he sided completely with the authorities on the matter of conventicles. Hot words at a conventicle had led to the murder of his friend, Archbishop Sharp. As Terry puts it in his biography of Claverhouse:

That he whole-heartedly approved of the policy which he was commissioned to carry out is attested by his letters, and is not to his discredit. To imagine that those whose fear and hatred he earned were persecuted solely as irreconcilables in religion is as far from the truth as to picture their religious extravagances representative of an ideal which the country generally was anxious to endorse. Conventicle-ism

was in its general aspect undoubtedly revolutionary, in that it presented itself as a political manifestation against an authority established and otherwise generally acquiesced in. Howie speaks of the notorious David Hackston of Rathillet, one of [Archbishop Sharp's] murderers, as "declared a rebel to the King, though no rebel to Zion's King." The sentence affords some vindication of the Government's attitude. No civil authority at least in the seventeenth century, when religious profession and civil duty were inextricably mingled could allow a considerable and active section of its subjects to contract or covenant itself outside its legal and natural allegiance, or to impose qualifications upon its submission to that authority. Political necessity was at the root of religious intolerance in the seventeenth century in Scotland as in England. To speculate upon the more practical wisdom of milder treatment of dissentients, or to judge the authorities upon their failure to adopt it, is to confuse the character of the period. Persecutors and persecuted alike were the product of their environment, and share in not unequal proportions its narrowness and its bigotry.

And again:

Unswerving loyalty to the Monarchy bound Claverhouse to his patron. The Covenant he discerned as a conflicting political creed, and gave his resolute service against it. Not even the flagrant misrule of James's reign could lessen the call upon his allegiance. That the interests of the Monarchy involved the maintenance of episcopacy in Scotland, Claverhouse accepted among other tenets of Stewartism... But that his religious convictions were loosely rooted, the accident of his political sympathies, cannot be admitted. Neither self-interest nor the example of his friends availed to entice him from the Protestant fold. Few men have drawn upon themselves a fuller measure of execration. Not one of his accusers, while lashing him as the persecutor of the "honest" ventures to challenge him as irreligious, or to suggest that his zeal was that of the mercenary, colourless and devoid of principle.

[Terry, p. 42 & pp. 85-86.]

For John Graham, the 1680s were spent battling an insurgency that never quite went away. He had also to contend with cabals against royal authority among the notable families of his bailiwick, which earned him more powerful enemies than preachers, lawyers, and shepherds, particularly Sir John Dalrymple, who, as the notorious Master of Stair, later functioned as King William's hatchet man.

Graham's relations with his immediate superior, the Marquess of Queensbury, were also strained. Queensbury felt Claverhouse had not done his best when sent to London to protest the Duke of Monmouth's soft stance against the Cameronians in 1679 – part of a ploy by Queensbury to steal Monmouth's job as Commander-in-Chief of the Scottish Army. It irked Queensbury that the Duke of Albany had taken a shine to Claverhouse, whose fortune suddenly shot up with the grant of a barony.

In 1681 Claverhouse was appointed sheriff for several counties in the Southwest and in 1682 commissioned colonel of the Royal Regiment of Scottish Horse, which incorporated his own and the two other independent troops of cavalry.

In 1683-84 there was a brief flareup of sedition when the Renwick Declaration was promulgated, dangerous enough for the death penalty to be introduced. Claverhouse, though he had the authority to exercise capital punishment, rarely used it. Nonetheless a number of 'slaughters' were laid at his door; this is the period in which he became known as 'Bluidy Clavers'.

To give a single instance, he is supposed to have personally ridden down a young Covenanter fleeing for his life; an early version of the same story had the man fleeing out the back door of his house before being shot down by Claverhouse's troopers. Both versions are apocryphal. The former was written by Daniel Defoe thirty years after the event.

[When Defoe wrote the account he was engaged in anti-Jacobite pamphleteering on behalf of the Whigs.]

In reality, Claverhouse met the man on the high road and had him stopped and searched. The search revealed he was carrying a Bible. As required by law the man was arrested on suspicion of being a Cameronian (which he probably was), and after he refused to answer questions he was sent off to Edinburgh, where the authorities independently determined he was a rebel and executed him. The man's execution (whether he was innocent or not) may have had something to do with the recent murder of a couple of Life-guardsmen by Cameronian fanatics.

[The Reformation was all about allowing the common man to read the Bible for himself. But possession of a Bible was forbidden when episcopacy was reintroduced in Scotland, as a way of ensuring everyone went to the authorised local church. By this logic, owning a Bible automatically meant a person attended conventicles.]

The most one could charge Claverhouse with is sending the man to his death. But he was an officer of the law as well as a soldier (no police force in those days). What else could he do? As Sir Walter Scott has him say in *Old Mortality* when the book's protagonist suggests sending an offer of pardon to the Cameronian rank and file:

"Well... and who the devil do you think would send a summons to these headstrong and desperate fanatics? They acknowledge no laws of war. Their leaders, who have been all most active in the murder of the Archbishop of St. Andrews, fight with a rope around their necks, and are likely to kill the messenger, were it but to dip their followers in loyal blood, and to make them as desperate of pardon as themselves."



[John Graham of Claverhouse, Viscount of Dundee]

Claverhouse's fortunes continued to rise under the patronage of Albany. He was made a member of the Scottish Privy Council (the Executive body of Government), and placed on a Treasury commission to look into the conduct of Charles Maitland, Captain General of the Mint, otherwise the 3rd Earl of Lauderdale. (Another put-up job, this time by the Earl of Argyle, though Lauderdale was probably guilty.) When Lauderdale was fined £72,000, Graham picked up a castle.

On the accession of James II in 1685, Claverhouse temporarily fell out of favour thanks to the machinations of Queensbury and others who were jealous of James' patronage. There were insinuations of financial irregularities arising from his position as sheriff. Also, there was his marriage in 1684 to Jean Cochrane, daughter of a prominent Covenanter family, which raised many eyebrows. 'Bloody Clavers' was called 'soft' on the Covenanters. (His actual offence in Queensbury's eyes was to argue for better pay and living conditions for common soldiers now that Lauderdale's skimming had ceased and there was money in the till.)

King James was in a cleft stick. In the face of the accusations against Claverhouse he had to relinquish his patronage until the latter was cleared. As King he could not be seen to take sides. Claverhouse lost his place on the Privy Council and his judicial posts. Challenging the combination against him proved wearisome, though he was vindicated soon enough. Or, at least, King James demoted Queensbury as part of his general scheme of promoting Catholics, with the serendipity that Claverhouse's own fortunes rebounded.

Apart from this political infighting, Claverhouse continued with his usual peacekeeping duties in the Southwest. The authorities were patrolling vigorously and trying to roll up the Duke of Argyle's Covenanter network, which they did with some success.

His fortunes gained momentum in 1686. He was made a Brigadier General and Constable of Dundee. After a visit to London and witnessing the execution of his old foe, James Renwick, at Edinburgh, early in 1688 he was made a Major General and Provost of Dundee.

The Revolution

On September 18th, 1688, the Scottish Privy Council ordered out the Militia of the Southeast. This order anticipated a royal letter from King James commanding the very same thing. The letter unexpectedly directed them to send the entire standing Army south, by way of Carlisle to Chester to London. So urgent was the summons that the shires were instructed to find horses for the foot soldiers.

On September 28th warning was given of the Prince of Orange's invasion. No person was to leave the kingdom without leave. The whole Militia was called out on October 3rd. That same week the Scots Army marched south: two regiments of Foot, being Douglas' Scots Guards and Thomas Buchan's Regiment (1,995 Foot); Lord George Livingstone's Troop of Lifeguards, Claverhouse's Scottish Horse, and the Earl of Dunmore's Dragoons (Scots Greys) (841 cavalry). Claverhouse had command of the cavalry and Lieutenant General Douglas commanded the whole, with Sir George Livingstone as his lieutenant.

[Lieutenant General the Honourable James Douglas was the second son of the Marquess of Queensbury, Colonel of the Scots Guards, and Master-General of the Ordnance. During the Killing Time he and Dundee served together in the Southwest. Douglas had both good and bad qualities. He was a Scots patriot and a hard worker, but also a fussy taskmaster (he started life as a lawyer) who was unpopular with the rank and file. His 'overweening pride' made him unpopular with his officers. It is suggested that the desertion of the Scots Guards at Reading may have been due to this fact. At the Revolution he returned to Scotland, leaving Livingstone in command, but decided to take the oath and serve William. In July of 1689 he was sent over to Ireland with most of his former command, where he served for the duration of the war.]

The Army reached London around the end of the month. At an audience with King James on November 12th, Claverhouse was created Viscount Dundee and Lord Graham of Claverhouse.

The Prince of Orange had of course landed by now and was at Exeter. The campaign proceeded as already described, Dundee being a witness of it; his cavalry brigade was stationed at Reading until Feversham's retreat, after which he pulled it back to Watford, north of London, possibly upon a request of his old patron William to keep out of the way. Dundee then went to London, leaving his troops at Watford.

Meanwhile, the Scottish Government, or rather, a handpicked Committee of the Scottish Council, was meeting in London. Called

into being by King James, it consisted of the Archbishop of Glasgow, the earls of Perth and Balcarres, the Marquess of Atholl, Viscount Tarbat, and Sir George Lockhart of Carnwath – all members of the Episcopalian party. Of the other key members of the Government the Catholic Duke of Gordon was on duty as Constable of Edinburgh Castle. The Duke of Hamilton, nominally one of James' supporters, was in London, but not usually present at the meetings. Rumour had it that he was planning a change of sides. The 10th Earl of Argyle, a man of equal importance but not a member of James' Government, had landed with William. His only aim was to restore his family's fortunes.

Ironically, the Committee met at Hamilton's lodgings in London, where a row developed between the host and Balcarres over the refusal of the latter to hand over a letter from King James. Dundee was present and apparently Hamilton vented his spleen on him, possibly because Dundee questioned his loyalty (he tended to be outspoken in such matters).

On the 17th of December the Committee sent Balcarres and Dundee to King James – it will be remembered that James had fled and been brought back on the 16th – and the trio walked down the Mall together. They tried to persuade him to call out the Army, which though stood down by Feversham was still in being, but the King did not trust his other officers. He confided his determination to leave the country:

'I see you are the men I always took you to be; you shall know all my intentions. I can no longer remain here but as a cipher, or be a prisoner to the Prince of Orange, and you know there is but a small distance between the prisons and the graves of kings; therefore I go for France immediately; when there, you shall have my instructions. You, Lord Balcarres, shall have a commission to manage my civil affairs, and you, Lord Dundee, to command my troops in Scotland.'

[Quoted by Terry, p. 242.]

While they were thus talking, Prince William arrived at Sion House, where he made his quarters prior to moving to Whitehall the following day, after his uncle vacated the premises. There is a legend that Dundee was one of the last to say farewell to the King on the 23rd, but by then he had been sent, under William's orders, to the billets of the Scots Army, which were by Oxford; the farewell must have taken place on the 18th as the King left Whitehall by barge.

The Scots Committee, still in existence, now made a move typical of politicians in every age. They decided to assuage the rancour of their Whig opponents by offering up a few lambs for the slaughter. Dundee and Balcarres were two of the five selected for this honour. To his credit, William rejected the idea. His general policy was one of toleration. He had no desire to waste time putting down a counter-revolution when there was a war with France to be won. On a personal note, Dundee had been an officer under his command, and Balcarres was related to him by marriage.

However, when the Scots notables were summoned to Whitehall on January 7th, Dundee took no part in the deliberations. He remained at his post. On the 14th, the group arrived at the decision to hold a National Convention, primarily to ease William into the role of Scottish King (for the moment, James was still the official King of Scotland). Dundee played a lone hand, negotiating with William through Bishop Burnet (to whom Dundee was related by marriage):

"[Dundee] employed me to carry messages from him to the King [William], to know what security he might expect, if he should go and live in Scotland without owning his Government. The King said, if he would live peaceably, and at home, he would protect him. To this he answered, that unless he were forced to it, he would live quietly."

[Quoted by Terry p. 247.]

The National Convention

Edinburgh had been rife with Orangist and Covenanter 'rabblings' and rumours of plots since the news of the Prince of Orange landing on November 5th. These riots culminated in the sacking of Holyrood Abbey, where King James' private chapel was wrecked and the Stuart tombs desecrated. In the street, the Pope was burned in effigy. Elsewhere in the Lowlands there was a general persecution of the Episcopalian clergy, mirroring that waged against the Covenanters for so many years. Ministers' families were driven out and their property destroyed, prayerbooks were burnt, and churches shut up.

The clergy appealed to the Prince of Orange. Though he was not yet King of Scotland, William seemed the only remaining source of stability. Unable at first to send military aid, William issued a proclamation for calm that was largely ignored. A false calm did ensue when the National Convention to determine Scotland's future opened.

The Convention of Estates opened at Edinburgh on March 14th, 1689. It ran until June 5th. The most vital points at issue were the questions of whether the Scottish Throne was vacant, and if so, whether William should be King of Scotland. But, there was also a considerable push by the Presbyterian, or Covenanter, party to undo the Restoration State entirely and impose some kind of theocratic rule – after all, it had worked for the Dutch, and William was Dutch, *ergo*...

There were three main factions at the Convention: the Episcopalians and Catholics who still supported King James out of a sense of duty, the Covenanters who supported William in hopes this Champion of the Protestant Cause would let them have a Church Government, and the bulk of the Episcopalian, who supported William out of convenience.

The key figures on William's, or more accurately, the Whigs' side were the Dalrymples, father and son, James and John respectively. John had supported King James to the last, but afterwards it was learned he had secretly been working for William on his father's behalf. His father preferred open hate to secret love and was an associate of the 10th Earl of Argyle, now returned to Britain from his Dutch exile. There was also Lord George Melville, scion of a powerful and well-connected Lowland family, soon to be appointed William's Secretary of State for Scotland. Associated with these men were Tarbat and Carnwath (last heard of in London), and Hamilton, who was being cagey; the Hamiltons claimed royal blood.

Of the other Episcopalians, Balcarres and Dundee chose the Jacobite side, Balcarres leading, as directed by King James. Like Hamilton, the Marquess of Atholl hedged his bets, but after a rebuff from William, came out openly on the side of King James. The Episcopalian clergy also supported James, refusing to sign the 'thank you' note dispatched to William upon his overthrow of the King.

[Colin Lindsay, 3rd Earl of Balcarres, was cousin to the Duke of Lauderdale and cousin to another branch of the Lindsay family, the Crawford, who were Orangists. Balcarres served in the Royal Navy with the Duke of York and cooperated with both him and Dundee in the suppression of the Covenanters.]

The Duke of Gordon and the Earl of Perth were the two most prominent Catholics. Gordon was holed up in Edinburgh Castle. Perth, as already mentioned, had tried to run and was now *out* of the running. Together, they and the Episcopalians may be termed the Jacobite party.

[George Gordon, 1st Duke of Gordon, was an odd fish, a Catholic who had been given perhaps the most important governorship in Scotland (as late as 1686). He was also Commissioner of Supply and a Commissioner of the Treasury. That was undoubtedly King James' doing, but as a general rule, the Army high command was Episcopalian – loyal, but opposed to giving Catholics commissions. Perhaps the fact that he was known as 'a libertine and a fop' gave him the appearance of a lightweight. The Earl of Dumbarton was the only other senior Catholic Army figure in Scotland, but he and his regiment, the Royal Scots, were billeted in England.]

The Covenanters were represented by Argyle, who was not present at the grand opening, and by the Dalrymples, but not very warmly. The latter only saw the Covenanters as a useful tool of intimidation and over the first week or so of the Convention introduced large numbers

to the Capital (no buses in those days, they had to make their own way). The Covenanters' most prominent champion was the baronet, Sir James Montgomery – of whom, more later. This loose coalition of religious fanatics and social climbers may be termed the Whig party.

[Argyle's attendance was disputed even by some in his own party, since he was still under attainder.]

The Jacobites suffered two critical blows in the first couple of days of the Convention. First, the Duke of Hamilton was just barely elected president of the assembly over the Marquess of Atholl. Neither man was any great shakes, but Atholl withdrew himself in a huff and no other Jacobite leader could be found to take his place. Twenty of their party went over to the Whigs.

Then, on the 16th a letter from King James was read out as part of the day's business. It declared the Convention illegal (which it technically was, since William was not yet King of Scotland and James had not convened it). But it was cosigned by the universally despised Lord Melfort, so both parties found the letter offensive. Most of the remaining Jacobites, despairing of success, chose to walk out, leaving the field to the Whigs.



[Portrait of William Douglas-Hamilton. By birth a Douglas, he was aged 55 in 1689, and held his title of duke by virtue of his marriage to Anne Hamilton, who was the true inheritor. King William chose him to represent his interests partly because his family had close ties of blood to the throne and partly because he expected him to firmly resist the republican notions of the more extreme Covenanters, though he sympathised with the Moderates.]

John Murray, 1st Marquess of Atholl, aged 58 in 1689, was by inclination and long habit a supporter of the Stuarts, only taking the oath of allegiance to King William in September of 1689. Prior to that he played a waiting game, though if he had won the election to President he might have openly joined the Jacobite side. His equivocal stance had much to do with a snub administered by the Prince of Orange. He was an opponent of Presbyterianism, particularly as manifested in the Earls of Argyle, though except in the latter's case, a moderate opponent. His son, Lord Tullibardine, married a daughter of Hamilton's.]

Dundee was one of those who walked out. In fact, it was a speech of his that sparked the walkout. He challenged the Convention, echoing

King James' declaration, and announced his intention of setting up a rival Convention under King James' auspices at Stirling. It was already known that James had landed in Ireland on the 12th, and his supporters were hourly expecting instructions to form such a body.

Unfortunately, no counter-Convention was ever set up, so most of the walkouts chose to return to the only game in town and take their lumps. All the Jacobites had managed to do was be absent when the vote to accept King William was put. (Which might be taken as a very politic act on their part.)

A typical general history of this 'rebellion' has Claverhouse – Bonnie Dundee – breaking with the new Government and running for the Highlands, where he raises the clans and takes them south to encounter Major General MacKay at Killiecrankie. Here, he beats the Government troops but loses his life. The Highland Host is stopped by a heroic defence at Dunkeld and crushed at Cromdale. After that there is some puttering around until a shocking example is made by the Government in the Massacre of Glencoe. This is not a false picture, but it is very incomplete and answers no questions.

The best part of four months elapsed between the issuing of the warrant for Dundee's arrest and his death at Killiecrankie, and Dundee butted heads with MacKay twice before that famous battle. After Dundee's death there was the Battle of Dunkeld, and in the following year the rout at Cromdale. Long months went by between these high points, with continuous, tortuous negotiation behind the scenes; the Government was always agitated by the fear that the clans would catch fire yet again.

Dundee's loyalty to James and his regard for William put him in a difficult position, while his Episcopalianism and his record against the Covenanters ensured him many enemies at the Convention. For him, the decision was a hard one, but having made it there was no reason why he should change his mind. Only the Earl of Balcarres and the Duke of Gordon immediately stood with Dundee.

The Duke of Gordon was the first to take positive action, standing to his post in Edinburgh Castle even before Dundee and Balcarres arrived from London. They found him wavering and urged him to hold out. Apart from the Bass Rock prison out in the Firth of Forth, his was the only citadel King James could still lay claim to.

[The Bass Rock held out until 1694. Even today it is a very hard place to land on – and to leave.]



[Edinburgh Castle]

Dundee had to visit the castle a second time when the Convention gave Gordon twenty-four hours to surrender. Hurrying in secret to the Castle he once more urged the wavering Duke to hold on. Gordon did not surrender. He chose to gain time in a rather novel way. Hamilton's deputies were told the Duke would surrender if, and only if, his 'friends' were given safe conducts out of the country. When asked to name them, he reeled off a list of every Jacobite lord and chief he could think of. The deputies exploded with rage. The chief negotiator

was so mad he could not articulate the Duke's demands to the Convention. The Duke was proclaimed a traitor. Satisfied, Dundee planned his own escape.

[A less colourful but perhaps truer narrative is that Gordon, on Dundee's advice, asked that command of the Castle be given to the Protestant Earl of Airlie, who just happened to be one of Dundee's former regimental captains. This forced the Convention to reject the offer of surrender.]

He used an unfounded rumour of an assassination plot against him as his justification for leaving. Observing the masses of rural Covenanters in Edinburgh, all sworn enemies of his, Dundee made the impractical demand that every 'stranger' be removed from the city; when refused, he declared his intention of retiring to his estates until order could be restored. And did so.

An attempt was made to bring him back:

The president [Hamilton], however, judged it expedient to send a messenger after the retiring nobleman, commanding his immediate return to the assembly. A Major Bunting was selected, with a troop of about eighty horse, to perform this somewhat hazardous piece of service; and it is said that he had secret orders, in case of finding Dundee retive, to seize his person and bring him back by force. The pursuers soon overtook the retiring loyalists, who were deliberately pacing along the road to Stirling by Linlithgow. When Dundee saw them advancing, he permitted his troop to go on before, and, falling back towards Bunting, entered into conversation with him. Bunting delivered the message of the Convention, and mentioned the alternative measure which he was commanded to take, in the event of finding his lordship unamenable [sic] to their commands. Dundee only replied, that he would advise him to go back to the Convention, without giving him further trouble, or his alternative measure would be "to send him back to them in a pair of blankets." At this dreadful hint, Bunting, though attended by double the number of Dundee's troop, judged it most prudent to withdraw.

[History of the Rebellions in Scotland, pp. 39-40. The encounter is unverified, but Bunting was certainly tasked with following Claverhouse. Bunting, or Buntine, was soon made Muster-Master of the Estates (i.e. Inspector of the Army), a post in which he did not shine.]

Before he left town Dundee made a climb up the cliffs at the back of the castle and held another conference with the Duke. What they spoke of unknown, but it is generally assumed to have been another 'pep talk'. Twelve days later, the Convention proclaimed Dundee a traitor at the Cross of Edinburgh and the idea of a legal Opposition dissolved completely.

The Convention continued, menaced by the guns of the castle, intimidated by riotous mobs of Covenanters in the streets demanding sweeping changes, annoyed by Cameronian preachers rudely interrupting serious debates and spouting political nonsense, and angered by news that Dundee was secretly engaged in raising an army of Highlanders.

The outcome of the Convention was a decision (the Claim of Right and the Articles of Grievance of April 4th) that James had forfeited the throne due to misgovernment – in contrast to England where he was said to have 'abdicated' – and an offer (accepted on May 11th) to William and Mary to take the throne as co-regents. This took place on the same day they ascended the English throne.

The use of the term 'forfeiture' – actually, 'forfaulture' – was a function of the strength of the Covenanters' position at the Convention, where their bodyguard of 1,000 Cameronians both protected the delegates and intimidated them. The implication, of course, was that the People had removed a Bad King, instead of him simply passing the baton to his heir ahead of schedule. Because forfeiture affected a man's posterity, they had to add a rider exempting Queen Mary and Princess Anne.

The Convention also condemned Prelacy, barred Roman Catholics from the Throne, claimed that the Royal Prerogative – the King's dispensing power – was subject to the Law (any lawyer who wishes to

sort that one out is free to try), and insisted that Parliament was the primary governing body under the King. A motion to unite Scotland and England was considered but rejected. William disputed some of these points, leading to further debate in 1690. He was as much against the Covenanters' republican ideas for limiting the Monarchy as James had been.

[It was the Jacobites who first suggested a Union with England, simply as a means of delaying events until King James could land with an army. Until the question of a Union was settled, the Whigs could not call upon William to ascend the Throne. The idea was thrown out, though the Dalrymples were intrigued.]

General MacKay

It will be remembered that King William gave the prewar Scots Army permission to return home. However, with a new war looking to break out in Ireland, General Douglas and his men were retained south of the border. William's new C-in-C for Scotland was his trusted commander of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade, General Hugh MacKay of Scourie. As his name suggests, MacKay was a native of Sutherland, in the far north of Scotland. Though settled in Holland, he was well known to the Scots and familiar with the country of his birth.

There is a symmetrical irony in the fact that Dundee, a Lowlander, commanded an army of Highlanders, while his chief opponent was a Highlander who commanded an army of Lowlanders, Dutch, and English. MacKay is often dismissed as a second rate leader, but this is an incorrect reading of his abilities, even when comparing him with Dundee. A comparison reveals many similarities. Both were pious men who placed honour and duty very high. Both were schooled in the Dutch service. MacKay could move as rapidly as Dundee when he chose and had the equal talent of getting the most out of his men something that is not usually recognised because no one pays attention to the preliminary manoeuvres of the war.

If Dundee relied on help that never came, the same could be said of the resource-strapped MacKay. Dundee did not have to answer to a bunch of overconfident politicians who stinted him of supplies, but he did have to cajole the Highland chiefs and deal with an evasive monarch. If it is pointed out that the Battle of Killiecrankie is one very large exception to MacKay's skill *vis-à-vis* Dundee, it should be noted in turn that Dundee did not always get the necessary mileage out of his Highlanders. He was killed before he had a chance to 'fail big'; MacKay failed big, picked himself up, and carried on.

MacKay was perhaps 49 years old in 1689. He was the son of one of the descendants of Lord Strathnaver, chief of the MacKays. In 1660 he joined Dumbarton's Regiment (the Royal Scots) and served it in under Louis XIV (the unit was originally raised for French service). In 1669, seeking further employment, he served the Republic of Venice and participated in the expulsion of the Turks from Candia.

In 1672 he became a captain in Dumbarton's and served under *Maréchal* Turenne in the Dutch War, along with John Churchill and John Graham. However, his Protestant beliefs led him to change sides, and he remained in the Dutch service thereafter; his wife, whom he married while billeted in enemy territory in 1673, was Dutch, which may have had something to do with his choice.

As a captain in the Anglo-Dutch Brigade he served under William of Orange (and in company with Dundee) at the Battle of Seneffe in 1674. In 1677 he was made lieutenant-colonel of one of the three Scots regiments in the Brigade and in 1680 full colonel. In 1685 he commanded the Brigade when King James summoned it to help put down Monmouth's Rebellion, receiving the rank of Major General at that time.

In recognition of his loyalty (though the Brigade as a whole was suspect in James' eyes), MacKay was made a Scottish Privy Councillor. He went through the ceremonies and the form of attending parliament, but was soon back in Holland. He had inherited his father's estates some years before (when his two elder brothers were murdered), but never visited them.

[There are many famous Scots, some of them world famous, who were born in the far North of Scotland, but curiously, most seem to have left the place as soon as they could.]

MacKay's choice of remaining with the Brigade when King James sought to break it by recalling it in 1687, was, as usual with that monarch, seen as a personal betrayal, and he would be specifically exempted from pardon during the Revolution. James' attitude thrust the General firmly into William's camp.

In the invasion of 1688 MacKay commanded the Brigade as well as all associated British forces, receiving his appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Scots Army on January 4th, 1689. After a brief illness he reached Leith docks on March 25th, just before Dundee was proclaimed a traitor.

MacKay's activities during 1689 and 1690 will be described in detail. In November 1690, he was sent first to Holland, where he organised William's campaign for the following spring, then travelled to Ireland in 1691, where he commanded the Williamite Cavalry at the Battle of Aughrim, leading it across a bog and flanking the Jacobite Army to ensure their defeat.

On July 24th, 1692, now a Lieutenant-General, he led the main assault at the Battle of Steinkirk. Counterattacked by the *Maison du Roi* after the French line broke, he was ordered to hold his position but refused the necessary reinforcements (a typical fate when serving under Dutch field marshals, who regarded all non-Dutch troops as cannon fodder). His only comment was, "the will of the Lord be done". MacKay was killed at his post, along with most of his division.

Current opinion holds that MacKay was the best divisional commander King William ever had, perhaps one of the best in Europe, but divisional command was as far as he would have, or ought to have progressed. Bishop Burnet said of him:

"The king [William] often observed that when he had full leisure for his devotions he acted with a peculiar exaltation of courage. He had one very singular quality: in councils of war he delivered his opinion freely, and maintained it with due zeal, but how positive soever he was in it, if the council of war overruled, even though he was not convinced by it, yet to all others he justified it, and executed his part with the same zeal as if his own opinion had prevailed."

Upon MacKay's arrival at Leith, he found at his disposal the forces in the Capital, plus a reinforcement of four infantry battalions and one dragoon regiment. The regiments were Balfour's, MacKay's, and Ramsay's Scottish Foot of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade; Hasting's Foot (a reconstituted English regiment); and Livingstone's Dragoons (formerly Dunmore's and later the Royal Scots Greys). 1,100 infantry and 200 dragoons in all. Of all this force, only the dragoons remained from the force that had gone south with General Douglas. The rest of that body, including their commander, were enroute for Ireland. Claverhouse's own regiment had been broken, except for his personal troop, who were with him.

MacKay's first task was the siege of Edinburgh Castle. The siege was remarkably lengthy for what it was, but resolved itself before any decisive encounter between the armies occurred. The Duke of Gordon's defiance thus had a moral effect only. The castle was officially invested on March 23rd. The Duke held out for 83 days, until June 13th. Short of supplies, and uncertain that Dundee's promises of a counter-revolution would be kept, he capitulated after being accorded favourable terms.

When the siege began, the rest of the country, if politically agitated, was militarily quiet, and it was hoped it might remain so, but it was well known that Dundee was trying to raise the Highlanders in King James' Cause.

King James' Lieutenant was passing by Stirling when the order for his arrest was given; a few days later (March 30th) he was proclaimed a traitor. The Earl of Mar, Governor of Stirling Castle, refused to commit himself, and the town barred Dundee's entry, so he rode on to

Dunblane, where he had speech with one Alexander Drummond of Balhaldy, who just happened to be the son-in-law of Sir Ewan Cameron of Lochiel, the most warlike of the chiefs of the western Highlands.



[Hugh MacKay of Scourie]

Highland Society

Highland society was very different from the rest of the country, remaining tribal in nature. The people were divided into clans under their own chiefs. Only the chief's immediate family would be blood members of his clan, but those inhabiting their lands and under their protection would be accounted members of the clan on a feudal basis. The power and authority of the clans and their chiefs varied widely. Some chiefs were Scottish peers or simple MPs, participating in the national government, while others were regarded as mere robbers. Some were both.

[It might be noted in passing that the only British consul who ever managed to deal effectively with the Afghans during the days of the Raj just happened to be the chief of one of the larger Highland clans.]

Wealth was measured in cattle, but cattle require land, so a clan's power was based upon the amount of land the chief owned. Only the chief owned land, but he had the authority to rent it to his dependents, usually members of his clan, but not always. Outsiders wishing to rent land could become vassals of the chief. Land could also be given as security for loans. An added wrinkle was the fact that many men either owned or rented land based on custom rather than legal title.

In this lies the root of the famous Campbell-MacDonald feud, a conflict that was about 200 years old by the late 17th Century. It began when King James IV of Scotland forfeited the MacDonalds of their title of Lords of the Isles, significantly weakening their power in favour of the Campbells. With royal backing (i.e. government money) the Earls of Argyll, chiefs of Clan Campbell, bought up the land of men who were having difficulty paying their own chiefs or feudal lords, and also bought land from clan chiefs who could not prove legal title; such men became vassals of the Campbells. Since the alternative

was to lose one's land to the Crown, these practices were widely seen as blackmail. Now the reader should understand why no one liked the Campbells very much.

Cattle and land spelt wealth, but fighting men spelt status. The story which best illustrates this tells of a wealthy Highland chief who visited London on business and made friends with an Englishman of his own class. This Englishman invited him to dinner, where he proudly exhibited his latest piece of technology, a massive cut-glass chandelier. In return, the chief invited his host to visit his castle whenever he was in Scotland, where he promised to show him something even rarer in chandeliers. A year or two later the Englishman did visit, finding himself in the typical dark draught-trap of a Scottish castle and wishing he was back in London. He asked his host what had happened to the chandelier he had been promised. At that, the chief called for it to be brought, and to the deafening skirl of the pipes two hundred armed retainers marched in, each bearing a flaming torch.

The trouble was, the chiefs needed employment for these warriors. So, on the one hand they fought each other over petty quarrels and land claims, and on the other they involved themselves in Lowland politics. This was not entirely their fault. James VI detested the Highlanders (he ordered the extirpation of the MacGregors as an example) and he tried to formulate policies that would force them into modern society, such as appointing satraps to govern them. For that particular policy, the Earls of Argyle (clan Campbell) and Huntly (clan Gordon) were awarded royal lieutenancies over the Highlands. Which power they abused. Seeking redress, however, under the new system a chief would be forced to travel to Edinburgh and hire a lawyer instead of just laying waste a glen or two.

Legal redress is a long, frustrating process. Therefore, the chiefs backed political factions who would give them the right to use speedier methods. This trend intensified during the Civil Wars. No chief was more involved in Lowland politics than the Earl of Argyle, and he backed the Covenant. Ergo, the other chiefs backed the King, giving him a readymade army. Montrose's campaign of 1645, from the point of view of the Highland chiefs, was a crusade against Clan Campbell which ended in the latter's mauling at Inverlochy. But, Cromwell's program of Highland subjugation, though fleeting, weakened the other clans likewise, so in the end the former imbalance was restored.

Also, war tended to increase everyone's debt load, which was a boon to savvy politicians like the chiefs of Clan Campbell. It also increased general lawlessness: things such as kidnapping women and marrying them against their will to get their property (*vide* Simon Fraser), burning immovable property (sometimes with the inhabitants still inside it), but primarily cattle rustling ('reiving').

After the Restoration, Argyle's fortunes picked up temporarily as he was made sole Royal Lieutenant of the Highlands and set about collecting the massive debts owed him by his neighbours. The heaviest burden was that of Clan MacLean who owed £200,000. In the 1670s Argyle invaded the MacLean's lands with an army; he was resisted with the aid of the MacDonalds. Similarly, Argyle's relations, Campbell of Breadalbane and Campbell of Glenlyon, attempted a military expedition to Caithness in the far North, again in aid of collecting property debts by seizing the property in question. This expedition did not go so well and Glenlyon incurred huge debts himself. (True to character, Breadalbane let his kinsman pick up the tab.)

Immediately after these fiascos, Argyle's fortunes plummeted again. The Duke of Albany (and his later incarnation, James II) had his own ideas on how to keep the Highlanders in check yet also retain them as a tool of coercion against the Lowlands. Argyle's wings were clipped. The MacLeans' debts were paid off. Four lords, Argyle (Campbell, in the Southwest), Huntly (Gordon, in the Northeast), Atholl (Murray, residing on the Highland Line north of the central Lowlands), and Seaforth (MacKenzie, in the North) were allotted spheres of influence.

When the 9th Earl of Argyle, as a good Presbyterian, opposed Albany's addition of a clause to the Test Act (the oath of loyalty to the Church) which provided for a Catholic head of the Kirk, he was forced into exile, and, returning in 1685 to lead a rebellion, was caught and executed. To break up the Campbell power base, King James began redistributing some of their lands to the original owners. James also set up a Commission of Highland Justiciary, which bypassed the old Campbell-dominated judicial system.

The Revolution of 1688 naturally reversed this situation. The 10th Earl of Argyle returned as one of the most powerful members of the new Government. And so, to say that the Highlanders championed King James' cause simply for what it was is incorrect. They did not desire an Absolute Catholic Monarchy. Ironically, many of the chiefs really preferred William to James, particularly those who had been the target of one of the Duke of Albany's commissions of Fire and Sword.

But for the moment, many saw a restoration of King James as the only means of staving off the vengeful Campbells. Still, despite their renowned sense of honour and obligation, the chiefs' loyalty would only take them so far. After James refused to send them significant aid their desire to preserve their rights and property outweighed any oath and they sought accommodation with Edinburgh. After all, obligation is a two-way street.

There was also the question of religion. Often, one speaks of the Highlanders as Catholic, but this is a simplification. Some clans were Catholic (most of the MacDonalds, and the Gordons), but others were Episcopalian (MacLeod, and curiously, MacDonald of Sleat [*slate*], plus others of the Isles), and some were Presbyterian (Campbells, Frasers, Grants, MacKenzies, and others of the North). As in the Lowlands, the Presbyterians were likely to line up with the new Government, the Episcopalians would keep their noses clean, and the Catholics, most at risk, would follow Dundee.

[The rank and file tended to adopt their chief's religion, although it might take a generation or two for the conversion to sink in. Things could be speeded up by the chief setting fire to his tenants' crofts.]

Despite the various fractures in Highland society, Viscount Claverhouse hoped for a large turnout. The MacLeans and the various MacDonald sept (sub-clans) stood to lose the most from a resurgent Campbell overlordship, particularly the heavily indebted Clanranalds and the semi-outlaw Glencoes, Keppochs, and Gengarries, plus Cameron of Lochiel, who was in the same boat. These were men of Rannoch, Lochaber and the Isles.

Not all the MacDonalds were at risk, though, and those of the Northwest, as well as their local rivals, the MacLeods and MacKenzies, proved hard for Dundee to recruit, since they feared each other more than Argyle or King Billy. As late as 1672 the MacKenzies had been awarded a commission of 'Fire and Sword' to chastise the MacLeods on behalf of the Government, so it was not likely MacLeod would rise for the Stuarts, and if he thought of doing so, he would refuse to rise if MacKenzie 'came out'. Lord Seaforth, chief of the MacKenzies, was with King James in Ireland, and, as will be recounted, promised to but did not raise his clan (some of his men were fighting in Ireland, though).

The clans of the central Highlands, Badenoch and Atholl, the MacPhersons, Murrays, Frasers, and MacIntoshes, were also less under threat, and indeed were almost as opposed to the MacDonalds as they were to the Campbells. Especially, the Camerons and MacDonald of Keppoch were at odds with Clan Chattan, a confederation of clans led by the MacIntoshes. In August of 1688 they had fought what is often called the 'last of the clan battles' at Maol Ruadh (Mulroy - Red Hill), on Keppoch land. This affray also soured the MacPhersons and Farquarsons, who were members of the Clan Chattan. Dundee had difficulty motivating MacPherson to do anything.

[There was an outstanding warrant for Lochiel's arrest over the Maol Ruadh affair, though he himself was not responsible for breaking the peace on that occasion.]

In the Northeast, Dundee thought the Gordons could be relied upon as natural rivals of Argyle, particularly since their fortunes had waxed under King James and were now on the wane. Most of the military campaigning was to focus on the Northeast. But Gordon support was spotty. Some of the other clans in that region backed the Government – Presbyterian Grants and Frasers (though these clans were schizophrenic, with septs on both sides of the fence).

In the North, in Ross, Sutherland, and Caithness, most of the clans again stood out and some joined the Government. Their chiefs were nearly all Presbyterian and had hopes for the new regime. Their opposition was another reason why the otherwise powerful Seaforth did not aid Dundee (a third reason was his feckless character).

Thus, only the men of Lochaber and some clans of the Isles took the field in strength, and from a mix of motives. The prime movers in their mobilisation, apart from Dundee himself, were Sir Ewan of Lochiel and MacDonald of Sleat. Lochiel was a Royalist from Civil War days and a marked man in Campbell eyes. However, he was also one of the most respected chiefs in the Highlands. Sleat's motivations were ambiguous; as an Episcopalian he supported the old regime, but he was at daggers drawn (literally) with some of the other MacDonald septs.

Dundee, an admirer of Gaelic culture, was about to receive an education in Highland politics.

His preparations were not yet complete when he received word the Convention was preparing to arrest him and Lord Balcarres. Dundee, notionally nothing more than a private gentleman living on his estates and involved in the birth of a son, had continued to correspond with anyone and everyone who might join King James. A letter from the King to both he and Balcarres was intercepted; it was this that led to arrest warrants being issued for both men. Balcarres was taken about April 11th and placed in solitary confinement. Dundee challenged his own arrest warrant in a letter to Hamilton:

Dudhop[e], March 27, 1689.

May It Please Your Grace,

The coming of an herald and trumpeter to summon a man to lay down arms, that is living in peace at home, seems to me a very extraordinary thing, and, I suppose, will do so to all that hears of it. While I attended the Convention at Edinburgh, I complained often of many people's being in arms without authority, which was notoriously known to be true, even the wild hill men ; and no summons to lay down arms under pain of treason being given them, I thought it unsafe for me to remain longer among them. And because some few of my friends did me the favour to convey me out of the reach of these murderers, and that my Lord Levingston and several other officers took occasion to come away at the same time, this must be called being in arms. We did not exceed the number allowed by the Meeting of Estates: my lord Levingstone and I might have had each of us ten and four or five officers that were in company might have had a certain number allowed them; which being, it will be found we exceeded not. I am sure it is far short of the number my Lord Lome was seen to march with. I And, tho I had gone away with some more than ordinary, who can blame me, when designs of murdering me was made appear? Besides, it is known to every body, that before we came within sixteen miles of this, my Lord Levingston went off to his brother, my Lord Strathmoir's house ; and most of the officers, and several of the company, went to their respective homes or relations ; and if any of them did me the favour to come along with me, must that be called being in arms? Sure, when your Grace represents this to the Meeting of the States, they will discharge such a groundless pursuit, and think my appearance before them unnecessary. Besides, tho' it were necessary for me to go and attend the Meeting, I cannot come with freedom and safety, because I am informed there are men of war and foreign troops in the passage; and, till I know what they are, and what are their orders, the Meeting cannot blame me for not coming. Then, my Lord, seeing the summons has proceeded on a groundless story, I hope the

Meeting of States will think it unreasonable I should leave my wife in the condition she is in. If there be any body that, notwithstanding of all that is said, think I ought to appear, I beg the favour of a delay till my wife is brought to bed ; and, in the meantime, I will either give security or paroll not to disturb the peace. Seeing this pursuit is so groundless, and so reasonable things offered, and the Meeting composed of prudent men and men of honour, and your Grace presiding in it, I have no reason to fear farther trouble. I am, May it please your Grace,

Your most humble servant,

DUNDIE.

I beg your Grace will cause read this to the Meeting, because it is all the defence I have made. I sent another to your Grace from Dumblain, with the reasons of my leaving Edinburgh. I know not if it be come to your hands.

For His Grace the Duke of Hamilton."

As already mentioned, the Convention's response was to declare Dundee a traitor. The latter chose to open hostilities in a formal manner by Raising the Standard for King James on the Law [hill] of Dundee, sometime between April 12th and April 15th (the date is uncertain because there was no large ceremony, just Dundee, his troopers, and a few supporters). He then made over the Seidlaws for the Tower of the Glen of Ogilvie (a country-house), which he owned.

[The Seidlaws are low hills north of the town of Dundee; the house was about 14 Km north of that town.]

Sir Thomas Livingstone, one of MacKay's subordinates, was given the role of sheriff, and his own regiment of dragoons was his police force. He dispatched them to the Tower of the Glen of Ogilvie, but Dundee escaped. After resting there three days, the Jacobites were warned of Livingstone's approach. Dundee had friends in the regiment – including its lieutenant colonel, Lord Kilsyth – and that two troopers 'allowed' themselves to be caught in a nearby wood before Kilsyth made his move.

[Kilsyth earned that title later on. At the time he was just Lieutenant Colonel Livingstone, which is confusing, given that it was Sir Thomas' regiment. So, the name Kilsyth will be used.]

MacKay also entered the pursuit, but not immediately. He had a hundred and one things to settle first: the siege, the raising of the militia, arranging for provisions, defining his power *vis a vis* the Convention. Shortly after Kilsyth 'missed' Dundee, however, the General set out, handing the siege of Edinburgh Castle over to Sir John Lanier. He took with him Sir Thomas, 120 men of Colchester's Horse, 180 men of Livingstone's Dragoons, and 450 Foot of his own regiment. At some point he dropped off 250 of the Foot, leaving him only 500 men to work with.

The General's plan was simply to capture Dundee before he could raise an army. If that were not possible, he could limit the army's size and capabilities by penning it in the Highlands. But the General had even worse tools than Dundee to work with.

Other than the troops MacKay brought with him, Scotland at this time had almost no mobile forces. Colchester's Horse, Berkeley's Horse, and Sir James Leslie's Foot had been dispatched from England fairly soon after MacKay's arrival at Edinburgh, but these did not add much to his strength.

As for local talent, the Earl of Mar came on board but died suddenly, the Marquess of Atholl refused to commit, and the Laird of Grant, MacKay's chief ally in the Northeast, fumbled the ball. The General always maintained a mistrust of militia forces, and these occurrences did not help to change his opinion.

Dundee's Ride

"Major General MacKay is gone North with a strong Detachment, to reduce the Viscount of Dundee and his Adherents, who have fled to the Duke of Gordon's County; he [Dundee] hopes to find assistance there, as a sinking man lays hold on every twig; however the Laird of Grant and all that County are in Arms to oppose and seize him and his Troop"

[An Account of the Proceedings of the Meeting of the Estates, No. 17, p. 48, quoted in Terry, p. 270.]

Dundee was able to ride freely to Forres, on the Moray coast east of Inverness. He rode northeast for much of the way, skirting the Cairngorms but avoiding the coastal towns, which were Whiggish in sympathy: by Kirriemuir, Cairn o' Mount, and Kincardine O'Neil to Keith, Elgin, and Forres. At Keith Dundee wrote (April 21st) to Lord Tullibardine, eldest son of the Marquess of Atholl. At Forres, he communicated with the clans of the West and North.

[His route followed an old military road, which used to be called the Great North Road. Kincardine O'Neil bridged the River Dee, Cairn o' Mount led to a short cut through the hills.]

Dundee also sought to enlist the Gordon clan. The Duke's brother-in-law, the Earl of Dunfermline, held written authorisation to raise his people 'if the situation warranted it'. Promises may have been given Dundee as he rode among the Gordons, but few followed took up arms. In June, the Provost of Elgin was to be summoned before the Estates for talking to Dundee; the forces of 'law and order' still held sway in the Northeast.

[James Seton, 4th Earl of Dunfermline, was married to a daughter of the Marquess of Huntly. Dunfermline was outlawed in 1690 and fled to France.]

The small Jacobite band now made a puzzling retrograde movement, returning south to Aboyne on the River Dee, about 40 Km west of Aberdeen. Dundee had received secret communications from members of Livingstone's Dragoons, promising they would declare for King James; he thought the way south might still be clear to join the regiment. However, a courier bearing letters for the Master of Forbes (a notorious Williamite) was intercepted. He gave news of MacKay's approach. Nevertheless, the Jacobites cut across the hills 20 Km south to Cairn o' Mount, which they reached on April 29th. The value of this spot is that it gives a clear view across the coastal plain all the way to the sea; the enemy's movements would be clearly visible around a wide arc.



[View from Cairn o' Mount.]

The General's column, only 500 strong but still far stronger than Dundee, had left the town of that name on April 29th, marching first to Brechin, which they reached that evening, hoping to catch their enemy, whom they believed was camped nearby. Disappointed, at Brechin the General also took the military road north. When he reached Fettercairn on the 30th, only 7 Km away from Dundee, the latter, warned by a spy,

turned back toward Aboyne. His path of retreat caused MacKay some concern.

The logical retreat path was the one Dundee had used before: by the military road to the bridge at Kincardine O'Neil. The Jacobites had instead moved northwest. Was Dundee planning to circle behind him by riding up the valley of the Dee to Braemar and then descending via Glenshee to the plains of Angus? But Dundee simply rode back to Forres, confident MacKay would hesitate before following. Along the way he collected 50 horsemen under the Earl of Dunfermline, which gave him an army of perhaps 150 horsemen.

[The fords of the Spey were supposed to have been held against the Jacobites, but the Laird of Grant, whose job it was, lacked the manpower. The river is quite wide, but there are a lot of fords.]

MacKay decided to press on to Kincardine, where he was joined by the Master of Forbes and Sir George Gordon of Edinglassie, two of his chief supporters in this part of the world. They brought 40 gentlemen on horseback and 5-600 of their tenants, so badly armed and so unwilling that MacKay dismissed the bands to their homes in disgust.

At Inverness Dundee had hopes of connecting with a war party of 800 Camerons and MacDonalds under Colonel John (or Coll) MacDonald of Keppoch. Needing foot soldiers, King James' Lieutenant had written from Fochabers to Lochiel asking for men; 800 Highlanders would put the Jacobites on par with the Williamites. Keppoch was duly sent.

What happened next paints an illuminating portrait of the culture of the day and the difficulties inherent in dealing with Highlanders. Dundee had intended to take the 800 men and turn on MacKay. Lochiel, on the other hand, thought he just wanted an escort to take him west into Lochaber. And, Keppoch... well, Keppoch was still at feud with the MacIntosh – remember the Battle of Maol Ruadh? The burg of Inverness had allied with the MacIntosh, so Keppoch, having 800 men at his disposal, decided to slake his desire for revenge. On April 28th the Highlanders, after plundering MacIntosh lands nearby, 'laid siege' to Inverness in true Barbarian fashion, demanding a ransom for their departure.

They sat there until May 1st, at which time Dundee arrived in their camp. In a three way discussion with Keppoch and the burghers of Inverness, Dundee promised to indemnify the town, at which they coughed up the money. He then berated Keppoch for behaving like a common robber. The chief took umbrage at this and retired west with his 800 men and his booty, plundering more MacIntosh farms on the way. So much for an early Jacobite victory. The gossip in the London coffee houses was soon all about Dundee's capitulation to MacKay or, alternatively, his abject flight from the country.

[Keppoch is said to have been 'a gentleman of good understanding, of great cunning, and much attached to King James, but indulging himself in to great liberties with respect to those with whom he was at variance'. Dundee nicknamed him 'Coll of the cows' for his skill in finding the beasts' hiding places after their proper owners had hidden them.]

Dundee and MacKay sat watching each other for a few days, the former at Inverness and the latter at Elgin. The General was hoping for nonexistent reinforcements to counter Dundee's nonexistent reinforcements. When the Jacobite commander felt the bluff was wearing thin, he left (8th May), riding down the Great Glen, following a drove road usually described as a boulder strewn goat track, to Invergarry Castle and the Kirk of Kilcummin, where he halted.

The next day, his party went east across the glen and up the rugged Pass of Corrieyairack (9th May) to the headwaters of the Spey and down that river to the Fords of Clune. Another valley, Glen Truim, branches south here, leading to Dalwinnie and the Pass of Drumochter, which in turn leads to the district of Atholl, Blair Castle, and the Lowlands. The headwaters of the Spey and Glen Truim were the lands of the MacPhersons of Cluny and the MacDonells of Glengarry. The clans did not immediately follow Dundee, but pledged their support.



[Corrieyarick Pass, looking east.]

Turning down toward Dalwhinnie, the band halted at an out of the way farmhouse called Presmukerach, a property of the Duke of Gordon. Here they paused for a day while Dundee wrote formally to Lochiel and the other chiefs in his capacity of King's Lieutenant, calling for a meet at Lochiel's house on the 18th of May.

[Lochiel had already called a meeting for the 15th, so this worked out well for everyone.]

With 70 troopers, Dundee then rode past Dalwhinnie on the 9th of May, down through the Passes of Drumochter and Killiecrankie to reach Dunkeld at midnight on the 10th. At Dunkeld they had an encounter with the local tax man, gleefully beat him up and despoiled him, then passed on to the important town of Perth, which they reached at 2am. At Perth Dundee took 20 volunteers into the town by stealth, looted the public treasury, and took a few officers who had been raising cavalry for Government service hostage.

"You take prisoners for the Prince of Orange, and we take prisoners for King James, and there 's an end of it."

[They took only public monies and left £500 in 'cess-money' which was privately owned. The unfortunate prisoners, of whom there were quite a few, including a son-in-law of the Duke of Hamilton, were sent to the island of Cairnburg in the Treshnish islands, a Highland version of Edinburgh's Bass Rock prison, from which there could be no escape. After nine months they were transferred to the more salubrious Duart Castle, but Hamilton's relation died.]

Dundee was making a bit of a 'royal progress' at this point, tweaking the noses of the Lords of the Convention. He dined with Lord Stormont at Scone [scoon] and the latter had to apologise to the Convention by saying he was forced into giving the dinner. Several prominent locals did join the Rising, augmenting the troop's strength. The most valuable addition was Halliburton of Pitcur, accounted a great warrior, who died by his General's side at Killiecrankie.

Pressing on to the town which bore his name, though, Dundee ran out of luck. His chief aim was to enlist his friends in Livingstone's Dragoons. The two troops left in the town were commanded by the sympathetic Lord Kilsyth and a hostile Captain Balfour. There was also a new independent militia troop, Rollo's, only partially recruited.

The Jacobites reached the town on May 13th. The place was in a panic, but it was also being put in a state of defence. A mounted assault was made which drove in the outposts, a few buildings were burned, and some loot was taken, but the town proper could not be penetrated. All three Government troops were sheltering there. Lord Kilsyth thought to make a sally with the secret purpose of joining Dundee, but Balfour had command of the gates and kept them closed.

The Jacobites spent most of the day ranging around the town, trying to provoke such a sally, without result. The place was walled, impervious to cavalry. It is recounted that a band of four young men rode up to one of the gates and challenged the defenders; one of the hotheads was

killed by a musket ball. At last, Dundee withdrew, harassed eagerly but ineffectively by twelve enemy horsemen. By the 15th of May the town received the welcome addition of Hastings' Regiment of Foot and Berkeley's Horse, both brought at the double from Berwick. Lieutenant Colonel Balfour's Foot (ex-Buchan's) at Edinburgh sent 200 men across the Forth to secure the Burntisland ferry crossing.

[The crossing from Leith to Burntisland cut a considerable amount of time off an army's time on the road when marching for the North, and bypassed a number of chokepoints.]

Having made a statement, Dundee's band returned without further molestation on a forced march to Glen Roy, 18 Km northeast of where Fort William stands today. The meeting of the chiefs was to be held at Lochiel's farm of Dalcomera (*more commonly, Mucomir*) at the South end of Loch Lochy.

Determining Dundee's actual route is difficult. The epic poem known as the *Grameid*, which was composed by one of his companions, lists a variety of landmarks that suggest they took several routes, but the poet must be allowed his license. The most sensible route devised by the historians is this: they rode back the way they came until they got through the Pass of Killiecrankie. Then they turned west along the North shores of Loch Tummel and Loch Rannoch, before heading northwest to the South end of Loch Treig, then north to Glen Roy, reaching that spot by the 15th of May. A hard road, through uplands still crisp with frost. There are two justifications for not retracing their path exactly: the need to have speech with the clans living in those glens and the fear that MacKay might come down to Dalwhinnie from Inverness and cut them off from the general muster. A route farther to the South, across Rannoch Moor, has been suggested, but the moor was physically dangerous and skirted the lands of the Earl of Argyle.

To return to General MacKay. He had pursued Dundee hotly until his column reached Elgin (some of his grenadiers ran with the cavalry). At Elgin, he received intelligence that 1,000 Highlanders were coming to support Dundee – this of course being Keppoch – and halted for a few days, writing to the chiefs of Rosshire and the North, asking them to raise their clans for William but to not to move until instructed. He wrote also to the 'Jacobite' clans, but they just laughed at him. The MacIntoshes and MacKenzies did not commit to either side.

MacKay moved to Inverness after learning of Dundee's departure, and put the place into a state of defence with a palisade, recruited 300 locals as a garrison, and strengthened them with his regulars. The whole of the coastal plain from Inverness to Dundee buzzed with activity, but MacKay's numbers remained small. Only 500 clansmen of the MacKays, Rosses, and Grants joined the colours at Inverness.

The first new units formed under the auspices of the Convention were Leven's Foot (of two battalions), Kenmuir's Foot, Annandale's Troop of Horse, and Belhaven's Troop of Horse. As previously mentioned, there were also Rollo's Troop of Dragoons and perhaps some unrecorded formations of like size. Other militia regiments recorded in the sources (all Foot) were those of:

- The Earl of Angus' (Cameronians; at Dunkeld)
- The Earl of Argyle's (possibly protecting Campbell lands)
- The Earl of Mar's (probably garrisoning Aberdeenshire)
- The Earl of Glencairn's (a unit from the southwest, sent to Inverness)
- Earl of Annandale's (disbanded February 1690)
- Lord Viscount Kenmuir's (with MacKay at Killiecrankie)
- Lord Strathnaver's (possibly stationed in the North)
- Lord Bargeny's
- Lord Blantyre's

Lords Lovat and Seaforth were commissioned to raise 500 Horse, but Seaforth took himself off to Ireland with King James, while Lovat pulled the covers over his head and waited for the war to end.

[The Earl of Leven was a zealous Orangist who had been in exile in Holland and accompanied William's invasion as a volunteer. Viscount Kenmuir's family became noted Jacobites, so it is assumed he had hopes of advancement under

William that were disappointed. Lord Belhaven was a vehement opponent of the Union of England and Scotland in 1707 and in 1708 died in a London jail as a suspected Jacobite.]

In addition to this augmentation of the Army, two privateers, known as the Glasgow Frigates (the whole of Scotland's Navy on the West coast) were sent to patrol the Irish Sea, while military supplies were sent to assist the Ulstermen (20 barrels of powder and 2,000 muskets). The MacLeans, who owned many of the western islands and disputed them with the Campbells, made shift to counter these privateers with their small navy of light craft, and raided into Argyll.

[One of the Glasgow Frigates was named the Pelican.]

At Dalcomera, Dundee wrote to King James, inviting him to come and take command. James promised him an army of 5,000 Foot and 300 Horse, but urged him to take no action until these had arrived. He himself would not come. Though he had the highest regard for his Lieutenant... etc. etc. The ex-Duke of Albany had no love for the Scots.

Government reports gave an estimate of about 800 men at the rendezvous, who appear to have dispersed. Probably most of these were Lochiel's men acting as 'headquarters security'. They are unlikely to have been Keppoch's band, as he was in Dundee's bad books (Keppoch tried to excuse his actions by claiming he thought the MacIntosh had declared for Dutch Billy). Lochiel could call out 1,000 men in all, so perhaps the missing 200 were those who were on their way back from Keppoch's foray after dividing the plunder.

[Modern accounts are often confused about the mustering of the clans. Three dates are given: the 18th of May, the 25th of May, and an unspecified 'too late for the ball' date. The numbers at the muster of the 25th are confounded with those of the 18th, and with the forces Dundee took with him to Killiecrankie. The membership was the same, but the men were not all under arms all the time. Prior to the summer months the rank and file clansmen had the spring planting and the calving to tend to.

The 18th was merely a meeting of the chiefs, with security forces present. The 25th, as will be described shortly, was intended for Dundee's first attempt to engage MacKay and about 4,000 men turned up for it. The last was the muster called for the march to Perth. Dundee's hand was forced and he had to leave early, with only part of the muster; after his death reinforcements again gave the Jacobites about 5,000 men. There were also independent bands of tens and hundreds carrying out feuds and raids, and guarding defiles and islands, and the like. In the later part of the war no large force was assembled. The legends, and some of the historians, would have the clans all assemble together 'on the plain' and pledge fealty to the Cause with one voice. This is not how it was. For honour's sake the chiefs would try and have their bands there on time, but if one chief was at feud with another he might not show up, or, as Keppoch made a habit of doing, he might delay to sack a manor house or steal some cattle. Some chiefs would be dubious and procrastinate, others would be eager and early.]

Encounter in Strathspey

Despite King James' injunction not to begin the campaign without him, his Lieutenant was persuaded of the need to do something, if only to excite the clans.

By mid-May the situation was roughly this. On the Jacobite side a number of the clans had pledged their support and were beginning to muster. Dundee suffered from a shortage of cavalry and artillery. The latter was not critical as MacKay also lacked guns, but it would be difficult to employ the Highlanders in open country without horsemen to protect them. Apart from the normal tactical weakness of unsupported infantry, the Highlanders had an ingrained fear of mounted troops.

On the other side of the hills, MacKay was establishing his own network of supporters. Militia regiments were being raised to protect the larger towns and he had established a cordon around the Highlands, with a strong garrison at Inverness and posts in the Spey Valley. The southern exits from the Highlands were covered by the Campbells in the West and Lowland militia in the center. MacKay himself was at Inverness, where he was making arrangements for a

permanent (i.e. postwar) base; the other half of his line regiments were still prosecuting the siege in Edinburgh.

Dundee had to strike at the enemy quickly and decisively, or he would lose credibility with the Highlanders. MacKay could wait for him, but his own mobile reserves were very small, and not concentrated for rapid deployment against Dundee's thrust – he might be defeated in detail. The longer he waited, the larger Dundee's army would become.

What transpired at the end of May, therefore, was a movement by Dundee down the Valley of the Spey. The choice of a central approach may have been made for a number of reasons. Attacking Inverness directly would mean traversing hostile and denuded MacIntosh territory (thanks for nothing, Keppoch), after which MacKay could retreat down the coast, link up with the rest of his army, and counterattack. His superiority in cavalry would be decisive. Attacking south into Atholl would be a similar scenario, plus MacKay could cut them off from their sanctuary by coming up the Spey. Dundee was not yet sure of Atholl's allegiance, but he was assured of Gordon's.

By attacking in the center, Dundee could accomplish several things. The enemy's center was weak, so the Highlanders could be blooded easily. MacKay would be separated from his remaining line regiments, allowing Dundee to defeat each group in turn. Finally, to both provoke MacKay and hearten the Gordons, attacks could be made on the property of those staunch Convention supporters, the Master of Forbes, Sir George Gordon of Edinglassie, and the Grants of Ballach Castle (Castle Grant).

Dundee called a general muster for May 25th. According to the *Grameid* (and probably accurate because the poet took part in the march) Dundee acquired the support of:

300 MacDonells of Gengarry, under Alastair Dubh [*dubh* = *black*] MacDonell, son of the chief of Glengarry, a distinguished warrior, 'brave, loyal, wonderfully sagacious and long-sighted'.

100 more MacDonells of Gengarry under Alastair's son. He was a man of property, so had his own company.

500 or 700 MacDonalds of Sleat, under Sir Donald MacDonald of Sleat, son of the chief, who had fallen ill.

100 MacLains of Glencoe (a MacDonald sept), led by Alastair MacLain. An old man, but built like a linebacker. It was he who would be murdered in the Glencoe massacre.

300 Clanranald MacDonalds from Uist, Moidart and Knoydart, under the sixteen-year-old Allan MacDonald. Sworn enemies of the Campbells.

200 of Keppoch MacDonald's men under their chief.

1,000 Camerons of Lochaber under Sir Ewan Cameron of Lochiel and his son-in-law, Alexander Drummond of Balhaldy (who also left a chronicle of these events) and his eldest son.

200 Stewarts of Appin, under the chief's tutor, Robert Stewart of Ardsheal. The chief was a teenager, but he left college to join his clan.

1,000 MacLeans under the nineteen-year-old Sir John MacLean of Duart and his cousin Sir Alexander MacLean. As noted above, part of his clan was raiding into Argyll and fencing with the Convention's Navy.

Plus small numbers or even individuals from many other clans: MacGregors, MacNabs, MacAulays, and MacGibbons (all from the Lennox district and allies of the Camerons), MacLeods of Raasay, MacNeils of Barra, MacLachalans, Lamonts, Grants of Urquart, many of the Frasers (though not their chief), Grants of Glen Morriston, MacNachtans, MacDougalls, and some MacAllisters of the Loup. There may even have been MacDonells from Ireland.

[The Chief of the Frasers, Lord Lovat, hedged his bets and did not call out his whole clan, but permitted his subordinates to make their own choices. The Grants were split in their loyalties.]

An alternate version of the muster has Dundee arriving at the rendezvous on the 16th, a ceremony on the 18th that involved everyone, and a week of drilling while the fiery cross went round again to summon the laggards. The men were already on short commons and the weather was unpleasant.

(Highland musters were prearranged by letter but at the appointed time runners would be sent out into the glens bearing wooden crosses soaked in pitch and set alight, as a sign for the clansmen to dig out their war gear and run to the clan's assembly point. As the men approached it they would hear the bagpipes wailing – the sound can carry for miles. Once the clan was formed up they would set out for the general muster at a tremendous pace.)

Whatever the details may have been, the army set forth on the evening of Saturday, May 25th, after a stirring speech by The Graham. Dundee, though he was not the genius legend has made him, was the sort of commander the Highlanders needed:

"If anything good was brought him (Dundee) to eat, he sent it to a faint or sick soldier. If a soldier was weary, he offered to carry his arms. He kept those who were with him from sinking under their fatigues, not so much by exhortation, as by preventing them from attending to their sufferings. For this reason he walked on foot with the men; now by the side of one clan, and anon by that of another. He amused them with jokes. He flattered them with his knowledge of their genealogies. He animated them by a recital of the deeds of their ancestors, and of the verses of their bards. It was one of his maxims, that no general should fight with an irregular army, unless he was acquainted with every man he commanded. Yet, with these habits of familiarity, the severity of his discipline was dreadful. The only punishment he inflicted was death. 'All other punishments,' he said, 'disgraced a gentleman, and all who were with him were of that rank; but that death was a relief from the consciousness of crime.' It is reported of him, that, having seen a youth fly in his first action, he pretended he had sent him to the rear on a message. The youth fled a second time. He brought him to the front of the army, and saying, 'That a gentleman's son ought not to fall by the hands of a common executioner,' shot him with his own pistol."

[Dalrymple's Memoirs, part ii. p. 47.]

With 4,000 warriors Dundee had complete superiority over MacKay, except in the important matter of cavalry. Aware of this fact, the General had already written twice to Edinburgh asking for reinforcements. The first batch, 600 strong, was commanded by one of the General's subordinates from the Anglo-Dutch Brigade, Colonel the Honourable George Ramsay. Ramsay's march did not accomplish very much. His orders were dated May 6th. The appearance of a Dutch herring fleet in the Firth of Forth, mistaken for a French invasion, delayed him a couple of days. Departing Edinburgh he crossed the Forth to Burntisland, but orders to render him assistance in the matter of supplies and transport were not sent round to the country magistrates until the 18th. On the 22nd he left Perth, taking the road that led to Blair Atholl and Dalwhinnie. The President of the Convention, Hamilton, assumed Ramsay would meet MacKay on the 24th, but on that date Ramsay was actually near Pitlochry, just short of the Pass of Killiecrankie on the road to Blair Atholl.

The Colonel encountered resistance from the men of Atholl and the Robertson clan (depending on whom one reads the resistance was fierce or imaginary). No word came from his superior; the Jacobites intercepted MacKay's instructions about which routes to take. Rumour led Ramsay to believe Dundee was between himself and MacKay, though the Jacobites were still at the muster in Lochaber. The night of the 24th, Ramsay decided to demolish his ammunition stocks and abandon his baggage, before retreating ignominiously to Perth. Unfortunately, before doing so (just before doing so) he wrote to MacKay announcing his imminent arrival at Ruthven Barracks, on the upper waters of the Spey River – a good day's march farther north!

[Details on this column are lacking, except for the fact they men were veterans and included Ramsay's battalion. In some accounts, Ramsay is said to have

been only 12 miles from Ruthven, but confusion has arisen because Ramsay took the same road a second time, in early June. Some accounts state that there was no opposition; Ramsay simply 'got the wind up'. However, the Grameid records two attempts by Ramsay to gain the Grampian plateau, each one repulsed by hostile clansmen. There is a record of a verbal message relayed to Ramsay from MacKay which authorised his retreat should circumstances required it, but even then he never told MacKay he was actually doing so.]

MacKay got Ramsay's letter on the 25th and acted accordingly, marching out on the 26th. Expecting a rendezvous and a movement back to Inverness, he took with him only two days' rations. His route lay southeast from Inverness by the vale of Moy to Carrbridge, about 32 Km southeast of Inverness. He left behind most of the friendly Highlanders, keeping with him 650 men: 150 of Colchester's Horse, 140 of Livingstone's Dragoons, 200 of (probably) his own regiment, and 200 of Reay and Balnagown's Highlanders (men of Sutherland and Ross, respectively).

Ruthven Barracks, sitting on a junction of the main trails passing through the central Highlands, was the first target for the Jacobites. It sat on the on the right bank of the Spey and exerted control over a well used crossroads. The garrison was small: a company of local men recently raised by its owner, the Laird of Grant, and commanded by a Captain Forbes. They were only there to act as guides for Colonel Ramsay. But from Dundee's point of view, if this blocking force could be removed there would be free communications with the Gordon lands.

[In 1692 Forbes delivered the order to conduct the massacre at Glencoe.]

On the morning of the 26th, he received a message from Captain Forbes stating that his enemy was approaching Ruthven from Garvamore, at the top of the Corrieyairack, about 19 Km southwest of Ruthven. The Highlanders had travelled over 40 Km in a single day. Dundee, unable to raise Badenoch because the locals feared the neighbouring Atholl men would pillage their farms if they left them, was busy harrying the glens himself as punishment.

At Carrbridge another runner informed the General that Ramsay had retreated to Perth. MacKay, stuck with his mere 650 men, debated sending a probe up the Spey or retreating to Inverness. From Carrbridge he shifted around a bit, moving 9 Km east to the farm of Coulnakyle, located on the right bank of the Nethy River, a right-bank tributary of the Spey near Grantown-on-Spey (the farm is about 1 Km from the Spey). From Coulnakyle he summoned the two remaining troops of Livingstone's Dragoons, last heard of at the town of Dundee. They would arrive on the 28th, by way of the coastal plain.

Ruthven, meanwhile, was invested by Keppoch while the main Jacobite camp was established at Raitts Castle 4.5 Km to the Northeast, on the left bank of the Spey. At Raitts, a celebration of the anniversary of the Restoration was held.

[Raitts Castle no longer exists, but it was near the present Balavil House, just off the A9.]

The first edition of Ruthven Barracks (it was 'improved' in time for the later Jacobite wars) was a decrepit building that bunked 40 men in abysmal conditions; it also served as a prison. Captain Forbes, about to undergo the assault, agreed to lay down his arms if MacKay did not relieve him in three days. MacKay not having appeared by June 1st, Ruthven surrendered. Forbes and his men were accorded honours of war. Ruthven was burnt down.

MacKay's own movements are not well described. His base remained at Coulnakyle. He visited Castle Grant, just north of Grantown-on-Spey, and secured an additional 200 Grant Highlanders. A portion of his force was then sent up the Spey on reconnaissance – it is variously described as his main body, General commanding, or a full detachment with or without the General, or a handful of Grant scouts. Based upon the weight of evidence, the most likely composition is the first one.

According to MacKay, his men made a twenty-four hour march to cut the enemy off from the Gordon lands, coming to within 2.5 Km of the

Jacobite camp, a 'night's march' northeast from Raitts. Inching forward another kilometre they went to ground about 4am on the 30th and rested until 10am, at which time MacKay reconnoitred the enemy camp. He found them batted down in a marsh within a wood and could not tempt them out. The *Grameid* describes a verbal encounter between the two sides, but the author transposed it to the following day, when Dundee challenged MacKay's rearguard with as little effect. The encounter probably took place about the western side of Loch Insh.

The *Grameid* also tells how the Highlanders took alarm during the night at a rumour they had either been outflanked by MacKay or had Ramsay on their tail. MacKay does record that at the first alarm Lochiel pulled back the Highlanders some 6 Km into the hills. This implies Dundee remained in his camp with his small band of cavalry, possibly wondering if his allies intended to return.

At about 4pm on the 30th MacKay fell back 7 Km northeast to a place called Kirk of Alvie, a defensible spot at the South end of Loch Alvie on the left bank of the Spey, about 26 Km southwest of Coulnakyle and 14 Km northeast of Raitts. Here the General wrote to the regiments of Berkeley's Dragoons at Forfar and Sir James Leslie's Foot at Coupar Angus, ordering them to join him by the coastal plain.

The Jacobites rested until the afternoon before approaching Alvie. The General was no longer there when the Jacobites arrived. He had retreated to Coulnakyle. A rearguard remained, but when Dundee hustled his troops into battle order it was dark, and the rearguard decamped under cover of night. This was the evening of the 30th of May. MacKay remained entrenched at Coulnakyle for three days. Terry (*Claverhouse*, pp. 295-296) describes it:

The Spey was in his rear. The Nethy secured his right. Abernethy Forest was on his front. And within these 'avenues' a 'pretty spacious plain' offered good ground for cavalry should he be attacked. His ally, the Laird of Grant, furnished 'as much housing as could cover' his infantry. MacKay kept his force in readiness for instant action; the horse bridled and saddled at night; outposts on every line of approach; scouts reporting 'every two hours at least.'

If MacKay's Right was on the Nethy with his back to the Spey, this means he was facing east or southeast on the northern side of the Nethy. This is entirely possible, as Dundee, coming from the South, passed him on the far, or eastern, side of the Abernethy Woods which lie south of the Nethy; the two armies remained about 5 Km apart at all times, and sometimes as much as 19 Km apart.

Dundee crossed the Spey at Kinakyle, a spot that is hard to identify but will have been a ford south of the Abernethy Woods and not near the better known crossing places of Aviemore or Boat of Garten which would otherwise have been mentioned. The Jacobites passed by or through the woods on June 1st. This put them between MacKay and the direct route out to the coast at Aberdeen. They camped about 5 Km away, probably still south of the Nethy.

The Jacobites were waiting for Keppoch. After completing the destruction of Ruthven, this 'rogue' had set himself a personal agenda. These were MacIntosh and Grant lands, so Keppoch was plundering and setting all to the torch. Dundee was not amused.

On the 2nd, Captain Forbes was released from bondage. What he saw on his way to MacKay's camp gave his General food for thought. After the surrender of Ruthven on the 1st of June Forbes must have been brought down by some of Keppoch's men and released at the Jacobite camp, because he passed through it, observing they were preparing to march. Dundee might have been planning to attack, or to move off northeast and raise the Gordons.

On the road to the Williamite camp Forbes encountered two members of Livingstone's Dragoons. One, a sergeant, was Lord Kilsyth's servant. They were bound for the Jacobite camp, but said they were on reconnaissance. Now, a little before this, some deserters from Dundee's army, who might have been spies, had under questioning

confirmed the plot to take Livingstone's Dragoons over to Dundee. When the servant and his companion returned, MacKay was almost sure, but decided it was safer to pretend to trust the regiment.

[To be clear, Sir Thomas Livingstone was loyal; it was Kilsyth, his namesake and lieutenant who was a secret Jacobite.]



[Abernethy Forest: remnant of the original Caledonian Forest.]

Toward the end of the day spies reported Dundee advancing toward the Williamites. This was news that had to be acted upon immediately. MacKay decided he had best not engage his opponent, for fear his cavalry would change sides in mid-battle. This, and the fact he had no supplies left, meant he had to retreat.

The Williamites decamped at midnight on June 2nd. The order of march consisted of a party of dragoons, then 200 grenadiers, 70 troopers from Colchester's, 200 of Lord Reay's and Balnagowan's Highlanders, and more dragoons. Placing Livingstone's Dragoons at the head and tail of the column was a deliberate choice, intended to demonstrate they were still trusted. But MacKay accompanied the lead elements, and Captain Balfour, whom it may be remembered prevented their desertion at the town of Dundee, was with the rearguard.

But, getting clear of the Jacobites by taking the direct route east round the South end of the Hills of Cromdale and over the Braes of Glenlivet was not possible. Dundee lay in the way. Also, that district was Gordon country, and in any case unsuitable for cavalry. Inverness was another possibility, but MacKay would have been isolated there and perhaps been forced to evacuate by sea. Therefore, the course the General adopted was a retreat down the of the Spey to Cromdale,

followed by a crossing of the Avon at Ballindalloch Castle, then a march to Balvenie Castle (at Dufftown on the Fiddich River), 36 Km from their last camp as the crow flies. They arrived in the early hours of the morning of June 3rd.

[The path to the Braes of Glenlivet leads to Tomintoul, the highest township in Scotland.]

Here they paused until 5pm while the men foraged and the roads were scouted. Some troops sent by the Master of Forbes and Gordon of Edinglassie joined them; Forbes brought more horsemen.

Among other parties, the General had dispatched a twelve-man patrol under Kilsyth's servant. This patrol had not returned by 5pm. This worried MacKay, so as soon as he had secured some provisions he set off again, not giving his men time to eat.

After short march (just over a kilometre) the Williamites crossed the Dullan Water, a small river running northeast out of Glen Rinnes into the Fiddich. After reforming, they had marched only about 800 metres farther when Dundee's cavalry, 150 strong, was seen heading for the same ford, his Highlanders close behind. Now the march became a fighting withdrawal.

Sir Thomas Livingstone was sent to the head of the Williamite column with instructions to keep up a fast but sustainable pace. MacKay stayed behind on a rise of ground with 50-60 of his own cavalry and 50 more under the Master of Forbes. This stance forced Dundee to conduct his crossing 'by the book', and when he had finally deployed for battle on the near bank, MacKay and the rearguard made off.

They had not gone far, however, when his nephew, sent off to the left to observe the enemy, returned with a warning that a body of horse was on that flank. They turned and made ready but it was the missing patrol. The sergeant in command pretended he had only just escaped Dundee – actually, he had ridden straight to him that morning and had guided him back to MacKay's camp!

[No reason is given for MacKay sending one of the men he knew to be an agent of the enemy on an independent patrol. Most likely, the General was not sure which officers were to be trusted and so followed the routine of allowing regimental officers to select the patrol leaders.]

The Jacobites, learning of MacKay's flight, had been in hot pursuit since MacKay broke camp at Coulnakyle. Dundee did not follow his enemy down the Spey, but went round the Hills of Cromdale and down the headwaters of the Avon to the village of Glenlivet. From here he could go north back to the Spey by Strathavon, or northeast to Balvenie. Meeting the false scouting party, he took the Northeast path, via Glen Rinnes and the Dullan Water, catching sight of MacKay's camp at 4pm. Like MacKay, he had made a march of nearly 40 Km in a single day, and the day was not yet over.

[Terry thinks the Williamites crossed the Fiddich after leaving Balvenie (it bends southward about 3 Km from Balvenie and they were on the left or western bank), but the lay of the ground and the distance travelled indicates they met Dundee when they crossed the Dullan Water. Dundee would have a hard time catching up with MacKay if he had come down by Glenfiddich, whereas Glen Rinnes is accessed directly from the village of Glenlivet. Also, Dundee could not have seen the enemy camp if coming down the Fiddich. The Williamites would still have to cross the Fiddich, but that happened later.]

The race continued. MacKay's men were exhausted, but Dundee's Highlanders cannot have been very fresh either. Fraser of Foyers was detached to harass MacKay's rear, but the enemy was moving so fast Dundee could not catch them until about 11pm, by which time it was too dark to see.

Breaking contact in the dark, MacKay crossed the River Bogie at 4am, after which he gave his men and horses two hours rest before moving them to Suie Hill, a well known landmark where the main north-south road crossed the watershed of the Bogie and the Don. From Balvenie they had marched another 20 Km due east, across the Fiddich and through the Daugh of Invermarkie, then down Strathdevron to Huntly

and the River Bogie. From Huntly to Suie Hill is another 26 Km. His men had marched more than 85 Km in under 36 hours.

Berkeley's Horse and Sir James Leslie's Foot rendezvoused with MacKay that day (4th June). The former arrived at noon and the latter at 6pm. This gave MacKay sufficient strength to turn about and become the Hunter.

The Williamites set out at 10pm that night, hoping to surprise Dundee, who was by the ruins of Edinglassie House, about 20 Km southeast of Suie Hill, near the village of Strathdon. Unwilling to come down onto the plain without cavalry superiority, Dundee must have continued following MacKay at a distance, keeping to the skirts of the hills. MacKay thought he might have been trying to intercept Berkeley's or Leslie's regiments.

Once again men from Livingstone's Dragoons warned the enemy, who made off while the Williamites were still 8 Km away. This time, MacKay had had enough. He arrested Lord Kilsyth and the others who seemed most in the plot.

Dundee 'sick of a flux', fell back to Cromdale (June 7th). His Highlanders plundered friend and foe alike. For two days while he lay ill his force remained concealed in the Abernethy Woods. MacKay, retracing his path, made Balvenie by nightfall on the 6th and Coulnakyle on the 7th.

[Dundee is sometimes said to have gone back the way he came, but surely from Edinglassie House it would have been easier and quicker to take the Lecht Road to the Braes of Glenlivet and so back to the Spey.]

In the pre-dawn hours of the 8th of June a small action was fought. Sir Thomas Livingstone had been ordered to chase off parties of foragers who were spoiling the property of the Laird of Grant south of the Nethy; Livingstone was told to take 200 troopers of his own regiment but also collected some of Berkeley's Horse. In the process of carrying out their orders the Williamites ran into a column of 2-300 foragers belonging to Clan MacLean, who were seeking Dundee's camp.

The clansmen, alerted by the approach of Livingstone's outriders, fled to a nearby hill, called Knockbrecht, where they made a stand. From the rather vague descriptions, the Williamites must have pursued the main body of clansmen, about 100 strong, to the knoll, then dismounted to assault them. They were beaten off. Casualties are debatable, MacKay saying the enemy lost 80-100 men against 7 of Berkeley's Horse, and Dundee saying the MacLeans only lost 6 baggage handlers. MacKay crossed the Nethy to support Livingstone, then all retired to Coulnakyle. Dundee sent out a detachment to collect the MacLeans.

[Knockbrecht is otherwise unidentified.]

On the 8th, MacKay was joined by Colonel Ramsay, who had at last reached the theatre of operations. The Colonel, taking the exact same road as before, passed to the west of both armies, met with no one, and saw nothing but the wreck of manor houses and burnt farms. He reached Ruthven on June 4th and arrived at Inverness the next day, before turning around and marching on Coulnakyle upon hearing of MacKay's return.

[Ramsay had suffered some desertions on his first retreat. This time he brought with him elements of Leven's Foot (200 men) and Hastings' Foot (100 men), plus 100 of Berkeley's Horse, in addition to his original force.]

The court-martials of the officers of Livingstone's Dragoons also took place on the 8th. A number, including Kilsyth, were committed to prison in Edinburgh. All but the ubiquitous sergeant appear to have been treated fairly leniently, since the opposing side was also 'playing fair' with prisoners. The sergeant was a Catholic, and possibly French.

[Kilsyth was later released. He married Dundee's widow. Sadly she was killed along with Dundee's young son when their lodgings collapsed; Kilsyth was badly injured too, and never really recovered.]

Meanwhile, Dundee retreated to Ruthven (8th June) and then down the Corrieyairack. MacKay followed, keeping a day's march behind.

Dundee intended to take up a position somewhere in Rannoch, but the Highlanders, now near home, were evaporating by the dozen. Bowing to the inevitable, their commander gave the entire army permission to disband, on a reminder that there was still work to be done. MacKay, learning of this but being out of supplies again, terminated his advance at Ruthven and returned down the Spey to Elgin.

Dundee arrived at Glen Roy on the 11th, where he remained some time. He had with him his cavalry and 400 MacLeans. Despite his illness and the rigours of campaigning that caused it, and despite the effervescent quality of his troops, King James' Lieutenant was apparently in good spirits, and optimistic of victory.

Waiting

Once encamped at Elgin, MacKay wrote first to the Lords of Convention, urging a policy that would be adopted over successive Jacobite risings: establish garrisons among the Highlanders. In particular he urged the construction of a post at Inverlochy, right in the heart of Lochiel's territory. Inverness, too should be continually garrisoned. As for the Northeast, he established a number of posts by quartering platoons and companies at the manors of disaffected notables.

[MacKay's suggestions were shelved. The Convention, wrapped up in religious questions, was uninterested in winning the war. That was MacKay's look out.]

At Inverness, MacKay left a strong garrison: a troop of Livingstone's (purged) Dragoons, 300 men from Leven's (200) and Hastings' Foot (100), and 200 Highlanders, all under Sir Thomas Livingstone.

The three battalions of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade he collected at Elgin while Berkeley's Dragoons were sent into Strathbogie. But these soon joined MacKay as he returned to Edinburgh. Colchester's Horse were sent south independently with the prisoners.

A small 'affair of outposts' took place at Braemar, where a party of 50 of Colchester's (or perhaps Forbes'), 50 of Berkeley's, and 60 Foot were sent to garrison the manor with 20 men. Braemar, on the upper River Dee, plugged a strategic route to the coastal plain and Aberdeen. The officer commanding had further instructions to go up the glen a further 5 Km and arrest a group of enemy officers who were reportedly on furlough from Dundee's army.

The Williamite officer carried out his instructions, but only after spending the night at Braemar; the Jacobite officers escaped. Worse, when the Williamites returned to Braemar and were taking their ease, the Jacobite officers followed with the local tenantry and shot at them from the rocks above their camp, stampeding their horses. The Williamites decamped. The Jacobites burned down the house to prevent its being used again.

In punishment, MacKay burned the lands of the principle landowner involved in the affair – Farquarson of Inverurie – sent 72 men to Abergeldie to intimidate the Farquarson clan, and quartered much of his remaining force in other posts along the Dee. He himself rode posthaste to Edinburgh, which he reached early in July. Already steamed by the failure of the Privy Council to adequately supply him, he found not only that his advice was being ignored, but that it was almost impossible to get the Council to prepare for the summer's campaign. In consequence, as he complained in his memoirs, Dundee was enabled to re-muster several thousand Highlanders and march on Perth. Only the latter's death prevented a disaster.

[The Convention had by now formed a government and disbanded. As before the Revolution, the Executive body was called the Privy Council.]

Dundee, currently living at Moy in Lochaber (about 10 Km northeast of Inverlochy), was busy concerting opposition to the Convention and again seeking aid from Ireland. His prospects seemed bright. MacKay's failure to defeat him was causing many to withdraw their support from King William's Administration, at least to the point of adopting a 'wait and see' attitude. Some lords had been cold-shouldered by the Convention, dominated as it was by the sectaries of

the Southwest and the Duke of Hamilton's cronies. In a letter to King James' 'Secretary for Scotland' Dundee wrote:

*"For the EARL of MELFORT.
Moy in Lochaber, June 27, 1689.*

When we first came out I had but fifty pounds of powder; more I could not get, all the great towns and seaports were in rebellion, and had seized the powder, and would sell none. But I had one advantage, the Highlanders will not fire above once, and then take to the broadsword. The advocate is gone to England, a very honest man, firm beyond belief; and Athol is gone too, who did not know what to do. Earl Hume, who is very frank, is taken prisoner to Edinburgh, but he will be let out on security. Earl Breadalbin keeps close in a strong house; he has and pretends the gout. Earl Errol stays at home; so does Aberdeen. Earl Marshall is at Edinburgh, but does not meddle. Earl Lauderdale is right, and at home. The Bishops, I know not where they are. They are now the kirk invisible. I will be forced to open the letter, and send copies attested to them, and keep the original, till I can find out our primate. The poor ministers are sorely oppressed over all. They generally stand right. Duke Queensberry was present at the cross, when their new mock King was proclaimed, and I hear, voted for him, though not for the throne vacant. His brother the Lieutenant General, some say is made an Earl. He has come down to Edinburgh, and is gone up again. He is the old man, and has abused me strangely, for he swore to cue to make amends. Tarbat is a great villain. Besides what he has done at Edinburgh, he has endeavoured to seduce Lochiel, by offers of money, which is under his hand. He is now gone up to secure his faction, which is melting, the two Dalrymples and others against Skelmarly, Polwart, Cardross, Ross, and others now joined with that worthy prince, Duke Hamilton. M. Douglas is now a great knave, as well as beast; as is Glencairne, Morton, and Eglinton, and even Cassillis is gone astray, misled by Gibby. Panmure keeps right, and at home, so does Strathmore, Southesk, and Kinnaird. Old Airly is at Edinburgh under caution, so is Balcarres and Dunsore. Stormont is declared fugitive for not appearing. All these will break out, and many more, when the King lands, or any from him. Most of the gentry on this side the Forth, and many on the other, will do so too. But they suffer mightily in the mean time; and will be forced to submit, if there be not relief sent very soon. The Duke of Gordon, they say, wanted nothing for holding out but hopes of relief. Earl of Dunfermline stays constantly with me, and so does Lord Dunkell, Pitcur, and many other gentlemen, who really deserve well, for they suffer great hardships. When the troops land there must be blank commissions sent for horse and foot, for them and others that will join."

[Nairne Papers]

On July 1st, King James at last dispatched 300 dismounted troopers of Cannon's Horse to the Western Isles. With them was Colonel Alexander Cannon, carrying a commission as a Lieutenant General; his regiment was commanded by Colonel Henry Purcell (so the regiment is sometimes called Purcell's Horse). There were also the Earl of Buchan, Viscount Frenndraught, Sir William Wallace of Craigie, and a number of other Jacobite officers and notable men who had been following King James about. Unfortunately, this small consignment was all James saw fit to send.

[Purcell's is often misnamed 'dragoons', but it was definitely a Horse regiment, dismounted. In this period both Horse and Dragoons frequently operated in that state.]

The regiment took ship on July 10th in three French frigates commanded by Monsieur de Quesne. The same day they were engaged by the Glasgow Frigates (as referred to in Dundee's letter). The action went well, de Quesne taking both privateers after each lost its captain. The expedition arrived at Duart Castle on the Isle of Mull on July 12th and were ferried across to the mainland. Their provision ships were not so lucky, falling in with a squadron of newly arrived English frigates. Cannon only managed to salvage 35 barrels of powder and shot. His troubles were not over. It took four days for the Irish to reach

Inverlochy at the head of Loch Linnhe, because they had to dodge the scouting parties of the local sheriff and his posse.

[Dundee tried to have the Irish land in Kintyre, even going so far as to send out false letters indicating they would land south of the Clyde, to draw off the local forces patrolling that peninsula. The plan seems to have spooked the Convention, but did not fool MacKay.]



[Duart Castle]

The clans were returning to the colours as well. By early July the Camerons and MacDonalds were under arms again, and the MacLeans were on their way to the rendezvous. Sir Alexander MacLean returned from a foray into Argyll, bringing 200 local men, mostly MacDonalds of Largie. As Dundee wrote to the powerful but undecided chieftain, MacLeod of MacLeod, about the 11th or 12th of July:

“Sra,—Glengaire gave me an account of the substance of a letter he received from yow I shall only tell yow, that if you hearken not to land your men, I am of opinion yow will have little occasion to do the king great service; for if he land in the west of Scotland, yow will come too late, as I believe yow will think yourself by the news I have to tell yow. The Prince of Orange hath wreaten to the Scots council not to fatig his troops any more by following us in the hills, but to draw them together in a body to the west; and, accordingly, severall of the forces that were in Pearthshire and Angus, are drawn to Edinr., and some of MacKay’s regments are marcht that way from him. Some of the French fleet hath been seen amongst the islands, and hath taken the two Glasgow frigats. The king, being thus master by sea and land, hath nothing to do but bring over his army, which many people fancy is landed alraidy in the west. He will have little to oppose him there, and will probably march towards England; so that we who are in the graitest readiness will have ado to join him. I have received by Mr. Hay a commission of lieutenant-general, which miscairied by Breidy. I have also received a double of a letter tniscairied by Breidy to me, and a new letter, dated the 18th of May; both which are so kind, that I am asham’d to tell. He counts for great services, which I am conscious to myself that I have hardly done my deutie. He promises not only to me, but to all that will join, such marks of favor, as after ages shall see what honour and advantage there is, in being loyall. He says, in express terms, that his favours shall vy with our loyalty. Ho bath, by the same letters, given full power of council to such councillors here, as shall be joined in the king’s service, and given us power, with the rest of his freends, to meet in a convention, by his authority, to counteract the mock convention at Edinr., whom he bath declaired traitours, and comanded all his loyall subjects to make warr against them; in obedience to which, I have called all the clannes. Captain of Glenrannald is near us these severall days; the laird of Baro is there with his men. I am persuaded Sir Donald is there by this. M’Clean lands in Morven to-morrow certainly. Apen, Glenco, Lochell, Glengaire, Keppoch, are all raidy. Sir Alexander and Largo have been here with there men all this while with me, so that I hope we will go

out of Lochaber about thre thousand. Yow may judge what we will gett in Strathharig, Badenock, Athol, Marr, and the duke of Gordon’s lands, besides the loyall shires of Bamf, Aberdeen, Merns, Angus, Perth, and Stirling. I hope we will be masters of the north, as the king’s army will be of the south. I had almost forgot to tell you of my Lord Broadalban, who I suppose will now come to the feelds. Dumbeth, with two hundred hors and eight hundred foot, are said to be endeavouring to join us. My L. Seaforth will be in a few dayes from Irland to rais his men for the king’s service. Now, I have layd the whole business before yow, yow will easily know what is fitt for yew to do. All I shall say further is, to repeat and renew the desyre of my former letter, and assure yow that I am,

*Sir
Your most humble servant,
Dundie.”*

MacPherson of Cluny was also undecided for a long time. Clan Chattan was still smouldering with anger against Keppoch, and his shenanigans in Badenoch that spring only fuelled the fire. In fairness, MacPherson had also fobbed off MacKay’s counter-summons with a plea of indisposition. He would eventually join Dundee, but only when the latter threatened to burn his lands. This was how the game was often played.

[July 14th.] “Sir, this I wryt to you to be comunicat to all the gentrey of Badenoch, so call them together; for from the head to the foot I will spair non that joyns not. The gentrey must march themselves, and I expect 400 men, and no expenses will be allowed. McIntosh, Grants, and all must come out.”

[Terry, pp. 321-322.]

On July 5th, the Williamite Earl of Argyle was authorised to raise his own clan to put pressure on Lochaber and the Isles. The Northern earls were also with the Government; they advised Dundee to abandon King James. That monarch’s Lieutenant remained sanguine. As Terry put it:

“That Londonderry had fallen, that James’s ships were turned towards England, that France was roused to serious effort, he believed, at least averred, to the end. Letters insistent upon an assured victory flowed from his prolific pen. Friendly chiefs were encouraged, the more backward were lectured into loyalty. His optimism was strengthened by the knowledge that James had learned the un wisdom of his earlier courses; that Melfort [the King’s odious Secretary of State] was discredited, and an over-riding Roman policy discarded. Death struck him down on the threshold of a prospect which broadened hopefully before him. The wide campaign was not set, its armies not in place. His own death pricked the bubble.”

[Terry, p.319]

[Dundee believed Londonderry had been taken, which was not so.]

Toward Legend

*Montrosio novus exoritur de pulvere phoenix,
Virtutis simul, et patrii cognominis haeres.*

*Lo! the Graham as a new Phoenix rises from the ashes of Montrose,
The heir alike of the valour and the name.*

[Grameid, .p.40.]

The Battle of Killiecrankie was not scripted, but a battle of circumstance. In the letter given above Dundee intimates his plan to gain control of the North. First, however, he would have to deal with MacKay. The latter was full of his scheme for establishing a garrison at Inverlochy which would effectively pacify Lochaber, but was harassed by the divisions within the Government. They seemed more concerned about the expulsion of Sir John Dalrymple from the Court of Sessions (for championing King William’s prerogatives over the republican notions of the Cameronians) than being slaughtered in the streets by wild Highlanders.

By the 12th of July the General was at Edinburgh arranging for his campaign into the Highlands. Two days before, King William had issued a warrant authorising pardons for 'rebellious' chiefs and lords if they submitted. The methods to be employed were left up to the men on the spot, and the politicians were talking concessions. But, using the carrot implies using the stick as well.

Originally, the General planned to join with the Earl of Argyle and campaign in the Campbell country, which was suffering from enemy raids. From Argyll, it was only a short hop to Lochaber, which was the center of the insurgency.

But a new threat suddenly presented itself much closer to home: the district of Atholl, on the borders of the Central Highlands. The district was home to the tenantry of the Marquess of Atholl and their neighbours, the Robertsons of Struan. There were also Stewarts, Fergusons, and Menzies. The Marquess alone could field 1,500 men if he chose; the district as a whole perhaps 4,000.

So far, dislike of the clans in Dundee's army and their lord's equivocal attitude had kept the tenantry at home, but with the new Government making a fool of itself, and especially, by its disregard of the Marquess, things were becoming a little dicey. The Marquess' son, Lord Tullibardine was – mainly to appease a nagging wife – loyal to King William and could be relied upon, but almost no one else.

[Tullibardine was a son-in-law of the Williamite Duke of Hamilton and also a close relation of King William.]

For this reason the General decided his next move should be a march up the Tay and Garry rivers to secure Blair Atholl, seat of the Marquess. Later, perhaps, the expedition could be reinforced and led over to Inverlochy to establish a garrison (if the Government ever voted the necessary monies).

Meanwhile, Dundee was also setting his sights on the district of Atholl. Strategically, its control would secure his southern flank while he advanced into the Northeast, and it would encourage the men of Badenoch to join him by taking away the threat of raids from that quarter – after all, the men of Atholl and Badenoch would then be allies. He knew the Marquess of Atholl was on his side, but too weak a character to commit himself; he had left his Jacobite bailie (estate agent), Stewart of Ballochinn, to act in his interests. Dundee was not sure of Tullibardine. He had already written once and received no positive reply, but this might just be another example of the Murray family's habitual caution.

On or about July 9th, therefore, Dundee moved his headquarters to Struan, home of the Robertson chief, just 7 Km west of Blair Atholl. He contacted Stewart of Ballochinn, ordering him to hold Blair Castle for King James. On the 10th Dundee wrote to the bailie's neighbours, promising King James' immanent landing in the West, which he himself believed in. Dundee sent 300 Jacobites from Kintyre and Lochaber (14th July) to strengthen Blair's garrison. They were aided by Halliburton of Pitcur and some 'associates' who had insinuated themselves into the castle as guests of the Marquess.

[Robertson of Struan missed Killiecrankie, but was the only chief to remain in arms for the entire rising.]

On the 16th Dundee travelled west to meet with the newly arrived Irish contingent. Neither he nor the Highlanders were impressed. These 'regulars' were poorly equipped and indisciplined, and they had brought no supplies. A feeling of depression and hesitation swept over the Jacobite camp when it was learned that King James would spare no more. On the 18th, a price of 18,000 'merks Scots' was placed on Dundee's head.

Meanwhile, Lord Tullibardine had offered to secure Blair for MacKay. It must be understood that the manor house did not belong to Tullibardine. As a matter of fact, there was a war of wills between him and his father's bailie, with Tullibardine commanding his vassals to 'live peaceably' and the bailie insubordinately telling him his House's interests lay with King James. The upshot was a blockade of the


family property by the eldest son of the House, using those of his tenants who continued to obey him.

Dundee's personal movements in this last week before the Battle of Killiecrankie are murky, but can be determined from his correspondence. It seems he was at Struan from the 9th of July on, conferring by letter with the bailie of Blair. He returned to Glen Roy and Inverlochy to meet the Irish and inspect his assembling army between the 16th and 18th. On the 20th he was back at Struan after sending a letter to Tullibardine on the 19th. From the 23rd, when he wrote a second letter to Tullibardine, through the 25th, he was visiting Cluny in an effort to persuade MacPherson to rise. Dundee continued to hope for a change of heart from the young Murray lord, writing a last time on the 25th, requesting an interview for a pair of officers:

"I have written often to your Lo. and not only desired yow to declare for the King, but endeavoured by reasons to convince yow that now is the proper time, which the state of affairs may easily show yow ; to all which I have never had any return from yow, by word nor writ, tho I can tell yow there is none of the nation has used me so, and I have tried all that have not already joy ned Major Gen. MacKay, on this side Tay, who have any command of men; yet, that I may leave nothing untried that may free me from blame of what may fall out, I have sent these gentlemen to wait on your Lo: and receive your positive answer."

[Terry, p.330.]

The officers were rebuffed. When they also reported MacKay was at Perth, Dundee foresaw the fall of Blair to the Government and immediately summoned what clansmen were to hand. He had no option now but to march into Atholl and take the castle 'by force' – that is, he expected Stewart of Ballochinn, to hand it over to him without a fight – before MacKay could arrive there.



Blair Castle as it stood in 1745-6 before being dismantled.

The importance of recording these movements is this: Dundee fought MacKay at Killiecrankie with only a portion of his strength, and this is often put down to pure chivalry and heedlessness; actually, he had no intention of attacking until his muster was complete, but the news that MacKay was ready to march north from Perth forced him to action. It was a matter of necessity, *not* choice.

Friday, July 26th, MacKay began his march, travelling by Stirling and Perth up the valley of the Tay toward Blair. His objective was the same as Dundee's: to take control of Blair Castle.

It was a march of about 20 Km northwest from Perth to Dunkeld, and about the same again from Dunkeld to the Pass of Killiecrankie; Blair was 5 Km farther on.

The General had with him 3,000 men: Balfour's, Leven's, MacKay's, Ramsay's, Kenmuir's, and Hasting's regiments of Foot, plus Kenmuir's and Belhaven's Troops of Horse. Kenmuir's and Leven's

Foot were understrength, raw, and commanded by civilians, as were the cavalry. Six additional troops of cavalry (two of Horse and four of Dragoons) were following behind, and MacKay also had a three-piece artillery train. The rest of his forces still garrisoned Deeside and the Northeast. There would have been no point in summoning them, as the Convention had not even supplied this small column adequately.

But Dundee's force was also slim. He had only 1,800 men, mostly MacDonalds and MacLeans, plus the men garrisoning Blair. Dundee's greatest asset was Sir Ewan Cameron of Lochiel, who accompanied him by special request although only 240 of his clansmen had arrived. There were also Cannon's 300 Irish. Perhaps 2,500 men in all.

At Blair Castle there were said to be strange doings afoot. In the words of General Stewart:

Lord Tullibardine, eldest son of the Marquis of Athole [sic], collected a numerous body of Athole Highlanders, together with three hundred Frasers, under the command of Hugh Lord Lovat, who had married a daughter of the Marquis. These men believed that they were destined to support the abdicated King, but were in reality assembled to serve the government of William. When in front of Blair Castle, their real destination was disclosed to them by Lord Tullibardine. Instantly they rushed from their ranks, ran to the adjoining stream of Banov, and filling their bonnets with water, drank to the health of King James, and then, with colours flying, and pipes playing, fifteen hundred of the men of Athole, as reputable for arms as any in the kingdom, put themselves under the command of the Laird of Ballechin, and marched off to join Lord Dundee, whose chivalrous bravery, and heroic and daring exploits, had excited their admiration more than those of any other warrior since the days of Montrose.

This story is apocryphal, or only half-true. Dundee got hold of the castle without a fight, but Tullibardine took many men with him when he fled south to MacKay. It is possible the 'fifth column' of 300 outsiders garrisoning the castle were the ones who broke ranks. The question then becomes, what happened to the Atholl men if they remained loyal to Tullibardine? They were not present at the battle; they did not even hold the Pass of Killiecrankie as MacKay requested. Nor were they present on Dundee's side. The answer is natural enough. They were busy hiding their cattle from the Lochaber men. After, they plundered the Williamite fugitives.

Dundee's march was rapid. He had no supply train to speak of. By the end of the 26th he was at Blair, bands of his Highlanders racing to join him. Tullibardine having taken himself off upon hearing of the enemy's approach, the Jacobites held a council of war in the castle. The debate centered over whether the Pass should be held against MacKay or whether the Highlanders should allow the enemy to deploy before attacking them. Dundee chose to wait.

As usual with Dundee, this decision is attributed to chivalry. In reality, many of his men were still on the march. Moreover, it was also sound military doctrine: do not attack the enemy *in* a defile, but as he exits from it. A defeat of the Williamites on the near side of the Pass would destroy them, whereas an inconclusive skirmish within the Pass, or at the southern entrance to it, would allow MacKay to make an orderly withdrawal.

The only tactical argument against the plan is that the Highlanders excelled at ambushes and would have been lethal if left to their own devices within the Pass. But, Dundee would have lost control of the battle and its aftermath. He managed to restrain the chiefs by appealing to *their* chivalry, saying that attacking an enemy before he deployed for battle would be unfair. He also assured them he had arranged that the Williamites would find a blocking force in their rear when they retreated.

At midnight on the 26th, a letter from Tullibardine arrived at MacKay's HQ. It stated that the Jacobites had control of Blair, but that the writer had placed watchers to keep the Pass open for the General. Unsure of the reliability of the locals, MacKay sent out 200 picquets

from his Dutch regiments under a Lieutenant-Colonel Lauder, who met neither friend nor foe and took over the job with his own men.

At dawn on Saturday, the 27th of July, MacKay resumed his march, encountering Tullibardine in person near the southern end of the Pass. Lauder meanwhile pushed his advance guard out of the defile, where they spotted a body of about 400 men under Sir John MacLean who had been sent down from Blair on reconnaissance.

MacKay reached the southern end of the Pass around 10am. Here he halted and sent 200 men of Leven's, along with their lieutenant-colonel, to reinforce Lauder. After a two-hour break for 'elevenses', the march resumed. The order of march was Balfour's, Ramsay's, and Kenmuir's Foot, Belhaven's Troop, Leven's Foot, MacKay's Foot with the HQ, the train, Annandale's Troop, and Hastings' Foot.

[The baggage horses numbered 1,200.]

The Williamite march was uneventful, except for one notable occurrence that is said to have occurred. A Jacobite by the name of Ian Ban Beg MacRaa fired a long shot across the river from the hills on the army's left flank and killed a horseman. The army debouched from the Pass without opposition and continued forward.

[There was a prophecy that whoever drew first blood would win the battle; this is the point of the sniper tale.]

Cath Raon Ruairidh: The Battle of the Field of Blood July 27th 1689

Like so many of the events described here, the Battle of Killiecrankie (in Gaelic, *Coille Creitheannich*, meaning the Aspen Wood) has multiple versions, even after setting aside the legends. All the historical accounts agree on the result, and most agree on the timetable. There are a number of small variations and one glaring difference: the orientation of the armies. General MacKay left an account, but he was writing from memory, based on a ground-eye view, not a satellite image.

One version has the Williamites facing to the right from their initial march column, with their backs to the Garry River and the Jacobites on the lower slopes of a hill above them, facing the river. The other version has the armies facing each other so that one flank lies toward the river and the other toward the hills: i.e. across the modern highway rather than along it.

The Wrong Position

Superficially, either deployment is possible. In fact, the former sounds the most promising from a tactical standpoint. When finding MacKay's route on a modern map, it must be borne in mind that they marched immediately beside the river, not by the path of the modern highway (the A9); there exists both a secondary road and a railroad bed, just by the river, which follow the route of the original track. In 1689 this 'secondary' route was the 'high road'.

The Pass of Killiecrankie is an extremely rugged spot, with cliffs overshadowing the River Garry and densely wooded slopes. Both north and south of the Pass the valley opens out, but it is still bound by high hills, impenetrable to the armies of the day. The Garry runs northwest to southeast here. About 5 Km away, west-northwest of the exit to the Pass of Killiecrankie is Blair Castle.

Exiting the Pass northward into Glen Garry, the river is on the left and there are low rolling slopes to the right. Immediately in front is a long haugh [*hoo*] or alluvial meadow stretching most of the way to Blair. The Garry cuts deep into this, so that the terrain is divided into three 'steps': the haugh, then a section of flattish ground (on which the A9 runs) at the top of a short but difficult slope, then the skirts of the high hills. This description is true if one looks to the right (northeast) or if one looks ahead (northwest), because the hills bounding the vale of the Garry curl toward the West.

A few farmhouses lay scattered through the vale. The most important for the narrative were Urrard House (then called Runraurie House),

and the farms of Aldclune and Lettoch. Aldclune, which is almost a hamlet, sits on the haugh, Lettoch is located on the upper slopes, and Urrard somewhat to the rear on the slope leading up from the river bank.

The upper slopes were mostly open ground, but the slope leading down to the river was covered in trees and scrub, and the haugh itself was boggy. Patches of bog also lay on the upper slopes.

On a map, visibility, apart from the trees, looks quite good, but for anyone marching on the track across the haugh it is difficult in spots even to see that there is a slope immediately on one's right. At Aldclune, the line of the crest becomes evident, but behind the crest is 'dead ground'; one can see the hills peeping over the crest, but not what lies between.

Within the bounds of the first choice of battlefield, the upper slope runs up to the base of a knobby hill called Creag Eallaich. On either side of Creag Eallaich is a burn, or stream, running down to the Garry. The northwestern one is the Allt Chluain (hence, Aldclune Farm). The southeastern one is called Allt Girnaig. The Allt Chluain runs out of a saddle between Creag Eallaich and another hill nearer Blair called Sithean.

Now, when reading MacKay's account and looking at a map (or even walking the ground) one can make the assumption that the Jacobites, coming from Blair, made a wide flanking movement east that led via the back of Sithean over the saddle to the back of Creag Eallaich, then over the latter to take up position on her lower slopes. If this was the case, then when MacKay saw them crossing the saddle he faced right, got his men up the first slope from the haugh to the level, so that the Jacks would not pin him close against the river, and thus the two armies faced one another with MacKay roughly along the A9 and the Jacobites about a musket shot away up the lower slopes of Creag Eallaich. Both armies would be between the two burns, with MacKay's Left by Aldclune and Urrard House behind his center.

This deployment puts the Williamites in a deadly situation. They cannot advance to Blair or retreat through the Pass without being attacked in flank. The Jacobites can, if pressed, retreat into the hills and escape, while their downhill assault can break the Williamite line and rout the whole army.

Thus, this deployment is the one often given in the accounts. However, there are some minor issues which point strongly toward an alternative deployment. To take them from last to first in point of time, the Highlanders did not charge until nearly sunset, and among other reasons for this the sun was said to be in their eyes. But, in this position it would not be in their eyes *until* sunset, and even then only slantingly.

Also, there is an account in the clan histories that an advance party marching straight from Blair got into Aldclune Farm before the armies deployed. That would be the MacLeans spotted by Lauder's Fusiliers. They were pushed out by Lauder, probably before the main Williamite body appeared, since MacKay does not mention any skirmish while he was present on the field. But the presence of the enemy advance guard down by the river would suggest to MacKay a threat coming from the direction of Blair and not from his flank, so he would deploy accordingly. Since the Jacobites then made a frontal assault, MacKay clearly made the right choice.

Finally, a flanking movement under cover from Blair to the slopes of Creag Eallaich would involve marching about 6 Km between the time the Williamites were reported exiting the Pass, which they did around 2pm, and the hour of 5pm, when the two sides were at last formed up facing one another. It is not impossible to travel 6 Km cross-country in three hours, but time would have been wasted while the scouts reported, the men mustered, Dundee gave a speech, and so on. Highland armies *moved* faster but took longer to *get* moving than regular troops. At 5pm MacKay was just completing his deployment but the Jacobites were already in position. In the first version it would

MacKay who was prepared first. Also, a close study of the description of the 'flank march' suggests a much shorter manoeuvre.

The 'True' Position

Both Terry and Smurthwaite assume the alternative position, which also fits the General's description more closely. This is to deploy MacKay's army across the A9 from the edge of the slope descending to the haugh, just southeast of Aldclune, on a line through Lettoch Farm. Terry has the line stop at Lettoch while Smurthwaite places the famous 'gap' in MacKay's line at Lettoch and has an extension beyond it. (In the other deployment this gap is at Urrard House, so in both cases it involves buildings.)

[As old a work as Cassell's general History also recounts this version of the deployment.]

From a calculation of the frontage, Smurthwaite seems to be correct. However, Smurthwaite puts the Jacobites in front of Aldclune; Terry's assessment that MacKay actually formed up on an oblique line – i.e. with his left closer to Aldclune – makes more sense. The Jacobites were facing this line, roughly equidistant along its length (which also makes more sense); all other factors, such as the hill in back of them, apply here, too.

All the preliminary movements fit this deployment equally well. The preliminary skirmish at Aldclune adds weight to Terry's angled deployment. The 'sun in the eyes' issue becomes possible (though it would affect the *Williamites* as the day wore on). MacKay's initial observations of the Jacobite advance fit the picture. Finally, the Jacobite 'flanking movement' becomes a much more creditable 3 Km march to a position on a reverse slope, after which they crest Sithean rather than Creag Eallaich and come down to within 'musket range' of the Williamites.

With these dispositions, MacKay is not lined up on the flat with the Highlanders on a slope above him. However, MacKay did not write that he was deployed on flat ground, only that he 'prevented the inconvenience' of the Jacobites lining the crest of the lower slope leading to the haugh by scrambling up that slope in haste and that he then 'got a ground fair enough to receive the enemy, but not to attack them, there being, within a musket shot to it, another eminence before our front' [*Memoirs, p.51*].

Both armies were deployed on sloping ground that rose toward the North, but the Williamites were on a shallower section and lower than the Jacobites. This would be where the Allt Chluain causes an undulation in the ground.


The Approach

It is about 2 Km from the exit of the Pass to Aldclune along the river track. Once his men began to debouch, MacKay sent Belhaven's Troop to reinforce Colonel Lauder's 200 fusiliers and scout ahead. He himself stopped in a cornfield between Urrard's House and the river, roughly where Claverhouse's Monument is now located (placed there on the assumption that the Williamites had their backs to the river). The General was waiting for his 1,200 baggage animals to clear the Pass, because Hastings' Regiment and Annandale's Troop were behind them. His other troop and five battalions fell out to rest in the cornfield.

According to MacKay, Lauder found a high point a little to the right of Aldclune, probably a cove that still exists just to the right of the A9 and not far from the Allt Chluain. MacKay says this was 'several hundred' paces in front of him; 600 paces would be about 900 meters, which is about the distance required.

[The location of this OP is one reason for assuming the Williamite line was farther forward than Smurthwaite puts it.]

What Lauder saw at his observation post was parties of Highlanders about a kilometre and a half away 'advancing from the direction of Blair' – that is they were already on the forward slope of Sithean. Not only did the hill rise steeply behind them, it also rose toward the



JACOBITE FORCES (LG Graham of Claverhouse)

Left Division

- 1: Horse (LG Graham of Claverhouse)
- 2: MacDonald of Sleat
- 3: Mixed Battalion (MacLeans, Stewarts, MacNeils)
- 4: Camerons

Right Division

- 5: MacDonnells of Glengarry
- 6: MacDonalds of Clanranald
- 7: Cannon's (Purcell's) Irish Horse (dismounted)
- 8: MacLeans of Duart
- 9: Baggage (at Blair Atholl)

WILLIAMITE FORCES (MG MacKay)

Left Division (Brigadier Balfour)

- A: Lauder's Picquets (200 fusiliers)
- B: Balfour's Foot
- C: Ramsay's Foot
- D: Kenmuir's Foot

Right Division (MG MacKay)

- E: Leven's Foot
- F: MacKay's Foot
- G: Hastings' Foot
- H: Dets of fusiliers from all regiments

Artillery

- I: 3x leather guns

Cavalry

- J: Annandale's Troop of Horse
- K: Belhaven's Troop of Horse

- L: Baggage



Pass of Killiecrankie

Jacobite Left (i.e. away from the river) so that everywhere they were in a higher position than the Williamites, and more so on their left.

The General galloped up to observe. Hastings' Foot had not yet arrived, but seeing how close the enemy were he gave orders for his men to draw ammunition and fall in. While they did so MacKay examined the ground and the movements of the enemy. It seemed as if Dundee might be trying to get on his right flank, in which case the battle would be actually *be* fought according to 'deployment version number one', except that the Jacobites would be on the crest of the *lowest* slope above the haugh, and 'within carbine range' before MacKay's regiments could fire at them. Already, there were parties within 400 meters or so of his observation post, farther to the Northeast – not yet on his flank but soon to be so. (400 meters away but more to the Northeast would place them just on the near side of the Allt Chluain, which is not an obstacle of significance.)

[This is another reason for assuming MacKay's line ran obliquely from southwest to northeast instead of south to north.]

MacKay had to move his regiments forward quickly. This was done, the battalions climbing the rough slope from the haugh and falling in along a line, as Terry calculates, from Lauder's OP up to a spot just behind Lettoch Farm, and (as Smurthwaite has it) some distance farther along the same line, which puts the end quite far up the slopes of Creag Eallaich.

MacKay had 3,000 men (by his own count, not the paper strength of 4,500 that historians routinely quote). Because of this he decided to deploy in three ranks instead of the usual six. This gives a frontage (at one meter of space per man) of 1,000 meters. Allowing for normal battalion intervals and a rather large gap at Lettoch Farm, this yields perhaps 1,100 to 1,200 meters, matching Smurthwaite's estimate. The troops are said to have given a general 'shout of defiance' when they were all formed up.

Hastings' was the last to arrive, after the rest of the line had fully deployed, but in the event this was not an issue. MacKay writes of adjusting Balfour's position at the other end of the line because it was too advanced, but again the Jacobites did not interfere. Fixed in front, the Highlanders simply ceased their attempt to flank MacKay and ranged themselves opposite, upslope and out of effective musket range.

Dundee had been kept apprised of MacKay's movements by friends within the latter's army, and by local spies. After first testing his Highlanders' mettle by calling a false alarm (with outstanding results) he mustered them that morning on the castle grounds, gave a speech, then led them by way of the lower end of Glen Tilt, to the north of a famous manor house called Lude, then over the reverse slope of Sithean, which forms the southeastern flank of Glen Tilt.

[Lude House was one of Bonnie Prince Charlie's last pit stops.]

Perhaps his intention really had been to deploy on Creag Eallaich. However, this meant crossing the Allt Chluain saddle, and upon cresting the first hill MacKay's forces would be in view. The Jacobites would be loosely spread out over the slope, advance parties making for Aldclune as well as Creag Eallaich.

(It should be remembered that Highland armies, although they fought in battalions and were often commanded by men with experience of modern warfare, did not march in strict columns or deploy in strict lines. Even when armed with muskets they moved and fought in 'clumps'.)

The Deployments

The General's deployment is not given consistently in the sources. The best accounts, including his own, give it as, from the Left:

Left Wing

Lauder's Picquets (200 men) at the OP; the unoccupied ground on the haugh below their left was marshy and covered by fire from the OP.
Balfour's (660 men)
Ramsay's Foot (660 men)
Kenmuir's Foot (770 men)

Right Wing

Leven's Foot (870 men)
MacKay's Foot (550 men)
Hasting's Foot (860 men); the regiment's right flank being open, detachments of fusiliers from each battalion were sent to reinforce it.

The numbers given add up to 4,570. By MacKay's own account that total is far too high, and must be a paper strength (or even an attempt by the chroniclers to make the numbers come out 'right'). The 200 picquets should be cut from the regimental strengths, too. But the numbers have been included to give an idea of relative size among the battalions.

The baggage was stationed at a blacksmith's house near the mouth of the Pass, under light guard.

Brigadier Balfour had command of the Left, and MacKay the Right. This division of labour was made because of boggy ground that made it hard to gallop up and down the full length of the line.

The Williamite regiments were arranged by half-battalions, with the three rearmost ranks arranged on each unit's (left?) flank, making each regiment only three ranks deep (remember, this is not the age of the bayoneted flintlock and the three or two-rank line, but a time when musketeers were still supported by at least some pikemen and depth was desirable). Even with these extensions there were intervals between the battalions and there was a wide gap between the two wings.

Annandale's and Belhaven's Troops were deployed in reserve facing the 'Lettoch gap' (50 of Annandale's on the right and 60 of Belhaven's on the left). In the gap itself was the three-piece leather-gun battery. MacKay had three reasons for this odd positioning of his Horse. First, the men were raw, while the Jacobite Horse, though fewer in number, were highly skilled, a mix of regulars from Dundee's old regiment and gentlemen volunteers. Second, he did not want them being shot at – they would have bolted. Third, it was his intention to have the Troops sally and flank any body of Highlanders that were held in front of the neighbouring battalions.

[The artillery is often said to have been poorly sited. Perhaps the field of fire was obscured by farm structures, but more likely, they were simply pointing at a higher slope, where the rounds could not skip.]

Dundee's forces were also arranged in two wings, in their clans. From his Right these were:

Right Wing

A battalion of MacLeans under Sir John MacLean of Duart (200 men)
Cannon's (Purcell's) Horse (dismounted; 300 men).
The MacDonalds of Clanranald (480 men).
The MacDonells of Glengarry (300 men, with Alexander MacDonell carrying the Royal Standard).

Left Wing

Lochiel's Camerons (240 men).

A second battalion of MacLeans and mixed clansmen (200 men, including 130 Stewarts of Appin and some MacNeils of Barra) under Sir Alexander MacLean.

Sir John MacDonald of Sleat's regiment (400 men commanded by MacDonald's son and one Sir George Berkeley).

There were also a number of high-ranking volunteers, including the Earl of Dunfermline, who were mounted and joined the Horse.

Dundee and his cavalry (usually cited as about 40 men under Sir William Wallace of Craigie) deployed on the far left, behind the MacDonalds of Sleat.

[Wallace got command of the Horse instead of Dunfermline through a piece of classic 'jobbery' on the part of Lord Melfort (King James' Secretary of State). Melfort was Wallace's brother-in-law. Dundee was not happy but could do nothing about it.]

Dundee did not have enough men to cover MacKay's front without also thinning his ranks or leaving large gaps. The first option would be useless with an army that relied on shock combat. Even if they did form a thin line, the Highlanders would naturally bunch behind their leaders, some of whom were in armour, creating gaps. So, Dundee arranged the clans with wide gaps to begin with. Each 'battalion' was given a Williamite battalion as its target (the Camerons and the mixed battalion charged together). His total frontage was about 1,300 meters – slightly overlapping MacKay on the latter's right.

The only significant gamble in Dundee's deployment was to leave a very wide space between his wings, opposite Leven's regiment.

[This is probably why Alexander MacDonell had the Standard; it improved Dundee's command and control.]

The Battle

It was about 5pm before both sides were fully deployed. The battle opened with a prolonged but desultory crackling of musketry evolving from the Highlanders' attempts to bring down MacKay as he rode along the front inspecting his men:

"finding every thing in readiness to receive the Highlanders, [MacKay] addressed his battalions in an appropriate speech, earnestly beseeching them to stand firm in their ranks, assuring them that if they did so they would soon see the Highlanders turn their backs; but if, on the contrary, they suffered the line to be broken, they would be undone. As the General was a very pious man, he concluded with some observations of a religious tendency. While he was thus engaged the Viscount of Dundee was equally busy ranging his men in order of battle, and his Lordship was particularly distinguished among his officers by a favourite dun-coloured horse which he rode, and by his armour, glittering in the sunbeams."

[Historic Tales, p. 451]

The shooting lasted perhaps three hours. MacKay figured the Jacobites were waiting for nightfall, when they would be able to rush his men in the gloom and panic them. He ordered his cannon to open fire, hoping to provoke an early attack, but Dundee managed to keep his men in check. Though the fire 'galled' the Highlanders each carriage broke after its gun's third shot. Leather guns were a neat idea in theory.

It was perhaps 7:30pm when a party of 60 Camerons got into some buildings near to MacKay's line and in front of the latter's own regiment. These would be the complex known as the Mains of Orchil. The General dispatched his nephew, a captain in that regiment, to clear them out with a small detachment, which the men did with great gallantry, killing some.

[An eyewitness account says the houses were occupied to forestall a perceived flank-ward movement on the part of the Williamites. That could be the arrival of Hastings' Foot or the appearance of the reinforcing picquets, though both of those movements seem to have occurred much earlier.]

Eight o'clock came without a general engagement. MacKay was torn. He knew he had to prevent the Highlanders from making a night attack which would completely unman his levies, but could not bring himself to order an uphill advance, which would require careful supervision and would quickly tire his inexperienced men. He stood pat.

Ironically, Dundee was now being pressured to hold off until the morrow. His men were tired, and a large number of reinforcements were expected from the West. He pointed out that if they delayed, MacKay would gain the use of at least four more troops of cavalry, which would outweigh the Highlanders' innate advantages. Even after the chiefs accepted his decision, they reportedly begged him not to endanger himself; he ignored the request.

At last, shortly after 8pm, just as the Cameron firing party returned to the line, chased partway by Captain MacKay's detachment, the signal for the general advance was given. The priests blessed the ranks and after a strongly worded exhortation to his men, Dundee rode forward. The pipes struck up and the battalions advanced at a walk; the shriek of the pipes rose to a scream and the men began to run forward, yelling blue murder. Dundee and his horsemen rode flat out toward the enemy line. The rapidity of the charge was astonishing:

"It was with the most intense anxiety that General MacKay beheld the sun rapidly sinking toward the horizon, and when this feeling was excited to the highest pitch he perceived an extraordinary motion among the Highlanders, and all at once they moved slowly down the hills barefooted and stripped of their coats. They soon rushed forward with tremendous fury, uttering such a yell as the wild solitudes of Killiecrankie probably never before heard. They commenced the attack by a discharge of their firearms and pistols, which, on account of their being drawn up without regard to regularity made little impression on MacKay's men who were marshalled according to the strictest rules of discipline then followed, and who reserved their fire until within a few paces of the Highlanders, when they poured it into them. They discharged in platoons, they were enabled to take a steady aim, and their fire told with dreadful effect on the disorderly masses opposed to them."

But this was almost all they were allowed to do. At that time the present plan of fixing the bayonet was not known, and before the troops had time to screw their side-arms on their guns, and present a shining array of steel to their assailants, the Highlanders rushed in upon them sword-in-hand."


[Historic Tales, p.454.]

Cameron of Lochiel is supposed to have encouraged his men with a longwinded mockery of the feeble counter-shout put up by the Williamites. The battle lasted only a few minutes. According to MacKay, his men, with the exception of Hastings' and Leven's regiments, "behaved like the vilest cowards in nature".

[Some accounts say the charge took place at 7:30pm, but MacKay says about an half hour before sunset. What they call Apparent Sunset was at 8:35pm for that date and latitude.]

Terry and Smurthwaite make the point that the angle of the slope would tend to channel the Highlanders to their right; thus Hastings', though its flank was exposed, was untouched, while the battalions on MacKay's Left took the full impact. Terry notes that the MacDonalds of Sleat routed MacKay's Foot although the Camerons initially fronted that unit. Sir Alexander MacLean took MacKay's Standard.

On the Jacobite side possibly 400 men were felled by musket fire, mainly on the Williamite Right. Balfour's wing does not seem to have been particularly active. MacKay gave no general order to fire. He had already instructed the regiments to open up at a range of 150 meters (100 paces). Firing was to be 'by platoons' in the Dutch manner – i.e. a continuous rolling fire, staggered along the line. Not every regiment fired as it should have, but those that did worked a wonderful execution. One chieftain took a bullet in his shield and picked himself



off the ground with the words “Och! Sure the *boddachs* are in earnest!”

The Highlanders’ return fire, which was not volley fire but ragged shooting by individuals armed with a variety of ‘civilian’ weapons, was ineffective. Once the Highlanders closed, though, it was simple butchery. As soon as a man discharged his ‘shooting iron’ he ran forward again with sword or axe. The men in the rear ranks had no firearms but carried a mixed bag of hand-to-hand weapons.

“There were scarcely ever such strokes given in Europe as were given that day by the Highlanders. Many of General MacKay’s officers and soldiers were cut down from the skull and neck to the very breasts; others had skulls cut off above their ears like night-caps; some soldiers had both their bodies and cross-belts cut through at one blow; pikes and small swords were cut like willows; and whoever doubts of this may consult the witnesses of the tragedy.”

[Historic Tales, p.456.]

Leven’s regiment was only partially engaged as the Camerons hewed down its right half-battalion. Hastings’ was also ignored as the MacDonalds of Sleat stormed into MacKay’s Foot instead. At the other end of the line, Balfour’s Foot never even fired a shot, and neither did the left half-battalion of Ramsay’s. The troops fled down to the haugh and back along the track to the Pass, and their enemies pursued. Some forded the Garry or wandered lost in the woods along its near bank.

[A possibly apocryphal story has the colonel of Leven’s horse bolting and carrying him ‘six miles’ down the road before he could master it. He at least came back in time to command the regiment and lead it off the field with MacKay.]

Dundee charged straight for the enemy Center, cutting to the right, across the front of his own line. He was followed by the Earl of Dunfermline and sixteen troopers. It was here, as he crossed in front of MacKay’s Regiment, that he met his end, shot through the body by a musket ball that passed between the plates of his cuirass. He fell almost unnoticed as the tide rolled on.

MacKay reacted to the oncoming rush by ordering Belhaven’s Troop to flank the mass of Highlanders attacking Kenmuir’s, then ordering Annandale’s to flank the Highlanders charging Leven’s on the right. Belhaven’s rode out, balked at what they saw, tried firing their carbines and pistols, then turned about and fled, careening into Kenmuir’s, which also ran.

Annandale’s apparently collided with Dunfermline and his sixteen men, who routed them instantly. Annandale’s vanished, and Dunfermline rode on to capture the dismounted Williamite cannon.

MacKay, meanwhile, seeking to both stimulate Belhaven’s and break through the mass of Highlanders descending on him, charged forward, calling on the Troop to rally to him. Only one of his servants followed, and that man had his horse shot out from under him. By then Belhaven’s were long gone. By the time the General got through the lines and turned around, there was no one left save the dead and dying, and the Highlanders were away off in the distance, plundering his baggage.

[There is a story of a conversation General Wade had with a Highlander thirty years later. The Highlander insisted MacKay could have beaten them if he had only put his baggage in front of his army.]

Sneaking Off

MacKay took some heart from discovering a small portion of his force still intact – he thought for a minute he was entirely alone. This was Leven’s (including their colonel and his staff), who were on his right. Some fugitives had rallied to them as well.

A little later he discovered Hastings’. The regiment was in motion, having wheeled right to ward off a flank attack and apparently shifted some way down the hill; they were now regaining their initial position. Given the ‘flow’ of the Jacobite assault, this flank attack has to have

been an attempt by Wallace and the remaining Jacobite Horse, which did not follow Dundee. The split may have been a deliberate attempt to envelop MacKay’s Right. The fact that they only had 40 horsemen does not make this any less likely. In these battles cavalry was ‘golden’. MacKay’s line was extremely thin and it would have already been overborne by the Highlanders by the time his flanks started to be rolled up.

[Once again, weight is added to Terry’s and Sumrthwaite’s disposition, since in the ‘backs to the Garry’ version the Jacobite Horse would probably have just gone off and plundered the baggage without attacking Hastings’ first.]

Hastings’ colonel thought many of the fugitives had a sporting chance of escaping, seeing the enemy had stopped to plunder. Many, too, had been seen down by the Garry. MacKay’s nephew, who had been left for dead, also survived; he had eight broadsword cuts to his body. Clearly, no one was in charge on the enemy side: had Dundee fallen?

The General’s small command stood until nightfall, disorganised but unmolested, while he tried to round up some of his routed men. He had only 400 still under arms. His nephew reported finding a few soldiers alive, but that even some of the officers pretended not to notice when he ordered them to rejoin MacKay. The battlefield was strewn with live plunderers as well as dead men.

MacKay’s solution to his predicament was a novel one, usually more suited to dealing with a pack of hungry dogs. At first he thought of entrenching at Urrard House, but concluded that would only mean having to surrender the following day. But while he was musing over what to do, he saw what he hoped were Lauder’s picquets skulking in their wood at the bottom of the slope. It turned out to be a body of enemy Highlanders instead, so he very calmly turned his horse and walked it slowly back to his own men. The Highlanders did not chase him. That gave him an idea.

It was twilight now, perhaps 9:30 or 10pm. In the dark, MacKay hoped to bluff his way out. Telling his men not to show fear or they would be torn apart, he had the two regiments close ranks and march slowly but steadily down to the Garry. On the way they picked up Lord Belhaven, two officers from Annandale’s, and some mounted troopers. They crossed the Garry by a ford which these seem to have discovered.

MacKay was the last to cross, and as he turned back to see if there was any pursuit he is supposed to have seen a gigantic Highlander standing in the ford, wielding a Lochaber axe and challenging him. MacKay ordered his servant, who was a match in strength, to deal with the man. The servant lopped off the enemy soldier’s head with a single blow, with the words, in Gaelic, “this is hard work, my father’s brother!”

[MacKay, remember, was a Highlander himself, so such a story, whether true or not, is at least believable. His servant may well have been the son of a foster-brother.]

Counselled to regain the Pass and head for Perth, MacKay decided instead to break out over the hills. It was not an easy job picking their way in the middle of the night. After mounting the first of the slopes on the west of the Pass they descended into the valley leading to Loch Tummel, a march of about 3 Km. Here they bumped into Colonel Ramsay and 150 of his regiment, unarmed and utterly lost.

Continuing on, they came to a hamlet, possibly Fincastle (if so, this indicates a march to the Southwest) where they obtained directions. MacKay had to threaten the men of Ramsay’s with execution to prevent them deserting; many did slip away, only to fall prey to the locals, who murdered them for their fine red coats.

By that morning, after a 13 Km ‘hump’ over the hills into the next valley – the valley of the Tay – MacKay and his men found safety at Weem Castle, seat of the Menzies; the chief was a personal friend, although his son had led a company of Highlanders on the Jacobite side of the battle! They resumed the march on Sunday, July 28th, following the Tay to reach Perth on the Monday.

Bayonets

Among military students Killiecrankie is famous for one thing: plug bayonets. They were introduced as a replacement for the pike, which required a good deal of training to use properly. Unfortunately, because the bayonet had to be jammed into the muzzle it turned one's firearm *into* a pike. Extracting the bayonet was not easy.

General MacKay agitated for a better version of the weapon after witnessing his infantry being overrun as they ceased firing and attempted to fix bayonets. The ring bayonet, which hooked over the muzzle and allowed the weapon to be fired while it was affixed was already in service on the Continent, so the General's claim to have invented it seems doubtful, though he may have introduced improvements.

[Jacques François de Chastanet, Marquis de Puysegur (1656-1743) is credited with the invention of the ring bayonet in 1678, but it was not in general service.]

The Williamites' bayonets were a contributing factor but not the primary cause of their defeat. That was a combination of inexperience with Highland modes of fighting and an extremely thin line. Plug bayonets were typically issued to fusiliers, grenadiers, and dragoons. Stock infantry units still carried a significant proportion of pikes. Hastings' Regiment and Leven's militia regiment are reported to have used pikes successfully, and continued to fire at targets within range, suggesting they had few plug bayonets. In contrast, the 'elite' units of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade, whom MacKay calls 'fusiliers', were broken because they had fewer pikes; with a three rank line, every man needed a bayonet or pike, and they had no time to fix bayonets.

[Curiously, the clan battle of Maol Ruadh the previous year is said to have been fought on similar lines, and with similar results (Clan Chattan being supported by a company of Government-equipped Highlanders).]



[Plug Bayonet, c1690]

The Bill

The death of Dundee ultimately spelt the end of the war in Scotland, though it fizzled on for some time. But for the moment, MacKay was in a bad way. He had lost an estimated 2,000 men killed (alternatively 1,000) and 500 prisoners. Though the battlefield was littered with bodies, most of the losses came in the rout down the Pass, which was also strewn with bodies and equipment tossed aside. MacKay's brother was killed at the head of his regiment. Brigadier Balfour was supposedly butchered by a sword-wielding Catholic priest for refusing to surrender (the priest did such execution in the pursuit that his hand became frozen to the hilt of his sword and they had to cut off the basket to free it).

On the Jacobite side the vital loss was Dundee, but many of the chief men of the various clans were also slain. One, MacDonald of Largo,

perished with his tutor and all his sons. Sir Donald MacDonald of the Isles lost five cousins. The men of Glengarry apparently suffered the most. The Camerons lost half their strength to Leven's fire, so if Glengarry suffered more, they may have lost up to three quarters of their numbers. Halliburton of Pitcur fell alongside Dundee either in the charge or as they were moving his body away from the vicinity of Leven's Regiment.

MacKay estimated the Jacobites lost six men for every one of his, which is hyperbole, since that would mean they lost some men twice over; still, casualties were extremely heavy, usually given as 600. The low estimate of Jacobite casualties is 200.

If MacKay lost 2,500 men out of 3,000, his losses were around 80%, which is an incredibly high figure. If the Jacobites lost, say 400 initially and another 200 in close combat, that would be 24%, which is sufficiently painful for such a small battle.

MacKay was of the opinion that Leven's and Hastings' stood not only because they were not under great pressure, but because they had a higher proportion of officers. He also felt that the 'Dutch' regiments had too many Scotsmen, whereas Hastings' was an English unit. As previously mentioned, Terry believes MacKay's Left absorbed most of the blow because of the shape of the ground. The plug bayonet issue has already been discussed.

This was an epic battle, and it spawned epic tales. Dundee is said to have ridden the Devil (in the shape of a horse) through MacKay's Regiment and broken it singlehandedly before being killed by a silver button fired from a musket – as a result of an Infernal Pact he was supposedly immune to lead or cold iron.

[The button would have been pewter, not pure silver. Also, Dundee's horse was white, not black, which seems odd for the Prince of Darkness.]

As for the more mundane tales, he was either shot as he was riding back up the hill to bring down Sir Donald MacDonald's regiment which for some odd reason was not advancing. Or, he was shot but ignored the wound and while directing the action from a knoll called the Mound of Clavers suddenly keeled over. Or, after falling from his horse he was carried into a nearby farmhouse, spent the night there, wrote a letter describing the battle to King James, and, in the morning, informed of his total victory, and that 'all would be well if he were well' replied 'he was well' and died.

The facts are these. He was shot during the initial charge, through the right side, by someone from MacKay's regiment – or at least while in front of that regiment. Also, he was standing in the saddle, waving on his men. Now, as he rode toward the enemy the fire was coming from his left, because he was riding down from his own extreme left toward the gap in the enemy center. There has never been a suggestion of 'friendly fire'. Therefore, if shot in the right side he must have turned around, probably to encourage the MacDonalds as the tales say. He may have ridden a little distance toward the enemy again before finally falling.

The battle was over in under ten minutes, so why the need to stand on a knoll directing events? Apparently there *was* a letter written by someone. But there is documentary evidence that Dundee did not live more than four hours. An alternate version of his dying speech is possible, as it is also said he died uttering those words in the arms of a Highlander who caught him up from the ground.

There were other tales. Of the warrior priest. Of the man with the Lochaber axe. Of the sexagenarian Ewan Cameron of Lochiel, the 'Ulysses of the Highlands', tripping down the slope in his armour because of his shoes (his men were barefoot). Of Donald Gorm MacDonell, son of the chief of Glengarry, who slew eighteen men single-handedly. And, there was the Williamite soldier, Donald MacBean, who managed to escape the Highlanders by leaping the Garry gorge at its narrowest point.

Dundee was 41 when he died.



[The Soldier's Leap]

Dunkeld

MacKay became the butt of Jacobite humour for his army's rout. However, he was a professional, he had resources to spare, and the Jacobite Army's new commander, Colonel, now 'Lieutenant General' Alexander Cannon, was incompetent. MacKay withdrew to Stirling and regrouped, amid scenes of panic. Perhaps now, at least, the Privy Council would give him the supplies he needed.

The news of MacKay's defeat reached Edinburgh on July 28th, brought by such fugitives as had not actually been in the battle. The shock to the Government was tremendous. They suddenly realised they had a war to fight. Hamilton ordered a full muster of the Militia, to be concentrated south of Stirling. Sir John Lanier was placed in command, MacKay being presumed *hors de combat*.

Dundee's death was only reported on the 30th. The same day MacKay checked in, and the mood of the Capital swung round one hundred and eighty degrees; not because MacKay lived, but because Dundee did not.

The Convention had ordered down Berkeley's Horse from Aberdeenshire and Sir John Lanier, MacKay's second, had sent for his own regiment, currently on the other side of the English border. The Convention hoped only to hold the line of the Forth, abandoning the rest of the country to the Jacobites. MacKay told them not to be daft. The Northeast could not be lost, or the numbers against them would double. He immediately prepared for a new advance. Having only 400 men with him, he collected Leven's new militia regiment, Lanier's Horse, Colchester's Horse, eight troops of local Horse and four of Dragoons, and requested Heyford's Dragoons (the Royals) from England.

All was ready by July 31st and they set out for Perth, followed slightly later by a new regiment of Foot composed of drafts from Mar's and Bargeny's regiments. Thousands of militiamen were assembling in the Southwest, but MacKay, who always felt citizens in arms were worse than useless, gave orders they should return to their homes.

On the Jacobite side, command devolved on Colonel Cannon and his Lieutenant General's commission, but he was not a popular leader, being ignorant of the Highlanders' ways and in their eyes ignorant of warfare in general. Cameron of Lochiel refused to serve under him and left. The MacDonalds of Sleat also departed. Others wavered. But counterbalancing their defection was the arrival of the MacGregors, the Stewarts of Appin, the Robertsons, and Lord James Murray of Atholl. This gave Cannon about 3,000 men.

The Jacobites camped at Dunkeld while a foraging party of Robertsons entered Perth and carried off some of the supplies intended for MacKay. Cannon's scouts skirmished with MacKay's scouts at a ford

of the Earn River. The General, figuring the enemy was nearby, had turned aside to the field of Tippermuir a few kilometres to the West. Once the situation was clear, he sent a party north of Perth to cut off the raiders and marched directly on the town. The enemy horse was already out of reach across the Tay, but their Foot, some 300 strong, were surprised at St. Johnstone's (Muirton, just north of Perth on the right bank of the Tay). Rather comically, they stood in horror at the mass of MacKay's cavalry, then, before they could bolt, he sent dragoons to seal off the ford and closed for the kill. The Highlanders tried to swim the Tay and were slaughtered, suffering 120 killed and 30 prisoners. The Williamites lost one man, who foolishly tried chasing a party of Highlanders on his own.

The moral balance was shifting. Cannon's force remained entrenched at Dunkeld for some days, completely inactive. Only after the last dribble of reinforcements came in did he move, and then not against the Capital, but northeast, among the foothills of the Grampians. He probably hoped to attract reinforcements, there being many Jacobite notables in that region, or, he may have needed forage. MacKay sent orders to speed up the arrival of the two English cavalry regiments, crossed the Tay with 1,500 cavalry, and marched on Coupar Angus, 20 Km northeast of Perth. Two battalions of Foot (probably Mar's and Bargeny's) remained at Perth.

At Coupar Angus it was reported that Cannon had camped in Glen Isla, about 20 Km to the North. The two armies marched on parallel lines, Cannon to the north of MacKay. MacKay moved to Forfar, Cannon to the hamlet of Clova, 25 Km northeast of Forfar, up the valley of the South Esk. But then, after a pause of two days, the Jacobites marched straight north to Braemar. This was clearly a trick to pull MacKay out of the way, or so he thought. Lanier was dispatched to Forfar with his newly arrived Horse, and MacKay paid a visit to Aberdeen.

Cannon's real intention was to collect more recruits. At Braemar some Farquarsons, Frasers, and Gordons joined him, as well as 200 MacPhersons and 500 Camerons under Lochiel's son, who had crossed through Badenoch; that interesting fellow, Keppoch, also reappeared.

The Jacobites encamped on the Williamite Master of Forbes' land. Their post was said to be very strong, and as MacKay divined it, Cannon hoped to sit there some time recruiting horsemen. To prevent this the General summoned Sir Thomas Livingstone and his regiment, and Heyford's Dragoons. These were to patrol the coastal plain, report on any enemy movements, and harass recruiting parties.

What befell next was a blow against the Jacobite Cause, but not one inflicted by MacKay. The circumstances were these. After spending a day at Aberdeen the General rode out to assess Cannon's camp, only to learn the enemy had shifted into the Duke of Gordon's territory. Alarmed for Livingstone's Dragoons, who were then in Strathbogie, MacKay changed course, and, being entirely mounted arrived in the vicinity before the enemy. These in turn, learning that MacKay was only 10 Km away, sat down and held a council of war. The question was whether to attack or not. *However*, before that was decided there was a question of precedence: should the many Lowland officers be permitted to sit in, given there were no Lowland units present? The Earl of Dunfermline, Cannon's second, advised him to allow it, which he did. By this decision, the Highlanders, who composed the entire army, received only a minority vote. Two things followed from this. First, the decision was made not to accept battle but to return to Atholl. Second, and more importantly, Cannon's officer corps was permanently split along 'national' lines.

Cannon's immediate object in returning south so quickly was to deal with the presence of a Williamite regiment that had occupied Dunkeld. This was the Earl of Angus' Regiment, better known as the Cameronians, a body of militia whose members were hated by the Highlanders. Perhaps Cannon was concerned the Williamites intended to seize Blair and bottle up that route out of the Highlands (as was indeed the case), or perhaps he felt he had to grant a concession to the Highlanders. MacKay, in his correspondence with the Government

over troop dispositions, had warned them they were inviting an attack by sending the Covenanters to that spot.

Cannon at first marched by way of the coastal plain. General Lanier left Forfar for Brechin with his own and Berkeley's Horse, and the two sides skirmished near there, while MacKay protected Aberdeen. Cannon turned aside into the hills. Having no instructions to pursue, Lanier returned to Forfar, where orders awaited him for the taking of Blair and Finlarig castles; he headed for Coupar Angus, where, next day, he learned the enemy was advancing on Dunkeld from the North.

Finlarig, at the head of Loch Tay, was the property of Campbell of Breadalbane; the Government wanted to secure it so as to keep him on their side. He was in negotiations to become a representative of the Government in the grand scheme of Highland pacification, but was suspected of fomenting trouble as a means of justifying his application for the job.

The posting of the Cameronians at Dunkeld was part of the operation to take Blair. The Privy Council (the Convention having finally done its business and formed a Government) wanted Blair and Finlarig before autumn. They had ignored MacKay's suggestion to use Lanier and some of the regular troops south of the Forth.

The Battle of Dunkeld, August 21st 1689

Dunkeld (*Dunkell*, in Gaelic *Dùn Chailleann* or the 'Fort of the Caledonians') has not grown much since those days. The town lies on the left, or northern bank of the Tay, in a bowl surrounded by hills. (The reference to a 'dun' refers to the nearby hummock on which the Iron Age fort stood.) The road (track, in MacKay's day) follows the Tay south through a gorge much like that of Killiecrankie before bending east with the river. At Dunkeld the road turns south to cross the river by a bridge (it was a ford in those days) before continuing to follow the river east through the last set of steep hills before the land opens out.

The town itself is surrounded by woods, with patches of farmland beyond, and lies on a gentle slope leading down to the river. It consists – and probably consisted – of a row of houses on each side of the main road with one cross street similarly lined paralleling the river about 100 meters up from the riverbank. The buildings are row-houses and shops now, but were detached cottages with enclosed gardens then; most of the original town burned down during the battle.

The western half of the cross street opens out into a rather small town square, forming a 'Y'. The principle feature of the whole site in earlier days was the Cathedral of St. Columba, now ruined, which lies at the extreme western end of the left branch of the 'Y', 200 meters from the junction with the main road and about 100 meters from the river, looking out across open fields to its north and bounded by a wood on its west. The right branch of the 'Y' no longer leads anywhere; until the 19th Century it led to Dunkeld House, 280 acres owned by the Marquess of Atholl. The trace of the house can be seen in satellite images but there are no ruins to speak of other than a few paving stones. It lay about 150 meters northeast of the cathedral, south of the main road, with the same clear field of view to the North.

The Highlanders first appeared on Thursday, August 18th, a body of 300 of them, from whom issued a messenger under a flag of truce:

"We the gentlemen assembled being informed that ye intend to burn the town, desire to know whether ye come for peace or war, and do certify you, that if ye burn any one house, we will destroy you."

Lord Angus was a teenager, so command for the defence devolved on the lieutenant colonel, William Cleland, veteran of Drumclog and Bothwell Brig. His men might have been raw recruits, but they were also Cameronian fanatics with scores to settle from the Quartering of the Highland Host. His reply was,

"We are faithful subjects to King William and Queen Mary, and enemies to their enemies; and if you, who send these threats, shall

make any hostile appearance, we will burn all that belongs to you, and otherwise chastise you as you deserve."

[Regarding the reference to burn the town, remember it was owned by the semi-Jacobite Marquess of Atholl. In the event, it might have been better if they had not mentioned burning houses...]

On the 20th, Lord Cardross suddenly appeared with a mixed force of Williamite Horse and Dragoons, who assisted the Cameronians in their local patrols that day, but were then as suddenly withdrawn to Perth on the orders of Colonel Ramsay. Though this is not explicitly stated in the sources, it does seem as if the Colonel expected the town to be overrun and did not want to lose any of his horsemen. Cleland declined to abandon his post, though it was hardly defensible:

"if the providence of God had not blinded Cannon, and disheartened his Highlanders from continuing their attack, the regiment had certainly been lost, for they had two full days time to carry them, and all their defence was but low gardens, in most places not above four feet high."

[General MacKay]

[The Government might have hoped to reduce the numbers of their own paramilitaries by hanging them out to dry, though the sources have never suggested this.]

On the 20th, Cleland's patrols encountered no more than 5-600 men, but the Fiery Cross had gone round, Cannon's Highlanders had arrived, and the 800 Cameronians were soon facing an army of 4,000 men.

The assault came on Sunday, August 21st. At 6am, the Highlanders could be seen on the hills ringing the village, formed up as for battle. At 7am they advanced. One troop of Horse circled around and got between the cathedral and the ford across the Tay. Two other troops covered the East end of the village and drove in an enemy post. The small artillery train (probably MacKay's three leather guns) was trundled down the ancient *dun*, escorted by 100 men in armour and a body of Highlanders. At the bottom of the hill they routed out another post of Cameronians from behind a stone wall.

From this point, once again, the battle has multiple versions. The primary question is whether the Cameronians defended the town at all, or only the House and Cathedral. From a comparison of the accounts it seems that they *did* occupy the town, but not in great strength. Cleland's main defence was centered on the two primary edifices. He placed snipers in the steeple and on the two roofs, and deployed the rest of his men along the various stone walls and ditches of the Marquess' property. The Cameronians had also prepared trenches. In the village, men were grouped in some of the enclosures.

The Highlanders swiftly occupied most of the town and sniped at the defenders from the cover of the houses or returned to the surrounding slopes and did the same at long range. Their artillery does not seem to have had much effect. The Cameronians returned the fire, until, low on ammunition, they were forced to strip the lead from the roofs to make bullets.

Shooting continued without letup for three hours. Cleland was killed within the first hour, shot once through the liver and once through the head. His major was also mortally wounded, so that a captain, George Munro of Auchinbowie, ran most of the battle.

When their muskets ran dry at last, the defenders sallied, bearing burning branches on their pikes. Rushing into the village they forced many of the Highlanders to shut themselves up, then set fire to the thatch and burned them alive.

(In some accounts, this action was not a desperate last measure but a deliberate tactic carried out during the firefight, with small parties being sent throughout the town to ignite fires at multiple points. Which version is correct would depend whether the Highlanders had completely cut the manor house and cathedral off from the village or not.)

It was now about 11am. The battle had been gruelling, neither side giving quarter. But the Jacobites, finding street-fighting not to their liking, low on ammunition, and hearing the screams of their burning comrades, began to call it a day, the men saying, “she could fight against men but was not fit to fight any more against devils”. Before noon the last of the clansmen had returned to the hills. The Cameronians jeered them, beat their drums, and then rushed to contain the fires, which had spread to all but three of the buildings. In the afternoon, it being the Sabbath, they held worship and sang psalms of praise for their victory over the *Amalekites*.

*Some trust in chariots and some in horses:
But we will remember the name of the LORD our God.
They are brought down and fallen:
But we are risen, and stand upright.*

[Psalm 20, verses 7-8. KJV.]

A few accounts say the battle lasted sixteen hours. This is certainly wrong, and must come from assuming the battle ended at ‘eleven o’clock’ at night, not ‘eleven o’clock’ in the morning. Neither side had reserves who could prolong the struggle, and although the various accounts are confused it does not seem that Cannon or any other senior figure exercised central command on the Jacobite side, suggesting the Highlanders fought in clan groups under their own chiefs. It is reported that Cannon asked them to reform and try again, but they refused. Street fighting was not their forte, nor was an assault on a fortified post.

Casualties range from as low as 20 to a high of 300 for the attackers, and either ‘an unrecorded number’ or 52 for the defenders. The Highlanders, throwing all the blame for the defeat on Cannon, retreated to Blair and then dispersed, though they did pledge a bond of association to uphold the cause of King James. Colonel Cannon, minus one army, travelled west to the island of Mull, where he stayed some time with the MacLeans of Duart.

Dunkeld was accounted a great victory for both the Saints and the Government. It eased MacKay’s mind. He was able to leave General Livingstone with only his Dragoons and nine troops of Horse to patrol the Northeast while he traveled to Perth (August 26th) and along with General Lanier began to carry out the Privy Council’s instructions.

Fearing the Highlanders would make Blair Castle indefensible, the General threatened to burn every farm in Atholl if it should be damaged. After securing the place he spent ten days accepting submissions upon an offer of indemnity which he issued. Blair was fortified with a palisade and breastworks.

It was now September 5th, and raining continually. MacKay was forced to abandon the other half of the program and leave Breadalbane’s castle of Finlarig for another day. He returned to Perth, leaving 500 men at Blair. (Finlarig was taken by Lord Cardross after the rains ceased, and was garrisoned by 200 men.)

All this time King James imagined Cannon was doing wonders. In a letter dated November 20th of 1689 he praised the General’s efforts in ‘revenging Dundee’ and urged him to put heart into the Jacobites, promising to send his son, the 19-year-old Duke of Berwick with some cavalry in the following spring.

In fact, Cameron of Lochiel became the *de facto* Jacobite leader. Cannon was ignored. Lochiel had very few men under arms, but since the rains had come early that was not critical. What he lacked most of all was royal support, so he and the other chiefs once again wrote to King James in Ireland, asking for aid, preferably in the form of a regiment or two.

James had none to spare; he was expecting William’s invasion of that island, but he did send some clothing, arms, and provisions. He also sent some more officers, including Major General Thomas Buchan with a commission as the King’s latest Lieutenant for Scotland, and the Earl of Seaforth. Neither Berwick nor the promised cavalry ever

arrived, because the following summer James was defeated at the Boyne and left the British Isles to their own devices.

[This Buchan was not the Earl of Buchan. He had been commander of Buchan’s Foot (The Earl of Mar’s, a.k.a. the Royal Scots Fusiliers) before the Revolution and had been Claverhouse’s second during the Killing Time.]

The Montgomery Plot

Meanwhile, though no armies manoeuvred, there was political action of a sort, culminating in the notorious Montgomery Plot. Sir James Montgomery, 4th Baronet of that ilk, came from Covenanter stock, and was once arrested for harbouring fugitives from a conventicle. In 1688 he visited the Prince of Orange on his own recognizance (though he claimed official status), encouraging him to invade England. When the Scots Convention opened he was made Member for Ayrshire and gave an impassioned seconding to Sir John Dalrymple’s motion that King James had ‘forfeited’ the Crown. This earned him a position as one of the three emissaries sent to offer William the Crown of Scotland.

After the National Convention disbanded a Government was formed. King William favoured the Moderates, meaning there were a number of Episcopalian as well as Presbyterian MPs. The King was concerned to repress the obstreperous Covenanters as much as possible. They were more of a threat than Dundee’s successors and much of the following year would be devoted to ecclesiastical issues in an attempt to find a compromise with them.

The Duke of Hamilton, an Episcopalian, was made Lord High Commissioner (King’s representative). The Earl of Crawford, a Covenanter, became President of Parliament. The Dalrymples, father and son, became respectively Principal Lord of Session and Lord Advocate (roughly, heads of the Executive and Judiciary). Lord Melville was Secretary of State, and Lord Lockhart Solicitor-General.



[George Melville, 1st Earl of Melville]

As was the custom in those days, the followers of these men got the plum jobs and the rest were cast out, breeding discontent. Hoping to be made Secretary of State for Scotland (high office was the dream of all emissaries bearing good news to a king) Montgomery was disappointed when the post went to Lord Melville. He was offered the post of Chief Justice Clerk, but refused it out of pique.

Instead, Montgomery vowed revenge and founded a political club with the highly original name of... The Club. It was composed chiefly of the wilder republican sectaries, such as Patrick Hume and Fletcher of Saltoun (names associated with Monmouth's Rebellion and King William's own invasion) and others who were not part of the Duke of Hamilton's circle, and was dedicated to opposing the Government, which it did with great success well into 1690. The few remaining Jacobites, who under William's policy of toleration were permitted to show their noses in public at first held aloof from The Club (they could walk the streets, but dared not voice opposition).

There were many issues which could be used as a stalking horse for thwarted ambition, but the primary one was King William's policy of toleration, which prevented the Kirk from being restored to its former glory as the 'Ultra Whig' Covenanters desired. When the Scots Parliament closed at the end of the year Montgomery went to London with the Earl of Annandale and Lord Ross. Annandale, it will be remembered, had raised a troop of Horse for the Williamites, but he was unimpressed with the new King and opposed Hamilton. Lord Ross had accompanied Montgomery on the trip to offer the Crown to William, but he had also been a personal friend of Dundee (and had been a witness at his wedding). The trio planned to present a list of grievances to the King, but could not obtain an audience.

Incensed, Montgomery determined to shake King William up. He contacted a man named Neville Payne, a well known dramatist who moonlighted as a Roman Catholic agitator. Together they hatched a plot to bring back the Stuarts. In Montgomery's case, he may have been hoping to scare King William into abandoning his policy of toleration so that the Kirk would adopt Covenanting doctrines; Payne, of course, was all for sticking William's head on the Tollbooth gate. It is said that both managed to deceive the other, so that the plot went forward in a cloud of smoke.

But, Montgomery found that being associated with the Jacobites ruined his chances in Parliament, and as his position weakened, the Clubbists dumped their founding member. Lord Ross quarrelled with him also, then made a confession of the plot (so far as it had got) to a

minister of the Kirk. Lord Melville was informed. Hearing of this, Montgomery made a full confession of his and Payne's designs, on a promise of indemnity. The plot was a fizzle.

[Rejected by King William, Montgomery made his way to the Jacobite Court in France, returned to London on some business or other; was taken, escaped imprisonment, and died in France in 1694. Payne was tortured, and imprisoned until 1701. Lord Ross was forgiven by William, who employed him, after a short prison term, as an Army officer and eventually made him Lord High Commissioner to the General Assembly of the Kirk. Annandale was also imprisoned for a time, then was created a Lord of the Treasury, before going on to even higher honours.]

This was not the only plot to take place. While Marshal Schomberg dallied at Dundalk in the late summer of 1689, King William was facing one crisis after another as the strife between Whigs and Tories grew more and more intense. William preferred to strike a balance and appointed one of King James' dismissed officials, the talented Moderate, George Savile, 1st Earl of Halifax, as his chief minister. The Whigs dominated Parliament but were denied absolute victory, which made them mad as hornets. Political business was at a standstill.

[George Savile was one of the commissioners sent to treat with William at Hungerford during the invasion of England. He was not exactly persona grata with King James, being one of the architects of the anti-Catholic Test Acts, but he was an opponent of Lord Shaftesbury's (despite being his nephew!) King William employed him in turn until his death in 1695. As a Moderate he often found himself championing causes he had once opposed, but he had no Jacobite leanings. His policies on the New World, if implemented, might have resulted in the 13 Colonies becoming part of the modern British Commonwealth.]

A new English Parliament had to be formed, which happened in January of 1690, and the King now favoured the Tories under Lords Danby and Nottingham – until they balked at continuing the war with France, at which he began to favour the Whigs. Later in the year he would repair to Ireland, leaving England in charge of Queen Mary.

A Fort for King William

[Pictured below; Fort William]

Like his master, MacKay found all these political machinations distinctly trying. They prevented him from getting on with the job. So, he decided to spend the winter planning the construction of his pet project – the fort at Inverlochy, to be called Fort William. It was to hold a garrison of 1,000 or 1,200 men. The plan of construction required the services of three frigates – *real* frigates – 10 or 12



merchant ships, 3-4 dozen boats, and 3-4,000 labourers. 3,000 muskets would be needed, 400 *chevaux de frise*, 2,000 digging tools, and money for two months provisions. The construction team, security force, and supplies would embark at Dunstaffnage Castle on the Kintyre coast (near Oban), then sail up to Inverlochry.

MacKay encountered nothing but obstacles. At first, the King was not interested. Eventually, after threatening to give up his commission entirely and prevailing upon the Privy Council to add its weight, the frigates were sent, along with some arms and ammunition, and tools. The Scots Government then balked at the expense. MacKay offered to march overland with only 600 men if the Government would just pay for three months provisions. He was told no. Edinburgh proving a broken reed, the General got the help of the city of Glasgow for hiring the transport ships and getting provisions, but the man chosen to lead the expedition, a Major Ferguson, waited five weeks for the supplies to arrive.

On reflection, it might be as well to delve a little into the politics behind the opposition to MacKay's sensible scheme. His chief opponents in the Government were Lord Melville and George MacKenzie, Viscount Tarbat (later 1st Earl Cromartie). Tarbat, a rising star in the Government, had a personal dislike of MacKay and also opposed the General's plans for a military subjugation of the Highlands in favour of bribing the clans by paying off their debts. If the Jacobites ultimately won, Tarbat could claim to have aided them by preventing MacKay's conquest, and if the Williamites won, he could say he had spared the Treasury the expense of a military campaign. Lord Melville's motivations were purely personal. He desired to supplant MacKay with his son, Lord Leven.

This raises a question: if they wanted to get rid of him, why did these men prevent MacKay from retiring? Well... King William was in Holland at this time. They feared that if MacKay returned home and had the opportunity of speaking privately to the King he would give a true account of the situation in Scotland. This could lead to a shake up in the Privy Council, or at least a more strict accounting of their work. So, the General got his frigates.

MacKay did obtain some comfort from his work. Having progressed as far as he had, against every conceivable obstacle, the Jacobites became convinced he meant business, and the Highlanders of the Western Isles would not take the field in the spring of 1690. They thought they would be dealing with a full blown invasion from the sea. This contributed to the defeat at Cromdale.

Half-Time

In the winter of 1689 the clans and General Buchan met at the farm of Keppoch, in Glen Roy, just up the vale from Lochiel's house. Buchan had brought with him from Ireland a Colonel Brown as well as Lord Seaforth. Colonel Cannon, now Brigadier Cannon, became his second in command (but still worthless in Lochiel's eyes).

Alarmed by the Montgomery Plot, the Government was making its first hesitant stabs at a diplomatic solution and some of the chiefs were thinking of submitting; Lochiel vehemently opposed them, pointing to Buchan as proof King James was still in the game. He argued that they had once supported Charles II at a time when his cause seemed far more hopeless. At last, it was unanimously agreed that they would continue the war.

Primary operations could not commence until after the clansmen had completed their spring chores, but 1,200 men were given to Buchan to allow him to start raids against the various Williamite posts guarding access to the Lowlands. If he could make contact with the Jacobites of the Northeast, perhaps they could harness some cavalry as well.

Meanwhile, the Government Army was undergoing restructuring. After the Revolution King William had been profoundly dissatisfied with performance of the English Army and in December of 1689 he also turned his attention to the Scots Army, issuing warrants for a general remodelling. Generals MacKay and Leven were ordered to

form seven regiments of Foot out of the material they had, keeping three and sending four to Ireland. Three troops of Horse (Earl of Eglington's, the Master of Forbes', and Gordon of Edinglassie's) and three of Dragoons (Lord Cardross', Jackson's, and Home of Polwart's) were also to be raised. Initially, all independent companies were to be disbanded, but King William amended this, allowing garrisons for the castles of Dumbarton, Stirling, Blackness, and the Bass Rock.

The Anglo-Dutch regiments mauled at Killiecrankie were available to act as garrisons for a time, but would be withdrawn in the summer of 1690, after being fleshed out. They were sent to Ireland along with the four regiments mentioned before. Hastings' Foot was withdrawn that autumn. MacKay also lost some cavalry that autumn: Lanier's Horse, Berkeley's Horse, Colchester's Horse, and Heyford's Dragoons.

The militia regiments of Angus, Argyle, Glencairn, Kenmuir, Strathnaver, and the Laird of Grant were regularised. A new regiment, Cunningham's, was raised. (Grant and Glencairn's, then garrisoning Inverness, were combined in February of 1690 to create Sir John Hill's Regiment). Four other militia units, Bargeny's, Blantyre's, Annandale's (possibly), and Mar's, were disbanded to provide bodies, along with twelve independent troops of cavalry. All Foot regiments were to have 13 companies of 60 men each; 1 company was to be grenadiers. This would leave MacKay ten battalions of varying degrees of competence.

[The same formula was applied to the English Army at the same time, which created an additional seven regiments of foot plus three troops of Horse and three troops of Dragoons. The Horse and Dragoons were to have 50 men per troop.]

[MacKay also writes of Danish troops arriving at Leith Docks. However, they merely transited the country and sailed for Ireland. They would not have sailed direct because the poor seasonal weather at both ends of Britain made doing so both dangerous and far more time consuming.]

Ten battalions was enough to secure the Lowlands from sudden assault, but not enough to pacify the Highlands by brute force. All the brute force at King William's disposal was either in Ireland or bound there. However, after the death of Dundee there was no guiding hand on the Jacobite Side. King James' vanity was touched that the Highlanders remained true him, but he had no desire to visit Scotland. Cannon was useless, Buchan untried. Lochiel was respected, experienced, and willing to fight, but it was axiomatic that Highlanders could not be led by one of their own. There would always be friction, if not downright mistrust between the clans.

Therefore, the Williamite Government continued its policy of divide and rule by sounding out the various chiefs and lords who remained in arms or appeared likely to make trouble. One of these was Campbell of Breadalbane. The Breadalbane Campbells were a cadet family of the Earls of Argyle, and they tended to go their own way when it suited them. John, 1st Earl of Breadalbane and Holland at first negotiated with Dundee. He was too canny to rise before a Government defeat and too canny to rise after the death of Dundee; he made his peace with the Williamites by gradual stages and became their primary contact with the other chieftains.

On the other hand, there was Lord Seaforth. The northern clans, nominally well disposed to the new regime, were restless. Their chiefs had not won the honours and positions they had hoped for while those who were Episcopalians and Tories opposed the rising power of the Covenanter-Whig party. In Seaforth, chief of the MacKenzies, they had a leader who was close to King James.

Major General Livingstone became aware of the discontent as he patrolled his sector in the winter of 1689. Livingstone had been at Aberdeen in the fall, when the threat was from Braemar. Now that Major General Buchan had taken command of the enemy, MacKay felt Inverness was in greater danger, so he sent Livingstone there in January of 1690. All remained quiet for a few months.

Upon the Haughs of Cromdale

In April of 1690 Buchan at last set out from Lochaber with his band of raiders, up the Corrieyairack Pass to the headwaters of the Spey – the usual road. By the time he surmounted the watershed Buchan was down, through desertions, to 800 men. (Clansmen were in a sense the property of their chiefs, who could loan them out for battle as well as lead them, but that did not mean the men were afraid to walk off the job.) Not all of the losses were permanent. A sizeable proportion, under Keppoch (who else) were straggling behind as they collected ‘tribute’.

Once again aiming to raise the Gordons and other clans of the Northeast, whose support would be sure to get the ball rolling, Buchan led his men down the Spey into the Cromdale district. When his movements were reported to Sir Thomas Livingstone at Inverness, the latter set out to meet him.

Livingstone twice sent an exploratory column up the Spey, but had difficulty maintaining himself there. He lacked a decent magazine and it was impossible to live off the land. He got no word of the enemy, but did learn one thing. There was an air of tension everywhere he went. Former allies were falling away.

MacKay responded to Livingstone’s warning letter by scraping together all the regiments he could from the principal towns – about 3,000 men in all – and assembling them at Perth, ready for a counter stroke. The remaining forces at Aberdeen, ironically commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel Buchan who was the enemy General’s own brother, were put at Livingstone’s disposal.

[These consisted of Ramsay’s Foot, the Cameronians (made a line regiment as a reward for their heroic stand at Dunkeld) and 5 troops of cavalry.]

Livingstone, meanwhile, camped ‘eight miles from Inverness’, i.e. probably at Moy House, 14 Km southeast of the town near the ford of the Findhorn River. He had under his command:

- Livingston’s Dragoons
- The Earl of Leven’s Foot
- The Laird of Grant’s Foot
- Sir James Leslie’s Foot
- Lord Reay’s Highland Company (100 men)
- Two independent troops of Horse

On April 29th, General Buchan arrived at ‘Cuhakill’ (probably Cullachie, just east of Boat of Garten) without opposition. Here he held a council of war. Should they establish a position in the neighbourhood and send out for recruits, or should they advance farther northeast? Now the Earl of Dunfermline’s edict that Lowland officers be included in the council of war bore bitter fruit. The Highland chiefs were unanimous in opposing a further advance, except to go one march further, into the Abernethy Woods, where they would have cover. They were voted down and on April 30th the Jacobites camped on the Haughs [*hooz*] of Cromdale, just across the river from Grantown-on-Spey.

Livingstone’s column was near Carrbridge on April 30th when he received a runner from Castle Grant (where a company of Grants was stationed) who reported Buchan’s appearance at Cromdale. This was the first intimation Livingstone had received of his enemy’s movements since the latter departed Lochaber. Livingstone had with him about 1,200 men:

- 300 of Livingston’s Dragoons
- 400 of the Earl of Leven’s Foot
- 300 of the Laird of Grant’s Foot (6 companies)
- 50-60 of Lord Reay’s Highland Company
- 150 men from two troops of Horse

[Or, alternatively, 17 troops of Dragoons, 900 Grants, and three regiments of Foot. These numbers are taken from an account which seems to have a false narrative.]

That afternoon, they marched to within 3 Km of Castle Grant. The castle defenders shut their gates, not to keep the Williamites out but to prevent any word of their approach reaching the Jacobites – several local gentlemen were visiting at the time.

It was dark by now, but Livingstone could not find a place to camp, so he carried on to the castle, topping the hill behind it at 2am. From here, as pointed out by the garrison commander, he could see the fires of the Jacobite camp across the Spey. He was shocked they were so close, and said later he would not have attempted the defile leading to the castle if he had known it.

The captain of the castle urged the General to attack at once, before some peasant spied him and warned the enemy; he offered to be his guide. So, the Williamites rested for half an hour, then about 3am filed down to the river.

Yet again there are different accounts of the subsequent battle. In all of them, however, Cromdale is a Jacobite rout. By using MacKay’s description of Livingstone’s report and other older accounts, the following is what seems to have happened.

General Buchan was encamped on the right bank of the Spey, with some men under canvas on the haugh and others (probably the officers) in the local hamlet. Two companies under captains Brodie and Grant guarded the ford closest to Castle Grant, where there is now a bridge. They were billeted in the kirk next to the ford.

Some accounts say that General Buchan failed to post adequate sentries at all, or to send out patrols, or that the picquets were negligent of their duty. This seems to have been a half truth. Buchan may have sent out patrols (after all, he was a professional officer) but they probably returned before Livingstone’s column appeared. He placed a guard on one of the fords, but he did not place a guard on *all* of the fords, possibly because the existence of the others was not known to him.



[Cromdale Kirk, from the Williamite viewpoint. The body of water is the Spey.]

The Williamites left Castle Grant by way of the vale of Auchinarrow to Dellachapel, near which was a ford guarded by the enemy (pretty much a straight walk east to the river by way of the valley below the castle).

[Dellachapel is probably a chapel on the left bank of the river just opposite the Kirk of Cromdale.]

Sending a detachment of Foot with a few Dragoons to screen the Kirk Ford 180 meters south of them, the rest of the column passed about ‘a quarter of a mile’ down the river ‘by a covered way’ to where there was another ford. This ford is about 580 meters in a direct line east-northeast from the kirk, at the base of the river bend. That section of the left bank is screened by a line of trees and is raised above the river,

so that viewers on the opposite bank would have difficulty seeing the column, even in daylight.

Dawn was breaking as Livingstone sent his remaining Highlanders across the ford, then followed with three troops of Dragoons and one of Horse. Behind them were the Foot and the remaining troop of Horse. Livingstone called these up as soon as he realised the enemy camp was stirring.



[Battle of Cromdale]

The Jacobites had time to wake and grab their weapons, but not to form into battalions. Their initial thought would have been for the enemy's superiority in cavalry, so many ran to where they could make a stand on the lower slopes of a rather steep hill called the Hill of Cromdale, just east of the hamlet. Some parties did not make the hill but were run down or found themselves fighting in the village streets.

Livingstone said the Williamite Highlanders outran their own cavalry so that the Jacobites turned to fight them, but that the approach of his horsemen set them running again, though it is also said they fought a rearguard action until a fog rolled in from the East and allowed them to break contact.

Casualties are given by MacKay as 400 Jacobites and 7-8 horses (only – not men) of Livingstone's, but Jacobite eyewitnesses say the enemy lost about 100 men, including many dragoons. Some of the 400 may only have been missing.

Buchan has been painted as an incompetent because of this action, but he was hardly that. He made three major mistakes, however. The first was to bring his Highlanders down from the high ground, against their own advice, where they would be at the mercy of the Williamite cavalry, the second was his failure to locate the enemy before so doing, and the third was to fail to properly reconnoitre (a common weakness of Highland armies, despite the whole 'ghillie' mythos). It seems clear that the unguarded ford was unknown to both commanders. Fortunately for Livingstone, he deigned to listen to the amateur captain in command of the castle. He might just have easily ignored him and tried to storm the guarded ford, which would have given the Jacobites time to organise or flee, or after seeing the campfires he might have decided not to attack at all.

Two small actions followed Cromdale. Again, the accounts are confused, and may involve one or two bands of the fugitives; the order in which they occurred is sometimes reversed. The most likely sequence is that Livingstone's men, scouring the valley for the remaining enemy, fought a brief skirmish on May 2nd at Aviemore, about 22 Km farther up the Spey. This killed some of them but the rest escaped and doubled back down the Spey on the Cromdale side to Craigelachie (27 Km northeast down the Spey), where MacDonald of

Keppoch met them. Typically for him, Keppoch and his own band had avoided the fight at Cromdale while on business of their own:

'Col. Macdonald of Keppoch, who was ever keen for plunder, had never once fought for his King, would not encamp with the other rebels, but with his men, quartered at Garolin, half a mile distant, and thereby escaped without loss.'

Now about 100 strong, this band decided to attack the castle of Loch an Eilein (Lochinclan), some 50 Km southeast up the Spey. The castle, situated on an island in the loch and joined to the mainland by a zigzagging causeway (now under water) was famous as the stronghold of a 15th Century robber baron called the Wolf of Badenoch; it was also a sanctuary for cattle rustlers. Its present owners were the Grants and it was held by the widow of the 5th Laird of Grant, Dame Grizel Mor. True to her class, the Dame gave the raiders a box on the ears, putting up a spirited defence as they rushed the causeway, and driving them off with the help of her tenants. Following this reverse the band dispersed.

[The Wolf was also the first Earl of Buchan, so perhaps the clansmen were acting on General Buchan's orders.]

Pacification

Cromdale spelled the end of organised resistance to King William's rule in Scotland. There was to be no general offensive by the Highlanders this year. The Jacobite party in Edinburgh likewise lay low and bethought themselves how best to make terms. However, there was still much work to be done.

[For propaganda purposes the Jacobites turned their rout into a victory by means of a famous song called the Haughs of Cromdale, in which the long-dead Marquis of Montrose and just about every Highlander in Scotland wipe out all the Covenanters ever spawned.]


The Williamite party, too, had a change of heart. First, they intensified their efforts to find a political solution in the Highlands, but second, they pressed forward at last with MacKay's program for building a fort at Inverlochry. Major Ferguson departed Greenock on May 15th with 600 men, bound for Loch Lochy. MacKay, meanwhile, got King William's permission to conduct offensive operations, over the fears of the Scottish Government that it might enable the Lowland Jacobites to take action in his absence.

The General left Perth on June 18th, with a column of 3,000 men. His objective was also Inverlochry, but first he needed to join with Livingstone, so after taking the road to Dalwhinnie he turned right instead of left. By this time the Highlanders were 'out' again, and seemed to pose a threat, but their numbers were actually not that great and they were poorly led. At most, they could have delayed his progress through ambushes. The Williamites joined forces on June 26th, rested a day, then marched southwest into Badenoch, bound for Inverlochry. Being 4-5,000 strong, they were not opposed.

From the accounts, it appears that the Highlanders set up a blocking position at the Pass of Corrieyairack; MacKay feinted toward it, then took an alternate route (July 1st) which led to Glen Spean by way of Loch Laggan and Glen Roy. By his usual speedy movements he arrived before the enemy expected him and thus avoided having to face any local opposition.

[It is curious that the Highlanders never seem to have used MacKay's route when traveling into Strathspey, even though it is the route taken by the modern highway while the Corrieyairack remains a desolate hiker's trail marked only by a gravel track. Particularly since the River Roy flows down that glen directly into Lochaber. Perhaps it was too heavily wooded to allow for rapid marching, a fact that might also explain why MacKay remained undetected.]

Arriving at Inverlochry on the 3rd of July, the Williamites completed the new fort in eleven days (July 5-16), using an older edifice built by Cromwell as a foundation. The combination of fosse and walls were twenty feet high, and it was given a palisade and glacis.



MacKay next thought to proceed to the island of Mull, homeland of the intractable MacLeans, who still held a number of prisoners taken by Dundee in 1689. But, he received a dispatch from the Privy Council ordering his recall. News of the Williamite defeat in the naval battle of Beachy Head had just been received and a French invasion was feared.

Abandoning his plans, the General returned south on the 18th, leaving a garrison of 1,000 men. The rest marched overland: to Badenoch on the 20th, where MacKay inspected Ruthven on the 21st and garrisoned it with Lord Reay's company of Highlanders (they were to build an earthen wall for defence), then Perth by the 26th.

Beach Head (or Beveziers), July 22nd 1690



[Battle of Beachy Head; the plan of the battle is shown below]

While these routine counterinsurgency operations were taking place, England suffered a severe scare. On June 30th the combined Brest and Toulon Squadrons of the French Navy, under *Amiral Anne Hilarion Comte de Tourville*, fought against an Anglo-Dutch fleet under Admiral the Earl of Torrington (Arthur Herbert), in the Battle of Beachy Head.

Strategically the battle was a waste. The French won it, but failed to use their victory. The Dutch suffered the most, since the English hung back, and there were charges of disloyalty and anti-Dutch feeling (the last was true enough).

The battle was fought on the express order of Queen Mary, because William had just landed in Ireland and she feared the French would

destroy his transports, but it was a foolish decision. The Royal Navy was badly outgunned. The sources vary in detail, but a common tally is 4,153 guns to 4,600 (or, 56 Anglo-Dutch vessels to 70 French, plus 5 light frigates and 18 fireships).

[As usual, the Royal Navy's technically more numerous assets were dispersed, patrolling against privateers and cruising the Mediterranean. The composition of the fleets can be found in the Annex.]


The French squadrons combined at Brest before sailing up the Channel. The English, under Lord Torrington, sailed from the Nore when the French were off the Lizard. On June 25th Torrington sighted the French off the Isle of Wight. Prudently, he retreated. In any case the wind was strongly against him. On the 29th, Torrington, who was believed by the Court to be acting in a cowardly fashion, received positive orders to engage.

Battle was joined about 8am on the 30th. The Allies had the weather gauge. The fleets were both arranged in the customary three 'battles' – that is grouped by squadron with a van, center, and rearguard. On the Anglo-Dutch side the White Squadron, all Dutch, had the van under *Luitenant-Admiraal Cornelis Evertsen*. Torrington commanded the center with the English Red Squadron, and Rear-Admiral Sir Ralph Delaval commanded the rear Blue Squadron, also English (though the odd Dutch ship may have been tacked on). The French Blue Squadron was in their van, under *Lieutenant-Général Château Renault*, the White Squadron was in the center, under *Vice-Amiral Le Comte de Tourville*, and the White-and-Blue Squadron had the rearguard, under *Vice-Amiral Victor-Marie le Comte d'Estrées*.

The Dutch bore the brunt of the French fire. First, they did not engage the foremost French ships of the van, which allowed the enemy to 'double' them, then Torrington could not come to grips with the French center because of a 'sag' in de Tourville's line (see the reproduction below). This enabled the French to first cut off the portion of the English Red Squadron which was sent to aid the Dutch and then to add even more weight to the fire against the latter. The allied Blue Squadron was badly overmatched.

After eight hours, the White Squadron had suffered two ships sunk, one captured, and many heavily damaged, so that they were forced to withdraw. Torrington decided to end the action, which he did rather neatly by dropping anchor as the wind died; the French were not prepared and simply drifted out of range on the tide. At 9pm the tide changed and Torrington withdrew, after burning eight additional ships that were too badly damaged to keep up (seven of the eight were Dutch).

Torrington got the sack, but, the only capital the French made out of the victory was a naval descent on the West Country, on July 22nd.



The operation seems to have been planned as a proper amphibious landing which would spark a general uprising against King William. De Tourville had 111 vessels, mostly transport galleys. Coming so soon after his victory, there was no naval opposition. But the response to the French presence was disappointing. No one appeared on the beach to welcome them.

In frustration the French landed about 1,000 men and sacked the fishing village of Teignmouth, just north of Tor Bay. They then departed. Of course, this rallied the entire country against them, Tories, Whigs, and Jacobites, too. Many Jacobites who had been stockpiling weapons and secretly training their tenantry destroyed their stocks and tore up the commissions King James had sent them.

Buchan's Last Gasp

The Earl of Argyle, chief of the Campbell clan and owner of most of the Southwest Highlands, had maintained a defensive posture throughout the war, beating off raids by his neighbours but not sending any formed units from his clan to aid MacKay. However, in August of 1690 he fulfilled the General's plan of attacking Mull by leading an expedition of 1,900 Foot and 60 Dragoons to that island. It was primarily a matter of pacification. Most of the islanders took oaths of allegiance to King William and surrendered their weapons (or some weapons...). Duart Castle had to be reduced, which proved beyond Argyle's capabilities when the weather broke and he had to leave. 300 men were left behind to keep it under observation. The chief fled to the nearby islet of Camburrow, which was inaccessible.

In MacKay's absence the Government's fears of Jacobite activities had been realised in a small way. Major General Buchan and Brigadier Cannon both escaped Cromdale. Basing themselves in Braemar they began raiding across the coastal plain, particularly in Angus and Mentieth. By the time MacKay returned from the West their numbers had grown to several hundred horsemen; most recently, Cannon's group, of 200 men, routed Lord Cardross' Dragoons at Mentieth and pursued them to the gates of Stirling. Units from Stirling and Perth tried to locate their camp, while MacKay took 1,000 men and tried to cut Cannon off from the hills, but he escaped.

Buchan and Cannon next combined forces at Braemar with Farquarson of Inverurie [In-ver-eye] and 5-600 local Highlanders. They left 160 men at Abergeldie Castle (11 Km down the Dee Valley from Braemar), which still contained a Williamite post, and fanned out across the plains recruiting 'well disposed gentlemen'. Their move was opposed at first by the Master of Forbes and Colonel Jackson's eight troops of Dragoons. Buchan intimidated them by his broad-front advance, in which he interwove his baggage to make his combat strength appear larger than it was. The two sides probably encountered one another near the bridge over the Dee at Kincardine O'Neil, because the Jacobites pursued them to the walls of Aberdeen, 20 miles (32 Km) away. (This stunt helped the 'Jacks' recruit a number of local landowners.)

MacKay's temper must have been very short indeed by now. He sent reinforcements in the shape of a Colonel Cunningham with 300 Foot (6 companies of Beveridge's Foot and 10 companies of Kenmuir's) and two troops of cavalry (1 Horse, 1 Dragoons), but the latter could not get into Aberdeen because Buchan's camp lay in the way (though the latter was by no means blockading the town). The French scare having faded, MacKay went himself with force of 1,400 – Livingstone's Dragoons and the three Anglo-Dutch battalions (soon to be pulled from his command) – sans baggage. Buchan was on his way south but chose not to meet him, instead heading into the hills. MacKay regrouped, placed Cunningham and a detachment at Aboyne, and marched into Braemar, where he relieved Abergeldie and proceeded to lay waste to everything within a radius of 20 Km, which amounted to some 12-1400 houses. A party of 200 enemy Highlanders was ridden down by 60 men under a Major MacKay and either killed or taken prisoner. Their chief escaped because he was trampled and left for dead.

Alarming news now reached the General. Lord Seaforth had succeeded in arranging a general insurrection, and General Buchan was riding to Inverness in anticipation of meeting several thousand Highlanders and turning on MacKay. The General acted swiftly. With as few pauses as absolutely necessary, and leaving his Foot to catch up, he rode through the sullen countryside to Inverness.

His quick reaction caused Buchan to lose his nerve. The Jacobites retreated down the West side of Loch Ness when MacKay was still four hours' march from them, while Seaforth, who was on his estates in Beaulie (lands just west of Inverness), sent his mother and another relation, MacKenzie of Coul, to MacKay, saying that he was willing to fall in with any solution the General might devise!

Kenneth MacKenzie, 4th Earl Seaforth, was 28 at this time. He had been a member of the prewar Privy Council, and had escaped to France, following King James to Ireland before accompanying Buchan to Scotland in the spring of 1690. After Cromdale, he had, probably unknown to Buchan, abandoned their concerted plan to raise his clan and instead sent emissaries to Edinburgh. The story he gave MacKay was that he had taken up arms 'for the sake of appearances'.

The General accepted that, with a grain of salt, and instructed Seaforth to come and surrender. The latter asked that he be arrested 'in arms', again for the sake of appearances – his Clan was very keen on going to war against King William. When the arresting party appeared, however, Seaforth balked, saying his health was too delicate for prison. Irritated, MacKay threatened to bring fire and sword to his estates, at which Seaforth did surrender. The Rising was put off.

[Lord Seaforth was imprisoned until January of 1692, when the general amnesty for the Highlands was due to go into effect, but even then his movements were limited to a radius of 16 Km from Edinburgh. In May he was rearrested for going outside the bounds (by a mile) and imprisoned at Inverness until 1697. He died in Paris in 1701.]

Seaforth's equivocal attitude had something to do with his enemies on the Privy Council, who lusted after his estates. They later opposed his brother's request that he be released early. Having done so little, his punishment appears rather severe, especially considering the lenient terms granted some of the more notorious chiefs.

With Seaforth's surrender, MacKay's work was virtually complete. By November he was in Holland, and, as noted in the short biography given earlier, he was to fight at Aughrim in 1691. Sir Thomas Livingstone became the C-in-C of the Scots Army.

Carrot & Stick

Throughout 1690 the Government had been distracted by the insistent demands of the Covenanter party for greater autonomy for the Kirk – and in fact for a 'purer' Kirk altogether. With the fading of the Jacobite threat, the normal business of factional politics could resume. King William was still enamoured of an 'inclusive' approach to government, and authorised a General Assembly of the Kirk to give the hotheads a place to grandstand. This was an issue that would require many meetings to resolve, but at least they were relatively bloodless affairs. The question of the Highlanders still remained, and once again, William advocated leniency.

By the end of 1690 the chiefs were beginning to feel the Privy Council's offers of a negotiated settlement were serious, and the string of defeats their cause had suffered, both at home and at the Boyne, led them to reconsider their options. Beachy Head had somewhat countered the Williamites' initial momentum, as did General Buchan's attempt to capitalise on the transient promise of a French landing, but by the autumn, the Jacobite principals were hiding out in the Western Highlands; Buchan and a few officers with Glengarry, Cannon and others among the island possessions of Sir Donald MacDonald. The few men they still had under arms were dismissed.

It was Viscount Tarbat who had first put forward a comprehensive plan for 'dividing and ruling' the Highlanders. Tarbat, a member of the Episcopalian party rather than the anti-Highlander Covenanter party,

pointed out that many of the chiefs were merely jealous of the Earl of Argyle's power or owed him money, and were fearful that he would use the current situation to seize lands awarded to them by the prewar regime. This was known to everyone, but only Tarbat voiced the matter and suggested a solution.

Tarbat's suggestion, made after Killiecrankie, was to pay off the debts owed to Argyle for the chiefs (about £5,000) and to arbitrate for the MacLeans, who had ancient land disputes against Argyle. To cap all, an oath of loyalty would be sworn to King William. In the days just after Killiecrankie however, Tarbat lacked the authority to implement this plan as he desired.

Still, tentative attempts were made at reconciliation. King William approved of the idea, but the man first chosen to conduct the negotiations, Campbell of Cawdor, was odious to the other Highland chiefs. General MacKay tried writing to Lochiel himself but got no reply; his offer of a 'bribe' to MacDonell of Glengarry was countered by the suggestion he come over to King James.

[Cawdor's (Calder's) base was near Inverness, but he also owned the island of Islay, which others had an interest in.]

As Tarbat's influence grew, John Campbell of Breadalbane took up the Government's project. A shifty character, it will be remembered MacKay had orders to occupy his castle on Loch Tay to keep him honest. However, he had not actually risen in arms, though he had fomented unrest by passing information to both sides, partly in case the Jacobites won, and partly in hopes the Government would buy him off.



[George MacKenzie, Viscount Tarbat]

Breadalbane had now agreed to try and bring over as many chiefs as he could to William. It was a slow process, involving much secret correspondence and negotiations. Fortunately, no military actions occurred in the between the autumn of 1690 and the spring of 1691 to spoil his chances (thanks in part to his own efforts, but mainly due to the sense of defeat on the Jacobite side).

Much of Breadalbane's motivation came from a long standing rivalry with his relation, Argyle, to whom he always seemed to play second fiddle. Tarbat's 'bribe the clans' scheme derived from the fact that so many owed money to Argyle. By paying their debts with Government money, Breadalbane's influence would rise while Argyle's would sink. At least in theory.

Simultaneously, the Jacobite chiefs were corresponding with the Court of St. Germain, King James' post of exile outside Paris. In the spring of 1691 the Jacobite Earl of Dunfermline was sent to France to meet with James to seek permission to treat with William's Government. Permission being granted, the Jacobite commissioned officers met at Achallader in Glenorchy on June 30th, 1691. Breadalbane was there. Together, they agreed on a complete cessation of hostilities until October 1st.

This still left the independent Highland chiefs. Breadalbane obtained £15-20,000 from King William for the purpose of paying off debts, fronting the purchase of land or government offices, and plain bribes. Sticklers for protocol, the chiefs insisted they too be given permission to treat by King James, which occasioned more delays; strangely, James, who had been ready enough to release his former officers from their oaths was less willing to release the Highlanders. But, after he was persuaded of their abject poverty, he agreed.

Breadalbane was notorious for his duplicity. It is said that, when given a further £4,000 to oil the negotiations, he used intimidation instead and pocketed the money. Questioned about this in front of a board of inquiry, he later stated: "The money is spent, the Highlands are quiet, and this is the only way of accounting between friends."

[Breadalbane was implicated in the Montgomery Plot, and in the Glencoe Massacre of 1692. Though he had a grudge against the Glencoe MacDonalds, who raided his lands, he was one of the few to realise the Government had committed a war crime. In September of 1692 he was arrested when his correspondence with the Highlanders came to light, but released when it was proved he had been a Government agent at the time those particular letters were written. In 1707 he refused to commit to the Union, in 1708 he encouraged the abortive rising against it, and in 1715 he sent his excuses to the Government saying he was too old to assist them but was seen in walking about the Jacobite camp. In each case there was money involved.]

On August 27th, a general indemnity was proclaimed for everyone who had borne arms, that they should not be prosecuted or persecuted so long as they took an oath of allegiance to King William before January 1st 1692. Buchan, Cannon, and the other Jacobite officers (about 150) took ship for France. All the chiefs took the oath, but as was their wont, in their own sweet time.

Not all the chiefs were amenable, so in some cases the stick followed the carrot. MacDonald of Sleat's son, who was the clan's field commander, was prepared to surrender, but his father was not. Two frigates had to be sent to his base on the Isle of Skye. When negotiation still proved futile they shelled his property and burned down two houses. Lowland troops were landed and forced back to their ships with the loss of 20 dead. Sleat did not cave in at this time, but took the oath before the expiry date.

Clanranald also proved intractable, so a similar expedition stormed the island of Eigg, one of their strongholds. Most of the fighting men being away the island witnessed scenes of rape and murder, and a general destruction of property. Clanranald gave in. There was but one more bloodletting remaining.



The Massacre of Glencoe

The Glencoe Massacre is one of those events that entered the collective memory of the Scots, obscuring equally heinous atrocities such as the one taking place on Eigg. It has been extensively written about, not always accurately. The affair itself occurred well after the end of all military operations in Scotland but is usually taken as the final note of the symphony.

When William's general indemnity was proclaimed, the last chief to take the oath was Maclain of Glencoe. He visited Colonel Hill, commandant of Fort William, on December 31st. Hill felt the oath should be taken before a civil magistrate, so he sent Maclain down to Inverary with a note of protection that also stated Maclain had made the oath on time. The sheriff of Argyll, Sir Colin Campbell, accepted both the note and oath of Maclain, even though the latter was delayed three days, partly through treachery, and then had to wait a further three days for the sheriff to return from vacation.

[The indemnity was not exclusive to the Highlanders but applied equally to all Jacobite rebels.]

Sensing a loophole in these proceedings, Campbell of Breadalbane and the Earl of Argyle, who were both in London, made a pact with Sir John Dalrymple, Master of Stair, King William's brand new Secretary of State for Scotland (there were actually two secretaries). Lord Stair had hoped the Highlanders would refuse the general amnesty, necessitating a military campaign of pacification which would break up the clan system.

[The more moderate Lord Melville had been fired for being too agreeable to the Covenanter faction. Stair, though vehemently anti-Highlander, was not a Covenanter but an Episcopalian.]

[Pictured above: left, John Campbell, 1st Earl of Breadalbane & Holland; right, Sir John Dalrymple, Master of Stair]



These three persuaded King William that Maclain's oath had been 'irregular' – by a piece of infernal luck it had already been marked as such by the clerks in Edinburgh. The Triumvirate obtained an order for the 'extirpation' of the MacDonalds of Glencoe under the usual and quite legal issuing of a 'commission of fire and sword'. The massacre itself was carried out by two companies of the Earl of Argyle's Regiment of Foot, totalling about 120 men. They were commanded by Captain Robert Campbell of Glenlyon.

In 1689, after the Battle of Dunkeld, Maclain of Glencoe and MacDonell of Glengarry were making their way home through Glen Lyon, a fertile valley north of Loch Tay owned by Campbell of Breadalbane. Thwarted of booty and finding themselves on Campbell land, they indulged in an orgy of pillage for the full 40 Km length of the glen. 1,500 head of livestock were rounded up. Achalladar Castle, at the western end of the property, was sacked. Robert Campbell had the rents of Glenlyon; he was already in debt and the destruction of the property bankrupted him.

It should be noted that Glenlyon held Glengarry more to blame and no mention was made of Maclain when the question of financial compensation arose. Also, Glenlyon was related by marriage to Maclain. Indeed, Glengarry had been slated as the first target should the Highlanders refuse the Amnesty, but his glens were more remote and harder to seal off than Maclain's.

Glenlyon's men were ostensibly billeted in Glencoe 'to collect the cess'. On February 12th, 1692, the senior captain of the regiment, Drummond by name, arrived with orders from Colonel Hill, which had in turn been passed down from Lieutenant General Livingstone. The orders were for Robert Campbell, not Drummond, so although the latter was the senior officer on the spot, more blame was attached to the former. The orders were, of course, to carry out the massacre.

Maclain was the first to die, shot in the back as he dressed for breakfast after hosting his murderers the night before. 38 MacDonald men were slain; 40 women and children died of exposure as they fled in a snow storm. Ironically the snow prevented Government cutoff

parties from blocking the exits to the glen. Roughly 700 of the clan survived, including the chief's two sons.

As an act of Government policy the massacre was a failure. Its execution was botched, and if the object was to frighten the Highlanders, it had the reverse effect, becoming a propaganda victory for the Jacobites. Breadalbane saw sooner than Stair just how bad a mistake they had made.

Some of the soldiers did refuse to participate or tried to warn their hosts, and later one or two gave evidence for the prosecution. Drummond and Glenlyon obeyed orders, the latter perhaps more from weakness of character. Their major, one Duncansons, and Hill's second in command, James Hamilton, had prior knowledge of the order and coordinated matters beforehand. Colonel Hill, who believed the Highlanders should be governed, not destroyed, may or may not have been aware of the full extent of the order, but since it was signed by the King his only option would have been to resign his commission in protest; he did not. General Livingstone's situation was the same.

King William, naturally, was deemed 'not responsible' though he shared Stair's views on Highland society. Stair was painted as the main culprit but did not suffer beyond a temporary dismissal, being under the King's protection. Breadalbane was imprisoned for a short time, but on the separate charge of corresponding with the Jacobites (as he indeed had done, on the Privy Council's orders). Argyle had not participated actively in the massacre; he became the most powerful man in the kingdom after the Union with England in 1707. Those few officers who had refused to carry out the order were initially punished – for failing to obey their superiors – but later exculpated for refusing to obey an 'illegal' order.

The event resonates in modern times as it illuminates the question of when orders should be considered illegal, as well as whether such an act is even illegal when conducted by a State. Under Scottish law, 'murder under trust' (i.e. murder while accepting the hospitality of a community) was more heinous than ordinary murder.

The finding of the parliamentary inquiry, held in 1695 was:

"Though the command of superior officers be very absolute, yet no command against the laws of nature is binding; so that a soldier, retaining his commission, ought to refuse to execute any barbarity, as if a soldier should be commanded to shoot a man passing by inoffensively, upon the street, no such command would exempt him from the punishment of murder."

Pro Libertate et Religione Nostra: Monmouth's Rebellion, 1685

"As long as brandy pays a duty of six shillings and eightpence a gallon, and freight and leakage comes to half a crown, while I am expected to sell it at twelve shillings, it matters little to me who is King of England. Give me a king that will prevent the hop-blight and I am his man."

[Micah Clarke (Sir AC Doyle)]

On June 11th 1685, James Scott, Duke of Monmouth, landed at the little port of Lyme, in Dorsetshire, with a following of 80 men. Within 24 hours his force had grown to 1,500, as Puritans, Whigs, and other malcontents flocked to his standard. Soon he would have almost 7,000 under arms. To oppose him, the tiny Royalist Army of King James II could only field 9,000 soldiers, many of them militia or new recruits. Though better trained and equipped in theory, even the core of the King's Army were a motley lot – regiments with experience in Dutch service, brutal veterans of the never-ending Moorish wars, and ill-disciplined old campaigners of the gambling hells of Pall Mall and Fleet Street.

Monmouth's Rebellion was the first, unsuccessful iteration of the revolution completed by William of Orange. The short explanation for its failure is that Monmouth lacked William's support base. The revolt was 'off the cuff' and sponsored by a relatively few men at a time when the newly crowned King James II was enjoying the ruler's traditional honeymoon period. Furthermore, the parties ranged behind Monmouth had just suffered a defeat in the ongoing struggle for power and influence; the King's supporters controlled much of the State machinery. But it was precisely because Monmouth's faction was in such a bad way that they decided to risk an armed rebellion.

James Scott, 1st Duke of Monmouth

James Scott was 36 years old when he led the rebellion against his uncle, King James II. The bastard son of Charles II by the latter's mistress, Lucy Walters – although he insisted the two had been married – Monmouth's fortunes had been chequered. Always a favourite of his father, he was nevertheless banished on more than one occasion, and lived in competition with his uncle the Duke of York, the heir to the throne. Protestant in religion (York's Catholicism was notorious), easy-going where James was bigoted and cold, Monmouth was the darling of much of the British public, but especially the nascent Whig party led by Lord Shaftesbury. On the question of religion alone it was widely felt that Monmouth would be a better king than York, and that his antecedents were a small matter in comparison. Some affected to believe his claims to legitimacy.

[Rumours, probably originating with the Duke of York, went further than saying Monmouth was illegitimate, claiming he was really the son of a Colonel Robert Sydney. However, modern DNA tests have demonstrated his blood relationship to the Stuart kings.]

Monmouth received his dukedom in 1663 (aged 14), along with other titles and an appointment as a Knight of the Garter. He was married to the Duchess of Buccleuch the same year, and took her surname and the title of Duke of Buccleuch. His early career followed a military bent, as was usual for the time. At 16 he served in the Royal Navy during the Second Dutch War, then commanded a troop of cavalry. At 19 he was colonel of His Majesty's Own Troop of Guards. At 23 he led a brigade of 6,000 auxiliaries sent to aid King Louis XIV in the Third Dutch War (1672). At 25 he was awarded the position of Master of the Horse, becoming de facto Commander-in-Chief of the Army when King Charles II directed that every order be examined by Monmouth before its execution. He was also in charge of the internal security of the realm. He was, in fact, regarded as England's finest soldier at this time. At 29 he commanded Holland's Anglo-Dutch Brigade against France in the Franco-Dutch War (1678), and the following year defeated the Cameronians at Bothwell Brig.



[James Scott, 1st Duke of Monmouth]

The Whigs

The opponents of James Stuart, whether as King or Duke of York, were the Whigs, a coalition of religious Dissenters and Nonconformists, with a leavening of 'leftist' republicans. Though they counted some high aristocrats among their number, most were of the merchant and tradesmen classes, which were the only avenues of advancement open to those with dissenting religious views. The supporters of the King, the Tories, tended to be landed aristocrats, court functionaries, and their dependents, but could be anyone who benefited under the rule of King Charles and his brother. Catholics naturally supported the regime, but so did mainline Anglicans, most of whom regarded Dissenters with as much suspicion as they did Catholics.

Antony Ashley-Cooper, 1st Earl Shaftesbury, was the very first parliamentary leader of the Whig faction. He had been one of the members of the so-called Cabal who helped King Charles II to govern after the fall of the first of his chief ministers, Lord Clarendon (he for whom the anti-Dissenter Clarendon Code was named). When that association of individualistic talent split apart, Shaftesbury became King Charles' Lord Chancellor. He did not last long in that post (being replaced by Lord Danby) because of his championing of government reform and Constitutional, as opposed to Absolute Monarchy, which set him against the Stuarts.

[Shaftesbury was also the chief Lord Proprietor of the Carolina Colony. The Ashley and Cooper Rivers are named after him.]

In 1680, Shaftesbury and his coterie named the Duke of Monmouth as an alternative royal heir to the Catholic Duke of York. The Duke would not perhaps have made the *best* of kings, but the Whigs were concerned to push an Exclusion Bill through Parliament, barring Catholics from the Throne, and needed a figurehead. They argued that a Catholic king would be by nature arbitrary in government, whereas Monmouth was not only more popular, but a Protestant, and therefore 'constitutional' in thought, word, and deed.

The majority of the Tories, it should be noted, were prepared to accept the Duke of York in the knowledge that his heir would be his daughter Mary, wife of the Prince of Orange. They could wait, seeing the 'republican' Whig political programme as the bigger threat to order and good governance.

The Duke of Monmouth was flattered by the attentions of the Whigs, but he went too far, making a tour of the provinces, not as a private nobleman, but as an Heir Apparent. Vast crowds gathered to see him. He made speeches and scattered largesse, even stooping to take an active part in local festivities. Armed men thronged about him; boughs and petals were strewn in his path as he rode through the various towns. Banquets were held, at which people were allowed to pass through his chambers to view him. He even dared to touch for the 'king's evil' at Liverpool, and was reputed to have healed several people. All this made Monmouth adored by the commons, more so when he was held up against the Duke of York. Everywhere he went, there were cries of 'a Monmouth! a Monmouth! and no York!'

For this, he was arrested at Stafford, charged with 'passing through the kingdom with multitudes of riotous people, to the disturbance of the peace and the terror of the King's subjects'. Some historians contend that there would have been a general rising if Shaftesbury had been with the Duke at this time, but the easy-going Monmouth accepted his fate. Forcibly escorted to London, his bail was posted at £10,000, plus sureties from others of his faction, notably Lord Grey and Lord Russell – the latter soon to be executed – of £2000 each. Though he was soon forgiven by King Charles, the Duke was nevertheless kept under close supervision. His uncle was shunted off to Scotland to ease tensions.

Although the Whigs had not yet succeeded in passing their Exclusion Bill, they had gained a great deal of momentum – which they promptly lost as the notorious Popish Plot fell apart in 1681. Though in some respects a spontaneous witch hunt brought about by the lunatic Titus Oates, the Whigs had harnessed the plot, using it to whip up anti-Catholic sentiment in aid of their political agenda.

As the more prominent Whigs were one by one implicated in the scandal, the Tories began to regain political ground. Monmouth's backers were no longer in a position to support his claims. In 1683, matters came to a head. Persecution of the Whigs bred desperation. The Rye House Plot, no more real than the Popish Plot, was discovered. Supposedly, the King and the Duke of York were to be ambushed and killed by Fifth Monarchy Men, a nearly defunct radical fringe group associated with the Whigs. Monmouth was not at first targeted, because he had been keeping the King apprised of his role in Shaftesbury's plans.

[*'Fifth Monarchy'* refers to the Book of Daniel and the final Kingdom of Jesus Christ. The Fifth Monarchy Men tried to hasten the Last Trump by 'violent jihad'.]

However, once Lord Shaftesbury and some of the other marked men fled to Holland, Monmouth was also made to flee, guilty by association. Shaftesbury soon after died, and some of his supporters were imprisoned or executed, but other major players: Ferguson, an ex-minister and fire-brand; Rumbold, one of Cromwell's Ironsides and the owner of the Rye House; Wade, a lawyer and son of a Cromwellian, Lord Grey, courageous everywhere but on the field of battle, survived to nurse their bitterness.

Meanwhile, the Duke of York, now back in London, made his first tentative stabs at curtailing various public freedoms. In particular, London and other major cities had their Charters taken away. This allowed James' creatures to gain parliamentary seats through rigged elections, giving the Tories even more power.

Monmouth returned from his temporary exile in October of 1683, and was again pardoned by Charles. The following incident serves to indicate something of his character. The terms of the pardon were that Monmouth was to remain at the King's pleasure, and must beg forgiveness of the King and the Duke of York. Monmouth agreed to

this, and went so far as to declare that he would be the first to support the Duke of York, should Charles die for some reason. But, he was also asked to testify in the trials of the Rye House plotters. Monmouth requested that he not appear publicly, but merely confirm the statements and evidence privately with the King. This was agreed upon, and Monmouth received his pardon and £6,000 spending money.

But, this was not the end of the matter. The details were published in the Gazette (the State-sponsored rag); Monmouth hotly denied that he was supplying information. Enraged, the King demanded that he write a public letter of explanation. This was done, and the letter sent to Charles, but Monmouth's friends remonstrated with him, and he was persuaded to ask for the letter back. Fed up with his son, Charles eventually agreed to drop the issue, but banished him from his presence. Monmouth retired to his country seat, where he promptly sent to the King, offering to rewrite the offending letter. Disgusted, Charles refused the offer. Finally, when subpoenaed for one of the trials, Monmouth fled back to Holland, unwilling to appear.

In exile, he lived for a time with the Prince of Orange in Brussels, confident he would soon be recalled and the Duke of York exiled in turn. He had reason for these hopes, as York was getting above himself. But then, on February 5, 1685, King Charles died, after accepting Catholic last rites. He did not once mention Monmouth's name.

The Duke of York, hovering at the deathbed, immediately took charge and was proclaimed King James II. Monmouth's hopes, along with those of the Whigs, were dashed. James quickly consolidated his power. He began building a Catholic army in Ireland, and took over the duties derived from Customs and Excise as his personal prerogative, thus bypassing Parliament's control of taxes. Shaftesbury's successor, the moderate Lord Halifax, he demoted. Even more ominously, James began to openly to practice the Catholic rites.

The Coronation took place on April 23, 1685. It was a day of gloom in the Capital, almost of mourning. To top it off, the King, while spending money on new outfits, refused to put on any displays or public amusements. James had already called a Parliament (where he planned to lay down the law), and was negotiating with Louis XIV, who promised him the sum of 500,000 Crowns in exchange for future considerations.

[After James' ouster, his daughter Mary was faulted for running about the palace with a smile on her face as she excitedly planned renovations. Like father, like daughter.]

Parliament opened on May 22nd that year. Packed with James' agents (of 635 MPs, only 150 were old members), there were no attempts to take an independent line. Copies of the Exclusion Bill that Shaftesbury had laboured so hard on, and the 'proofs' of Monmouth's legitimacy, were publicly burned. James repeated his intention to rule according to the laws of the land, asked for a life revenue, and then told the assembly that if they wanted to meet often, they should do as they were told.

At this point, Parliament was informed that rebellion had broken out in Scotland, where the 9th Earl of Argyle had returned after a long exile in Holland. Capitalizing on the alarm this raised, James also managed to squeeze money out of Parliament to pay his father's debts, and to replenish the naval stores and arsenals. With his now immense income, he broke free of Parliament's control. The Commons complained about the pressure being placed on them, and expressed fears about the revocation of Habeas Corpus and the Test Acts, but nothing was resolved. A much more serious threat than a border incursion had arisen – Monmouth had returned...

False Start

There were many Whig and Covenanter exiles in the Low Countries. The most influential of these, such as Robert Ferguson, Lord Grey of Warke, and the other players in the spurious Rye House Plot, constantly worked on both Monmouth and the Earl of Argyle, urging a *coup d'état*. The latter needed little prodding. A fanatical Presbyterian, the Earl of Argyle was the recognised leader of the Covenanter party in exile.

But, the Duke turned out to be a tougher nut than expected. At this date he had little interest in leading a coup. He was in Brabant, living the life of a gentleman of leisure, and had taken up with the Baroness Wentworth, a remarkable woman who was doing much to give his character some stability. Monmouth was no longer interested in Court life. Even Argyle, who buttonholed him aggressively, could not sway his mind. Eventually, however, Grey and Ferguson won over the Baroness, and with her stimulus, Monmouth was persuaded to act.

Messages were received from two Whig agents in London, Danvers and Wildman by name, representing that the country was ripe for rebellion. Colonel Danvers was to lead a London rising 10,000 strong aided by £6,000 collected from the merchant community, while Lord Delamere was to galvanise the Midlands, particularly Cheshire.

It was agreed that Argyle and Monmouth should time their endeavours to provide mutual support, making simultaneous landings. This would at least split the Royal Army, and with the popular support known to exist for the Duke, it would only be a matter of weeks before they were successful.

Argyle would land in Southwest Scotland, raise his clan and mobilise the Covenanters, seize Edinburgh, then take his blue bonnets over the border, if necessary. (Actually, that part of the program might have been forced on the English since the Scots would want to ensure compliance with their own interests.) Monmouth would land in the West Country, where support for his person was strongest.

At this stage the intention was to leave King James on his throne, but under the wardship of his nephew, as Lord Protector, and a 'free' parliament.

Each invasion group brought along a couple of representatives from the other faction to ensure coordination of interests. Ferguson was one of the Scots slated to accompany Monmouth, and the other was a man called Fletcher of Saltoun. Fletcher at least was talented, but he was soon to be lost to the cause after a petty quarrel.

King James was well informed of his enemies' plans and put pressure on the Dutch government to prevent any sailing of the exiles. His measures came too late to stop Argyle, who, leaving on May 2nd, traveled up the East coast of Britain. Upon sighting Kirkwall, in the Orkneys, about May 6th, a scouting party put ashore but was arrested by the local bishop. The remainder of the expedition quickly sailed out of sight. By the time they arrived in Campbell country on June 6th, the Scots Government was thoroughly alerted and had already begun to disarm the clan and imprison the lesser chiefs. Only about 1,800 men followed the fiery cross.

Argyle's efforts were doomed to failure as he was compelled to trail about a committee of twelve men, each with extreme, often widely divergent views on politics and religion, without even being permitted to serve as president of his own council. The Earl prudently wanted to liberate his own lands and establish a base first, but members of his council accused him (perhaps rightly) of being self-seeking and so they parted company. The Council took a substantial portion of the 'army' with them.

After sailing up the Clyde and finding the landings held against them, the dissidents returned, but were still unable to agree on their strategy. Finally, after several false starts, and the loss of his naval support, Argyle in despair marched directly on Glasgow. Harassed on all sides by enemy militiamen (as well as by his 'twelve apostles'), the remains

of Argyle's army blundered into a bog and melted away in panic. The Earl was taken, transported to Edinburgh, and on June 30th, beheaded. Although threatened with torture he steadfastly refused to reveal the plans of the exiles. His head was affixed to the Tollbooth, where that of his family's enemy Montrose had hung forty years before. Over 300 of his men were Transported to New Jersey and the West Indies as slaves.



[Archibald Campbell, 9th Earl of Argyle]

The West Country Aflame

Monmouth and his men left the Texel on May 30th, after some dodging of the Dutch authorities. Only the fact that the administration of the Hague cordially hated the administration of Brussels prevented his seizure – he was permitted to leave before the order for his quarantine was signed. The mighty invasion flotilla consisted of the thirty-two-gun frigate *Helderburgh* plus three small tenders. On board, apart from the crew, were about 80 officers and 150 men of varying station. The weather was stormy and government ships lay everywhere in the Channel. Not until June 11th did they sight the little port of Lyme, in Devonshire. It was a beautiful summer's day, hot and calm.

For the locals, the first sign of trouble came when the customs officials went aboard the vessels and did not return. Then, a number of boats were seen putting out from the 'flotilla'. With Monmouth at the landing were Ford Grey, Lord Grey of Warke, Fletcher of Saltoun, Robert Ferguson, Nathaniel Wade, and a man named van Buys, an experienced mercenary who had served the Elector of Brandenburg.

Ford Grey, Lord Grey of Warke and 1st Earl of Tankerville was a close friend of both Monmouth and Shaftesbury, and a notorious Whig, known to be involved in many semi-legal proceedings on the political side. Apart from the Rye House Plot he was also notorious for seducing his wife's sister. After the Rebellion he turned king's

evidence and received a pardon. His military abilities were rather less than useful.

Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun was also a notorious Whig implicated in the Rye House Plot, but unlike Grey he was a man of some ability. After the Revolution he became prominent in Scottish politics, backing the Darien Scheme and opposing the Union. But at the present time he would be of little help to Monmouth. He tried to commandeer a horse belonging to the Rebel paymaster, a Taunton man named Thomas Dare. The argument became heated and Dare was shot dead. Saltoun was sent back to Holland before the locals could lynch him.

Robert Ferguson was another Scot, and a vehemently anti-Catholic Nonconformist minister (or, at least he said he was a minister; Burnet says he was cast out of the fold). Shaftesbury had hired him as a pamphleteer to promote the Exclusion Bill. He was one of the main organisers of the whole expedition. He has been described as a perpetually discontented crank. Sidelined by King William he later joined the Jacobites. There are suggestions he always played both sides, and might have been an *agent provocateur* for King James.



[Lord Grey (left) and Fletcher of Saltoun (right).]


Nathaniel Wade, another Rye House conspirator and Nonconformist, was the expedition's chief factor, arranging shipping and buying arms and ammunition. During the Rebellion he served as colonel of Monmouth's (Red) Regiment. After the Rebellion he also turned king's evidence and received a pardon.

Anton van Buys was a professional soldier who commanded the small train of artillery, along with a famously 'unnamed' Dutchman. There were a number of other professional officers and common soldiers who acted as cadres for the Rebel regiments; the units were therefore not as 'raw' as Tory propaganda later made out.

On the shore, Monmouth knelt and prayed for success; the party then proceeded to the town square and set up his Standard, a green flag fringed in gold with the motto 'Fear Nothing But God'. A rambling proclamation drawn up by Ferguson was read out, declaring James II to be a tyrant and an usurper who desired to destroy the Protestant religion, who had poisoned the late king, burnt down London, originated the Popish Plot, conspired with France against Holland, etc. etc. Monmouth was received with loud acclamations, and within a day had 1,500 men under arms, which, incidentally, was all that his arsenal could supply.

[The Rebels later received a blue flag with the motto 'Pro Libertate et Religione Nostra' – 'for our Liberty and our Religion'. In 1688 the Prince of Orange deliberately copied this flag as a propaganda stunt.]

Men of very different world views supported Monmouth: diehard Puritans out to cast down the Sons of Belial; Whig republicans seeing the chance of Liberty disappear; Dissenters fearing to be martyred; dispossessed landowners; and the inevitable opportunists. Although



quick-witted, and brave enough in battle, Monmouth was not, ultimately, the man to lead such a disparate coalition. In council he was weak, and in personality effeminate. Most of the great magnates refused to support him, fearing for their lands, or disagreeing with the sentiments of his closest followers.

For example, on June 21st the Duke unwisely persuaded his council that he should be proclaimed King, thus turning an act of liberation into one of rebellion. This was supposed to lure the aristocracy to his side, but as at the same time his declaration made severe, almost republican demands against the existing Government (a sop to his more left-wing followers), no magnate could be expected to favour his cause.

Nevertheless, the Duke still commanded great loyalty and popularity among the common people of the West, who remembered his largesse when travelling the land five years before. Monmouth was not too proud to run a foot race with the local bumpkins, or shake the hand of a weaver. The question was, could a force made up predominantly of labourers and tradesmen survive an encounter with a professional army? With von Buys's help, and with the assistance of a number of veterans, the men received drill with musket and pike. Unfortunately, the Rebel cavalry, as usual in such ventures, was to prove worse than useless. Cavalry requires a great deal of training to be effective. Especially, horses have to be trained and fit for battle to a much greater degree than their riders.

First Moves

The Rebellion began auspiciously with (an admittedly indecisive) brush between 450 Rebels and the Dorsetshire Militia at Bridport on June 14th. A first clash had already occurred on the 12th, between the two side's recruiting parties. On the 13th Fletcher fought his duel, meaning that the Rebel Horse was henceforth to be commanded by the inept Lord Grey. On Sunday the 14th, detachments from the Red and White Regiments, with 40 Horse, marched over to Bridport and tangled with the half-formed Militia. The affair gained a few horses, a few prisoners and some deserters to flesh out the ranks but the lieutenant colonel of the Red Regiment, Samuel Venner, was severely wounded and spent the rest of the campaign 'behind a desk'; Major Nathaniel Wade took over. Grey's Horse gave its first proofs of uselessness.

The next fight took place at Axminster, on the 15th. The town, sited on the Axe River, was slated for occupation by the Devonshire Militia, blocking egress to the East. The Somerset Militia was rumoured to be on its way to reinforce them. After a night forced march, the Rebels, now about 3,000 in number, beat the Devonshire Militia to the town and routed the Somerset Militia with extremely little effort, collecting enough equipment to fully arm themselves once more. The Devonshire Militia perforce retreated to Honiton, where it regrouped. Help was coming.

The Regime was quick to act. The West Country militia had received orders to begin mustering on the 13th, advance elements of the Royal Army (four troops of the Blues, two of the Royals, and five companies of Kirke's Lambs) under John Churchill were enroute to Salisbury and points west. Sixteen guns were pulled from the Tower arsenal and eight more from the Portsmouth by-train. Soon after, the Scots regiments of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade were summoned from Holland (they arrived; Prince William was not sorry to see a rival discomfited).

On the 19th, the bulk of the Blues and the Royals were dispatched west, along with two battalions each of the First and Coldstream Guards, followed by Dumbarton's (Royal Scots), the Train, and some companies of Trelawney's Regiment. Their route was by Salisbury, Blandford, and Dorchester to Axminster. That same day, much to Churchill's displeasure, Lord Feversham was appointed Lieutenant General over him.

[The Scots Guards were not sent, since they were part of the Scots Army. By an anomaly, Dumbarton's Foot was on the English Establishment.]

King James did not trust Churchill, since Monmouth was an old comrade of his; the Duke even wrote to him on the 19th, but Churchill merely passed the letter on. A far different course than he took in 1688! As would be the case in 1688, the usurpers relied on the hope of defections. Unfortunately, Monmouth's endeavour came too close in time to the Coronation, when the Army was still James' lapdog.

On the 18th, the Rebels had their first encounter with regular troops. Churchill and 300 cavalry appeared at Axminster on the 17th. On the 16th the Rebels passed through Chard, enroute to Taunton, which they reached on the 18th. Monmouth, concerned for the security of the road they had just come by, which many recruits were using to join him, sent a scouting party of 17 horsemen back to Chard. There they clashed with 22 troopers of the Blues. The Rebels lost four men and the Blues three, but the former fled to Taunton, while Churchill made his headquarters at Chard.

The Rebels based at Taunton for some days. It was an old Roundhead town, sympathetic to Monmouth's cause, or at least to the cause of the republicans among his entourage. It was here he unwisely proclaimed himself the True King. That day, the 21st, he and his 5,000 men left Taunton for Bridgwater, and ultimately for Bristol. The Duke's mien was gloomy:

"I thought he looked very thoughtful and dejected in his countenance, and thinner than when I saw him four years before..."

[Quote in Chandler, p. 26]


Ultimately London, hotbed of Whiggish sentiment and the center of economic and political power, was the goal. To remain in the West would merely give the Royalists time to consolidate. However, a direct advance to the East, over Salisbury Plain, would put the Rebel Foot at great risk from the Royalist Horse. Bristol, England's second city, lay to the Northeast within easy reach. The city would provide men and material, money and prestige, and access to the wider world. From there, also, the army could withdraw into Wales, or advance north and east, through counties reputedly sympathetic to Monmouth's cause, accumulating resources and manpower. (Those same counties provided much of the industrial output of pre-Industrial England.) When they were strong enough they could descend on the Capital.

Both sides being aware of Bristol's potential, a race ensued. Churchill's advance guard shadowed the Rebels, resulting in another skirmish favourable to him at Langport on the 22nd. On the 23rd the Rebels were at Shepton Mallet, while the Royalist main body under Lord Feversham was marching on Bath. Both parties still had the option of passing north or south; Monmouth chose north, and the Royalists moved to block him.

Bristol was already garrisoned by three militia regiments, but their steadiness was suspect. Monmouth, persuaded by Wade, made for Keynsham Bridge, southeast of the city. Crossing here they could make a proper 'investment' – which in reality would amount to the moral effect of showing up before the Royalists, cowing the Militia into opening the gates. But the Royalists were before them.

Feversham himself arrived in Bristol with his personal guard on the 23rd, and the bridge at Keynsham was broken down, but they only destroyed one span. On the 24th, the Rebels attempted the bridge. Feversham was in some danger, as his main force had not yet arrived. The bridge guards, a troop of Horse from the Gloucester Militia, abandoned their post, allowing Rebel scouts to repair the broken span with planks. On the 25th Monmouth's army was across the River Avon.

What happened next was a bit of bad luck for the Rebels. Pelted by a sudden violent storm, they were ordered into quarters on the Keynsham (left) bank of the river. Almost as soon as the men were dismissed into quarters, they came under attack from two sides: 100 of the Blues up from the South, and 250 troopers of another party who had swum the river earlier in the day and now came in from the North. The Royalists lost about six men. The Rebels lost fourteen, and more



importantly, their morale. There were already rumours of an offer of amnesty, and a few men began to take advantage of it.

Monmouth made the excuse that he did not want to see Bristol destroyed by street fighting, then followed the whim – he really was acting on whims by this point – of seeking a band of reinforcements rumoured to be waiting in Wiltshire. The Rebels made a night march on Bath, passing it on the 26th. When they summoned the town to surrender the messenger was shot out of the saddle.

Monmouth's whim led his army into its last clash before the climactic battle at Sedgemoor: Norton St. Philip (or Philip's Norton). It was the 27th of June, wet and cold – typical English weather for June. The Rebels were encamped at the village, with some halfheartedly distributed picquets to warn of surprise. Feversham was following them from Bristol, and had reached Bath, where more of his forces joined with him: Churchill from the West and the artillery from the East. Feversham now had about 2,500 men in proximity to the enemy.

Scouts reported the Rebels' location but the General was not satisfied and sent out a reconnaissance in force, consisting of 45 Grenadiers, 500 Foot of the Guards, and elements of the Blues and the Royals.

The Royalists were overconfident. Early on the 27th the Grenadiers were ambushed by the Rebel rearguard. Monmouth was already on his way south to Frome, from where he intended to circle around to Warminster. At the sound of firing he countermanded the march and formed for battle.

The Rebel rearguard, under a Captain Vincent, was holding a barrier across the road at the edge of the village and had pinned down the advancing Grenadiers. The Royalist support elements were too close behind and could not deploy easily, since the road was sunken, and lined with hedges. At first, Feversham, who was near the lead elements, expected the Grenadiers would bull their way through and did not even see the need to deploy.

The Red Regiment was moved to the Rearguard's right, from which it moved by way of 'a gentleman's house' onto the Royalist flank and began pouring fire into them at pointblank range. Meanwhile, the Green Regiment was sent by a covered way around the left of the barrier (on that side the ground dips into a valley) and did the same on its side. Those Royalists under fire began to flee. When Feversham's supports attempted to take the Red Regiment in flank, the Green Regiment crossed the road and counterattacked.

Meanwhile the Rebel Horse made a wide flanking movement to the left. However, it once again let Monmouth down. Instead of closing with the Royalists and turning a fighting withdrawal into a rout, it hung back. Feversham did not consider counterattacking in such a confused situation. This hedge-by-hedge 'fire and movement' continued until the Rebels came to a large area of ploughed land, rising away from them. Feversham's army was drawn up in this field, slightly above them.

Once the Royalists were reformed on the high ground and the Rebels were reformed below them, the nature of the battle changed into a set-piece affair. Monmouth outnumbered Feversham two-to-one, so the latter put on a brave show as he waited for the Portsmouth by-train to arrive (the muddy roads imposed their usual delay). Once the train appeared, he would have eight heavy guns to Monmouth's four light pieces.

The guns arrived about 10am, but the resulting cannon duel accomplished very little. One rebel is said to have been killed. Still, it would not have been pleasant experience to be so outgunned. The firing went on for six hours, while both commanders debated with their respective staffs on the advisability of attacking. Monmouth went so far as to cut gaps in the hedges for his troops to pour through, but ultimately decided to withdraw under cover of night. Feversham came to the same conclusion. The Rebels retired to Frome, and the Royalists to Bradford-on-Avon.

[It took nine hours for the Rebel army to travel 10 Km.]

The Duke's advisors were hopelessly divided. From the North had come news of Argyle's landing, from which great things were expected. Now came news of the wreckage of the Campbell clan, the disunity of the Lowland Scots, and the panic-stricken flight of the small northern army. Argyle had failed; more, he was taken. It was up to the English now. But the masses seemed inert. The promised 500 Wiltshire lads were nowhere to be found, the risings in Cheshire and London had not taken place, and more men were leaving the army than were arriving. The Rebels, out of funds, were forced to requisition what they needed.

Monmouth may have been kicking himself for not attacking Feversham, but it was too late now. Instead, he began to toy with the idea of slipping away to his mistress in Brabant and leaving his army to face the music. Putting it to a vote, the Duke was dissuaded, though Colonel Venner and another officer deserted, expecting him to follow. Monmouth was forced to lie and say they had gone to Holland to buy arms. Another whim: 10,000 Clubmen promised at Axbridge. Rather than march on London they would return to the West.

[Students of the English Civil Wars will remember the Clubmen: bands of peasants who fought to keep both sides from pillaging their lands.]

A march on London at this juncture might or might not have succeeded. Feversham was behind him. But, more Royalist forces awaited in the East and the Militia was effectively policing the country. As things stood, he might simply have been arrested as a common malefactor. Still, returning to the West on such a flimsy excuse was an obvious admission of failure.

Feversham's journeying took him in pursuit of the Rebels, from Bradford on the 29th to Westbury, to Frome, and to Shepton Mallet. Having received intelligence that the Rebels might try to break south, the Royalists moved to Glastonbury on the 3rd of July, and to Somerton on the 4th.

Monmouth, meanwhile, having left Frome on the 30th, made for Shepton Mallet under constant harassment by Churchill's cavalry, and from thence to Wells. The march to Wells was an attempt to seize what turned out to be a very small Royalist supply train. Any material gain was outweighed by the action of some of sectaries, who attempted to desecrate the Cathedral. This not only alienated the locals, but divided opinion within the army.

That was Wednesday, July 1st. On the 2nd, the Rebels made for Bridgwater and collected their Clubmen – all 160 of them. The Somerset Militia garrisoning the village, already nervous about the Clubmen, made themselves scarce, and the Rebels camped on the Bridgwater moor.


Sedgemoor, July 6th 1685

For anyone wishing a detailed treatment of this battle, David Chandler's book is highly recommended. What follows here is only a summary.

At Bridgwater, the Rebels pretended to entrench themselves, while their leadership planned a breakout toward Keynsham Bridge. It was a desperate gamble, and in the event could not be executed.

Feversham brought the Royal Army up to the hamlet of Westonzoyland, within patrolling distance east of Bridgwater (5 Km). He had about 1,000 cavalry and 1,500 infantry. The cavalry were billeted in the village and the Foot camped by their regiments along a large drainage ditch called the Bussex Rhine. (The region had once been fenland and was still very boggy.) Three regiments of Wiltshire Militia (another 1,500 men) were camped at Middlezoy and Othery, about 1.5 Km southeast of Westonzoyland. All 18 cannon were on the Left of the line, near the Bridgwater Road; the teamsters had walked off the job and left them there.

A short skirmish occurred near Bridgwater when the defenders attempted to chase off some Royalist scouts, but otherwise no action occurred on the 5th of July. The main event was planned for that night,



when the Rebels intended to slip past the Royalists. At the last minute, though, their plans were altered. While observing his opponents from the Bridgwater church steeple, the Duke noticed they seemed to be observing no sort of camp discipline. A night attack, though also risky, might produce a better result than the gamble of a long march into fresh fields.

The new plan was to circle north, away from the enemy artillery, and turn the flank of the Royalists. Monmouth's force by now consisted of 600 Horse, 2,500 Foot in five regiments and an independent company, and four cannon. The protagonists would be evenly matched in numbers, but it was hoped the Night would make up for any deficiency in training or morale.

Approach March

The Rebels broke camp around 10 pm (the last, including the Duke, leaving the town about 11pm) and headed into the misty darkness on their final 10 Km march. They took the Bristol Road, northeast, then circled around the hamlet of Chedzoy before marching south to the Royalist camp. The object was not only to place the enemy army between them and its own artillery, but to avoid the couriers and spies that infested the more direct route.

Chandler points out that the Rebel plan was not as ill-conceived and blundering as some have believed. It was extremely risky, but well reasoned. They would approach via a covered lane to within about 1,200 meters of the Bussex Rhine before emerging onto the open ground of the Langmoor. They would cross the intervening Langmoor Rhine by its ford, since the ditch was full of water. The advance guard would race ahead and cross the Bussex Rhine by another ford called the Upper Plungeon, then rush Westonzoyland and engaged the enemy cavalry while its membership was still in billets. Most of the senior officers were also billeted there, and if they could be taken or isolated from their commands, the Rebel Foot, by then fighting the Royalist Foot some hundreds of meters to the west of the village, would be at a distinct advantage. As a best case scenario the enemy guns would be captured and turned on the enemy camp.

At first all went well. Monmouth's first mistake came when he left his ammunition wagons and a defective cannon at Peasy Farm, where the army turned off the Bristol Road. Chandler suspects as squeaky wagon wheel as the reason.

But the Duke's decision may have seemed correct to his men when they heard an enemy cavalry patrol passing them not so far away along the route they were taking. Chandler also recounts how the Rebels were detected by the locals, but those men only passed the word to the night watch, who, instead of reporting to the Royalists hastened to find a spot where they could watch the battle!

It was around 1am at the Langmoor Rhine that things fell apart. Their guide, one of Monmouth's officers who had already reconnoitred the Royalist camp that day, came out of a patch of fog to find he had missed the crossing point. While he hastily sought it, the column piled up behind him, and they were heard, most likely by a picquet from the Blues, who promptly fired his pistol to warn the camp before being ordered to ride there with a verbal warning.

[There is a famous legend to the effect that a witch once warned Monmouth to 'beware the Rhine'; he had, of course, thought she meant the somewhat larger one in Germany, but he remembered the prophecy now.]

As part of their routine security precautions, the Royalists had deployed a number of picquets, some of whom were not available when the fighting commenced and others that were located in the Rebels' way. 50 Dragoons were sent to watch the Bridgwater-Taunton Road; they were about 3 Km away to the South. 50 Foot were stationed in a sheepfold next to the direct road to Bridgwater; they also covered another crossing of the Bussex Rhine called the Lower Plungeon, and would be on the Rebel Foot's right flank once the battle commenced. Additional vedettes were stationed on the Rebels' side of the rhine opposite the Royalist camp. A Colonel Oglethorpe led 200 of

the Blues out on a patrol; it was they who had passed the Rebels in the night. Though Oglethorpe took a circuitous route to get back to the battlefield he was in time for the *coup de grâce*.

100 of the Blues and 50 of the Royals under a Captain Compton were based at Chedzoy, to the right of the Rebels route; it was one of their men who sounded the alarm. These horsemen now, per standing orders, retired at full speed to the main Royalist camp. Enroute they collided with Lord Grey's Horse making for the Upper Plungeon. Compton was shot in the chest as the two sides exchanged pistol fire in the dark. The opposing troops then raced to the Upper Plungeon together, periodically bumping into each other, but the Blues got there first and reformed.

[There is another legend that it was a Rebel officer who fired, after which he made for home to take the amnesty. It is also possible, if that legend is true, that the man discharged his weapon accidentally and fled punishment.]

The Battle

Shorn of the element of surprise, Monmouth's attack became a more conventional affair. The Rebels were not yet bound to lose, but the odds were stacking against them. The Langmoor Rhine was crossed as quickly as possible and the regiments hustled forward across the moor while the Royalists fell in, some only half dressed, but all fully armed.

Pushed off course, Grey did not engage Compton's force directly but struck the Bussex Rhine a little to the right of the ford. Apparently the ditch was fairly dry in many places, but, assuming it was as full of water as the Langmoor drain, the Rebel Horse divided. 200 went left, where they engaged Compton's men at equal odds and were eventually overcome. The other 400 went right down the length of the ditch, aiming for Dumbarton's Regiment, the only one of the Royalist units still equipped with matchlocks, and therefore clearly visible in the dark. Grey bluffed his way passed them, but the next unit, one of the Guards battalions, challenged him:

"For whom are you?"

"For the King."

"For which King?"

"King Monmouth! God with us!"


"Then take this with you!"

Dumbarton's opened fire. The Rebels rode hastily on down the line of enemy regiments ranged on the other side of the ditch, but taking volley after volley was too much for their untrained horses, which bolted off the field – by way of Monmouth's advancing Foot, whom they careened into.

Debouching from the lane they had used, Monmouth had ordered his Foot to cross the moor at the double, Red, Yellow, Green, Blue, and White, the three remaining guns groaning along behind. Two-thirds of the way across the moor, Grey's troopers came pouring out of the black mist and rode them down. While the Red Regiment sorted itself out, the others piled up on it. Grey's men meanwhile, tore down the lane, shouting to the men of the ammunition train to save themselves. Grey himself at last reined in, and managed to collect a few horsemen before riding back onto the field.

Meanwhile, the Rebel Foot began to form line. Wade, commanding the Red Regiment, had planned to cross the Bussex Rhine before opening fire, but when Matthew's Yellow Regiment on his right started shooting at extreme range, his own regiment took this as a good excuse to do the same, and after that they were stuck in place. It was 2:30am.

The opposing regiments traded fire for a short while. Casualties in this exchange would be fairly minor, given the low light and the distance involved, but the Rebels eventually began to run low on ammunition. At that point it was realised the ammunition train had gone. Or rather,



the wagons were still there, but over 2 Km away, with no one to fetch them.

As Officer of the Day, John Churchill had command of the Royalists. Lord Feversham had dined rather too well with the local bishop and was still asleep. Fortunately for the Royalists, his host was alert and offered his carriage horses to shift their guns. One by one the pieces were hauled to the right of the line, three against the Red Regiment and three against the Yellow, which were the only units yet formed in line; the other enemy regiments were still moving up. The Rebel guns were silenced first, then the gunners began using canister...

Feversham appeared around 3am. Chandler debunks some of the Whig propaganda that had him preening himself for half an hour before leisurely descending to observe the scene. Apparently he suffered from a debilitating head wound that prevented him from waking quickly. After Feversham showed up, Colonel Oglethorpe and his missing patrol did so too, giving the Royalists an additional 200 cavalry. Dawn was not far off and Feversham decided to wait until it was light to deliver the *coup de grâce*.

Monmouth did not wait. He had run the battle the best he could under the circumstances, but prescience told him his army was doomed. He changed into civilian dress and rode away with Lord Grey, van Buys, and his personal doctor. The Royalist guns greeted the Green and White Regiments as they at last formed up in the twilight.

Feversham's assault came as a double envelopment, his cavalry crossing by the two plunges. The Rebels continued to fight very hard. Oglethorpe's wing was repulsed once (he had attacked a little ahead of schedule). Only when Feversham saw the enemy ranks wavering did he send the Foot across the Rhine to complete the job.

[*'Wavering' is literally what he would have seen: the pikes waving about instead of being held steady.*]

[*Below, Sedgemoor, viewed from Chedzoy.*]

Aftermath

The Royalists suffered 80 dead and 220 wounded. The Rebels lost 1,000 killed and 500 captured, plus their guns. The battle was a disaster for them, but it was not an inevitable one as is sometimes claimed. Monmouth's plan was overbold, but it was possible. Contrary to legend, his regiments were reasonably well equipped, and did have a number of veterans, both mercenaries from the Dutch service and those with Civil War experience. The men making up most of the rank and file were small tradesmen and 'mechanics', not of the 'best' class, but certainly of the steadiest. In fact, the Rebels compared well with the Royalists when considering firepower (except in the matter of resupply).

The real weakness of the Rebel Army was a lack of even adequate cavalry. 1,500 of the 2,500 Rebel Foot were armed with muskets. Of the rest, less than half again had pikes. The remainder were equipped with farm implements, sticks, and stones. Because of the lack of cavalry, the lack of pikes also took on additional importance. It was a deficiency only partly made up by the use of scythes on poles.

As revealed by his previous record, Monmouth *could* fight successfully, but only, it seems, if he was in the mood. That was his fatal flaw. Norton St. Philips was a far better opportunity, but on that occasion, his stars were not aligned. By most accounts he was 'on his game' when the Battle of Sedgemoor began, but the risks inherent in his plan were great. He was gambling all upon a single throw of loaded dice.

There were a number of tactics he might have tried, even something as simple as falling back out of artillery range while it was still dark and reforming to repel cavalry. Instead, he gave up completely. One wonders if a belief in his 'prophetic doom' played a part when he chose to flee the field and leave his army without a head.



James Scott and his companions were captured after a few days of hiding in the fields. Bound and taken to London, he was Attainted for Treason and sentenced to death. Ever the vacillator, he proved so *in extremis*, begging his uncle for his life; even offering to turn king's evidence or become Catholic, so long as he was spared. Nothing availed. Only on the block did he make a brave show, testifying briefly to the Protestant faith and refusing to exhort the crowd to obey the authorities as he was asked to do. He gave a quantity of gold to the headsman, Jack Ketch, charging him to make a clean cut and not botch the job. Unfortunately the executioner lost his nerve, or the blade was dull, because it took several blows to sever the head. The executioner was nearly torn to pieces by the enraged spectators and had to be escorted away under heavy guard.

[Every chief London Headsman was known as Jack Ketch, but this was the original.]

Meanwhile, Monmouth's hapless followers were being subjected to Judge Jeffries and the 'Bloody Assizes'. Suspects were strung up at every crossroads; the Blues, following the Moorish practices they had learnt while garrisoning Tangiers, tortured and raped innocent locals for sport or gain; and Jeffries, presiding over a kangaroo court, sentenced hundreds to death by hanging or transportation to Bermuda as slaves.

Although Whig propaganda magnified Jeffries' reign of terror beyond what it was, the truth was sufficiently stark for many to begin questioning their support of King James. Three years later his unpopular rule was brought to an end by William of Orange, whose strategy was much the same as Monmouth's but whose resources and singleness of purpose were far greater.



[The flight of Monmouth]

Annex: Orders of Battle

Royal Army of King James, c1688

Showing prewar billets. (?) indicates possible location.

- At Berwick: Sackville Tufton's Regiment of Foot & part of the Duke of Newcastle's Regiment of Foot
- At Kingston-upon-Hull: part of the Duke of Newcastle's Regiment of Foot & the Hull By-train (artillery)
- At Chester: Henry Gage's Regiment of Foot & Viscount Montgomery's Regiment of Foot (?)
- At Stamford: Earl of Salisbury's Regiment of Horse
- In South Wales: John Carne's Regiment of Foot
- At Northampton: Duke of Berwick's Regiment of Horse
- At Newport Pagnell: Bevil Skelton's Regiment of Foot
- At Stony Stratford: Archibald Douglas' Regiment of Foot
- At Banbury: Earl of Lichfield's Regiment of Foot
- At Reading: Duke of St. Albans' Regiment of Horse
- At Newbury: Robert Werden's Regiment of Horse
- At North Waltham: Sir Edward Hale's Regiment of Foot
- At Bicester: Troop of Scotch Lifeguards
- At Burford: John Berkeley's Regiment of Dragoons
- At Islip: Lord Charles Murray's Regiment of Dragoons
- At Thame: Dunmore's Scots Foot Guards (2 battalions)
- At Oxford: Dumbarton's Regiment of Foot (2 battalions) & John Wachope's Regiment of Foot
- At Witney: Tomas Buchan's Regiment of Foot
- At Woodstock: John Wachope's Regiment of Foot
- At Worcester: Henry Cornwall's Regiment of Foot
- At St. Albans: 3rd Troop of English Lifeguards
- At Chesham & Amersham: Sir Theophilus Oglethorpe's Regt of Foot
- At Barnet: Royal Regiment of Fuzileers
- At Hatfield: Lord Forbes' Regiment of Foot Luton (Tower2N)
- Earl of Peterborough's Regiment of Horse (*at Bedford*)
- Richard Hamilton's Regiment of Horse (*at Fenny Stratford*)
- M. de Miramont's Regiment of Horse (*at Aylesbury & Wendover*)
- Alexander Cannon's Regiment of Dragoons (*at Dunstable*)
- At Hereford & Ware: Charles Trelawney's Regiment of Foot
- At Huntingdon: Sir Charles Littleton's Regiment of Foot
- At Buckingham & Winslow: Henry Slingsby's Regiment of Horse
- At Bishop's Stortford: Lord Brandon's Regiment of Horse
- At Chelmsford: 2nd Troop of English Lifeguards
- At Cambridge: Sir John Lanier's Regiment of Horse & Earl of Arran's Horse (?)
- At Sudbury: Solomon Richard's Regiment of Foot
- At London: Tower Train Artillery
- At Tilbury: 2nd Battalion First Foot Guards
- At Reigate & Dorking: Sir John Fenwick's Regiment of Horse
- At Sevenoaks: George Holman's Regiment of Horse
- At Maidstone: 1st Troop of English Lifeguards & 1st Battalion Coldstream Regiment of Foot Guards
- At Canterbury: Earl of Bath's Regiment of Foot & John Hale's Regiment of Foot
- At Sittingbourne & Milton: John Hale's Regiment of Foot
- At East Grinstead: John Butler's Regiment of Dragoons

At Lewes: 1st Battalion Irish Foot Guards & Anthony Hamilton's Regiment of Foot

At Abingdon: John Graham of Claverhouse's Regiment of Horse

At Wallingford: Percy Kirke's Regiment of Foot

At Dover & Rochester: 2nd Battalion Coldstream Regiment of Foot Guards

At Epsom & Ewell: 4th Troop of Scotch Lifeguards

At Guildford & Godalming: Sir John Talbot's Regiment of Horse

At Farnham & Alton: Lord Cornbury's Regiment of Dragoons

At Arundel: Earl of Stafford's Regiment of Foot (?)

At Portsmouth: 1st Battalion First Foot Guards, Roger MacElligott's Regiment of Foot (part) & Portsmouth By-train (artillery)

At Chichester: Roger MacElligott's Regiment of Foot (part)

At Southampton: Duke of Berwick's Regiment of Foot

Orangist Forces (November 5th 1688)

Garde du Corps van Zijne Majesteit

Gardes te Paarde van Zijne Majesteit

Regiment te Paarde van Lippe

Regiment te Paarde van Boncourt

Regiment te Paarde van Ginkel

Regiment te Paarde van Schack

Regiment te Paarde van Reidesel

Regiment te Paarde van Oyen

Regiment te Paarde van Montpuillan

Regiment te Paarde van Nassau-Zuylenstein

Regiment te Paarde van Berlo

Regiment te Paarde van Nassau-Saarbrücken-Usingen

Regiment te Paarde van Obdam

Regiment te Paarde van s' Gravenmœr

Regiment te Paarde van Flodorf

Regiment te Paarde van Heyden

Garde Dragonders van Zijne Majesteit (Eppinger's)

Regiment te Dragonder Marwitz

1 & 2 Gardes te Vœt van Zijne Majesteit

Vœt Regiment van Graben

Vœt Regiment van Brandenburg

Vœt Regiment van Tassin de Torsay

Vœt Regiment van Nassau-Saarbrücken-Ottweiler

Vœt Regiment van Wijnbergen

Vœt Regiment van Birkenfeld

Vœt Regiment van Lannoy

Vœt Regiment van Fagel

Vœt Regiment van Hagedoorn

Vœt Regiment van Carlson

Thos. Tollemache's Regiment of Foot

Phil Babbington's Regiment of Foot

Lord John Cutt's Regiment of Foot

MacKay's Regiment of Foot

Balfour's Regiment of Foot

Ramsay's Regiment of Foot

Suriname Gardes te Vœt (200 men)

Up to 5,000 English & Huguenot volunteers

Artillery train of 21x 24-pounders (naval guns)

Jacobite Forces in Scotland 1689+

The Jacobite Army in Scotland had no permanent OOB but was instead composed of various clan bands and gentlemen volunteers, the latter mounted.

Under Bonnie Dundee at various times

Claverhouse's Regiment of Horse (elements of 1 troop)

70+ Gordon horsemen

MacDonells of Glengarry (400)

MacDonalds of Sleat (5-700)

MacLains of Glencoe (100)

Clanranald MacDonalds (300)

Keppoch MacDonalds (200+)

Camerons of Lochiel (1,000 in total)

Stewarts of Appin (200)

McLeans of Duart (1,000)

Small numbers of various clans, mostly from Lochaber & the Western Isles; some from Argyll.

Under General Cannon

Elements of the above

Robertsons of Struan

Frasers (some)

Gordons (some)

MacPherson of Cluny

Farquarson of Inverurie

Additional mounted gentlemen

Maximum about 5,000 men

Under General Buchan

Elements of all the above

Mounted gentlemen 300+

Farquarson of Inverurie (5-600)

No more than 1,500 men at any one time.

Williamite Forces in Scotland 1689+

Like the Jacobite forces, the Williamite OOB for Scotland was not stable. The following list probably includes most of the units that attained a functioning state. Many militia were disbanded before even receiving arms. Some received line status (Cameronians, Argyle's, Glencairn's, Kenmuir's, Strathnaver's, Grant's).

Regulars

Colchester's Regiment of Horse

Berkeley's Regiment of Horse

Lanier's Regiment of Horse

Livingstone's Regiment of Dragoons

Heyford's Regiment of Dragoons

Balfour's Scots Regiment of Dutch Foot

Ramsay's Scots Regiment of Dutch Foot

MacKay's Scots Regiment of Dutch Foot

Hasting's Regiment of Foot

Sir James Leslie's Foot

Sir John Hill's Regiment (formed from Glencairn's & Grant's)

Cunningham's Regiment of Foot (formed from Mar's, Bargeny's, & Blantyre's)

Militia

Annandale's Troop of Horse
Belhaven's Troop of Horse
Earl of Eglington's Troop of Horse
Master of Forbes' Troop of Horse
Gordon of Edinglassie's Troop of Horse
Lord Rollo's Troop of Dragoons
Lord Cardross' Troop of Dragoons
Jackson's Troop of Dragoons
Home of Polwart's Troop of Dragoons
Leven's Regiment of Foot (2 battalions)
Viscount Kenmuir's Regiment of Foot (2 battalions)
Earl of Angus' Regiment of Foot (Cameronians)
Earl of Argyle's Regiment of Foot
Earl of Mar's Regiment of Foot
Earl of Glencairn's Regiment of Foot
Earl of Annandale's Regiment of Foot
Lord Strathnaver's Regiment of Foot
Lord Bargeny's Regiment of Foot
Lord Blantyre's Regiment of Foot

Highlanders

Laird of Grant's Regiment of Foot
Lord Reay's Highland Company
Balnagown's Highland Company
MacKay's, Munro's, & other Northern clans either in arms or prepared to fight on behalf of the Government.

Rebel Forces 1685

Strengths are given for Sedgemoor. At its peak the rebel Army had about 5,000 men.

Cavalry

Monmouth's Lifeguard of Horse (40 men)
Grey's Horse (600 men in 8 troops)

Infantry

Red (Monmouth's) Regiment (N. Wade commanding; 800 men)
Matthew's Yellow Regiment (500 men)
Holmes' Green Regiment (600 men)
Bovet's Blue (Taunton) Regiment (600 men)
Ffoulkes' White Regiment (400 men)
Independent Lyme Company (80 men)

Artillery

4 light guns (1 defective)

Royalist Forces 1685

Units present at Sedgemoor indicated by an asterisk (). Overall the Royalists could call on 9,000 men, but this included newly mustering units and the Anglo-Dutch regiments.*

Cavalry

1st-3rd Troop of His Majesty's Royal Horse Guards*
(including 2 troops of Horse Grenadiers)
4th Troop of Scotch Lifeguards
Duke of Berwick's Regiment of Horse (Blues)*
Lord Cornbury's Regiment of Dragoons (Royals)*

Infantry

First Foot Guards (2 battalions)*

Coldstream Regiment of Foot Guards (2 battalions)* (1 bn)
Dumbarton's (Royal Scots) Regiment of Foot (2 battalions)* (1 bn)
Percy Kirke's (Tangier or Queen Dowager's) Regiment*
Charles Trelawney's (Queen Consort's) Regiment of Foot*

Militia

Mix of infantry and cavalry, but primarily infantry.

Earl of Bath's Cornwall Militia
Duke of Albemarle's Devon Militia
Earl of Bristol's Dorsetshire Militia
Duke of Beaufort's Three Counties Militia
(Gloucestershire, Herefordshire, Monmouthshire, Bristol)
Duke of Somerset's Somersetshire Militia
Viscount Hampden's Hampshire Militia
Earl of Dorsetshire's Sussex Militia
Earl of Pembroke's Wiltshire Militia (3 battalions)*

Artillery

Tower Train 16 pieces
Portsmouth By-train 8 pieces* (6 pieces)
Hull By-train (? about the same size as Portsmouth's)

Reinforcements

Anglo-Dutch Brigade

Monck's Regiment of Foot
Sir Walter Vane's Regiment of Foot
Holland Regiment
MacKay's Regiment of Foot
Balfour's Regiment of Foot
Wauchope's Regiment of Foot

Recruited during the crisis

The Ordnance Regiment (Royal Fusiliers)
Earl of Pembroke's Regiment of Foot
Baron Ferrer's Regiment of Foot
Henry Cornwall's Regiment of Foot
Earl of Bath's Regiment of Foot
Duke of Beaufort's Regiment of Foot

Recruited after the crisis

Sir John Lanier's (Queen's) Regiment of Horse
Earl of Peterborough's Regiment of Horse
Earl of Plymouth's Regiment of Horse
Lord Dover's Regiment of Horse (disbanded 1686)
Earl of Thanet's Regiment of Horse
Earl of Arran's Regiment of Horse
Earl of Shrewsbury's Regiment of Horse
Earl of Scarsdale's Regiment of Horse
Baron Lumley's Regiment of Horse
Duke of Somerset's (Queen's) Regiment of Dragoons
John Berkeley's Regiment of Dragoons
Duke of Norfolk's Regiment of Foot
Earl of Huntingdon's Regiment of Foot
Sir Edward Hales' Regiment of Foot
Sir William Clifton's Regiment of Foot

Scots Establishment

Lord Livingstone's Troop of Lifeguards

Royal Regiment of Horse
Royal Regiment of Dragoons (Dalyell's)
Royal Regiment of Foot Guards (Scots Guards) (2 battalions)
Earl of Mar's Regiment of Foot
Edinburgh Train of Artillery
plus 20,000 militia

Irish Establishment

Hungerford's Troop of Lifeguards
Duke of Ormonde's Regiment of Horse
Earl of Arran's Regiment of Horse
Earl of Ossory's Regiment of Horse
Richard Hamilton's Regiment of Dragoons
Regiment of Foot Guards (Irish Guards) (2 battalions)
Duke of Ormonde's Regiment of Foot
Earl of Granard's Regiment of Foot
Viscount Mounjoy's Regiment of Foot
Sir Thomas Newcomen's Regiment of Foot
Sir William King's Regiment of Foot
Thomas Fairfax's Regiment of Foot
Dublin Train of Artillery

Battle of Beachy Head July 22 1690

French

(Rate/Name/Est. Guns); FS = Fireship; 4F = 4th Rate light frigate

Avant-garde

2 Le Fier 68-72
FS L'Hameçon 6
3 Le Fort 52-60
4 Le Maure 52-54
2 L'Éclatant 64-68
1 Le Conquérant 70-74
FS Le Fanfaron 10
2 Le Courtisan 62-66
4 L'Indien 44-50
4F Le Solide 42-48
4 Le Trident 46-52
3 Le Hardy 56-58
3 Le Saint-Louis 56-58
3 L'Excellent 56-60
2 Le Pompeux 72-74
FS La Branche d'Olivier 6
1 Le Dauphin-Royal 90-110 (Château-Renault)
FS L'Impudent 10
FS Le Déguisé 4
3 L'Ardent 62-66
3 Le Bon 52-56
3 Le Précieux 54
3 L'Aquilon 52-54
4F L'Alcion 40-44
3 Le Fendant 52-58
3 Le Courageux 60
1 La Couronne 72-78
FS Le Dur 10
3 Le Ferme 54-60
3 Le Téméraire 52-58
4F L'Éole 46-50

Corps de Bataille

3 Le Brusque 50-56
3 L'Arrogant 54-60
4 L'Arc-en-Ciel 44-46

2 L'Henri 62-66
1 Le Souverain 80-84
FS Le Périlleux 10
3 Le Brillant 58-66
4 Le Neptune 46
3 Le Sans-Pareil 58-60
3 Le Fidèle 46-56
3 Le Diamant 54-56
2 Le Sérieux 56-64
2 Le Tonnant 70-72
FS L'Espion 10
1 Le Soleil-Royal 98-104 (Comte de Tourville)
FS L'Insensé 10
4F Le Faucon 44
1 Le Saint-Philippe 80
FS La Jolie 10
3 Le Marquis 58-60
3 Le Furieux 58-60
3 La Fortuné 58-60
3 L'Apollon 56-58
3 Le Saint-Michel 54-58
3 L'Entreprenant 56-60
1 Le Magnifique 76-80
FS La Bouffonne 10
FS Le Fâcheux 10
2 Le Content 56-60
3 Le Vermandois 58-60
4 Le Cheval-Marin 40-46
3 Le Fougueux 58

Arrière-garde

4 Le Comte 40-44
3 Le Vigilant 52-56
2 Le Parfait 60-62
2 Le Triomphant 70-72
FS L'Impertinent 6
2 Le Bourbon 58-62
3 Le Duc 48-52
3 Le Vaillant 48-54
3 Le Capable 50-54
3 Le Brave 50-58
3 Le François 44-46
3 L'Agréable 58-60
2 Le Florissant 72-80
FS La Diligente 6-10
1 Le Grand 80-86 (Comte d'Estrées)
FS Le Bout-de-Feu 6
2 Le Belliqueux 72-74
FS Le Royal-Jacques 6-10
4F Le Léger 44
3 Le Prince 56-58
3 Le Prudent 52-58
3 Le Modéré 50
3 Le Fleuron 54-58
2 L'Aimable 66-70
1 L'Intrépide 80-84
FS La Maligny 6-10
2 Le Glorieux 60-62
2 L'Illustre 66-70
2 Le Terrible 72-74
FS L'Extravagant 10

Allied

(Rate/Name/Est. Guns); FS = Fireship; note that Dutch ships are not rated numerically)

White Squadron (Van) – all Dutch

Wapen van Utrecht 64
Alkmaar 50
Tholen 60
Westfriesland 82
Prinses Maria 92
Castricum 52
Agatha 50

Stad en Lande 52
Maagd van Enkhuizen 72
Noord Holland 44
Maagd van Dordrecht 60
Hollandia 70 (Cornelis Evertsen)
Veluwe 60
Provincie van Utrecht 50
Maas 64

Friesland 68
Elswout 50
Reigersbergen 74
Gekroonde Burg 62
Noord Holland 72
Veere 60
Kortgene 50

Plus 4 fireships:

Suikermolen 4
Kroonvogel? 6
Maagd van Enkhuizen 6
Burg Etna 4

[In the battle, the Allies combined forces so that the Van contained the Dutch ships and the Center and Rearguard contained English ships. The number for Van is usually given as 21 ships, so the 22nd ship, plus 4 Dutch fireships, may have been attached to the English Rearguard, which is sometimes said to have included Dutch ships.]

Red Squadron (Center)

3 Plymouth 60
4 Deptford 50
3 Elizabeth 70
2 Sandwich 90
FS Wolf 8
FS Vulture 8
3 Expedition 70
3 Warspite 70
4 Woolwich 54
3 Lion 60

4 Constant Warwick 42
3 Rupert 66
2 Albemarle 90
3 Grafton 70
FS Roebuck 8
1 Royal Sovereign 100 (Earl of Torrington)
FS Dolphin 8
FS Owner's Love 10
2 Windsor Castle 0
FS Speedwell 8
3 Lenox 70
3 Stirling Castle 70

3 York 60
3 Suffolk 70
3 Hampton Court 70
2 Duchess 90
FS Hound 8
FS Spy 8
3 Hope 70
3 Restoration 70

Blue Squadron (Rear) – not split internally into van, center, rear

3 Anne 70
FS Fox 8
FS Thomas & Elizabeth 10
4 Bonaventure 48
3 Edgar 72
3 Exeter 70
3 Breda 70
1 St. Andrew 96
FS Charles 6
1 Coronation 90 (Sir Ralph Delavall)
FS Griffin 8
FS Hawk 8
2 Royal Katherine 84
FS Cygnet 10
3 Cambridge 70
3 Berwick 70
4 Swallow 48
3 Defiance 64
FS Hunter 8
FS Cadiz Merchant 12
3 Captain 70

Plus 7 light frigates & a hospital ship (H):

5 Portsmouth 32
5 Milford 32
5 Garland 30
6 Sally Rose 22
6 Saudadoes 16
6 Fubbs yacht 12
6 Salamander bomb 10
5H Concord

Source: gentlemenandtaraulins.com, search for Beachy Head

Royal Army Regimental Conversions

Jacobite Regiment	Williamite Regiment	Notes
1-4 Lifeguard Troops & Horse Grenadiers	1-3 Lifeguard Troops	King William disbanded the 4th (Scotch) Troop; no formal Grenadier Troop
Duke of Berwick's Horse	Earl of Oxford's Horse	The Blues
Sir John Lanier's Horse	Sir John Lanier's Horse	The Queen's
Earl of Peterborough's Horse	Villiers' Horse	Later the 2nd Dragoon Guards
Sir John Fenwick's Horse	Viscount Colchester's Horse	Later the Earl of Plymouth's or 3rd Dragoon Guards; served in Scotland & England
Robert Werden's Horse	None	Disbanded at the Revolution
Earl of Arran's Horse	Charles Godfrey's Horse	Later 1st Irish Horse or 4th Dragoon Guards; did not serve in Ireland
Duke of St. Albans' Horse	Anne of Denmark's (Langston's) Horse	Princess Anne's
Sir John Talbot's Horse	Hewitt's Horse	Queen Dowager's & later 6th Dragoon Guards
R Hamilton's (Earl of Shrew) Horse	Coy's Horse	7th Horse
Marquis de Miramont's Horse	Marquis de Miramont's Dragoons	Ephemeral under James; properly formed under William. Sent to Savoy.
Lord Bradon's Horse	None	Ephemeral
Henry Slingsby's Horse	None	Ephemeral
George Holman's Horse	None	Ephemeral
Earl of Salisbury's Horse	None	Ephemeral
Royal Regiment of Scottish Horse	None	On Scottish Establishment; Claverhouse's regiment & therefore disbanded
Duke of Ormonde's Horse	None	Irish Establishment but broken up by James – Ormonde was a Williamite
Lord Cornbury's Dragoons	Matthew's Dragoons	The Royals
Alexander Cannon's Dragoons	None	Irish Establishment; remained with James; later the Queen's Dragoons
Murray's (Dunmore's) Dragoons	Leveson's Dragoons	Royal Regiment of Scottish Dragoons (The Greys)
John Berkeley's Dragoons	John Berkeley's Dragoons	Princess Anne's
John Butler's (R Hamilton) Dragoons	None	Disbanded at the Revolution
1st Foot Guards	1st Foot Guards	2 battalions; dubious references to presence at the Boyne
2nd Coldstream Guards	2nd Coldstream Guards	2 battalions; dubious references to presence at the Boyne
3rd Scots Guards	3rd Scots Guards	2 battalions; dubious references to presence at the Boyne
Irish Foot Guards	None	2 battalions; served under James in Ireland
Dumbarton's Foot	Dumbarton's (Schomberg's) Foot	2 battalions; regiment mutinied but reconstituted and sent to Holland. Royal Scots.
Kirke's Foot	Kirke's Foot	Queen's (2nd of Foot)
Sir Charles Littleton's Foot	Prince George's Maritime Foot	
Oglethorpe's Foot	Charles Churchill's Foot	The Holland Regiment or The Buffs (3rd of Foot)
Trelawney's Foot	Trelawney's Foot	Queen Consort's (later King's) (4th of Foot)

Royal Army Regimental Conversions-1

Jacobite Regiment	Williamite Regiment	Notes
Royal Fusiliers	Royal Fusiliers (Marlborough's)	Royal Fusiliers (7th of Foot)
Duke of Berwick's Foot	Beaumont's Foot	Princess Anne's (8th of Foot)
Henry Cornwall's Foot	Steuart's Foot	9th of Foot
Earl of Bath's Foot	Earl of Bath's Foot (Granville's)	10th of Foot
Viscount Montgomery's Foot	Hanmer's Foot	11th of Foot
Earl of Lichfield's Foot	Wharton's Foot	12th of Foot
Earl of Huntingdon's Foot	Hastings' Foot	13th of Foot
Sir Edward Hale's Foot	Beveridge's Foot	14th of Foot
Sackville Tufton's Foot	Lord Herbert's Foot	15th of Foot
John Hales' Foot	John Hales' Foot	John Hales' Foot
Henry Gage's Foot	None	Ephemeral
Solomon Richard's Foot	Solomon Richard's Foot	
Duke of Newcastle's Foot	None	Disbanded at the Revolution
Archibald Douglas' Foot	Robert Hodges' Foot	16th of Foot
Bevil Skelton's Foot	None	Disbanded at the Revolution
John Carne's Foot	None	Ephemeral
Earl of Stafford's Foot	None	Disbanded at the Revolution
Thomas Buchan's Foot	None	Scottish Establishment; disbanded
John Wachope's Foot	None	Scottish Establishment; disbanded
Justin McCarty's Foot	None	Irish Establishment; exchanged for French regiments
Lord Forbes' Foot	Lord Forbes' Foot	Royal Irish (18th); Irish Establishment
Anthony Hamilton's Foot	None	Irish Establishment; disbanded
Roger McElligott's	None	Disbanded, but second regiment raised for James in Ireland
Mountjoy's Foot	None	Irish Establishment; broken up
Lundy's Foot	None	Irish Establishment; broken up
MacKay of Scourie's Foot	MacKay of Scourie's Foot	Scots-Dutch regiment
Balfour's Foot	Balfour's Foot	Scots-Dutch regiment
Ramsey's Foot	Ramsey's Foot	Scots-Dutch regiment
Babington's Foot	Babington's Foot	Anglo-Dutch regiment
Tollemache's Foot	Tollemache's Foot	Anglo-Dutch regiment
Lord John Cutt's Foot	Lord John Cutt's Foot	Anglo-Dutch regiment
Royal Artillery	Royal Artillery	Train abandoned and taken over by William intact

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Special Thanks to Paul Dangel for once again providing his excellent maps.

Bonnie Dundee

To the Lords of Convention 'twas Clavers who spoke.
'Ere the King's crown shall fall there are crowns to be broke;
So let each Cavalier who loves honour and me,
Come follow the bonnet of Bonny Dundee.

Come fill up my cup, come fill up my can,
Come saddle your horses, and call up your men;
Come open the West Port and let me gang free,
And it's room for the bonnets of Bonny Dundee!

Dundee he is mounted, he rides up the street,
The bells are rung backward, the drums they are beat;
But the Provost, douce man, said, "Just e'en let him be,
The Gude Town is weel quit of that Deil of Dundee."

Come fill up my cup, etc.

As he rode down the sanctified bends of the Bow,
Ilk carline was flyting and shaking her pow;
But the young plants of grace they looked couthie and slee,
Thinking luck to thy bonnet, thou Bonny Dundee!

Come fill up my cup, etc.

With sour-featured Whigs the Grass-market was crammed,
As if half the West had set tryst to be hanged;
There was spite in each look, there was fear in each e'e,
As they watched for the bonnets of Bonny Dundee.

Come fill up my cup, etc.

These cowls of Kilmarnock had spits and had spears,
And lang-hafted gullies to kill cavaliers;
But they shrunk to close-heads and the causeway was free,
At the toss of the bonnet of Bonny Dundee.

Come fill up my cup, etc.

He spurred to the foot of the proud Castle rock,
And with the gay Gordon he gallantly spoke;
"Let Mons Meg and her marrows speak twa words or three,
For the love of the bonnet of Bonny Dundee."

Come fill up my cup, etc.

The Gordon demands of him which way he goes?
"Where'er shall direct me the shade of Montrose!
Your Grace in short space shall hear tidings of me,
Or that low lies the bonnet of Bonny Dundee.

Come fill up my cup, etc.

"There are hills beyond Pentland and lands beyond Forth,
If there's lords in the Lowlands, there's chiefs in the North;
There are wild Duniewassals three thousand times three,
Will cry hoigh! for the bonnet of Bonny Dundee.

Come fill up my cup, etc.

"There's brass on the target of barkened bull-hide;
There's steel in the scabbard that dangles beside;
The brass shall be burnished, the steel shall flash free,
At the toss of the bonnet of Bonny Dundee.

Come fill up my cup, etc.

"Away to the hills, to the caves, to the rocks
Ere I own an usurper, I'll couch with the fox;
And tremble, false Whigs, in the midst of your glee,
You have not seen the last of my bonnet and me!"

Come fill up my cup, etc.

He waved his proud hand, the trumpets were blown,
The kettle-drums clashed and the horsemen rode on,
Till on Ravelston's cliffs and on Clermiston's lee
Died away the wild war-notes of Bonny Dundee.

Come fill up my cup, come fill up my can,
Come saddle the horses, and call up the men,
Come open your gates, and let me gae free,
For it's up with the bonnets of Bonny Dundee!

The odds are good that the reader will have heard this tune before; it is a common British march, often played by Highland regiments, and also for cavalcades. The words are by Sir Walter Scott (1825) but the music dates at least to the 1630s; Scott imagined Claverhouse's troopers singing the original (and entirely different) song as they rode about the country during the Killing Times of the 1670s. The original tune had a ballad sound, but it has evolved into an unforgettable cavalry canter.

Mons Meg is a famous old bombard, cast in 1449, mothballed at the Tower of London in 1754, but now back Edinburgh Castle. Scott was one of the petitioners who got her returned, which is probably why he mentions her – but she burst asunder in 1680, and so could hardly have fired a salute to Claverhouse in 1689.